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30TH0 LAW AND CUSTOM ITT BASUTOLAND
Abstract of Thesis
Introduction. Basutoland (now Lesotho) is a small land-
locked nation of about 900,000 inhabitants, mainly Sotho
in origin and Sotho-speaking, with an internal economy
that is partly pastoral and partly agricultural, suppl¬
emented by large-scale labour migration to South Africa.
Field work was conducted for eleven months in 1964
and three months in 1966, being divided between the sys¬
tematic study of court records and a period of research
in a village in the arable lowlands.
Chapter I. Customary law can be defined as a set of
norms which the actors in a social situation abstract
from practice and invest with moral authority. The term
"custom" is misleading. The concept of "social con¬
trol" has positivist implications that distract attent¬
ion from the specificity of the social experience of law.
Excursus. The Roman-Dutch courts in Basutoland
toid on the whole to impose common-law doctrines of
custom. The Basotho courts adopt a pragmatic view,
which cannot be deduced from their terminology.
Chapter II. The Paramount Chief and most of the twenty-
two principal chiefs are descended from the four senior
sons of Moshoeshoe I, founder of the nation. The domin¬
ant Xoena lineage achieved national control partly by
intermarriage, partly by the system of "placing" sons as
chiefs. Succession passes in the male line, but pro¬
blems of ranking arise since seniority can be assessed
either by reference to descent from Moshoeshoe or by
proximity to the reigning Paramount Chief.
Chapter III. The traditional ethic of chieftainship has
Iosp its actuarial but retained its moral expectations.
Social change has presented it with some familiar pro¬
blems. The judicial courts are now separated from the
chiefs, who however retain administrative rights and
can hold courts of arbitration.
Chapter IV. Chiefly jurisdiction is in principle terri¬
torial, but various anomalies complicate its operation.
The relative positions of principal chiefs, lower chiefs
and headmen present problems of administration and furn¬
ish occasions of dispute.
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Chapter V. Subjects receive various land rights firom
the chiefs, land is not an inheritance, but succession
gives certain legitimate expectations to heirs. The
tension between the two principles is central to the
traditional system but has been obscured by recent
practice in the judicial courts.
Excursus. In spite of Sheddick* s arguments to
the contrary, there is a serious land shortage in
Basutoland.
Chapter VI. Cattle and other moveables are inheritable,
but "ownership" (in itself a problematic concept) in¬
heres in the agnatic family. Matters of inheritance are
for the family council. The mutual rights of widows
and heirs are a major source of difficulty, both
practically and analytically.
Chapter VTI. The concepts of power and authority are a
starting point for the analysis of law and are plausible
for most western systems; but the Basutoland evidence
shows that they are inadequate in a customary context
in so far as they imply a polarity of "judicial" and
"administrative" which obscures the nature of the "exec¬
utive law" that is the characteristic legality of chief¬
tainship.
Appendix I. Affinal terminology can be structured in
terms of the distinction between siblings of like and
unlike sex.
Appendix II. The dispute over the Patlong chieftain¬
ship illustrates many issues of succession, legitimacy,
inheritance and chieftainship, reveals some juristic
techniques in action and offers an insight into the
structure and operation of the agnatic lineage.
Appendix III. The higher chieftainship, especially
within the house of letsie I, is internally linked by
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INTRODUCTION 4
i) Basutoland 1964-1966 (1)
a) General
In 1964, Basutoland was a British colony. It
achieved full independence as the Kingdom of Lesotho on
4th October 1966, about two weeks after my second period
of fieldwork ended. The designation "Basutoland" is
therefore used throughout, except when the post-independence
period is specifically referred to, or when a direct
quotation in the Sesotho language is introduced.
Basutoland is entirely surrounded by the Republic of
South Africa, being bounded by Natal in the east, Cape
Province on the south, and the Orange Free State on the
north and west (see Map 1). Its total land area is
about 11,716 square miles, of which the greater part is
mountainous. The Highland plateau stands at an elevation
of between 9,000 and 11,000 feet, dropping into Foothills
about 7,000 to 9,000 feet above sea level. The lowlands
and borders (themselves at an elevation of 5,000-6,000
feet) form a crescent round the north-west and south¬
west of the country, which extends into a deep penetration
up the Orange River Valley.
Extremes of climate range from about 90 degrees F.
in the lowlands in the summer to very deep frosts in the
winter, especially in the mountains, where winter snow¬
falls are frequent and intense. Most rainfall occurs
in the summer, between October and April; the average
precipitation is about 28 inches a year, but it is not
so predictable that well-founded fears of drought are
excluded.
b) Demography
The 1966 Population census suggests a total popula¬
tion of about 858,000 persons present within the territory
at the time. The number of persons reported absent from
Basutoland was in the region of 120,000. This very high
proportion of absentees is due to the heavy incidence of
labour migration to South Africa, which is a perennial
feature of Basutoland's economy and society. Most of
these absentees are men aged between twenty and forty
years.
About two-thirds of the population live in the low¬
lands and lower Foothills, where nearly all the arable
land is found. (Only about 1,450 square miles of the
country's area are available for cultivation, the rest
being either grazing land or else mountainous terrain of
little or no ecological value.) There is little urban
life. The capital, Maseru, with a population of about
7,000, is by far the largest urban area, though smaller
centres exist in the other eight district capitals and
in one or two other semi-urban areas like Morija, Mazenod
and Peka. Population density varies from about 25
persons per square mile in the district of Mokhotlong to
about 88 in the district of Berea.
At the 1956 Census, the proportions of which are
very unlikely to have changed significantly, of 641,674
persons, 1,926 were Europeans, 247 Asiatics and 644 of
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mixed race. About 85 per cent of the African population
are Sotho, most of the remaining 15 per cent or there¬
abouts being of Nguni origin. These differences in
ethnic affiliation, however, have little importance
either in Basutoland or for the purposes of this study.
They do not, in themselves, represent political divisions
of structural significance, nor do they constitute
linguistic barriers. Virtually all Africans in Basuto¬
land speak Sesotho, though some may have other Southern
Bantu languages as well. The official languages of
the territory are Sesotho and English.
There has been no European settlement in Basutoland;
the great majority of the 2,000 or so European residents
live in Maseru or one of the other district capitals,
though some live in trading stores at a distance from
the towns and a very few have established themselves as
adopted Basotho. Nearly all the Europeans are govern¬
ment servants, traders or missionaries; the Asiatics,
who live mostly in the Butha-Buthe areas in the north,
are almost entirely traders. The category of "coloured"
exists because it is recognised as a legal classification
in the Republic, but has very little meaning in Basutoland.
About two-thirds of the population are enumerated
as Christian, the leading denominations being the Roman
Catholic Church (about one-third of the population),
the "French Protestants" (about one-fifth — so called
from the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society, the former
name of the Lesotho Evangelical Mission), and the Church
of England (about 10 per cent). There are many African
independent churches; and about one-third of the
population is classified as adhering to traditional
beliefs, the greater number of these being inhabitants
of the mountain areas.
Education is widespread, most of the schools being
run by the missions. The University of Botswana,
Lesotho and Swaziland, sited at Roma about twenty-tv
miles south-east of Maseru, and formerly a University
College of the University of South Africa (UJKISA), serves
all three territories, but the majority of the students
come from Basutoland. A national literacy rate of 60
per cent is claimed, and although this figure must be
treated with some scepticism, Basutoland nevertheless
enjoys one of the highest literacy rates in Africa.
It would be difficult (at any rate in the Lowland areas)
to find any community without several members who could
read and write Sesotho, and a few with some passable
competence in English, as well (English being the medium
of instruction in secondary schools and beyond).
c) Origins and History
The titular founder of the nation was Moshoeshoe I,
from whom all subsequent Paramount Chiefs and many of
the senior chiefs of the land are descended. The nation
was forged in the early part of the nineteenth century
during the so-called Lifaqane wars, when Moshoeshoe (or
Moshesh, as he is often called) established a redoubt
on the top of the small mountain of Thaba Bosiu (about
fifteen miles east of Maseru) and protected his people
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against the Zulu King, Chaka, and the populations that
he scattered in front of him in his campaigns. By 1831
Moshoeshoe had become the acknowledged leader of what
was to be the Sotho nation. For another thirty years,
however, Moshoeshoe and his followers had to defend the
territory over which they claimed control against the
threat of the Boer Voortrekkers, with the consequence
that when the borders of Basutoland were eventually
defined at the Convention of Aliwal North in 1869, the
Basotho had lost the greater part of the plain running
west and north from Maseru and Mefeteng to Thaba Nchu:
a rich farming country that now forme part of the platis¬
land of the Orange Free State. By this time, Basutoland
had for about four years been British territory, and the
Basotho people British subjects, and so it remained until
1966, with the exception of a period of thirteen years
from 1871. During these years, it was attached to the
Cape Colony (recently granted responsible government),
but after the so-called Gun Wars, provoked by the Cape
Government's attempt to enforce a ban against firearms
on the Basotho, Basutoland was finally brought under the
direct rule of the Queen on 12th March 1884, in response
to a petition from the chiefs themselves.
d) Constitutional Development
It was never supposed that Basutoland would remain
permanently a British colony, the expectation in Britain
being that in due course it would be incorporated into
what became the Union of South Africa. Until shortly
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before the outbreak of the Second World War, only minimal
government was attempted, and no attempt was made to
develop the country economically or to prepare it for any
other destiny than as a part of the Union. This prospect
was resisted, however, even before the post-war govern¬
ments of the Union (and later the Republic) adopted
policies that made incorporation totally unaceeptabJ
the Basotho.
Basutoland was governed by the Crown acting through
the High Commissioner to Basutoland, Bechuanaland Protect¬
orate and Swaziland (in his other capacity also later
Ambassador to the Republic of South Africa), and immediately
by the Resident Commissioner in Maseru. (At a much later
stage, the High Commissioner lost his responsibilities,
since it became felt that his duties in respect of the
three territories were incompatible with his obligations
as Ambassador to South Africa; the Resident Commissioner
now governed under the direct authority of the Crown.)
Effective government was in the hands of the Resident
Commissioner, assisted by a Government Secretary and
other government servants, including District Commissioners
in the (now) nine administrative districts, these in their
turn being assisted by District Officers.
In 1903, a Basutoland National Council of chiefly
composition was convened, which continued for the next
forty years to meet on a regular and official basis as
a consultative and advisory body for the guidance of the
government of the Colony. In the middle 'forties,
district councils were also established, though without
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effective power, and a Basutoland National Treasury was
set up in 1946. However, it was not until the 1959
Constitution (effective in I960) that any real degree
of responsible internal self-governaent, even on a
limited scale, was given to the Basotho (apart from the
chiefly administration, of course, of matters concerning
traditional "native" affairs). This was the constitu¬
tion in force in 1964, and therefore calls for rather
more detailed examination.
The principal organ of government was now the
executive Council, consisting of the Resident Commissioner,
three senior Government officials, and four members of
the National Council. Of these four, one was appointed
by the Paramount Chief, the other three by the Council.
The Council itself (known as LegCo, or Legislative
Council) consisted of four Official members (i.e.,
members of government), the twenty-two "Principal and
Ward Chiefs", forty elected members and fourteen nomina¬
ted members. The latter were appointed by the Paramount
Chief, while the forty elected members were elected from
and by the District Councils, themselves (apart from a
small ex-officio element) being directly elected in the
districts.
The iixecutive Council was advisory to both the
High Commissioner (subsequently the Resident Commissioner)
and the Paramount Chief, but was not responsible to LegCo.
Each Executive Council member was "associated with" and
had some responsibility for the work of a specific
government department.
The Legislative Council had a qualified power to
propose legislation on all matters that were not reserved
to the Resident Commissioner. These reserved matters
were mainly concerned with foreign affairs, security,
and the Civil Service. Over a wide range of other
matters, the sovereign government retained overriding
powers, including (residually, at least) unqualified
power both to veto any proposed legislation and itself
to legislate directly in any sphere.
e) Recent Political History
By this time, organised political parties were
active in Basutoland, of which by far the most influen¬
tial were the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP), the
Marematlou-Freedom Party (&FP), and the Basutoland
National Party (BNP). The first of these was the most
radical of the three, with a strong Pan-Africanist
emphasis, alleged associations with Communist China, and
a policy that was in effect marked by considerable
hostility to the Chieftainship. The MFP was the party
of "moderate progressives", and was thought of as the
Paramount Chief's party; it was alleged to derive its
funds from Soviet sources through the mediation of the
African National Congress. The BNP was the most
conservative of the three, drawing its support from the
middle and lower chieftainship and the Roman Catholic
Church. Political activity at this period was intense,
the bitterest opposition being manifested between the
Congress and the MFP, the latter (through its patronage
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by the Paramount Chief and its popularity with the
colonial government) enjoying a virtual monopoly of the
Executive Council and a nominated majority in LegCo,
whilst the former claimed, with every evidence of truth,
to enjoy the greatest degree of support among the people
as a whole.
These political activities coincided with and i
were largely prompted by the strong movement in favour
of independence (boipuso) that captured much of the nation
in the early sixties, and which found formal expression
in the 1963 Report of the Basutoland Constitutional
Commission. This Report, which owed much of its substance
and style to Professor D.V. Cowan in his capacity as
adviser to the Commission, proposed an immediate move to
self-government, to be followed by the early granting of
complete independence. Much of 1964 was occupied in
constitutional discussions in London and elsewhere, as a
result of which the Iasutoland Order in Council of 29th
January 1965 was promulgated, and took effect on 1st May.
This was the constitution still in force in 1966,
and calls for some brief attention. If the "transitional"
clauses, reserving certain powers to the colonial authori¬
ties in the preindependence period, are left out of
consideration, the effect of the 1965 Constitution was
to vest ultimate sovereignty in a bicameral legislature,
while recognising the "special position" of the Paramount
Chief. The latter was now given the official title of
Motlotlehi, and would become King Moshoeshoe II of
Lesotho with the attainment of independence. The lower
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house consisted, of sixty members, elected on the basis
of universal adult suffrage in single-member constituen¬
cies with simple majority voting. The Senate, or upper
house, consisted of the twenty-two "Principal and Ward
Chiefs" already mentioned together with eleven other
Senators nominated by Motlotlehi. Motlotlehi retained
the power to act in accordance with his own judgment
over certain matters (including land administration), a
Privy Council being established with a general duty to
advise him. Executive government reposed in a Prime
Minister and Cabinet, responsible to the lower house and
broadly conforming to the Westminster pattern. The
Senate was clothed with certain limited powers of delay.
The General Election preparatory for the new
constitution was held at the end of April 1965. The
Basutoland National Party secured 41.5 per cent of the
votes cast, Congress 59.5 per cent, and the MFP 16.5 per
cent, giving the BNP tnirty-one seats in the lower house,
Congress twenty-five, and the MFP four; one MFP member
subsequently declared his support for the government,
thus giving the latter an overall majority of four (2).
This result, which would have been dismissed as
highly improbable even twelve months before, was a
bitter disappointment for the BCP, who had long regarded
themselves as the certain inheritors of power. The
MFP had abandoned any serious expectations of national
success, but they too regarded the new government with
extreme disfavour. In a matter of weeks, Congress and
the MFP, for long so bitterly hostile, formed an alliance
devoted to the defeat of the BNP, and (more immediately)
to the postponement of independence, which they regarded
as likely to confirm the government in office indefini¬
tely on the basis of a minority of votes. Motlotlehi
was adopted as the leader and symbol of the intended
national struggle against the government and the BNP, a
role which he fulfilled enthusiastically — and much ti¬
the government's displeasure and alarm.
This was the situation in the winter (June to August)
of 1966. By September, however, it had become clear
that the United Kingdom Government proposed to accede to
the government of Basutoland's request that independence
should be granted, as indeed it was, on the arranged date
of 4th October. Nevertheless, the preceding months
were marked by a desperate intensity of political activity
far exceeding even that of 1964 (3).
f) The College of Chiefs
The 1959 Constitution established, in formal and
statutory form, a body known as the College of Chiefs,
consisting of the twenty-two Principal and Ward Chiefs,
supplemented by certain others, whose principal function
it was to determine issues of chieftainship: notably to
decide questions of succession to chieftainship, the
definition and adjustment of boundaries, the mutual
relationships and jurisdictions between different levels
of chieftainship, and discipline. All these questions
were now withdrawn from the ordinary courts. Under
the 1965 Constitution, the College of Chiefs remained in
existence, but its functions were now reduced, in effect,
to two: to decide questions of succession to the Param-
ountcy (including the appointment of a Regent), and to
act as keeper of the chieftainship archives. The other
matters which had fallen with its purview were now
handled either by the ordinary courts or by the politic
authorities, according to the case.
g) Land Administration
Under both constitutions, the special position of
land rights was recognised (though subject, under the
1965 provisions, to the ultimate control of the legisla¬
ture). The matter is discussed in chapters four and
five below; here it will suffice to say that matters
relating to the use, allocation and deprivation of land
were left in the hands of the chieftainship to be
determined in accordance with customary law, the Paramount
Chief (Motlotlehi) remaining the ultimate decision-maker.
h) The Courts arid the General Law
The judicial structure of Basutoland is twofold,
consisting on the one hand of the Roman-Dutch magistrates'
courts (known as Subordinate Courts), and on the other of
the courts of customary jurisdiction, known as the Basuto
Courts (hereafter referred to as Basotho Courts). The
jurisdiction of both these classes of tribunal is limited.
Representation was not permitted before the Basotho Courts.
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Prom the latter, appeals lie to the Judicial Commissioner's
Court (which can also, by fiat, convert itself into a Sub¬
ordinate Court when occasion requires), the Judicial
Commissioners at the time of the research being Mr R.F.
Thompson (a European) and Mr G. T. Mohaleroe. Appeals
from the Subordinate Courts and (with leave) from the
Judicial Commissioner lie to the High Court, which is
also a court of original jurisdiction without limitation
of competence. Prom the High Court (whether as a court
of first instance or otherwise) appeals lie to the Court
of Appeal, and thence to the Privy Council. All the
courts mentioned have both civil and criminal jurisdict¬
ion. (The Basotho Courts are discussed in detail in
Chapter Three below.)
Statute law in Basutoland consists of (a) the
statutes in force on 2nd February 1884 in Cape Colony,
except in so far as subsequently amended or repealed and
(b) local Basutoland statutes. The Common Law is the
Roman-Dutch law in force on 2nd February 1884 in Cape
Colony, as subsequently interpreted and decided by the
Basutoland courts. South African case law, like that
of other jurisdictions, is of persuasive but strictly
speaking not binding authority. South African decisions
involving matters of "Native Law" have much less authority,
it being recognised that in this area customary law in
Basutoland has followed a different path of development
from that found (or attributed to it) in the Republic.
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ii) Research Autobiography
Fieldwork in Basutoland was conducted in two stages:
(a) January to December 1964 (eleven months) and (b) July
to September 1966 (three months).
My interest in Basutoland was first created by my
acquaintance with the Paramount Chief, who at the time
was a minor and at school and university in England.
My academic interest in the country, as a social anthro¬
pologist, was stimulated by Dr J. Littlejohn, who
introduced me to Dr V.G. Sheddick's study of land tenure
(Sheddick 1954), and in the particular area of customary
law by Dr (now Professor) M. Banton, who urged that a
former lawyer might well make this his first study in the
field. I spent a term at the School of Oriental and
African Studies in the University of London, where I had
the very great good fortune to receive a grounding in
written and spoken Se otho from Dr Daniel P. Kunene, now
at the University of California. Dr A.N. Allott, now
Professor of African law, kindly allowed me to attend
lectures and classes in his department, and to take part
in the weekly seminars of the Restatement of African Law
Project of which he is the Director.
During my first fieldwork visit, the bulk of my
systematic work was organised around a careful study of
the records of the Judicial Commissioner's Court, the
archives of which were lodged in the High Court Buildings,
Maseru. I was given liberal access to all the files,
and was able to work through a total of several thousand
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cases, covering the period 1944 through to the point at
which new cases were coming up on appeal. Virtually all
the files carried a complete transcript of the original
proceedings in Seeotho, comprising a long-hand record of
the evidence and a complete judgment, for both the Basotho
Courts below (or for all three, during the period when
the Matsieng Appeal courts were still in existence).
Many files also carried an English translation of the
Sesotho record, and where the case had been carried
through to judgment, the Judicial Commissioner's decision
as well. Throughout the entire period, therefore, I
was concerned to improve my knowledge of Sesotho, though
I did not achieve the standard of competence in the
language that I should have desired. After a few months,
however, I was able to read most judgments with a suffi¬
cient degree of understanding to be able to assess their
relevance, and with the help of my assistant, Mr M.M.
Sempe, I soon had no difficulty in handling the material.
Much of the earlier period was spent in identifying
the problems that were there to be confronted. I had
brought some of these with me from Edinburgh and London,
but not all of them retained their interest after I had
been exposed to the material that I was studying. I
came to Basutoland with many typical lawyer's concerns:
for example, did Sotho law know the executory contract?
This alone seemed, in advance of the facts, in itself a
major problem for research; my present conclusion (which
indeed extends well beyond Basutoland to cover all
customary systems that I am acquainted with) is that in
spite of Elias and Schapera (Elias 1956; Schapera 1965)
it does not, except in the special case of bohali (lobola)
and that the problem ends there. Again, in what areas
and to what extent did Sotho law distinguish contract
from delict, or delict from crime? Admittedly, there
was some material here that could have yielded a reply,
but the intellectual problem itself began to appear both
obsessive and parochial. Another inquiry that had
suggested itself to me, while still in Britain, was how
far and how successfully the legal concepts and principles
of one social and cultural system could be translated into
those of another. This still appears to me to be both an
interesting and an important topic (cf. V'anderlinden 1966)
and indeed it is one to which I have addressed myself in
several places in the chapters that follow; but I have
learned now to be content with stressing the difficulties
and delicacies that are involved, and to offer such
suggestions as seem possible only with the greatest
caution and self-doubt. Certainly, I have abandoned
the notion (which a perhaps somewhat chauvinistic Scots
legal background had implanted) that a particular trans-
cultural virtue attaches to the civil or Roman law; and
though a suitable jurisprudential "meta-language" may
one day be created to aid the travail de conceptualisation
to which Vanderlinden points the way, I now regard it as
both premature and pretentious ever to have nourished
the ambition of achieving or even approaching this goal
in the course of a year or so's work.
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One problem, however, that had aroused my interest
before I left Britain remained with me and grew. This
concerned the relationship between "political" action
on the one hand and "law" on the other (to pose the
question in the terms in which it then appeared to me).
What I had read, not only about Basutoland but other
comparable societies (notably the Lozi (Gluckman 1955)),
led me to expect that jural processes in a chiefly
society would shed light on this problem. And so it
proved: moreover, the colonial government's efforts to
replace the former Chiefs' Courts and substitute for
them a dichotomous system, in which judicial and adminis¬
trative affairs were institutionally as well as concept¬
ually ""Tiy segregated, meant that the differences
between the two types of political order were often very
starkly revealed. Much of my attention was therefore
directed towards cases which, irrespective of their
subject-matter, provided me with material relevant to
these interests. My concern with this category of
problem is reflected throughout what follows, but is
particularly apparent in the theoretically-oriented
first and last chapters, and in chapter five, where
much of the empirical material in the area of land
administration is presented and discussed.
In the course of research, the problems surrounding
the relative positions, in law, of widows and heirs
forced themselves upon me, and prompted some questions
about the status of the concept of ownership in Sotho
law. I also confronted the issue of "custom" itself,
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and involved myself in some inquiries into its meaning
in indigenous terms as well as its "treatment at the hands
of the governmental courts. These were interests that
had existed before I came to Basutoland, but they were
given a sharper focus and some changes of direction as
a result of my experience in the country.
Of the thousands of cases that I considered, some
five hundred were selected for special attention, in
respect of which a large volume of copied or transcribed
material was retrieved. After my return to Britain,
these were coded on to edge-punched cards and have formed
an important resource in the preparation of this thesis.
Apart from what I have described as the systematic
work that occupied most of my time during this first
period, I set about exposing myself as widely and com¬
pletely as possible to the indigenous society, granted
the limited nature of my access to it in the rather
special environment of Maseru. The Basotho being a
singularly open and outgoing people, however, I found
no difficulty in establishing a wide acquaintance, and
within that a group of close friends. Some aspects of
this relatively informal part of my fieldwork are referred
to in an article published in Race in 1966 (Hamnett 1966^).
In general terms, it is difficult to specify or particula¬
rise the insights and items of knowledge which I acquired
in this unstructured way. One leading concern, however,
derived from this part of my experience, and forms the
entire subject matter of Chapter Two below. This
concerned the ambiguities and ambivalences surrounding
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the determination of chieftainship succession and
seniority. Though I was able to conscript a consider¬
able amount of the fruits of my legal research into the
service of this interest, it arose initially from a
casual meeting with the Chief of Leribe, and most of the
material that supports my analysis arises from events,
arguments and inquiries that bore little direct relation
to my study of the court records. (A preliminary state¬
ment of my views was published in Africa, see Hamnett
1965.)
Much of my legal research was, of course, continually
supplemented, corrected and guided by conversations taken
part in or observed, and by other interactions with my
friends and acquaintances, and even with those who were
neither. Outside the field of law, I developed consider¬
able interest in Sotho riddles and proverbs, both for
their ethnographic relevance and for the wider theoretical
questions that they provoked (Hamnett 1967^).
My first period of fieldwork was interrupted, in
both a practical and a psychological sense, by a series
of unexpected events that left rae, quite unwittingly, at
the centre of a political cataclysm which looked fair,
at one point, to making my further residence in Basutoland
impossible. The nature of this disturbance and the
circumstances that led up to and surrounded it are not
appropriately specified here, especially as, in the event,
I was able to continue my life and work in the country.
But one consequence was to reduce, to an appreciable if
by no means crippling extent, the range of both my physical
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and my social mobility. I cannot, however, entirely
disown or regret the experience, since had I conducted
myself with the reserve and circumspection which would
have prevented my falling into this predicament, I
should, by the same token, never have achieved the degree
or kind of penetration into Sotho life that I was able to
do, by virtue of the lack of calculation and purposive-
ness in the relationships I established. Partly as a
consequence of these events, however, I enrolled myself
as a member of the Basutoland Bar, which I was able to
do with little formality on the strength of my status as
an Advocate in Scotland; and this served to give a
credible account of my position in the country. It also
involved me, to some extent, in rendering this position
plausible by actually conducting cases before the High
Court; 1 appeared in both civil and criminal causes on
behalf of Basotho litigants or accused, but took steps to
ensure that these activities did not make any too serious
inroads on my time.
I was acutely aware that most of my time and work
had been devoted either to documentary study or to
unstructured social interaction in the sociologically
unrepresentative context of Maseru. I was therefore
glad to be able to correct this imbalance when a grant
from the Centre of African Studies in the University of
Edinburgh made a second fieldwork visit possible in 1966.
The change in political alignments that had occurred in
the intervening eighteen months did not, as I have already
described, in any way reduce the tensions in the nation:
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rather, they aggravated them. This had implications
for my choice of a place of work, and put difficulties
in the way of finding a suitable place to settle.
However, with the help of friends, I was lucky enough
to spend some months in the village of Kasite Nek, about
twenty-five miles south-west of Maseru, off the road to
Mafeteng (see Map 2). This proved, in every sense, a
happy choice. The village was strongly Congress, and
the generous letter of introduction with which the Para¬
mount Chief equipped me acted, in the new political
atmosphere, as an assurance of welcome and acceptance.
I stayed with the leader of the women's section of the
Congress Party and her daughter in a tumble-down house
at the back of the village store. Through this period,
I had the advantage of Mr D. Thulo's help and advice,
as my continual assistant, interpreter and friend, as
well as the use of a horse in daylight hours. Having,
on this occasion, no car at any point, I was able to
prosecute my work without the continual interruptions
which requests for transport to hospital, to church, to
school or to town would certainly have otherwise involved.
Masite Nek (4) is a village of about sixty home¬
steads (malapa), set attractively on the lower slopes of
Masite Hill and spilling down on to the edges of the
plain below, which stretches over to Qeme Plateau on the
northeast, and over to Masite and Rothe to the northwest.
Morija is about three miles distant, Natsieng (the royal
capital) about five. The villagers hold their "lands"
(fields) in the plain, and keep those cattle which remain
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directly in their hands in masaka (kraals) adjoining their
homesteads. Apart from the fact that it is, at least to
Western eyes, more attractive than most Lowland villages,
it is, in all the relevant features, probably as typical
of its kind as I could have found, in point of size,
economy and social structure. By the time that I came
to live in it, my central interests had already been
determined. In the course of working through the
material that I had collected on my first expedition, I
had come to focus my interest on the four areas of chief¬
tainship succession, land allocation and administration,
inheritance, and the relationship between judicial and
administrative processes. My inquiries in Masite ward
(the chieftainship within which Masite Nek falls) were
directed towards the collection of empirical material
that would enable me to carry these interests further
and acquire a direct insight into the manner in which
the "law" that I had been studying was reflected in the
concrete experience of the villagers. My assistant's
life-long knowledge of the village and the ward gave me
a wealth of background material and history, and in his
company I came to know every enclosure, hut and compound
in Masite Nek and to gather information about the kinship
relations, marriage alliances, stock-ownership and land-
holdings of most (though not of all) its inhabitants, as
well as accounts, for the most oart first hand, of dis¬
positions of property and disputes over land, cattle and
jurisdictions bearing upon my basic concerns. In some
respects, the months that I spent in Masite Nek seemed
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more valuable than the whole of my initial stay in
Maseru, although without the experience of the first
visit and the crystallisation of inquiry that it produced,
I could not have profited so fully from the short period
that I passed in the village.
The material that I collected was ordered in two
different ways. First, I set up a homestead-by-homestead
index of each household and family, in which I incorpora¬
ted as fully an account of the relevant features of each
as I was able to assemble. Secondly, I accumulated much
valuable though less systematic material based upon the
many hours of discussion, questioning and apparently
inconsequential local gossip in which I passed many hours
of each day. An attempt was made, each evening, to
order and assess the results of each day's work, so that
it could be followed through, where appropriate, on
future occasions; but much of the analysis was unavoidably
postponed until after my return to Edinburgh in late
September 1966. References to Masite Nek, Masite and




The mostly generally approved name for the language
spoken in Basutoland is Southern Sotho (the first adject¬
ive distinguishing it from Northern Sotho (Sepedi) and
from Setswana (Sechuana)). In these pages, it is
referred to simply as "Sesotho". The standard general
discussion of the Southern Bantu languages is Doke 1954;
the best grammar is that of Doke and Mofokeng (1957),
though Paroz 1957 may also be referred to.
Sesotho is fortunate in being equipped with an
excellent 600-page dictionary (Mabille and Dieterlen 1961),
which constitutes the lexicographic authority on which
I have consistently relied, unless positive evidence
from local usage suggested otherwise. I have, however,
adhered throughout to the Basutoland orthography, except
on the rare occasions when a direct quotation has compel¬
led the other course. Paroz's revision of Mabille and
Dieterlen is based on the Republic of South Africa 1959
orthography, which however has not been adopted in
Basutoland (5), and I have been very willing to adhere
to local practice in this instance.
I use "Mosotho" in the singular and "Basotho" in
the plural to refer to members of the nation (sechaba).
In other contexts, I use "Sotho" without a prefix as a
universal adjective (e.g., "Sotho law", "Sotho assumptions",
etc.), except in the case of the "Basotho Courts", which
are so described rather than (anglice) as "Basuto Courts".
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(As previously stated, the country is referred to in
Knglish as Basutoland, unless specific reference is made
to the period from 4th October 1966, when it is named
"Lesotho".)
Sesotho can boast a not inconsiderable original
vernacular literature. Apart from the "praise-songs"
(lithokiso) and the traditional stories (litsorao), there
are several recent and contemporary historians, grammar¬
ians and novelists. Of these, the best known is
undoubtedly Thomas Mofolo (see Kunene 1967), but A. Sekese,
E. Mphahlele and B.M. Khaketla have also achieved consid¬
erable distinction.
Secondary Authorities
Apart from historical material, to which specific
reference is made wherever relevant in the text, the
most important contemporary authorities bearing upon the
subjects of this thesis are Sheddick 1954 and Jones 1951.
Ashton 1967 contains an abundance of ethnographic material
but very little theoretical analysis (see Hamnett 1967a).
Duncan I960 gives a short and uneven account of Sotho
customary law, but bears only too much evidence of the
author's considerable (if very creditable) experience as
Judicial Commissioner, there being little systematic
attempt to disentangle the evidence bearing on Sotho law
from the not always informed and certainly never directly
authoritative decisions of alien tribunals. There are
several points at which Sandra Wallman's absorbing mono¬
graph (Wallman 1969) overlaps with my own interests, and
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Mr Clifford Morojele's analyses of the I960 Agricultural
Census (Morojele 1962) have proved invaluable in certain
places. The best accounts of the recent political
history of Basutoland are Halpern 1965 and Weisfelder
1969. Spence 1968 is the best general account of
3asutoland or Lesotho to have appeared in recent years.
Lord Hailey's magisterial discussion of the administra¬
tive history of the territory perhaps commands most
respect of all (Hailey 1953), written though it is from
the standpoint of a polymath imperial reformer.
Throughout the thesis, the contributions made by
these writers are taken for granted; no conscious
recapitulation of their material is attempted except
where indicated, that being in those cases where specific
attention is drawn to their work either in order to
abridge discourse or to express disagreement with the
views they have expressed.
foode of Citation
Normal conventions of citation have been adopted in
the case of published work and official reports; reference
is made to the appended bibliography.
Reported cases in the High Court of Basutoland etc.
are reported in accordance with the prevailing conventions,
viz., 1926-1953 H.C.T.L.R. followed by the initial page
reference for cases falling in those years, and 1954
H.C.T.L.R. etc. for subsequent cases. (The initials
stand for "High Commission Territories Law Reports".)
Cases reported in the United Kingdom follow the accepted
conventions of case citation in this country. Cases
before the Judicial Commissioner's Court are cited as
J.C. 100/60, etc. Basotho Court cases are cited as
C.C. 100/60, etc., but are necessarily prefaced with the
name of the court concerned. Where only one name is
given, the names of both parties are identical in the
record (thus Khatala J.C. 70/61 indicates that the case
is that of Khatala v. Khatala). Cases appearing before
the Chief's Courts are cited in whatever manner seems
appropriate to the instance at hand.
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The Structure of the Thesis
Chapter One sets the subject of the thesis within
the framework of my preferred theoretical approach,
presenting some leading problems and suggesting how they
should, in terms of my general argument, be approached.
An excursus is annexed, in which the treatment of the
concept of "custom" by the various Courts in Basutoland
is critically examined.
Chapter Two is devoted to the complexities of
succession to the higher chieftainship and the modes
of determining relative seniority within it. In
Chapter Three, the chieftainship is examined in rather
broader terms, with special attention to the changing
relationship between the chiefs and the courts.
Chapter Four examines some technical problems of chiefly
jurisdiction and area administration. Chapter Five
is concerned with land law and land administration,
with a shift of emphasis from chiefs to subjects; it
ends with an excursus on the question of land shortage
in Basutoland. Chapter Six discusses the salient
issues in the law of inheritance.
The concluding chapter resumes some of the theoret¬
ical concerns raised in Chapter One, and moves towards
a proposed reformulation of certain issues, in the
light both of the material previously examined and of
some other considerations that are introduced for the
first time at this point.
There are three appendices. The first proposes
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a structure to elucidate the Sotho terminology of affines.
The second contains a lengthy analysis of a litigated
dispute over a chieftainship. The third plots some of
the marriage and kinship links integrating the higher
chieftainship, in illustration of some passages in
Chapter Two.
Many of the notes are lengthy and their contents
important to the discussion, but have been removed
from the main text in order to maintain a consecutive
flow in the argument (6).
Prefatory Note on Methodology
It was often a difficult problem to decide what
items should and what should not count as relevant in
a study of "customary law". At the end-points of the
scale, of course, no difficulty arose. When I attended
a funeral in Masite Nek, there was no doubt that in
witnessing the "pouring of the soil" into the grave, I
was observing the order of seniority in the deceased's
lineage and family receiving ritual expression: this
was the "law in action" in a particular context.
Equally, it was clear that if a magistrate in a Subordi¬
nate Court ruled that a bewys (stock certificate) was
invalid since it failed to show the day of the month on
which it had been issued, this was a matter which I
could with impunity entirely ignore. But there was,
and remains, an area of doubt between these points.
I could detect in myself a temptation to what may be
called the "Real Thing" heresy, which at its worst can
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turn into a sentimental antiquarianism: analogous,
intellectually, to the distortions present in those who
do not wish to acknowledge that, over much of Basutoland,
it is easier to hear the sound of a transistor radio than
that of a lesiba (a kind of traditional stringed instru¬
ment). Conversely, there was a danger of accepting as
relevant a judgment by the Judicial Commissioner, simply
because it would be, to some degree at least, effective
as a resolution of a particular dispute. At different
stages of my experience, I found myself moving either
towards a too easy acceptance of alien interpositions,
or towards a facile rejection of anything that was super¬
ficially repugnant to traditional practice or even
inconsistent with the material culture of former times.
In one sense, indeed, it can be said that the answer to
the problem lies in the sociology of the matter: the
"real thing" is, after all, that which is real to the
actors, and the necessary discrimination can therefore
locate itself in action. This is, of course, true,
and some of the problems that I imagined were confront¬
ing me did yield to this operational attack. But in
another sense, they were simply displaced to a higher
level. The Basotho themselves have a strong commitment
to bokhale, a word which may quite fittingly be translated
by such a phrase as "olden times", or even "days of yore".
An answer framed too brashly in terms of "sociology"
risks the positivist failure to acknowledge that the sub¬
jective attitudes of the actors are themselves part of
the reality that is being addressed. The difficulty was
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compounded by the fact that the indigenous stress on the
"real thing" did not necessarily fall where the analyst
might put it himself, yet he is compelled to recognise
that to collapse the dimension of time into a sociologi¬
cal "present" is to distort what he observes, unless
his sociology incorporates within itself a history.
In the converse sense, too, Basotho would often place
on the same level items of clearly widely divergent
origin: for example, a tradition of genuine antiquity
such as mafisa (the loan of cattle) on the one hand, and
the government's system of stock-registration on the
other. The legal analogue of this can be seen where,
as not infrequently, the decisions of the Judicial
Commissioner's Court, or even the High Court, do not
simply operate to bring one particular dispute to a
conclusion, but have made a permanent mark on what is
thought to be the law. It would be equally as foolish
to reject or analyse out the modifications thus imported
by the alien courts as it would be to accept the often
misinformed or insensitive decisions of those courts
as authentic accounts of customary law.
Time and experience enabled me to reduce these
problems, in practice, to manageable proportions; that
is to say, they do not present practical difficulties
over most of the area where a decision has had to be
made. But I have not been able to find a theoretically
rigorous answer to the questions that posed themselves,
which would derive from an argued methodological
principle. There are thus certain apparent inconsisten-
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cies of practice in what follows. Sometimes the views
of a higher court are taken seriously, more often they
are either not considered at all or are briefly mentioned
in a note. To a considerable degree, this turns on
whether the issue is one of the substantive law (in
which case, the higher courts are largely irrelevant) or
whether it concerns the relationships and tensions exist¬
ing between the different structures (and in this case,
of course, both types of tribunal are equally relevant
to my interests). But in some instances, the weighting
to be given cannot be accounted for in such systematic
terms, and although I would argue that the election
could be justified ad hoc, I have found no explicit rule
of method that enables the discriminations to be exhausti¬





Professor Lucy Mair (1962: 19) has regretted the
floods of ink that have been, as she correctly says,
wasted on debates about the definition of law, of custom,
and of "law and custom". What follows is not intended
as an addition to this very largely metaphysical, or at
least terminological, discussion. But some substantive
consideration of customary law and customary systems,
both in Basutoland and more generally, seems justifiable,
indeed mandatory, in the light of the preoccupations
that mark the present study.
Even the term "customary systems" raises an initial
problem, at least in so far as the word "system" implies
a rigorous, logically ordered and complete array of
juristic propositions and normative rules. In the ideal
legal "system", at least, all norms sre mutually consist¬
ent in themselves and in their implications; there are
no gaps in it — no juristic vacuum; and each item can
be derived from some other item (a concept or a rule) of
higher order. Customary law falls short of all these
requirements. The concepts it employs are not rigor-
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ously defined; logical ordering exists more by chance
than on principles of structure; the scope for deduction
is very limited; it is far from being logically complete;
and its rules are not always mutually consistent.
Professor Stone has recently suggested (Stone 1964) what
is implied by referring to legal "systems", and since
customary law does not measure up to his well-argued
requirements, some less misleading term for the assemblage
of norms and prescriptions that constitute it must be
found. It can more consonantly with modern usage be
called an open set. But to say that customary law is a
set of normative rules is trivial, indeed truistic.
It fails to suggest the specific features that distinguish
customary law from any other unsystematic set of norms.
The special qualities of customary law cannot be purely
negative; no satisfactory conception of customary law
can be arrived at simply by taking a systematic legal
order and eliminating from it in turn its consistency,
its conceptual precision, its completeness and its logic
and supposing that the residue constitutes customary
law.
The word "customary" itself suggests a more
positive approach. Although the term "customary" has
misleading overtones for English-speaking lawyers, it
has the virtue of bringing out a central characteristic
of certain forms of legal order. It deflects attention
away from those who teach or interpret the law, and
directs it instead towards those who live it and use it.
Customary law emerges from what people do, or — more
accurately — from what people believe they ought to do,
rather than from what a class of legal specialists
consider they should do or believe. This is not to deny
that, in any society, some people are credited with a
more acute sensitivity to such obligations than others,
or even that the incumbents of certain statuses (defined
often by age or seniority) have a prima facie claim to
possess this greater sensitivity. Differences in
human qualities are universally recognised, and in
hierarchically ordered societies the senior grades will
be assumed to be more, rather than less, generously
endowed with wisdom, understanding and insight than
other people. Yet the ultimate test is not, "what does
this judge say?" but rather "what do the participants in
the law regard as the rights and duties that apply to
them?" The real task of the customary jurist is to
answer this last question, not to apply deductive or
analytic reasoning to a set of professionally formulated
legal concepts.
Again, the word "customary" itself points to this
conclusion, suggesting as it does a law that emerges,
not from jurisprudential interpretation, but from the
"customs" in terms of which the actors themselves
determine their actions. However, there are serious
dangers in relying too much on the concept of custom —
whether in its technical or in its everyday sense — for
an understanding of customary law. The first danger
arises from the fact that, at least in the English doctrine,
"custom", if it is to have the force of law, must have a
series of attributes not all of which have any formal
application to the kind of lav/ now under discussion.
Thus, it is said that a custom must be "reasonable".
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But this is usually little more than an ethnocentrism.
The test of "reasonableness" has a place only when the
authoritative exponents of the law are at a social and
institutional distance from the rest of society.
Where they are not set at this distance, reasonableness
and the common social perception fuse. The test of
conformity with statute has, rather obviously, little
or no application in societies where no distinct
legislative institutions exist. The requirement of
immemorial antiquity raises more complex problems,
which can be considered in conjunction with those posed
by the further stipulation that custom must not change.
In the first place, English "custom" of the kind to
which these several tests apply, is essentially a
particular derogation from or extension of the "general
custom of the realm", consuetudines regni. The "custom"
in customary law, on the other hand, itself constitutes
the law, and is in no way an island of privilege or
exemption that prescinds from or adds to a more general
rule. This does not, of course, mean that one homogene¬
ous body of custom necessarily pervades the whole of
society; indeed, nothing is more characteristic of
customary law than its particularism and localisation.
It means only that any customary norm is, at its own
level, the juristic equal of any other and does not
have, as it were, to be "proved against" some other norm
which is otherwise presumed to apply. English custom,
then, is necessarily derogative; it is an exception to
a general rule, and is consequently intrinsically
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particular and specialised. The tests of antiquity
and unchanging continuity, therefore, make sense since
they can be taken to justify, juridically, the exceptional
case. The most important norms of customary law, on
the other hand, are usually quite different in character.
Though they are concrete, they are general. Customary
law is pre-eminently embodied in a set of concrete
principles, the detailed application of which to particular
cases is flexible and subject to change (Allott I960 ch. 3).
The principle is unchanging, no doubt, but it is not always
an easy matter to determine when any given norm or rule
is an authentic principle or is nothing more than the
practical application of a general norm to a particular
case. If, therefore, custom is to be described as
stable or immutable or unchanging, this permanency must
be attributed only to the most general norms and not to
the subordinate or contingent norms that emerge when a
given principle is applied in a concrete case. These
subordinate norms can, should, and do change, in response
to varying social situations. Moreover, when a general
rule is applied in a concrete case, the law is not, est
it is in systems that recognise the binding precedent,
thereby made more specific or narrow. When the case is
concluded, the law returns, as it were, from its brief
excursion into detail and reverts to its normal condition
of generality.
A further stipulation found in modern systems of
law is that custom must be observed as of right. This
requirement is different in kind from the other rules,
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and is in principle fully applicable to customary law,
indeed it is crucial to any analysis. Besides the
misunderstandings to which the technical lawyer is
liable, and which have just been discussed, there is a
further danger of an opposite kind, namely that custom
may be interpreted to mean no more than practice. If
law is to be looked for not in those who expound it as
professionals but in those who live it and use it, it
could be supposed that it can be found simply by looking
at what people do — law becomes simply a function of
practice. No misunderstanding could be more complete.
To make practice the formal source of law in the customary
field is to be untrue to the facts, where people recognise
in normative law a moral authority, a legitimacy, that
they do not accord to practice or usage as a whole.
No approach to customary law that fails to take this
indigenous recognition into account can ever be satisfact¬
ory. The certainty of this distinction is not affected
by the difficulty of drawing a precise line of demarcation.
People may not be sure whether certain intermediate norms
are authoritative or not, but they may still be clear
that X is in a real sense "law" while Y is definitely
"not law" (cf. Schapera 1955: 37-8). This is all that
is necessary in order to make the point. Moreover,
norms can never be equated with practice since so much
of practice is contrary to the norms. Customary law
does not say that a man should not steal his neighbour's
chickens more than occasionally, or graze his cattle on
another man's fields more than anybody else does. It
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says that these things may not be done at all. For
these reasons, the test of observance as a right, if
interpreted as an affirmation of the authoritative and
regulatory character of normative rules, is a critical
feature of customary as of any other law.
Another way of putting this would perhaps be to
say that practice is not, and cannot be, the formal
source of customary law. It remains, of course, its
material source, in that customary law is materially
abstracted or derived from practice, rather than by a
series of logical operations upon a legal formula or
proposition. It is not just that the original rule of
common law was derived from practice, but was then made
the object of jurisprudential operations in the course
of its later development. In customary law, not only
the original but also the derived norms are related to
those who participate — to the actors in the social
situation — and not only to a professional body of
specialised teachers and judges.
The phrase "actors In the social situation" points
to the last formal characteristic of customary law to
be discussed: its social origin and character. This
might seem an obvious feature of all law, and hardly
worth insisting upon. However, if the ultimate test
of customary law is not "what does the judge say?" but
"what do the participants regard as the rule?" the
question arises of the eccentric participant or actor
who regards as a rule some private and personal predilect¬
ion of his own. If customary law derives from practices
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that are endowed with authority by the practitioners,
how is it possible to deal (analytically) with idiosyn¬
cratic practitioners? It is to close this gap that it
becomes necessary to stress the social character of
customary law. The argument here is not that a total
"society" — whatever that may be — defines one homogene¬
ous law by derivation from universally sanctioned practice;
though in fact this meets the case in certain instances,
it would be much too rigorous an assumption for most non-
literate societies. To say that law is social and not
individual is not to imply that between the individual
and the total society to which he belongs there are no
intermediate social groups whose corporate and semi-
independent character validates their own local law.
Clans, sub-clans, lineages and even individual families
can constitute social groups in this sense, in such a
way that the norms to which they attribute authority are
socially and not merely individually legitimised. The
exact nature of the groups that possess this, so to speak,
"public" character will vary from society to society.
Moreover, the domain within which this public character
exists will vary according to the kind of rule or subject
matter involved. Thus, as will be seen for Sotho law,
questions of inheritance may be determinable by the
immediate agnatic kinsmen of the deceased, while questions
of succession to office may be determined by some more
widely defined group, and questions of land-tenure may
be referred to some other authority again. So variations
may be expected not only from society to society, but
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also, within any one society, from one type of case or
subject-matter to another. The essential fact is that
the law is always socially defined. In no known society
is it open to each individual to find his own law.
The legitimacy, the imputed authority, with which customary
law is clothed is not transmitted by a legislative assembly
or a specialist judge, but neither is it the product of
an individual's idiosyncrasy.
II
The argument so far has raised a number of substan¬
tive and not merely definitional issues and suggests a
formula that omits purely contingent and accidental
features and yet is not entirely trivial. Customary
law can be regarded as a set of norms which the actors
in a social situation abstract from ractice and which
they invest with moral authority. The positive content
of this definition may be taken as fourfold: the relation
of norms to practice rather than to "lawyers' reasoning";
the dominant role of the actors or participants in the
determination of law; the authoritative or legitimate,
rather than merely factual or utilitarian, character of
the emergent rules; and the essentially social nature
of their validation and status. But it is equally
important to be clear about what this formulation does
not say — the questions that it still leaves open.
An examination of these absences *ill indicate some
further important features of customary law.
In the first place, the formula proposed leaves
room for those who act unlawfully. The typical unlawful
act is one which the actor knows to he wrong, rather
than one performed by an actor who acts on a different
set of normative assumptions. In the customary context
this tends to mean something rather more than that the
actor knows his act to be in a simple objective sense
"against the law"; rather, he will himself share the
general social evaluation of his act, while hoping that
he will "get away" with it. But, and this is the second
point, this does not, naturally enough, rule out the
existence of different and conflicting interpretations
of the law. No doubt this will always be the case, in
all legal systems; but in customary law, the point needs
to be stressed, not only because a misreading of the
argument about law and society might suggest that conflict
and disagreement were eliminated, but also because the
specific character of customary norms has a direct bear¬
ing on the scope for disputed interpretation.
Reference has already been made to the fact that the
fundamental norms of customary law tend to take the form
of general but at the same time concrete principles,
and it was stressed that the effect of a particular
application of the norm is not to give added precision
or specificity to the law in future cases: rather, the
law reverts to its, as it were, "normal" condition of
generality when it has accomplished its mission in the
particular case in hand. This is one major reason why
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disputes over the proper interpretation of rules are a
constant possibility. It is reinforced by the fact
that, analytically considered, the norms of customary
law often seem mutually inconsistent. This inconsis¬
tency arises from the fact that legal rules are not
considered in the abstract but in the context of differ¬
ent social situations. It is only if the analyst
insists upon following all the logical implications of
each of two analytically inconsistent norms that their
conflict becomes inevitable, and the trained lawyer is
tempted to take the view that one of them must triumph
and the other perish, or at least that some boundary
(whether procedural or logical) must be drawn to demarcate
for each its area of competency or relevance. If on
the other hand the general and concrete principle returns
to generality after each application, it can coexist
with other principles without either being sacrificed
to the other. At the same time, in particular cases,
the two can conflict and provide each of the parties to
a dispute with an armoury of legal arguments. The
following chapters provide illustrations of this point
from Basutoland, in matters of chiefly succession and
ranking, in land allocation, and in "private" succession
and inheritance.
Nor does the formulation suggested above ignore
the fact that some people may be regarded as more
authoritative exponents of the law than others. The
incumbents of certain positions, typically the hereditary
position of chief, may be especially privileged in this
regard. It is true that it has not been a feature of
lawful chieftainship in Basutoland that chiefs were
despots or tyrants; Moshoeshoe was very different from
Chaka, not only in personality but in the character of
his office and in his political and historical situation.
When a Sotho chief gave judgment, it used to be said
"ho lumile" ("it has thundered"); but the despotical
implications of this saying are contradicted by a still
more celebrated and ideologically fundamental maxim,
that "a chief is a chief by the people" (morena. ke morena
ka batho). Yet too much can be made of the "essentially
democratic" character of traditional monarchy. To stress
the social and in a certain sense "popular" character of
customary law, in chiefly societies as in others, is
certainly to recall something of what is implied in the
American term "folk-ways"; but this does not exclude
the indubitable truth, neatly expressed by Professor
Goebel, that a folk-way may be the way of the folk in
power (quoted in Plucknett 1949: 7). This indeed is
one of the crucial ambiguities of domination (in the
sense of Herrschaft, Weber 1947: Part 3; 1954: 322-348).
A hereditary chieftainship develops its own interests
as an aseriptive status-group, which are analytically
(and can become empirically) separate from those of the
community. Where chieftainship is itself a central
political value in the society, the ambiguities of its
domination grow to create a broad area of "indeterminacy",
and it is precisely here that "force" is mediated to
"law" (or "power" to "authority", in terms of an alterna-
tive and overlapping scheme, Smith I960). The point
will be returned to later in this chapter.
An empirical feature of most customary law is that
it is unwritten. This is more than a simple descriptive
fact, for it has implications for the kind of law that
emerges. When law is tnrwritten, it is possible to
isolate it from its social context and to seal it off
in books; jurisprudential analysis can then begin.
The fact that customary law is unwritten is one reason
why it remains both general and concrete. It remains
general because its detailed applications in different
places are not made known to all, only the principle
being universally remembered, and concrete because
detailed logical analysis is impracticable when the
analyst has got no accurate and objective reports on
which to rely. The doctrine of precedent is hard to
set up when there is no written record of earlier
decisions. This allows customary norms to be flexible
and adaptable, and to function, in Plucknett's words,
as "instruments for legal change rather than the
fossilised remnants of a dead past" (1949: 7). But
it is not just a matter of saying that pre-literate
societies lack certain cultural techniques and that
therefore their law is what it is. It is hardly too
much of a paradox to reverse the order of cause and
effect and assert that the unwritten character of
customary law is the product or effect of its general
nature, rather than the reverse. Max Weber has shown
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how essential writing is for the functioning of a modern
rational bureaucratic system (Weber 1947). But the
relevant point in the present context is that it is not
the mere fact of writing but the use to which it is put
that is crucial. In Basutoland, it happens to be the
fact that written records of the proceedings and judg¬
ments of most courts and tribunals are kept, but this
is not enough to constitute a "written law", since the
records are not, on the whole, then used as a basis
for analysis, the establishment of precedent, or the
abstract manipulation of concepts. At least until
very recently, writing might as well not exist for all
the part that it has played in the shaping of the law (1).
Ill
A comparative glance at legal procedures in an
acephalous society will help to bring out some further
points, both about customary law in general and about
the characteristics of "chiefly" law in particular.
Gulliver's admirable study of the Arusha provides an
excellent starting-point for such an inquiry (Gulliver
1963). Gulliver shows how dispute settlement among
the Arusha depends upon a series of direct or sometimes
mediated confrontations at various levels of formality
betv/een the disputing parties or their spokesmen,
counsellors or supporters. The principal goal of the
procedures is to restore the social peace, rather than
to impose on a reluctant defendant a set of obligations
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(to compensate, to repay a debt, to fulfil an undertaking)
derived from an abstract calculation of universal liabilit¬
ies. The whole process of settlement is set within a
framework of normative rules, which define the presupposi¬
tions of the parties and draw the contours of their mutual
expectations. But no superordinate agent or agency
dictates the emergent compromise, or even plays a major
role in arriving at it. The procedure is essentially one
of mutual adjustment, and it is of course this aspect of
affairs that gives the settlement its stability and strength.
Imposed settlements of their nature lead to resentment of
the part of the unsuccessful litigant; mutual agreement
implies equal acceptance of the result. It is, in fact,
seen as a breakdown of the traditional and proper proced¬
ures if the parties have recourse to the modern magistrates'
courts, where judicial settlements may in the last resort
have to be imposed upon them, to the lasting dissatisfaction
of either or both.
Gulliver contrasts Arusha settlement procedure with
the processes of other societies, especially with those
that have superordinate chiefs or other more specialised
judicial officers. Although his terminology differs
from that which Smith adapts from Weber, the trend of
thought is the same. He attaches particular importance
to the presence or absence of a superordinate officer
such as a chief or a judge, arguing that in the absence
of such a person the "political" element will play an
important part in arriving at a settlement. On the other
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hand, where a superordinate judge exists, the "political"
element is present only as an abuse, and because of the
weakness and fallibility of mortal men; ideally, where
a presiding officer superintends the court or moot, the
"political" element disappears and only the "judicial"
function remains. Gulliver proposes a continuous scale
from "judicial" to "political", and very reasonably
places the Arusha towards the "political" end of the
continuum.
"The resolution of the matter is not a case of
reaching a decision as to which disputant is supported
by the norms and to what extent.... These processes and
inter-party struggles can only be understood in terms of
the social system in which the participants are involved
in ordinary social life", (p. 301)
This is a very fair way of putting it, and there
is no reason to quarrel with Gulliver about the position
at which the Arusha should be placed within this frame¬
work. But the framework itself is inadequate in several
respects.
In the first place, the implied comparison is not ^
being drawn between equivalent levels of structure.
Arusha settlements should not be compared with the judicial
process in Lozi (Gluckman 1955; 1965), far less in English,
society, but with extra-judicial or pre-judicial settle¬
ments, which account for the overwhelming majority of
"litigable" disputes. Much of what is said of the Arusha
could, mutatis mutandis, be said of the ninety per cent of
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disputes in contemporary Britain that are settled out of
court or before reaching the courts at all.
Of course, it is true that in Britain these settle¬
ments are reached under the shadow, as it were, of the
courts; the parties or their solicitors know that the
courts are there, and this knowledge influences their
conduct in working towards a settlement. But this only
introduces a second complaint against Gulliver's account,
which is that he undervalues the normative element in
the Arusha settlement process. He is, though, a meti¬
culous enough ethnographer to provide evidence of this
himself, and this is why in the above account of his
findings, mention was made of the framework of norms in
which the settlement procedure is set, and which defines
the moral presuppositions and mutual expectations of the
parties. In a relatively homogeneous society, these
norms and expectations do not need authoritative exposit¬
ion by formal courts. But none of the evidence cited
makes sense unless it is seen in the context of a normative
system overarching the "political" process of compromise
and negotiation and injecting into it a standard of what
is, in fact, to be regarded as a reasonable rather than
a leonine settlement. These norms (as Gulliver says)
do of course arise from (though they are not reducible to)
"the social system in which the participants are involved
in ordinary social life"; but they are none the less real
for not being articulated through specialised judicial
institutions.
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Thirdly, it is misleading to analyse the role of
the superordinate judge in the way Gulliver implies.
He suggests that the introduction of a '•judge" so to
speak converts the process from being a largely "political"
into an ideally "judicial" one: any "political" elements
now present being the results, as it were, of the inevit¬
able imperfections of human-kind. He accounts for the
differences between Arusha and Lozi settlement processes
largely on these grounds. This is to make too much of
the judge's role and at the same time to say too little
about it. Quite as important as the presence or absence
of a "judge" is the question of whether he is or is not
a specialised judicial officer. In most traditional
chiefly societies, men were not appointed to be judges:
what we analyse out as their judicial function was part
of the ascriptive status of chieftainship. A chief has
to make many decisions, some of which we may legitimately
characterise as "judicial"; but this analytical distinct¬
ion may have no empirical counterpart in terms of the
social perception of the chief's role.
It is contended here that where judicial office is
only an analytically separable aspect of a role which
empirically comprises a variety of other functions, the
persistence of certain "political" features is not to be
regarded as a sign of human fallibility but as a structural
corollary of the office. It is, in fact, a perfectly j
legitimate element in chiefly decision-making, where
differentiation has not reached a point at which specialised
judges are appointed to carry out specifically judicial
tasks. But this does not mean that the "political"
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element falls outside the area of normative control.
This assertion constitutes one of the central themes of
the present study, and will be echoed in the chapters
that follow as well as re-subjected to a closer analysis
in the conclusion. It involves the concept of what may
be called "executive law" — a category of legal action
that is not simply reducible to "political" and "judicial"
components. Executive law is the characteristic legality
of chieftainship. This approach has implications that
underline what has been argued in an earlier passage:
that there is what may be called a "specificity" about
law and legal action that is only obscured by an over-
insistence on the notion of "social control". It has
been remarked that there is an inherent ambivalence in
chiefly Ilerrschaft, and as a consequence of this there
is little point in debating in the abstract whether the
putting down of an overmighty subject is the maintenance
of a legitimate order or the self-interested defence of
privilege (or both). Empirically and extrinsically
the two cases are exactly the same, whereas legitimacy
lies in the eye of the beholder — or, more exactly, of
the actor. The deficiency of the concept of social
control is that it stops short at this empirical and
extrinsic identity and obscures the "specificity of law"
by distracting attention away from the normative element ^
that discriminates legality from coercion. It is no
accident that the vogue for "social control" coincided
with the continued if disguised dominance of positivism
in social anthropology. Malinowski was rather too glib
in his repudiation not only of "codes, courts and
constables" (Malinowski 1926) but of the "cake of custom"
too. The rather commonsensical account that tends to
emerge from his work is only slightly less improbable
than the legalisms and automatisms that he attacked.
Much of the trouble here arises, as has been suggested,
from the word "custom" and its derivatives (customary,
accustom, etc.), where the ambiguities have the effect
(here strenuously argued against) of obliterating the
distinction between "fact" and "norm"; and of course it
is precisely this obliteration that has recommended the
word to generations of positivists. But the solution
to this theoretical problem is not to polarise "customary
or "executive" law into the analytical dichotomies of
"judicial" and "political". Executive law is lew
(however open its practitioners may be to the subversions
of power) just as the specialised "judicial" law of
modern societies is law (however open it may be to the
subversions of analytical logic). The analyst's task
is to describe its operations, and to relate them to
the structural features of the societies that characteris
tically generate it. Much of what follows is an attempt
to do this for Basutoland.
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Excursus: CUSTOM <Sc THE CQUiiTS
The Judicial Commissioner's Court
Judicial Commissioners have taken varying views of
"custom" in Basutoland. They (like the District
Commissioners before them, prior to the establishment
of a special tribunal of appeal from the Basuto (Native)
Courts) have frequently had to decide what the "custom"
was, and to what extent it was to be given effect to in
judicial decisions. This involved the evidential
question of how an alleged custom was to be proved, and
how to resolve conflicts of evidence, which were not
of infrequent occurrence. They had to consider whether
it was necessary, and if so to what extent, to have
evidence of actual instances of an alleged custom being
followed, or whether it was sufficient for a witness
to custom (if believed) simply to aver that the custom
was as he described it. They had (or so they believed)
to decide whether what was argued as custom was in fact
no more than common practice, and whether different
customs could be contemplated in different parts of
Basutoland or in different clans or lineages. Again,
they were obliged to consider the question of whether
custom could change, and if so by what means, and
subject to what kind of evidence or proof such change
could be acknowledged. Another of their self-imposed
tasks was to determine at what level of generality a
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custom, once proved, was to be given the force of law —
whether, for example, the undoubted rule requiring
publicity for certain transactions could be regarded as
satisfied by means (e.g., letters and documents) that
had no application at the time when the custom was
supposed to have been set up. A similar and more
challenging question was whether the principles of
customary law could be applied to situations never
contemplated in the traditional context.
The Judicial Commissioner's Court has shown a
wide variation in its approach to these important
problems. One response, found regularly in the
decisions of Mr V.G.S. Driver, was to rest on the
concept of custom as defined in English and Roman-Dutch
Law. Thus, in Hlalele v. Matlou J.C. 152/54, he
stated:
"No person can make custom because custom is
something that has become law over long usage.
Custom is something that comes from the Dark
Ages and there must be evidence that the
custom was observed from time immemorial; it
must be reasonable; it must be certain".
Again, in the celebrated case of 'Ma-Dyke letsitsi
v. Mafa J.C. 84/53, he quoted Halsbury (Laws of England,
Vol. 10, paragraph 423) to the effect that
"a custom to be valid must have four essentials;
first, it must be immemorial, secondly, it must
be reasonable, thirdly, it must have continued
without exception since its immemorial origin,
and fourthly it must be certain"
and went on to comment that "no person or body of persons
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can alter a custom" (and cf. Driver in Thabana v.
Mapesela J.C. 212/53: Mno person or body can alter a
custom").
On the other hand, in Sekake v. Tautona JVC. 15/59
(see Appendix II), Driver upheld the validity of kenelo
(the levirate), in spite of the fact that, in his view,
"it may be a decadent custom". It is not clear whether
he meant that it was falling into disuse (in which case
it would fail the test of non-interruption) or that it
was repugnant to good morals and good sense (in which
case it would fail the test of reasonableness, and also
the universal criterion of natural justice).
Mr W.A. Ramsden's judgments are bizarrely interest¬
ing from another point of view. In the case of Makibi
v. Mabeko J.C. 11/56, heard at Lerlbe on 18th January
1956, Ramsden considered laws of Lerotholi (1946) Part I,
sec. 7 (3)» which deals with the right of a chief to
deprive an occupier of lands if they have been left
uncultivated (the substantive law on land deprivation
is discussed in chapter five below). He stated:
"My Mosuto assessor is of the opinion that Section
7 (3) is a correct statement of Basuto customary
law and I am of the opinion that this fact is
notorious that I am entitled to take judicial
cognisance of it. In numerous cases... Mr
Driver has come to the conclusion that the above
section is an accurate statement of Basuto
custom and this is now therefore 8 well-
established fact".
On the following day, again in Leribe, Ramsden
60
considered the same subsection in the case of Letuk? v.
Klaas J.C. 19/56, and said in his judgment:
"No evidence was led in the courts below... to
show that this is a correct statement of the
custom. My assessor is of the opinion that it
is, but that has not been proved in the way in
which it is customary to prove such laws, and
such laws, which derogate from the individual's
rights of ownership or occupation, may not be
lightly presumed".
It may be added that the Mosotho assessor was the
same (Tebatso Jonathan Molapo) in both cases.
Ramsden's approach to custom appears in another
guise in three subsequent cases, which show that he had
not exhausted his interest in Section 7 (3) in the two
judgments that have just been quoted. In Ntholi v.
fjelebalo J.C. 75/76, he invoked the words of the sub¬
section (now once more reinstated as valid custom) that
lands may be taken away if the subject fails for two
successive years to cultivate it or "cause /it/ to be
cultivated". The Judicial Commissioner therefore
upheld the subject's right to transfer his usufruct to
another, remarking that "the occupation of land is /not/
a personal right of such a nature that it cannot be
transferred". He was moreover sufficiently convinced
by his own argument to follow rather than reverse this
precedent in Khalime v. Lesaoana J.C. 82/56 a few days
later. (It may be pertinent to note that in Ntholi's
case, all the Basotho Courts were upheld; but the
grounds of their judgment were that the loan or trans-
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ference of land had been effected with the knowledge
and concurrence of the chief; that Ntholi was ntate
moholo (father's eldest brother) to Oelebalo; and that
the lands had been occupied by the letter's grandmother.
The substance of the law, again, is discussed in
Chapter Five below, but these observations may serve
to indicate the radical difference in approach between
the Basotho Courts on the one hand and Ramsden on the
other.)
In Lekulana v. Paramount Chief J.C. 108/56, Ramsden
took his concern with personal rights a stage further,
once again founding on Laws of Lerotholi s. 7 (3), and
arguing that Basotho have no ius in rem to the land they
occupy as subjects, that they are orecario tenentes, and
lack civil possession. "My duty," he stated, "is to
apply the law as I find it". He did not, however,
specify which law he had in mind. It could hardly be
supposed that an analysis in his terms had Sotho law as
its object; while as a gratuitous account of Roman or
Roman-Butch law, he is vulnerable to the observation
that the Roman precario tenens does of course, appear¬
ances notwithstanding, enjoy possessio civilis.
Judicial Commissioners normally sat with one of
more Basotho assessors (see Hailey 1951: 107 ff.).
One latent purpose of this was to give chiefs and other
persons considered suitable some experience of and
training in the administration of civil and criminal
justice; but the assessors were also expected to offer
advice and guidance to the Commissioner on points of
"Basuto law and custom". Although an assessor (like
Tebatso Jonathan with Ramsden) might not be able to
bring himself to reverse his settled opinion on a major
issue in the course of twenty-four hours, it was never¬
theless unusual for there to be such disagreement.
In certain crucial areas (especially in relation to the
relative position of widows and heirs in inheritance,
discussed in Chapter Six below) the terms of the problem
are such that (as will be seen) apparently contradictory
formulations can both or all be justified in particular
cases, and from one case to another, and this goes some
way to explain how it was so regular an occurrence for
the Judicial Commissioner, in his judgment, to declare
that he was fully supported by his assessor, even though
another Commissioner (or even the same one on another
occasion) would produce another view of the law, again
with his assessor's "full support". But this is not
a full explanation. Personal discussions with Basotho
who had acted as assessors made it plain that they
perceived their situation as one of dependency on the
Judicial Commissioner, and that more than one had learned
the futility of offering advice that departed from the
Commissioner's views. Work as an assessor also repres¬
ented one method of attaining a public position and
embarking on a rewarding career; the present Prime
Minister, Chief Leabua Jonathan, first entered public
life at the encouragement of the late Mr Patrick
"Duncan, who when Judicial Commissioner frequently took
Chief Leabua with him as his assessor. This does not
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mean, of course, that all the Judicial Commissioners
themselves disliked, much less resented, disagreements
from their assessors, but the latters' perception of
their situation was inevitably very different from that
of the Commissioners themselves.
However, one of the principal sources of evidence
as to "custom" was, in theory, the assessor's advice.
Another was simply the Judicial Commissioner's own
experience in the Courts (though with the exception of
Mr Duncan, few had more than a smattering of Sesotho).
But not infrequently, evidence as to custom was heard,
and here there is uncertainty as to whether the witness
should speak as an "expert" on the law, or whether his
function was rather to give evidence of fact, showing
that a certain custom had in fact been followed on
particular, named occasions and had never (lawfully)
been departed from. The implication of Duncan's remark
in Jonathan v. Benjamin J.C. 97/52, in discussing a point
that he accepted as valid custom, to the effect that
"the principle is not well-enough known in Basutoland"
points to the view that evidence of custom is expert
evidence on law; but there is little consistency in the
general run of cases, though the weight is in favour of
the "expert witness" view of Basotho called to give
testimony on custom.
Mr R.P. Thompson's judgments confronted some inter¬
esting questions. This Judicial Commissioner's approach
was very different from that of most of his predecessors
and colleagues. In Kolapo J.C. 77/60, he said that
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"there may be a contrast between the custom of the dim
past and that of today", and did not hesitate to uphold
the contemporary law. This view is consistent with his
statement in Nonare v. Koela J.C. 89/59 that the
character of Sotho customary law is such that "it has
the inestimable advantage of not crystallising outmoded
laws and customs which are being abandoned in favour of
customs evolving as more suitable to modern conditions"
(and cf. in Sofeng v. Letsie J.C. 97/63: "Sesotho custom
is not a rigid system"). In Matsepe v. Serame J.C. 75/
63, he considered a case involving a partnership between
tvro Basotho, who carried on a brickworks on land alloca¬
ted to one of them. Serame, the allottee, was attempt¬
ing to exclude his partner from the business. Thompson
stated:
"While Sesotho custom may not have yet evolved a
system of law to meet modern developments never¬
theless cases such as this are within the /Basuto/
Courts' jurisdiction and the courts have to apply
the general principles of law and custom to reach
an equitable decision between disputants as best
they can, and law and custom is a set of principles
which develop with the ages".
He upheld Matsepe's rights tinder the partnership
agreement. In S.S.4 Trading Store v. Kolapa J.C. 153/
63, however, the commercial technicalities put the matter
well beyond the scope of even an "evolved" custom, and
Thompson referred the case to the Subordinate Court (i.e.,
the Magistrate's Court) for the application of Basutoland
Roman-Dutch Law.
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Thompson was here skirting the much-debated topic
of whether Sotho (or other) custom knows the executory
contract. In spite of Slias (1956: 144 ff.) and
Schapera (1965), it is arguable that it does not, except
in the particular case of marriage where special consider¬
ations apply (marriage is in fact Elias's principal ground
of argument; and Schapera's examples are all reducible
to cases of contract for executed consideration). But
it is not so much the substantive law enunciated by
Thompson in Matsepe that is of interest here as the
expansive and creative view of customary law as a whole
which his remarks imply.
The High Court
In general, the view of the High Court was that
which transmitted itself to the Judicial Commissioner's
Court, from which it was the immediate court of appeal.
There was a similar reliance on Halsbury and on the
English or Roman-Butch views of custom as having the
requirements of immemorial antiquity, continuity,
certainty and reasonableness ('Hantsebo v. Bereng J.C.
245/45 (de Beer J. in the High Court); lansdown J. in
Bereng Griffith v. 'Mants'ebo 1926-53 H.C.T.L.R. 50).
However, it was firmly stated in Mots'oene 1954 H.C.T.L.R.
1 that the argument that custom must be proved only by
specific instances "has no application.... It is true
that... the word 'custom' is used, but in fact what we
are here dealing with is a 'law'. And... the best
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evidence... is the evidence of those who by virtue of
their experience may be expected to be familiar with it".
The Basotho Courts
Some presidents of the Basotho courts have been
more influenced by Roman-Dutch law, and by the "native
law" emanating from the District Commissioners' and
Judicial Commissioners' judgments, than others, and
considerable variation is due to this. There is a
tendency in some cases for a court president to seize
upon some fragment of "law" enunciated by a European or
other technically trained judge or magistrate and rely
uncritically upon it, sometimes (though not always)
unconsciously modifying or even reversing the original
sense and intention of the utterance in question. In
the matter of custom, the Paramount Chief's Court and
other Basotho Courts would on occasion pay more attention
to the published Laws of herotholi Part I than their
authority, in either customary or statutory terms,
warranted; though in fact this was, often enough, more
because the Court of its own impulse sought to come to
the conclusion indicated by the text, and used it as a
convenient basis for decision. Where it preferred
another interpretation, it was ready to state that the
Laws of Lerotholi were merely purported declarations of
custom, which was not necessarily as stated in them (cf.
judgment of the Paramount Chief's Court in Sekake v.
Tautona J.C. 15/59, Appendix Two).
But the Basotho Courts have been ready to hear
evidence on custom. In Lenka v. Kantsieng J.C. 4/51,
the Paramount Chief's Court heard evidence on the relative
seniority of the Tlokoa, Phuthi and Peli clans (liboko)
not only from expert Basotho witnesses but also from
publications of European authorship, including Ellen-
berger's history (Ellenberger 1912) and works by the
French Protestant missionary E. Jacottet (and see also
Bereng J.C. 99/50). Goliath's evidence in Bekake
(Appendix Two) was professedly entirely that of an expert
on custom, not at all as a person informed about the
particular case under dispute. The strictness with
which the Basotho courts approached the question of
proving custom tends to reflect their view of what is
being argued for. In Shale J.C. 592/52, the court at
Katsieng (C.C. 148/51) required the appellant to prove
the custom of marriage to the grave (ho nyalla lebitla.).
This form of marriage had been statutorily abolished by
the Paramount Chief's rule in Laws of Lerotholi Part II
sec. 34 (3), and it might have been argued that this
abolition impliedly affirmed the previous law. However,
Chief Kelebone Nkuebe, one of the wisest judges in
Basutoland, argued that the appellant had "failed to
satisfy this court that marriage to a grave has been
lawful, and the two witnesses... do not show what was
the law or custom in 1922". The fact is that there has
been an indigenous tendency to turn against the more
"exotic" forms of marriage, which tend to complicate
issues of succession and lead to intractable disputes;
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and Kelebone had in fact made up his mind to reinforce
this tendency in Basotho opinion by putting the appellant
to a probably impossible proof, in view of the lack of
prior warning. The judges of Chief Makhaola's court
at Qacha's Nek in Sekake's case, considering the legality
of woman marriage, found not only (a) that there was
insufficient evidence of the custom but also (b) that
such marriages had been the cause of incessant unrest,
as well as (c) that they were contrary to law (Appendix
Two). This again is an instance of the dislike in
which such marriages were being regarded and of the way
in which courts were able to thwart claims based upon
them if they wished to do so. Kenelo (levirate), on
the other hand, being an approved custom, was held to
be law, in spite of the prima facie meaning of the Laws
of Lerotholi, since there was nothing in the law actually
forbidding it. Those in whose interest it was to argue
the reverse, however, claimed that the custom had fallen
into disuse: a position involving the difficulty that
even if that were the case at the date of the hearing,
it was not therefore necessarily true of the situation
when the kenelo issue had been born.
In Molapo J.C. 205/63, the court at Tsifalimali
under M.D.L. Masupha, another well-known Mosotho,
attacked the practice of marrying for the senior house,
commenting that "anybody could at any time marry a
junior wife for the senior house, so that the succession
devolves on the last house. Although I do not deny
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that this custom has existed all along and is still
continuing... I firmly deny that it is valid, because it
runs counter to the law of succession and is therefore
illegal". This is a more direct assault on custom, in
that no factitious doubts are raised as to its existence
or the mode of its proof. What is done is regarded as
a common but unlawful practice which e sa ipapisa le
molao le toka — "is not in conformity with law and right".
The common word for "law" is molao (plural melao).
This comes from the stem lay-, from which are derived the
verb ho laya, to correct, reprimand, warn, and the deriva¬
tive verb ho laela, to order, command, instruct. The
"Laws of Lerotholi" are Melao ea Lerotholi. The word
"custom" is generally translated by mokhoa, usually in
the plural mekhoa, or moetlo, pi. meetlo. Sometimes a
distinction is drawn between molao on the one hand and
moetlo (or mokhoa) on the other. Thus in leqheku v.
Pholoana J.C. 287/47, Mojela in the Paramount Chief's
Court said of the custom of tlhabiso (the slaughtering
of an animal to mark bohali payment) that the requirement
of the bride's presence at the slaughtering of the
tlhabiso beast "is not molao, it is moetlo", adding that
"marriage is law" (lenyalo ke molao). But another
judgment affirmed that the bride must be present, and
stated that this was the molao le moetlo ("law and
custom") of the Basotho.
However, there is very little to be gained by
teasing out refinements in the use of these terms in
relation to "law" and "custom". Basotho do not (within
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the area of semantic overlap of the three) use them with
much precision. In particular, the words molao le moetlo
are regularly used as a twin pair, much like "law and
custom". Indeed, the pair moetlo le mokhoa are also
used in the sense of "law" (e.g. Seenzile J.C. 143/61,
A.C. Court)r Conversely, in Tsepe v. Peete J.C. 158/47,
the Paramount Chief's Court used molao to mean law and
(non-legal) custom indifferently, and described a certain
"custom" (molao) as being against the "law" (molao again).
It is not in a pedantic definition of terminology that
the view of the Basotho courts is to be found. This is
seen again in Lekhela v. Shishila J.C. 74/65 where the
court at Lejone declared that "in the custom of this
country (moetlong oa naha ena) land allocations are
public acts.... Private allocations are unlawful (e se
tsa molao)".
The substantive issue was raised in Manyebutse J.C.
49/44, where the claim was made that in a particular
area, it was the custom for a chief to resume lands after
a death, even though there were children left behind in
the family. The Paramount Chief's Court described this
"custom" as a tloaelo, meaning a "habit" or "accustomed
practice", and stated that its judgment proceeded "not
in accordance with the custom (tloaelo) which you say
is practised in your area, but in accordance with the
law (molao)".
Here, the (non-terminological) issue is raised of
local custom, as a derogation from general practice.
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A distinction must be made according the generality of
the rule or norm involved. It is shown in Chapter Six
below, for example, that in matters of family succession
and inheritance, the really cardinal rule is that now
formalised in Laws of Lerotholl (1959) Part I section 14
(4), requiring the calling of a council of the lelapa
("family") of the deceased, and that the substantive
norms represent the principles which inform the debates
within that council. The Basotho courts do not reject
even a wide variation in practice between one "family"
and another in this respect; and of course such practice
may reflect a private "custom" of the particular lineage
or clan or tribal group involved — more especially
where the various non-Sotho and non-Koena groups are
concerned. But where, as in Kkuebe J.C. 591/52, an
alleged exception strikes at a basic principle, another
view is taken. In this case, it was claimed by Chief
Sempe that chiefs do not return cattle on divorce,
though commoners must. D.M.L. Mojela rejected this
argument as impertinent, and commented:
"The •custom' means that which applies to the
nation generally; it cannot affect only a certain
sector of it.... The court admits that this
witness may produce evidence showing that chiefs
do not return cattle, but it will be found that
such action never came before a court.... Law
and custom should be the same throughout the
nation".
The court was recognising here that chiefs, in point of
fact, can often do what they please, since they have a
good expectation of not being brought to book for it;
and of course when chiefs conducted their own courts
directly, this was much truer than it has been since
the implementation of the 1938 Khubelu proclamations
(see Chapters Two, Three and Seven below). But in
rebutting Chief Sempe's claim, Mojela went too far,
since it is quite clear (as Chapter Three makes plain)
that in several critical areas different laws apply to
chiefs and to subjects; in the case in hand, however,
there was no such area involved, and the chief was
simply attempting to erect his practice into a legally
protected custom.
CHAPTER TWO
THL PUBLIC LAW OF CHIEFTAINSHIP AND SUCCESSION
In this discussion, the traditional political
system has been isolated for purposes of analysis (1).
Strictly speaking, rights of chieftainship and succession
in the period of the research derived ultimately from
recognition by the High Commissioner, in terms of the
constitutional law then prevailing in Basutoland (2),
though within this framework, recognition of chiefs
effectively rested upon the "final decision" made by
the Paramount Chief under Section 80 of the Basutoland
(Constitution) Order in Council 1959 • So far as the
judicial courts are concerned, the Gazette is the final
and conclusive criteria of Chieftainship. In this is
published the full list of recognised chiefs, together
with the name of their area and their place in the
hierarchy. The publication of a new Gazette fortunately
coincided with the beginning of this inquiry, so that an
up-to-date list was available.
However, the law governing chieftainship and succes¬
sion as here described is neither that of governmental
recognition nor even that of the statutory "final
decisions" of the Paramount Chief. The purpose of this
chapter is to elucidate the nature of the customary law
of succession to the higher chieftainship, largely in
abstraction from the formal processes of the administer¬
ing colonial authority of the time. The Gazette lists
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are far from irrelevant to the customary structure of
chieftainship, but they are not for the present purpose
conclusive of it.
Basutoland is administered by a centralised and
hierarchical chieftainship (borena). (The only terri¬
torial areas that fall outside chiefly control are those
expressly reserved by statute — notably the principal
towns and administrative headquarters of the colonial
administration, which are directly supervised by the
District Commissioner or other statutory authority).
At the head of the hierarchy stands the Paramount Chief,
whose jurisdiction extends over the whole nation. The
title is not indigenous, and has no specific translation.
In Sesotho, he is known as morena e moholo, which means
simply "the great chief", and though this term is used
of no other person, it is in no qualitative sense lingui¬
stically marked off from the word morena used of any other
chief. Recently, the formal title of Motlotlehi ("one
who deserves praise") was introduced as the official
designation of the Paramount Chief (subsequently king).
But there is no Sesotho word that exactly translates the
word "king". Borena, chieftainship, is a noun formed by
adding the prefix bo- to the stem -rena. This prefix
generally has the effect of turning a stem into an
abstract noun describing a state or condition. The
verb ho rena means "to be rich, not to work; to be a
chief" (5), and morena thus means "chief". Borena means
"chieftainship, kingship, government, authority" (Paroz
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1961: 427b). The word also shades off into a collective
sense, and can refer by implication to "the chieftainship"
as a corporation. Thus, in one case, a Basotho Court
rebuked an accused for "showing disrespect for chieft¬
ainship" (Hlangamadla v. P.C. J.C. 224/64); in another,
the Paramount Chief's Court increased a fine imposed on
a disobedient headman, on the grounds that he was
"evidently a man lacking in all respect for the chieft¬
ainship set over him" (o talimaha e le motho ea sa
hlompheng ho hang borena bo mo okometseng (Kehase v.
Borena J.C. 59/52). The "chieftainship" (in its collec¬
tive sense) has, in fact, a collegiate character, in
which the Paramount Chief has a preeminent role, but
which he does not exhaust (4). It is a matter for a
separate discussion to determine how far and in what
sense "village heads" (ho-ramotse) or even bugles (li-
phala) and messengers (maqosa) may be said to be sharers
in borena. But in common usage, the term morena is
used widely and unpedantically, as a sign of respect.
Close relatives of chiefs are regularly addressed as
morena; and the term is, of course, used in a more
direct sense of certain established village heads,
whether these are gazetted or not.
Below the Paramount Chief stand the twenty-two
Principal and Ward Chiefs, each having jurisdiction
over the whole of his ward. (The term "ward" is used
to indicate any area of chiefly jurisdiction, at no
matter what level of the hierarchy.) The distinction
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between Principal Chiefs and Ward Chiefs is somewhat
complex. All twenty-two are, in fact, Principal Chiefs,
except for the Chiefs of Tsikoane and Kolbere (one ward),
and Malingoaneng. Tsikoane and Kolbere is a dependency
of the Principal Chiefdom of Leribe, but has semi-autono¬
mous status as a result of the problems arising from the
succession to Moshoeshoe's second son Molapo (5).
Malingoaneng is a dependency of the Principal Chiefdom of
Mokhotlong, originally owing its special status to the
fact that it is occupied by the Ba-Tlokoa people, having
been awarded to them, under their leader Sekonyela, for
their part in the so-called Gun War (1880-1881) (Tylden
1950: 145-170; Ashton 1967: 190 f., etc.). This did
not end the vicissitudes of Tlokoa history in Basutoland;
in 1925 Paramount Chief Griffith placed his senior (6)
son and eventual successor Seeiso over Lelingoana, the
then Tlokoa chief, and a few years later attempted further
to demote the chieftaincy. The dispute was still in
the judicial courts in the late 'forties (Lelingoana v.
P.C. J.C. 31/46), but the recognition of Mosuoe Lelingoana
as "Chief of the Tlokoa" in 1948 combined with his sub¬
ordination to ftokhotlong to produce a viable compromise (7).
The Tlokoa are in this respect rather better off than
some other "immigrant" groups, though not quite so well
provided for as the Ba-Taung or the Makhoakhoa, each of
whom have a full Principal Chiefdom. During the period
of this study, membership of the twenty-two carried
membership of the College of Chiefs (set up under the
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1959 Order in Council), a body whose function it was to
determine issues of succession, jurisdiction and discipline
among the chieftainships (8).
The twenty Principal Chiefdoms are:





Koeneng and Mapoteng Taung
*Katsieng Quthing
Rothe and Masite etc. Ratsoleli and Mashai
Maama's (Qacha's Nek)
Ramabanta's (Kubake) ^Mokhotlong
*(During the revevant period of the research the
Principal Wards of Matsieng and Mokhotlong were held
directly by the Paramount Chief in his capacities as
Principal Chief of the two Wards. The wards were
administered by Reentseng and Bofihla respectively
(each the son of a different and junior house of
Paramount Chief Griffith).)
In each principal ward, there are a varying number
of chiefs or headmen directly subordinate to their
principal chiefs; for example, in that part of the
Principal Ward of Rothe and Masite that falls within
the administrative district of Maseru (9) there are
thirteen such chiefs. Of these thirteen, ten have in
their turn lesser chiefs or headmen directly subordinate
to them, to a total of forty-eight. Of these forty-
eight, one (a headman) has a headman subordinate to
him, making a total of sixty-three jurisdictions.
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In Basutoland as a whole, there are about 1,120 chiefs
and headmen altogether — in some respects an astonish¬
ing figure for a total population of less than 1,000,000
and a resident population much lower than that.
Moreover, these figures relate only to gazetted chiefs
and headmen. Many others possess a dje facto jurisdict¬
ion, in positions subordinate to those listed in the
Gazette (10).
It is normal for the Principal Chief to hold at
least one of the substantial chiefdoms in his ward in
his own name. Thus, in the example from Hothe and
Masite already given, Kohlalefi Bereng (whose full
title is Principal Chief of Rothe, Masite, Serooeng,
Lets'eng, Kolo-ha-Mohlalefi and Thaba-Tseica ha Ntaote)
holds one of the thirteen immediately subordinate
chiefdoms himself, namely, that of Rothe and Masite, to
which seven headmen are attached. In fact, a chief at
any level of the hierarchy does not grant the whole of
his ward to subordinates, but retains a part in his own
hands, so that the sum of all the subordinate wards in
any chiefdom is not as great as the totality of the
superior ward of which they are parte.
The ruling dynasty in Basutoland is normally
described as belonging to the Koena (Crocodile) clan,
and this terminology will be retained. It is, however,
not completely accurate, in that the Bakoena form a
much larger group, of which the Basutoland branch is
only a part, and a rather junior part at that (11);
within the Bakoena, the Basutoland chiefs are more
properly known as (Ba-) Mokoteli. Some Basotho insist
on the point (more especially if they are descended
from one of the more senior Koena lines, such as Ts'olo
or one of the senior sons of Monaheng), hut in everyday
parlance it would be pedantic — or else combative —
to make an issue of it. In any case, the term Koena
serves to distinguish the principal chiefly group from
the other Sotho clans in the population: Fokeng, Rolong,
Phuthi, Taung, etc.
According to a fairly recent survey, not more than
about 30 per cent of the population are Koena (12).
However, the bulk of the chieftainship are Koena chiefs.
Most of the discission in this chapter will be concerned
with the internal relationships within the Koena chief¬
tainship, though some attention will be paid to certain
aspects of the process whereby they obtained their
present supremacy.
Moshoeshoe I, the founder of the nation, died in
1870, leaving four sons in his first house (13). These
were, in order, his heir and successor Letsie I; Molapo;
Masopha (Masupha); and Majara. Attention will be
focussed mainly on the relationship between the first
three of these, and the chiefly lineages descended
from them. Each of these three brothers is the start¬
ing point for a major lineage, hereafter referred to
as a "cardinal" lineage (segment, descent group, chief¬
tainship etc.), finding its apical ancestor in one of
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these three. The senior line represents the succession
of the Paramount Chiefs, which is as follows:
MOSHQESHOE I d. 1870
LETSIE I 1870-1891
LEROTHOLI 1891-1905
LETSIE II 1905-1913^ OMMTH 1913-1939
SEEISO 1939-1940
MOSHOESHOE II (BEHEEG) acc. I960
Certain problems arise in relation to this line of
succession, which may be discussed before the other
cardinal lines are examined. These problems raise
general questions regarding the law of succession and
have application beyond the Paramountcy.
Duncan informally but reasonably writes that "the
traditional law controlling succession might be described
as 'heredity modified by expediency'. That is to say,
normally succession would be by heredity, but if a chief
were totally unsuitable, particularly in a crisis, he
would be passed over in favour of a better man, prefer¬
ably a member of his own family" (I960: 48). The
present law is much more rigorous than this, as expressed
in Laws of Lerotholi (1959) Part I, sec. 2:
The succession to chieftainship shall be by
right of birth; that is, the first born male
of the first wife married; if the first wife
has no male issue then the first born male
child of the next wife in succession shall
be the chief. - Provided that if a chief
dies leaving no male issue, the chieftainship
shall devolve upon the male following according
to the succession of houses.
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Historically, the rules exhibited a preferential
tendency to primogeniture, and, even with this frame¬
work, different particular rules were held to apply
by persons with different interests. Thus, Nehemiah
was the sixth of all the sons of Moshoeshoe, a child
of the third house. Moshoeshoe had one son (Neko) in
his second house. Nehemiah argued that the third
house — that of the "wife of the breast" — took
precedence over the second house and also (apparently)
over all but the eldest son of the first house.
"Letsie alone, as eldest son, is entitled to the chief¬
tainship, and I follow him in rank. I would take
Letsie's place" (Moshesh 1880). The history of the
law of succession over the following sixty years
represents the growing ascendancy of the primogenitural
principle in Basutoland. This ascendency was achieved
across political conflicts, and though easily capable
of post hoc legitimation, it is to be seen as the
culmination of a political process rather than as simply
the full implementation of any certain and pre-existing
rule of law (14).
The conflict began even before Koshoeshoe's death.
Moshoeshoe did not wish the succession from his heir
Letsie to pass to Lerotholi, the son of Letsie's second
house (there being no surviving male issue of the first
house). Moshoeshoe attempted to pass the succession
through the daughter of the first house, Senate. The
plan failed, and Lerotholi in due course succeed d to
his father as Paramount Chief (15). Lerotholi took
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the leading part in setting up the Basutoland National
Council, one of whose first acts was to issue a declarat¬
ion of law and custom (16) in which Law One stated the
law of succession in terms very similar to those of the
1959 amendment, sec. 2, quoted above. Duncan is probably
right to comment that "it may... be assumed that lerotholi's
desire was that his new council ought to record the
custom of descent through the male line..." (Duncan I960:
44).
A further point of interest in Lerotholi's succes¬
sion concerns the composition of the group convoked to
determine the candidate. In both public and private
succession, the initial consideration of the matter
lies with a "family council" (17). On Letsie's death,
the council consisted of Letsie's own sons. But on
the suggestion and recommendation of the Resident
Commissioner, the "Sons of Letsie" were enlarged to
include the "Sons of Moshoeshoe" — Masopha; seven sons
of Letsie; three sons of Molapo and Majara; one son of
the full brother of Moshoeshoe; one son of a half-
brother; two nephews; and one other relative — sixteen
persons in all. This incident has important implicat¬
ions for the ensuing analysis: it reveals a tension
between two principles of succession, the one tending
to regard each successive chief as a "new" Moshoeshoe,
the other tending to see the treble (strictly quadruple)
lineage structure deriving from Moshoeshoe's sons as
the permanent, once-for-all framework of the p< litical
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and legal order. The enlargement of the "Sons of Letsie"
to the "Sons of Moshoeshoe" can also be seen from a
slightly different aspect as founding an assertion that
the choice of the Paramount Chief is a matter for the
whole nation (through its chiefs, or at least through
the Koena-Mokoteli chiefs) rather than for a succession
council composed of the immediate family (lelapa) of the
deceased Paramount.
Related problems arose on the death of Letsie II
in 1913. Letsie left only an infant son, and his senior
widow, 'Kahali, made no claim to act as regent during
the child's minority. His junior brother of the same
house, Griffith, seemed already anxious to play for
higher stakes. Then, after an inconclusive meeting of
the Sons of Moshoeshoe at Matsieng, the infant died, and
the way was clear for Griffith to claim the Paramountcy
direct — to sit on the throne "with both buttocks".
At this meeting at Matsieng, no suggestion was made
that only the "Sons of Lerotholi" should make the
decision — or so it was stated by Jeremiah Moshoeshoe,
son of Moshoeshoe's junior son George, giving evidence
at the age of 72 in the succession case before the High
Court (Bereng v. 'Mantsebo 1926-1953 H.C.T.L.k. 50).
According to the same source, Chief Jonathan Molapo
objected that a posthumous son might still be born to a
widow of Letsie. This was a reference to the law of
kenelo (levirate), the effect of which is that a son
born to a widow as a result of kenelo-union wit an
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agnate (usually a younger brother) of the deceased, is
recognised as a son of the deceased. The validity of
kenelo has recently been upheld in the Paramount Chief's
court, and some consideration given to the proviso in
the existing Laws of Lerotholi, sec. 2. The court
decided that the proviso applied only where there was
no surviving posthumous child at the relevant time; in
other circumstances, a posthumous child assumes the
position of his deceased pater. "According to Basotho
Law and Custom a child is begotten by the cow (ngoana o
tsoaloa khomo)" (18). This certainly fits Griffith's
own policy well, since he accepted the throne under the
explicit reservation that subsequent kenelo-children born
to his brother's widow should have no claim. The "Sons
of Letsie" endorsed Griffith's accession, in terms of a
letter to the Resident Commissioner from Chiefs Maama
and Mojela Letsie "on behalf of the Sons of Letsie and
the Matsieng people". Matsieng was the site of Letsie's
home, and this letter can be seen as an assertion (albeit
a complaisant one) of the special relevance of the lelapa
even in a matter of the "national" chieftainship.
Griffith's accession thus represents a certain degree of
change in the law of succession, since from one point of
view it appears to assert propinquity to the first
cardinal line as the criterion of seniority. Yet it can
be, and sometimes is, regarded simply as a modification
of the rules governing posthumous children and nothing
more (19).
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Further difficulties arose with the succession to
Griffith. Griffith had no sons from his first house.
In his second house, his heir was Seeiso, who was born
in 1905; and in his third house he had an older son,
Bereng, born in 1902. Griffith wished Bereng to
succeed him. (Chief Goliath (see note 19 above) claims
that Seeiso's mother, Sebueng, deserted Griffith and
returned home to her father, Chief Nkuebe Letsie of
Quthing; the problem was resolved at Lerotholi's instance
when Nkuebe provided another daughter as a seantlo wife
to replace Sebueng (20). But the incident was a
plausible ground on which Griffith could claim that
Bereng was his senior son — whose mother (like two
other wives of Griffith) was also a daughter of Nkuebe.)
In the event, Griffith was not successful (21); but,
again, the frustration of his original wish should be
seen as a stage in the development of the law, rather
than the simple victory of an already known law over
political ambition. It is relevant also to notice
that both when Griffith sought to promote Bereng, and
when after his death the decision was made for Seeiso,
a plenary meeting of the "Sons of Moshoeshoe" was
summoned (though on the first occasion only thirty-three
of the seventy invited appeared, of whom twenty-two
supported Bereng).
These issues came up for renewed debate with the
death of Seeiso in 1940, after a very short reign. In
his first house, Seeiso married a daughter of Chief
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Sempe of Quthing, and had from her a daughter Nts'ebo,
but no sons.
In his second house, he married the daughter of a
Tlokoa chief from Mokhotlong, and in this house the
eldest son is Bereng Seeiso, later Paramount Chief, who
was born in 1938. In his third house, his son is
Leshoboro, born a few years before Bereng and now
Principal Chief of Likhoele; 'Ma-Leshoboro is a daughter
of the late Principal Chief of Matelile from the third
house of Letsie I.
The issue that arose on Seeiso's death was not so
much that of succession as of regency, and the dispute
between the late Seeiso's brother Bereng and his senior
widow 'Mants'ebo gave rise to the major legal action
already referred to. In the event, 'Mants'ebo continued
as regent and Acting Paramount Chief until I960 when
the young chief Bereng Seeiso was installed as Paramount
Chief Moshoeshoe II. The grounds of judgment are not
of direct concern, since they rest upon principles that
are not always fully authentic; but some of the circum¬
stances of the dispute raise important and relevant
problems. Bereng maintained that the choice of succes¬
sor (and also of regent) lies with the immediate members
of the deceased's family. When they have made their
decision, they then summon the surviving members of the
lineage next in depth (in this case the Sons of Letsie).
Thereafter, the sons of Molapo, Masupha and Majara would
be informed. At the meeting at Matsieng, very soon
after Seeiso's death, some effort was made to separate
out the Sons of Letsie from the other Sons of Moshoeshoe
present, hut without success. In the event, the deter¬
mining role of the Sons of Moshoeshoe was acknowledged,
the greater part of them (including all hut two of the
Principal Chiefs) supporting 'Mants'eho against Bereng
Griffith.
Other issues, of course, entered into the dispute;
prominent among these were the question of the lawful
role of women (22); the relationship between the senior
widow and the heir in public law; the danger of a
paternal uncle usurping the throne to himself if appoint¬
ed regent; the effect of a possible kenelo (leviratic)
union between the regent and the royal widow; and
others again. Attention has been focussed here on
those aspects of the case that bear most directly on
the manner in which seniority and succession are
envisaged and given effect to. Bereng's claim rested
upon his position within the lelapa of the deceased
chief. His position within that lelapa determined
his high rank among the chiefs of Basutoland. It will
be argued subsequently that there is a tension between
this principle of seniority, and an alternative
principle, where rank is determined by reference to the
enduring "cardinal lines" (in terms of which the Chief
of Leribe would have the precedence, as the incumbent
of the Molapo chieftainship).
The House of Letsie thus provides the line of the
Paramount Chief. Second in order comes the House of
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Molapo. The complex story of this house can he found
in various forms in several sources, and only those
aspects that are relevant to the present argument will
be recounted here (23). The succession to Molapo and
the present structure of chieftainship in the North are
diagramatically presented in Jones (1966: 66-7). What
had been Molapo*s northern ward now consists of (1) the
Principal Chiefdom of Leribe, whose incumbent during
the period of research was the late Letsie Mots'oene,
heir to the first house of Molapo's senior son Joseph;
(2) the Principal Chiefdom of Butha-Buthe, under Kuini
Mopeli, heir to the house of Joel, from Molapo's second
house; and (3) the (major) Ward of Tsikoane and Kolbere,
under Jonathan Mathealira, from the first house of
Jonathan, Molapo's second son in his first house (24).
Butha-Buthe was formally created a separate Principal
Chiefdon by Paramount Chieftainess *Mantsebo, but as
will be seen it had enjoyed largely autonomous status
for many years — in fact, since Joel had defied the
authority of Jonathan shortly after Molapo's death.
At the same time Butha-Buthe is of lesser rank than
Leribe and in certain aspects remains subordinate to
the latter (25).
An account of the house of Molapo, and its
relationship to the Paramount Chieftaincy, is found in
an anonymous account dating from 1928 in the Basutoland
Archives in Maseru (26). Internal evidence makes it
clear that it is the work of an informed Mosotho of
89
strong pro-Jonathan sentiments. The following is a
precis of this lengthy document:
Precis of "A Resume of the Causes which have led to the
Present Condition of Affairs in the Leribe
District" (Anon. 1928)
For three years, Molapo, the second son of Moshoeshoe,
was (together with his people) a subject of the Orange
Free State. After his ransom, he attached himself
to his father, ind his area (after various adjustments)
became what it is now.
Molapo had two principal sons by his chief wife •Ma-
Mo sa — Joseph and Jonathan — and two by his second
wife — Joel and Mpaki. Joseph as senior was given
Butha-Buthe, and the other sons received caretakings
too. At a later stage, Joel was given charge of
Joseph when the latter showed signs of imbecility.
After the Gun War, when Molapo had died, Letsie I
had to come to Leribe to adjudicate a dispute over
succession between Jonathan and Joel. He confirmed
Joel in Butha-Buthe, but (following Molapo's charge)
maintained Jonathan as the senior son and sole succes¬
sor to the chieftainship of Leribe. Joseph's son
Kots'oene had, moreover, been hailed while still an
infant as the future Paramount Chief, though of
course the succession never went to him in the end (27).
Joel, however, did not recognise Jonathan's authority;
and this led to the subsequent disputes between the
sons of Molapo. The Paramount Chief's people in
Matsieng supported Joel, and Jonathan's complaints
against Joei's insubordination were neglected.
Appeals from Joel's ward went direct to Matsieng,
instead of passing through Jonathan. Moreover, in
an important area dispute between Leribe and Butha-
Buthe. the Paramount Chief's representative (Chief
Maama) and the Resident Commissioner overruled
Jonathan's decision and made an award to Joel that
Jonathan regarded as an invasion of his rights —
especially as he had given the area to Mots'oene as
part of his cattle-post. Jonathan claimed that
Mots'oene's right extended over the whole of the
northern province, whereas his opponents sought to
limit Mots'oene to Jonathan's own area. But
Jonathan could not resist the pressures against him
and had to yield to his junior brother. Matsieng
bears much responsibility for this affront.
Jonathan was unusual in having six wives. The
first, second, third and fourth had no surviving
male issue. The fifth, 'Ma-Tumo, had Tumo, Jan
Fick (a lunatic) and Moramang. The sixth is the
notorious 'Ma-Tau, mother of various independent
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kinglets: Tau and Moshoeshoe (both dead), Majara,
Setsomi, Lelingoana and Matlamela.
At one stage, the late Mathealira (deceased son of
Jonathan's second wife) became involved in a direct
clash with Tau. Jonathan himself favoured Tau,
whilst the majority of the chiefs and people were
for Mathealira. In the circumstances, Jonathan
had no choice but to seek the intervention of the
Paramount Chief. The Paramount Chief thereupon
drew a boundary delimiting the caretakings of the
various sons. This was not the purpose Jonathan
had in mind in seeking his adjudication. Moreover,
the Paramount Chief's award separated the ward of
Jonathan from taat of Mots'oene, Joseph's son,
although there had been no quarrel between them;
and no order was made requiring the subjects of the
chiefs to remove themselves into the appropriate
areas.
This award was made by Griffith, and Jonathan
appealed against it to Leteie II. But the Para¬
mount Chief rejected the appeal. The consequence
has been to confirm Tau in his disobedience to
Mots'oene and encourage him in his ambitions to
become chief of Molapo's area.
As a result, there are three warring factions within
the senior house of Molapo: the sons of Joseph, the
sons of Jonathan, and the sons of 'Ma-Tau. On top
of this, there is the question of Joel himself.
Jonathan's generosity has been met by insubordination,
backed up by unfairness and hostility from Matsieng."
This account, partial though it obviously is (28),
is illuminating of the role of the Paramount Chiefs,
and the occasions which they seized to "interfere" (as
one school would have it: "intervene" according to others)
in the affairs of other cardinal lines (29). It is
significant that the writer regularly refers to "the
Matsieng section", treating the Paramountcy as simply
one, albeit the senior, of the cardinal lines derived
from Moshoeshoe's sons. In a passage omitted from the
precis, the writer demands: "Grant him (Jonathan) the
same powers as Masupha exercises in his own district
or any lesser chiefs like Bereng, Theko and Maama in
Maseru district — for even a common headman has the
right to place his son anywhere in his caretaking with¬
out reference to his immediate chief." This author is
plainly an advocate of what will be called the "retros¬
pective" principle of seniority: typically, he regards
what will be explained as the "circumspective" principle
as the result of historical accident, and as a distortion
of the authentic Sotho law and custom (molao le moetlo oa
Basotho). He also points to what he regards as a
sinister alliance between the colonial power (in the
person of the Resident Commissioner) and the Paramountcy -
though others (e.g., texts in Germond 1967) took the
view that the British authorities were culpable in fail¬
ing to back the Paramount Chief against the "rebels".
The subsequent history of Basutoland, however, makes it
clear that on the whole the British administration
played an important part in enlarging the de facto power,
and ultimately the de lure authority, of the Paramount
Chief — though in this they were not so much creating
something new as bringing to the fore one aspect of the
political structure of Koena rule that had always been
present. In fact, Letsie II was, if anything, a weak
ruler. The major extension of Paramount domination
took place in the long reign of Griffith (1913-1939).
One of the "contradictions" in the "retrospective"
view is also apparent in the anonymous's account: the
autonomous rights of the cardinal houses are stressed,
but discomfort is felt if the logic of this vie- is
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then extended to any claims made by subordinates within
any of these houses. The writer wants Jonathan to
display in his own ward the very prerogatives which the
Paramount is blamed for exercising in Basutoland as a
whole. In fact, within the Molapo wards, this is just
what happened. Collateral lines have been depressed,
to make way for the advancement of sons (including
younger sons) of the reigning chief's own line.
The third and fourth houses of Moshoeshoe's first
house will be more briefly discussed. The third son,
Masupha, received the ward of Berea (forming most of
the administrative district of Teyateyaneng). At the
time of the research the Principal Chief Regentess was
Chieftainess 'Ma-Mathe, acting for her minor son David
Masupha, who has since acceded to the Masupha throne (30).
The House of Masupha retains this major ward intact.
Though small geographically, it is thickly populated
(holding half as many tax payers again as the enormous
mountain territory of Mokhotlong), and has most of its
area in the (relatively) fertile areas of the lowlands
and Foothills (cf. Morojele 1962).
Of the four senior sons of Moshoeshoe, Majara's
legacy has been much the poorest. The Principal Chief-
dom of Majara's, ruled in 1964 by Chief Leshoboro Majara,
is one of the smallest of the Principal and Ward Chief-
doms in Basutoland, only Kubake's and Likoeneng having
fewer taxpayers. Majare's makes up that part of Berea
which is not part of 'Ma-Mathe's (Masupha's) wad.
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It is now possible to look more generally at the
structure of the major chieftainship as a whole.
For this purpose, the Principal Chiefdoms of the Taung
and the Khoakhoa, together with the Ward of Malingoaneng,
will be excluded since they are not Koena chiefdoms.
The Principal Chiefdoms of Koeneng and Mapoteng and of
Tajane's also form a partly special case, in that they
derive from Makhabane and Mohale respectively, who were
brothers of Moshoeshoe and thus fall in collateral
lines; the same is true of Goliath's ward at Likoeneng
(see above note 19), and of a few small sub-wards in
Mafeteng and Mohale's Hoek districts. This leaves









Rothe and Masite etc.
Thaba-Bosiu
making seventeen in all.
than twelve belong to the cardinal line deriving from
Letsie I, i.e., all except Butha-Buthe, Leribe and
Tsikoane (from Molapo), 'Ma-Mathe's (from Masupha), and
Majara's (from Majara). The two wards of Tajarxe and
of Koeneng and Mapoteng, deriving as they do from junior







Qacha's Nek (Ratsoleli and Kashai)
Mokhotlong
Of this number, no fewer
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subordinate to letsie's house; and the Taung chiefdom
is geographically as well as affinally so closely linked
to the house of Letsie as to offer no counterbalance to
its primacy. What has occurred has, in fact, been a
double process; the imposition of Koena (Mokoteli) chief¬
tainship upon virtually the whole of Basutoland, and
within that the largely successful assertion of the
"paramountcy of the Paramount" within the Sons of
Moshoeshoe. Both aspects of this process must be
examined, both separately and in relationship to each
other. But first it may be as well to bring out some
theoretical features of the principles of seniority
and succession that have so far suggested themselves.
A Mosotho setting out to determine the seniority of a
chief may do so in part by "looking backwards", and
identifying the cardinal line through which he is
descended from Koshoeehoe. In so far as this respects
the structure constituted by Moshoeshoe through his
sons, it will be called "retrospective". Since, more¬
over, "the father never dies" (monna ha a shoele) (31)
but lives on in the person of his successor, the four
lines simply move forward in parallel lines from
generation to generation, never losing their structural
relationship to each other or their relative position
within the hierarchy. Thus, retrospectively, Letsie
Mots'oene of Leribe, as successor of Molapo, was in 1964
the second chief after the Paramount, since Molapo was
second brother to Letsie (32). Similarly, David Masupha
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became the third chief on his accession, being successor
to Moshoeshoe's third son. It is implied in the retro¬
spective reckoning of seniority that Moshoeshoe's sons
stand as the founding fathers of a lineage which has a
"once-for-all" character. It is essentially non-repeti¬
tive, in the sense that it is not open to each succeeding
Paramount Chief to start the process afresh by promoting
his own sons and so narrowing the Moshoeshoe lineage by
reducing it to its own senior segment. When lerotholi
succeeded Letsie in 1891 he did so as the senior member
of Moshoeshoe's senior descent line, and Jonathan
succeeded Molapo (33) in the north as the senior member
of Moshoeshoe's second descent line (though still in the
senior house), etc. In the non-repetitive system, it
is not open to letsie to make his second son head of
the second cardinal line, to be replaced in his turn by
yet a further nominee in the next generation.
The retrospective system thus ideally considered is
in tension with a competing system, which will be called
"circumspective". But before this second system is
examined, a problem must be considered within the retro¬
spective system itself. This arises from the internal
segmentation with each of the cardinal lineages, as they
bifurcate and divide into subordinate lineages within
the major lineage from which they spring. In other
words, there is the problem of what to do with junior
sons. As will be seen, these were — and are —
regularly "placed" within the ward to which they were
born, in positions (caretakings) subordinate to that of
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the senior son but co-ordinate with each other — or,
at least, that is what "ideally" takes place; though in
fact cross-winds of political rivalry frequently distort
the "ideal" process: and indeed it will become apparent
that there are absolute factors as well, notably the
filling up of places after a few generations have passed.
But this is to anticipate. What emerges at present is
that although the retrospective system is "non-repetitive"
at one level, it is "repetitive" at a lower level. At
the level of the cardinal lines, each line retains the
seniority which it derives from its relationship to
Moshoeshoe, who set up "once and for all" the cardinal
lineages that persist through time in an unchanging
structural relationship. But within each cardinal
line, secondary segmentations occur, on the model of
Moshoeshoe and his sons, so that in the next generation
the system repeats itself at a lower level of political
structure. This segmentation is in its turn "non-
repetitive" at its own level, though in the third
generation a similar segmentation and repetition occur
at the structural level next below. Each level
represents both a grade in the political hierarchy and
a generation in time.
The problem that emerges concerns the ranking of
the segments in relation to the cardinal lines. A
chief in whose interest it is to assess his seniority
retrospectively will rank first the senior successors



















to the successors of the major segments of the cardinal
lines in the same order, then to the minor segments,
and so on. Pig. 1 is an attempt to represent such a
retrospective system, the order of seniority moving
from left to right (senior to junior) and being determined
by retrospective distance from Moshoeshoe I. It also
illustrates the political and generational levels at
which any given sub-system is repetitive or non-repeti¬
tive (34).
Political authority is in principle territorially
determined in Basutoland (35), the Paramount Chief
having authority over the whole territory, a Principal
Chief over the whole of his principal ward, a minor
chief over the whole of his minor ward, etc. In terms
of the retrospective system, therefore, any chief's
position in the political structure should indicate not
only his social ranking, but also his territorial
jurisdiction and subordination. This would mean, for
example, that 2b in Pig. 1 would hold a minor ward
within the major ward of 2a, who in turn would hold his
major ward within the principal ward of 2, who in his
turn holds directly of the Paramount Chief. But though
the two systems do indeed reflect each other like mirror
images in many cases (36) it is at least as frequently
found that they do not. The political system departs
from the genealogical system to varying degrees. The
next step in the analysis is to identify the source and
nature of this "distortion", when it occurs.
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One important factor was, historically, the legis¬
lation introduced by the British administration in 1938.
The 1938 Proclamations (commonly referred to in Lesotho
as the khubelu, the Red (Book), after the colour of the
original) represented an attempt by the colonial Govern¬
ment to rationalise and systematise the complex,
cumbersome and imprecise pattern of chiefly administra¬
tion and justice, as it had come to be in the 1930's as
a result of the processes about to be examined. The
formal consequence of the kbubelu was to place the
chieftainship on the statutory basis referred to at
the beginning of this chapter, and to provide the Govern¬
ment with enabling legislation permitting the High
Commissioner and hie agents to implement a series of
ancillary modifications into Native Administration as
circumstances indicated. (The effects of Khubelu on
the administration of justice in the traditional sector
are discussed in Chapter Three and Chapter Seven).
This is not the place to describe in full or in detail
the nature and consequences of the 1938 Proclamations,
which have been admirably discussed and analysed else¬
where (Jones 1951: ch. 6; Hailey 1953: 64-112, 130-147);
it will suffice to draw attention to certain aspects of
this legislation pertinent to the argument in this
chapter. (Other aspects will be discussed in the
appropriate places.) Two correlative features may be
mentioned at the outset. The gazetting of chiefs had
the effect of freezing, or purporting to freeze, the
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chieftainship in the form and structure, and with the
incumbents, it was deemed to possess by the competent
authorities at the time the first "recognitions" were
issued. Succession was (formally) now dependent on
"recognition" by the High Commissioner. Naturally,
however, the information on which recognition was based
was not gathered directly by him or his staff or agents,
but was supplied by the superior chiefs with whom the
Resident Commissioner and the District Commissioners
had most to do. Prom this point of view, the 1938
legislation can be regarded as a potent weapon in the
hands of the chiefs against their subordinates, enabling
them to conscript the whole weight of the sovereign
colonial authority behind their selection for gazettement.
By freezing the status quo and prohibiting unauthorised
"placings", the Proclamations also tended to support the
autonomy of the cardinal lines, and of recognised
segments within these, and from this point of view they
acted in support of the "retrospective" principle within
the upper levels of the hierarchy. But, at the same
time, this legislation did much, over the years, to
consolidate the position of the Paramount Chief and to
give statutory backing to his decisions and administrative
orders. In this sense, the khubelu favoured a "circum¬
spective" principle, as the competing basis of seniority
will be called.
Although it is true that the statutory enactments
were not necessarily or immediately followed through
101
into the customary or "traditional" sector, it would be
a serious error to suppose that they can be disregarded
in a study of the recent and contemporary chieftainship.
Though at first not many Basotho were fully aware of
the implications of the change, consciousness of what
was involved became more widespread as the Government
progressively implemented the modifications which it was
empowered to introduce by the new legislation. Pew,
if any, chiefs are now unaware of the importance of the
gazette.
But important though the 1938 legislation was, it
was a (partly misguided) response to a set of processes
internal to the Basotho nation and chieftainship, and it
is these processes that are crucial to an understanding
of the public law of succession as a whole, and of the
"circumspective" principle in particular.
The Koena paramountcy has converted a military
hegemony into a political order largely by the use of
two linked techniques: a complex pattern of intermarriage,
and the appointment or "placing" of the Sons of Moshoeshoe
as superior chiefs over other and pre-existing chiefs
and communities. The network of marriage alliance
among the senior chiefs does not lend itself to discur¬
sive treatment and is therefore set out in an appendix
(See Appendix III). What may be observed here is that
inasmuch as the density of the network and the prolifer¬
ation of affinal ties sets up a variety of relationships
between incumbents of office, there is much scope for
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delicately "balanced discussion over issues of seniority,
depending on how the relationship is traced. Such
debates can be further complicated by the problems of
both fact and law arising from adoption, kenelo, seantlo,
eeriti, marriage to the grave, divorce, bohali payments,
etc. Most of these factors, and others too, are well
illustrated in the long-drawn-out and continuing dispute
over the chieftainship of Patlong in Qacha's Nek (37).
"Placing" (ho isa, ho bea, ho nts'a motse) simply
means "appointment", but is the word universally used,
in English, to refer to the Sesotho practice whereby a
chief could appoint a man (normally a son) to a ward
or caretaking in his own area. It can refer to the
simple act of placing a successor in the place of a
deceased or deposed chief, and in this sense there is
little to be said; in principle, this successor is the
man whom the law points out as the "heir" to the chief¬
tainship. The initial decision and determination is
made by the "family", notably the deceased's brothers,
whereafter the successor is presented to and accepted
by the superior chief (in the case of a Principal Chief,
this superior is of course the Paramount). Leaving
aside the technical considerations of recognition and.
gazettement following the khubelu, such "placings" do
not create any disturbance in principle; although
naturally disputes may arise over who, in fact or in
law, had the better right, in the absence of such dis¬
agreement the placing of a successor to a deceased
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does not alter the structure of chieftainship, nationally
or locally. But "placing" has a sharper meaning too,
and often indicates the creation of a new position,
usually for the son of a leading chief, and usually above
an existing chief of headman (or chiefs and headmen) in
his or their own area. The effect of a placing of this
kind is to leave formally intact the position of and
succession to the chief over whom the new chief is placed,
but in practice it depresses the position of the existing
chief, and of all the chiefs below. This is partly
because a further link is now introduced in the chain of
command, and partly because the new chief requires
lands and jurisdiction to maintain him, which he inevit¬
ably acquires at the expense of the now subordinate
chiefs over whom he is placed. The depression of
status by the introduction of a new link was noticed
above, in the history of Griffith's placing of Seeiso
over Lelingoana, the Tlokoa chief, and Rafolatsane,
previously placed over the Basuto settlers, both in
Mokhotlong (and see Ashton 1938: 319-320; 1967: 201).
Appeals from both Lelingoana and Rafolatsane now went
to Seeiso, instead of directly to the Paramount Chief.
Griffith also, as was the custom, demanded an area
(caretaking) for Seeiso's own personal jurisdiction.
Mosuoe (Lelingoana) was reluctant to hand over any of
his own area; and the dispute continued not only after
Seeiso attained the Paramountcy in 1939, but after his
death in the following year. In 1944, the Paramount
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Chief ('Mantsebo) sent messengers to demarcate an area,
and the Paramount Chief's court told Mosuoe that "it is
the law that when the son of a chief is placed (lit.
presented) over somebody, the man over whom he is placed
is obliged to make over a caretaking" (38). It is to
be remembered, moreover, that before the implementation
of the 1938 changes, court fines and tribute-labour
(matsema) were important sources of wealth.
Placings were also the means whereby Moshoeshoe and
his sons achieved effective political control over the
non-Koena groups — a control which was further strength¬
ened by judicious intermarriage with them. In addition
to these general political advantages, the placing
system provided a means of securing promotion for those
whom a Chief desired to advance or favour, and especially
for his own sons or brothers; by placing such immediate
relatives, he not only advanced the position of his kin,
but also maintained an intimate political link with the
group over whom the placing was made (39). Moreover,
in so far as younger and junior sons are also placed
(rather than simply the heir, who would succeed to the
chieftainship in any event), the placing system had
the effect of advancing the position of the senior
descent line at the expense of collateral lines (40).
This process has already been observed in the preceding
references to Leribe, and the promotion of Jonathan's
sons within the ward. More or less rapid demotion of
formerly respectable chiefly families occurred with
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great frequency all over Basutoland. Of course, this
process served to hold in check the fissiparous tenden¬
cies inherent in a segmentary system once a fair
genealogical distance has opened between one line and
another, with the passing of even a few generations.
But just because of this, it represents a tendency
incompatible with the ideal retrospective and non-
repetitive principle discussed above. The alternative
principle implied by "placing" hints at a reckoning of
seniority deriving from propinquity to the reigning
house of the day; instead of "looking backward", a man
can look "round about", and calculate his social position
in terms of this other criterion, if it suits him to do
so; hence, it may be called a "circumspective" way of
establishing seniority in the chieftainship. For
instance, in this way of thinking, the Paramount Chief
is seen not so much as a Son of Moshoeshoe (implying
that the second chief is the heir to the house of Molapo),
nor even a son of Letsie or Lerotholi, but (as Bereng
argued in 1940) rather as a son of Griffith or of
Seeiso, etc. — the minimal lineage replacing the
maximal as the focus of reference. Many Basotho would
thus describe not Mots'oene of Leribe, but Leshoboro
of Likhoele (41), the elder but junior brother of
Moshoeshoe II, as the "second biggest chief in Basuto¬
land" (42). (it will be remembered that Leshoboro is
the son of Seeiso Griffith's third house). Similarly,









Phamong, the son of Griffith's favourite and eldest son
Bereng, would rank as the "third" chief in the land.
Obviously, in terms of the "circumspective" principle
itself, claims to seniority couched in terms of proximity
to the throne lose their strength as the generations
pass. Indeed, it was anticipated that were the Paramount
Chief to place his full brother Mathealira at Mokhotlong,
the latter would become (for the "circumspective" school)
the "second" chief, displacing Likhoele and Phamong (43).
If this principle is expressed in ideal form, it
gives rise to the pattern of seniority represented in
Fig- 2, where the retrospective reference to Moshoeshoe I
and the cardinal lines set up by him "once and for all"
have given way to a circumspective reference to the
reigning Paramount Chief of the day. Such a system is
clearly fully repetitive at every level and would, if
realised, result in the "shunting off" into virtual
oblivion of all chiefs of other cardinal lines super¬
numerary to the number of wards available. In fact,
this has not happened at the level of the cardinal
lineages, though as has been seen it has regularly
taken place at lower levels of the chiefly hierarchy,
extinguishing or demoting junior collateral lines and
advancing the senior house. It has not been politically
possible for the Paramount Chief's own line to act
invaseively at the expense of the houses of Molapo and
Masopha in a similar way (44); nevertheless, the circum¬
scriptive principle can be seen at work in other ways.
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Though the Paramountcy has not been able to advance the
line of Letsie-Lerotholi-Griffith to the territorial
disadvantage of the two succeeding sons, it has secured
a preeminent position for itself by other means. In
the first place, the multiplication of Principal Chief-
doms within the house of Letsie, compared with the more
or less static position in Berea and Leribe, gives the
royal descent line a notable preeminence among the twenty-
two. As has been seen, twelve of them belong to Letsie
as against five from all the other three cardinal lines
together (counting Majara). It is true that some of
these are fairly small (Ramabanta's, Rothe, Maama's,
Matelile and Tebang), but the others are not; and so far
as membership of the twenty-two is concerned, one
chief's vote is as good as another's (45).
There is probably no way of arriving at a definitive
answer to the question of how far the Paramount Chief's
authority extends into the internal affairs of the
Principal Chiefdoms, and (most crucially, of course)
into those of the other cardinal lines. There are as
many views on this matter as there are interests at
stake; moreover, the stand taken will change according
to the circumstances of the case confronting the
individual at a particular time. The extreme Paramount
and circumscriptive view is that the Paramount Chief
can act directly throughout the length and breadth of
the land, all other chiefs being merely his local
delegates. The extreme separatist and retrospective
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view is that the Paramount Chief can act directly only
within his own area, i.e. in the wards of which he
personally is the Principal Chief, and that anywhere
else, and above all in the provinces of Kolapo and
Masopha, he enjoys no more than a primacy of honour.
It is quite clear, for a start, that neither of these
views is remotely acceptable as an authentic account
either of law or of fact; and indeed few would be heard
(soberly) to advance either in quite these forms (46).
What is more common is to find the retrospective principle
regarded as the only really authentic and traditional
law of the Basotho, legitimated by a past extending
back far behind Moshoeshoe, and to interpret evidence
of the circumspective principle as being a later distort¬
ion, the result of historical accident, overweening
ambition in the Paramount Chief and others, and improper
activities on the part of the colonial power. Conversely,
though the advocates of the circumspective principle
would not claim as much for it in its ideal form, they
argue that the major challenges made to it by the other
cardinal lineages, or by lineages within the cardinal
wards against the reigning chiefs, are acts of insubord¬
ination or "rebelliousness" that have no bearing on
the question of right (tokelo) or law (molao).
In the first place, it is clear that the Paramount
Chief has traditionally had the right to adjudicate on
appeals coming to him from all parts of Basutoland.
As will be explained in more detail in a later chapter,
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the traditional situation has been altered as a result
of the 1938 Proclamations in that "judicial" and
"administrative" courts, tribunals, acts and decisions
are now distinguished from one another. The Paramount
Chief has now no concern whatsoever with "judicial"
matters. A transitional phase intervened, however,
between the present arrangement and the pre-1938 state
of affairs (when no distinction between judicial and
administrative existed in the "native" sector). In
the transitional phase, the Paramount Chief's courts
continued to operate as Appeal Courts from the Native
Courts below; none of these courts, in practice, paid
much attention to the judicial/administrative distinction,
though in terms of the khubelu laws, they were required
to do so. For some time after 1938 it remained the
practice for the Paramount Chief to "confirm" the
decisions of her (judicial) court, and though this was
intended to be a mere formality, it was not regarded in
this light either by her or (frequently) by her advisers.
In a case as late as 1945, the Paramount Chief's court
stated that "the Paramount Chief has the authority to
cancel or confirm or alter any judgment as she sees
proper (..» o na le matla a ho fokotsa kapa a ho tiisa
le a ho eketsa kahlolo efe kapa efe...)" (Lerotholi v.
Monyoe J.C. 189/45). Though such a view ran flagrantly
counter to the official policy of Government, and though
the particular expression of it in Lerotholi may be
regarded as somewhat extreme, it illustrates an important
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feature of the traditional powers of the Paramountcy (47).
In administrative matters, such as the ad judication
of boundaries and the resolution of area disputes between
chiefs or their followers, the Paramount Chief also
traditionally enjoyed a special authority, within other
major wards, including the cardinal, houses themselves.
The history of the Molapo ward earlier in this chapter
provides several instances of this (48). Since
disputes over boundaries and areas are of very great
frequency (and always have been), the Paramount Chief's
role in these matters is one of outstanding importance.
It remains true, however, that it is idle to attempt
any pedantic definition or circumscription of his
traditional "rights" in any abstract sense, since what
he can ("politically") do and what he is entitled
("legally") to do are intimately related. The "law"
of Paramount rights has grown out of the interplay of
local and central forces and out of the dialectic of
"retrospective" and "circumspective" claims. There
are at least two views on any particular issue, and
neither can be regarded as a definitive statement.
For example, an act by the Paramount Chief might be
interpreted as evidence of his "right" to act as he
did, or simply as a successful but "illegal" initiative;
and out of this initiative, a new concept of legality
can grow (49).
In recent times, the position changed as a result
of legislation. In 1959 > the College of Chiefs was
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established, and all disputes arising from chieftainship
were thereafter handled in terms of this body and its
rules. Under the Rules of the Standing Committee,
the Paramount Chief was empowered to consider its find¬
ings and if satisfied to make a "final decision" in the
matter. This legislation represented a policy of with¬
drawing the adjudication of judicial claims to areas
and jurisdiction from the judicial courts, while provid¬
ing a more formal and constitutional process for decision¬
making than existed in the administrative tribunals of
the chiefs. It was not the intention that the Paramount
Chief should act directly in the matters that came before
the College, though his ultimate right to make the
"final decision" was preserved (50).
A similar story can be told of the Paramount
Chief's rights in relation to land (considered now as
the object of a "usufructuary" rather than as an
"administrative" title, in the terms of Sheddick's
distinction — Sheddick 1954: 7-12). Land law is
specifically considered in Chapter Five, only the
relevant aspects being referred to here. The Paramount
Chief is the ultimate "owner" (mong) of all the land in
Basutoland, and cases or disputes involving land alloca¬
tion, deprivation and occupancy can in the last resort
be appealed to him; this represents the traditional
law. Since the separation of judicial from administra¬
tive affairs, following the 1958 Proclamations, this
has meant an appeal through the chieftainship administra-
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tive courts (makhotla a puso) to the Para-mount Chief —
together with his advisers — himself (51). The
observations on the impropriety of the Paramount Chief's
intervention in judicial matters do not apply here.
Under more recent practice still, questions of land
allocation have been set on a more formal basis, with a
series of land authorities hierarchically organised, but
with an ultimate appeal to the Paramount Chief (see
Chapter Five). These modern changes, however, have
done little more than formalise and render more "visible"
procedures that are, in the relevant aspects, traditional
and customary.
The special prerogatives of the Paramount Chief in
relation to maboella (grazing) have already been noticed,
though here as elsewhere it is the law that he should
act through the lawful chief of the area. The problem
arises when the chief fails to obey the Paramount, and
it is of course in this situation that the most vexatious
difficulties are presented. Every chief should act
through his immediate subordinate, just as a subordinate
can approach the top of the hierarchy only through his
immediate superior (see Chapter Four). It would not
be proper for the Paramount Chief to short-cut the
chain of command by issuing an order directly to the
subject of a chief, especially in another Principal
Ward, and especially in the area of one of the other
cardinal houses. Of course, a refractory immediate
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chief opens himself to disciplinary action, but here
again there is no simple and unambiguous distinction
between "political" fact and legal "right". Subject
to these reservations, however, the (lawful) orders of
the Paramount Chief must be obeyed; this applies to all
chiefs, but has especial force in the case of the
Paramountcy.
The Paramount Chief also has the customary power
forcibly and directly to remove a subject who declines
allegiance to his territorial chief (52). (This is
the offence of "turning the door of the hut" (ho reteletsa
ntlo monyako) and is a traditional offence.) This could
be done "without a case", though today it probably can
only be effected through the courts.
As has been observed in other connections, the
advance of the Paramountcy to pre-eminence has at times
been greatly assisted by the British colonial administra¬
tion. In 1938, Paramount Chief was empowered to issue
both Rules and Orders, with statutory effect, and a
considerable volume of subsidiary legislation, much of
it of considerable importance, has resulted. Parts II
and III of the Laws of Lerotholi in their modern revisions
consist of these Rules and Orders respectively. Though
these are, of course, recent innovations in the particular
form they take, it seems proper to regard them as another
stage in the successful advance of the Paramountcy to a
position of administrative preeminence of nationwide







Paramount Chiefs conscripted the British authorities
into supporting their claims to an ever wider and more
effective authority over the whole territory.
These, then, are the effective general dimensions
of the central, "circumspective" power of the Paramount
Chief, so far as it is possible to delineate them.
Like the "placing" system, they tend to depress the
claims of subordinate and collateral lines, and like
the placing system again, they have not proved so
dominant as to offer any real threat to the integrity
of the other cardinal lines. The political realities
of the cardinal lineage structure and its effective
legitimation "retrospectively" determine the limits of
the "circumspective" principle and of the claims or
pretensions of the Paramountcy. The effective seniority
system (the "empirical" as opposed to the "ideal") can
best be described as "mixed", giving rise to a partly
retrospective and partly circumspective system such as
is formally and schematically suggested in Pig. 3 (53).
The two principles of seniority determination are
thus not fully compatible, yet their degree of de facto
coincidence is sufficient to permit them to coexist
without disturbing the political structure unless the
two systems come into conflict at a point where important
interests are threatened. At such a point, a decision
between the two systems, or a compromise capable of
interpretation in terms of either, must be found. Many
Basotho adopt (at least in theory) the circumspective
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principle, and many the retrospective; but the actual
ranking suggested in practice will be found to correspond
to neither. When the inconsistency is pointed out, the
discrepancies between the theory and the actual ranking
produced will be accounted for (perfectly correctly at
one level of analysis) in terms of historical or other
accidents. The empirical situation will generally be
described in a similar way by all local observers, but
will be interpreted according to one view of seniority
or another, the choice being only occasionally determined
by whether the speaker will tend to gain from the theory
he adopts. But from whichever standpoint of the two
the empirical situation is initially approached, the
"accidents" themselves can be viewed as generating the
alternative principle, and that is the analytical method
that has been pursued here. Each principle exists as
a descriptive item in the field. The tension between
them, and their coexistence, and the duality of the
system of seniority determination are, however, analyti¬
cal concepts and do not exist *on the ground1.
The retrospective principle permits a structural
and administrative continuity, in terms of both the
political and the kinship systems, in that it envisages
a continuing hierarchy, persisting territorially and
in time, and conforming to patrilineal descent groups,
which makes possible an exact and unambiguous reading-
off of any individual chief's position, once his
relationship to Moshoeshoe I is known. Such continuity
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could not be achieved in a system which gave each
succeeding Paramount Chief the power to "start afresh",
nor could such a system be accommodated to the kinship
institutions and the general law of succession, both
of which are effective throughout Sotho society.
The retrospective system reaches its terminus ad quem
only when lineage segmentation has produced (by lower-
level repetition at generation intervals) so many
candidates for position that further jurisdictional
subdivision ceases to be feasible. The lower levels
of the hierarchy are then easily 'shunted off' into
commoner status by applying the principle of primogeni¬
ture to exclude younger sons — i.e. at this level,
the system becomes "purely" retrospective and non-
repetitive. Younger sons of chiefs are frequently in
this position. Prom this point of view, the placing
system is an acceleration of the 'shunting off' process,
applied circumspectively by the Paramount Chief.
The retrospective principle, since it takes
Moshoeshoe as its point of reference and ranks seniority
in terms of cardinal lines, indicates, and indeed by
its logic implies, the primacy and seniority of the
Paramountcy, yet at the same time it maintains the
localism of chiefly government, which is an inescapable
necessity of administration in a territory of nearly
12,000 square miles and more than three-quarters of a
million resident inhabitants, where communication is
rendered slow and difficult by the mountainous and in
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places almost inaccessible terrain.
The conceptual unity of the chieftainship in Sotho
consciousness is a fact of ethnography. It can be
incorporated into this analysis in terms of both
principles of seniority, each of which represents the
one borena as existing on different levels and in
different degrees; but whereas retrospectively considered
the source of this "diffraction" lies in Moshoeshoe I,
or rather in his institution of the cardinal lines,
circumspectively considered, it lies in the Paramount
Chief as Koshoeshoe's successor. Yet the process of
lineage segmentation, central to the retrospective
system, threatens this unity by producing (as it has in
fact produced) a tendency to separatism as the descent
groups move away from each other. The circumspective
principle holds this tendency in check by relating
seniority to the Paramount Chief in person and authorising
him to override separatist forces, while at the same
time a retrospective counter-reaction prevents this
process from converting the hereditary chieftainship
into an ad hoc bureaucracy. In this way as in others
that have been noticed, the retrospective system tends
to represent lineage authority, the circumspective to
represent chiefly power (54).
The circumspective focusing of attention upon the
living Paramount Chief also centralises administrative
control in him; the balance between this centralisation
on the one hand and the localism of chiefly government
on the other makes possible a system which respects
kinship and succession without permitting segmentary
anarchy, and maintains the political unity of the nation
in a manner obedient to, and moulded by, the facts of
Basutoland's topography.
The circumspective principle runs into the ground
when the assessment of seniority by reference to the
Paramount threatens the essential interests of the
other cardinal lines, especially where new placings are
involved. It is at this point that the interplay
between the two principles brings about the situation
represented in Pig. This "mixed" system can perhaps
serve as a more accurate model of Koena chieftainship
than either of its two analytically pure rival consit-
uents; the analytical separating out of the constituent
models illustrates the political functioning of the
mixed system to advantage, by clarifying the separate
features of each of the conceptual schemes that underpin
it. But whereas each of the two constituent principles
is susceptible of legal formulation, their resultant,
the "mixed" system, has not been so formulated or defined.
It only attains visibility at points of tension between
the retrospective and circumspective criteria — in other
words, at points of choice and decision, which is
precisely the domain of politics and not of law (55).
The logical tension (or balance) between the two
principles of seniority determination is the context in
which certain political opoositions are expressed, and
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although the oppositions can naturally only be resolved
politically, that resolution can be legalized in terms
of either the one principle or the other. The two
find their point of coincidence in Moshoeshoe, whose
ambivalent position — founder of the "once-for-all"
fraternal lineages; or else pattern for subsequent
chiefs to repeat — is the model of the other ambiva¬
lences and ambiguities detected in the political
system, and enables any empirical decision to be
explained and justified by reference to him.
CHAPTER THREE
Chiefs and Courts (1)
Basutoland and the Basotho are well-known through¬
out Southern Africa for the number of their chiefs.
It is a matter for banter among other southern Bantu
peoples, in the Republic and in Swaziland and Botswana.
At a time when the population of Basutoland was estimated
to be about 800,000 (including absentees) the number of
gazetted chiefs was rather over 1,100. (In Swaziland,
with a population of about half, there were fewer than
two hundred). Moreover, many people whose names do
not appear in the gazette are also commonly known as
chiefs. There are something in the order of 5,000
villages, where the headman receives the title of morena,
and many junior sons affect or are accorded the style.
As was seen in Chapter Two, this proliferation of "chiefs"
must not obscure the sharp hierarchical stratification
within the chieftainship as a whole. The twenty-two
so-called "Principal and Ward Chiefs" are in a very
special category. Of the remaining gazetted chiefs,
about 650 are headmen, of whom only about sixteen have
other junior gazetted headmen under them (2). Of the
remaining 450 or so gazetted chiefs, about 100 can be
considered major chiefs, taking as an operational
definition of this category that a major chief has at
least two gazetted jurisdictions subject to him, and
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that he is himself directly subject to his Principal
Chief, unless he has three or more such subject juris¬
dictions, in which case he may be subject to another
chief. Thus, the number of chiefs of substantial
position is small. The special feature of the Basotho
is that they nevertheless use the title of morena very
freely, and have little use for any formal terms distin¬
guishing one category from another. The terms morena oa
sebaka, literally "chief of a ward'1, and morena oa sehlooho.
"head chief", are used in formal contexts or where the
rank must be clearly specified. Otherwise, the name
is used alone or in conjunction with the ward. Basotho
are familiar enough with the ranks of the major chiefs
not to need any more detailed specification. At the
other end of the scale, a headman is officially a
ramotse, literally "father of the (a) village", but such
a person will also be addressed as morena on suitable
occasions. xjamotse is more the name of an office than
a form of address. The term morenana "chieflet" or
"chiefling", is normally used jocularly or depreciatively
though it can also be used as a formal description; but
it would not be employed as a form of address (an English
equivalent used teasingly in some circles is "sixpenny
chief"). Morena is itself used as a term of respect
to Europeans, and indeed to any stranger who appears to
deserve or command it. Conversely, the term ntate,
which is the ordinary form of address to a man (corresp¬
onding to feminine 'me), is used in speaking to chiefs in
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informal contexts without any disrespect; it is indeed
used to the Paramount Chief (3). (A chieftainess,
including the wife of a chief, will also at times be
addressed as ntate, when in fact it carries a particular
note of respect.) Khosana, really a Nguni word meaning
"prince", is used to refer to a chief on occasion,
particularly to the heir to a major ehiefdom. As
noted in the preceding chapter, the term Motlotlehi
has been brought into use as the particular title of the
Paramount Chief, equivalent to "His (or Your) Highness"
or "Majesty". The relatively unstructured character
of "chieftainship terminology" should not, however, be
allowed to obscure the keen consciousness of different¬
iation of rank with which the Basotho view the hierarchy.
Mo Mosotho would class the Chief of Leribe in the same
category as a sub-chief or headman; nor again would he
regard the Chief of leribe as of the same rank as, say,
the Chief of Ramabanta•s, simply because they are both
now officially "Principal Chiefs" (unless, of course,
the person involved adopted a particularly and in this
case eccentrically "circumspective" index of rank).
Basotho, in fact, use the title morena rather loosely,
but this is no indication of any substantive looseness
in their view of actual chiefs (4).
In one sense, Basotho have traditionally accorded
great respect to chiefs, and most continue to do so.
They tend to regard chieftainship as a mark of tribal
self-respect and to look with pity and contempt on a
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man without a chief; and it is, of course, the fact that
Basutoland has developed, politically and administratively,
on the hasis of chieftainship, in ways that are specified
elsewhere in the current study. This is allied to the
simple recognition of the political and tenurial reality
of the institution, so that a man is wise to show respect
to the chief of his area, no matter what his sentiments
may be. But sentiments are not, at least outside the
urban or semi-urban areas, in any real sense at war with
interests (5). At the same time, Basotho are not servile
in their attitude to chiefs, even the most senior. They
will talk with great informality, even cordiality, in a
manner that they continue to combine with respect. It
is not always easy for a stranger to tell the rank of
someone met on a road or path from the way in which he
is greeted by a companion. It may be clear that he is
some kind of chief, from the words used, and the fact
that it may be hard to learn more without direct informa¬
tion can mislead the observer into misunderstanding the
attitude of the Basotho both to the chieftainship as a
whole and to its internal differentiation. The diffi¬
culty is aggravated by the formal courtesy which all
Basotho normally display to each other (friends or
strangers) when they meet. Comparatively lengthy
exchanges of greetings are conducted with any person
who is met along the way, and the stranger might mistake
for marks of great deference the warm thanks that are
proferred in return for the stereotyped inquiries after
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the other's health and well-being (6).
Although such factors as land shortage, the intro¬
duction of a partly money economy, and a changed
political consciousness on both sides have modified the
"actuarial", they have not undermined the "moral",
expectations of chieftainship, nor rendered irrelevant
the sort of characterization of the office and the
office-holder that have been traditional in the nation
(sechaba). It will be recalled that in Chapter One,
reference was made to the stem - ren- (as in morena)
as implying wealth. A chief is assumed to be richer
than a man who is not a chief, and traditionally this
meant that no one was supposed to rival his chief in
wealth. Cattle being the principal form of wealth,
they have a special significance for chiefs. A
traditional greeting to a chief is to call, "Khomo tseo,
morenai " ("Those cattle, chief.'"), with the reply or
addition of "le manamane a tsona" ("and their calves").
Chiefs had a traditional monopoly of cattle, as is
suggested by the saying, "khomo, 'muuj Sellamoreneng,
metsaneng ea ronana" — "MooJ goes the cow; she lows in
the chief's place, and is out of place in the small
villages". Chiefs, however, would lend cattle out to
their subjects (mafisa), retaining ownership but letting
the borrower use the milk and dung and having any beasts
that died naturally. A subject with a herd so large
that it might attract the jealousy and enmity of the
chief or of his neighbours would mafisa many of his stock
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to others. (The practice of mafisa is still, of course,
very widespread in Basutoland, though other functions
have overlaid without eliminating the former motivation (7).)
Chiefs, on the other hand, are proud of their herds,
and large numbers of cattle are taken as bohali when a
chief's daughter marries (in chiefly marriages, the
bohali is preferably of fifty head, usually of actual
stock, rather than of a cash equivalent or other substi¬
tute, end is normally paid at once instead of by
instalments). Even today, it is an awe-inspiring sight
to see the Paramount Chief's sea of cattle being driven
through the royal village of Matsieng back to their
kraals in the evening.
Chiefly wealth is often real enough in modern terms
too, and several principal chiefs are moderately rich
men by any standard (8). But whereas there was little
that could be done with traditional forms of wealth
except, in the familiar phrase, to use it to build up
"social capital", chiefs no longer have to spend their
money in this way. Many chiefs use their liquid
resources to buy large American cars, and to indulge
freely in expensive food and liquor. Since their
sources of revenue are now largely independent of the
communities over which they rule, there are fewer
popular sanctions that can be mobilised against their
defection from the traditional chiefly virtues (exag¬
gerated though these may be in contemporary conscious¬
ness). Of course, traditionally as today, chiefs lived
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better than their subjects, but the difference was
quantitative rather than qualitative. They ate meat
more often, and consumed the better cuts; their huts
were larger and more numerous, better built and with
better accommodation; above all, they had more wives.
But there was no radical discontinuity between their
general manner of life and that of their subjects.
Demographic changes have also played an important
part in changing the relationship between chiefs and
people. As seen, it was formerly possible for subjects
to move from one chief to another, and in the early
days of expansion there was even some competition among
chiefs to secure followers. The increase in population
has caused a greater pressure on land resources and
thus critically altered the balance between the subject
seeking land on the one hand and the chief as land
administrator on the other.
These developments have coincided with and to an
extent been shaped by the rise of a modern political
consciousness. The best accounts of the recent political
history of the territory are Halpern 1965, Spence 1968
and Weisfelder 1969; see also Hamnett 1966a. The
principal event was the rise of what became the Basutoland
Congress Party (B.C.P.), a radical nationalist group
equipped with an able leadership which rapidly gained
very wide popular support for its militant, anti-
colonialist and (in effect) anti-chieftainship policy.
The relevant effect of its intervention was to impel the
12 9
chieftainship, or a wide section of it, into an alliance
with the colonial authority of a highly qualified and
ambivalent but nonetheless effective kind. The principal
agent mediating between the chiefs and the government
was the Karematlou-Freedom Party (M.F.P.), which enjoyed
or was said to enjoy the support of the Paramount Chief
(who certainly exercised his rights of nomination very
largely in favour of M.F.P. supporters). Another group
of chiefs, consisting to a significant extent of those
who were hostile to the Paramount for reasons other than
those of "modern" politics, were joined together in
leabua Jonathan1s Basutoland National Party (B.N.P.),
although at the time this party played only a minor role
in visible public life. The B.C.P. won a convincing
victory in the (indirect) elections held in I960 under
the new constitution, but in the Legislative Council
they were weakened not only by defections from their
ranks but also by the non-elective element in the member¬
ship, which assured an easy majority for the government
front bench. The relevant effect of this situation
was to render the chieftainship, in one aspect still the
unique and "total" governing institution in the nation,
in another aspect no more than one limited group
competing with other limited groups structurally equal
to and co-ordinate with it, with clear implications for
its continued legitimacy and for its claims to represent
a "national" as against a partial and partisan interest (9).
The ideal chiefly virtues are those of generosity,
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fatherliness, hospitality and (much more ambivalently)
strength. The proverb (or more accurately, riddle)
"sefate se luloang ke nonyana tsohle? - ke morena"
("A tree on which all birds sit? - A chief") illustrates
many of these features. A chief is expected to give
rest, hospitality and shelter to all, and to be strong
enough to support all the many who depend on him (10).
In Kekane v. Makhorole J.C. 11/60, the Paramount Chief's
Court (in a judgment delivered in 1934) instructed
headman Thakamakula: "chief, there are your children -
see to them and give them lands when they come humbly
before you.... They live with you and help you and work
for you." In Koali v. Sebolelo J.C. 4/44, the Paramount
Chief's Court rebuked Chief Molapo, saying "You are the
chief of orphans, but today I see that you are their
destroyer (moqhali, scatterer)" and reversing his
allocation; and shortly after, in Letsoela v. Coronelis
J.C. 67/44, the same court told a chief, "You are the
protector of widows and orphans, and I find that you
have betrayed your duty and used the powers you possess
wrongly." An accused person relied on this general
conception of chiefly obligations to justify his refusal
to join in the work of ploughing the chieftainship
fields: "I work and yet he does not feed me.... It is
only right that when he issues a call to the work-party
(a meme letsema) he should give us food.... It is known
that a chief should feed the people." Although on this
occasion the Paramount Chief's Court did not support
the defendant, the cry "I work and yet he does not
feed me" (ke sebetsa a sa pnofepe) is eloquent of the
reciprocities that he saw as morally involved ('Matli v.
Letsie J.C. 4/49).
The might of chieftainship, its greater strength
than the strength of ordinary people, which enables it
to bear the weight of so many social responsibilities,
is, as has been suggested, more ambivalent. Most
proverbs and sayings that reflect this aspect of chief¬
tainship have either a menacing or a cynical ring:
ntsoe la morena le haheloa lesaka (the word of the chief
builds a kraal, i.e., the chief's word is powerful and
is obeyed); morena ha a. tene moluopo (a chief does not
wear a moluopo (a kind of loose loin cloth), i.e., he
is never badly dressed — he is never wrong); morena ke
khomo e chitja (the chief is a hornless cow, viz., he is
unpredictable); ke naleli e tlasa khoeli (he is a star
below the moon — said of a chief's letona, or counsellor)
matsoho a marena a malelele (the chief has a long reach);
morena ha a ts'oaele, oa bolaea (a chief does not put in
the second blow, he is the killer; ho ts'oaela is to be
the second person to strike an animal or prey, hence to
be an accomplice or assistant; the proverb signifies
that a chief gets the credit for and the profit from
what his subject does) (11).
Chiefs have traditional powers to issue orders.
Today, they retain the power to issue "lawful" orders,
and if these are not obeyed, the chief may prosecute, so
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that the "lawfulness" of the order may be tested in
court; but formerly, of course, when the distinction
between administration and the judicial courts did not
exist, the chief enforced his own orders "without a
case" (Motsie v. Borena J.C. 44/57). It was easy then
(end as will be seen is not difficult now) for a chief
to "eat up" a recalcitrant subject, by fining him,
dismissing his suits, impounding his cattle and taking
away his fields. A wise Mosotho hesitates before
incurring the enmity of his chief.
Chiefs constitute the network whereby the government
and administration of the country are carried on.
The Paramount Chief communicates with the whole territory
by sending letters or messengers to the Principal and
Ward Chiefs, who then pass the instruction or notification
to the subordinate chiefs, and so on down the hierarchy
until each village and homestead has been informed.
A special occasion warrants the holding of a pitso, or
meeting (*uch commoner in the past than now), at which
the communication is delivered to the whole community,
an<* R T>i"fcso may be a rally for all the people over a
wide area, and even nationally. But day-to-day and
week-to-week administration takes a more routine form,
and is conducted through the whole body of chieftainship
in its widest sense, concluding at the level of the
village phala, or herald. Chiefs can order a subject,
or a subordinate chief, to attend them, so that important
questions can be discussed face-to-face without the use
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of messengers. Much business is conducted in this way
by the Paramount Chief and his officers both at Maseru
(the modern capital) and Matsieng (the royal village),
and equivalent activity goes on in the principal wards
and below. Considerable use, however, is made of
representatives and messengers (maqosa, sing, leqosa),
who should command the respect due to the chief, and
yet not incur blame for bad news. As the proverbs
put it, leqosa. la morena ke morena (the chief's messenger
is the chief), and leqosa ha le na molato (the messenger
is not to blame). But in fact messengers are often
much more active agents than this suggests. The chief's
messengers often act in the place of (bakeng sa) the
chief, and are charged with decision-making functions:
to investigate a dispute or faction-fight and take
action on the spot, or (very commonly) to inspect an
area and determine a boundary. It is obvious that the
Paramount Chief (whose special role in the matter of
boundaries has been noted in the preceding chapter)
cannot usually appear in person, and before the quasi-
judicial procedure of the College of Chiefs was
introduced in 1959 (12) it was the regular practice
both for him and for other chiefs to rely upon their
representatives (13). No qualitative distinction
existed between the act of making a decision and then
sending messengers to execute it, and the act of sending
messengers to make a decision. It follows, more
particularly in the latter cases, that the word "messenger"
does not necessarily emply a lowly status. In major
matters, the messengers will be people of great seniority
themselves (cf. the Paramount Chief's interventions
in the Molapo disputes through his "representatives",
who include Chief Maama and Chief Griffith: see Chapter
Two, precis of "Anonymous of Leribe").
Modern government also makes extensive use of the
chiefly administration, and in fact could not function
without it. The link is provided by the local Govern¬
ment Department, which communicates with Principal
Chiefs and, in the normal case, with their subordinates
through them. District Commissioners also communicate
with their Districts through the chieftainship. No
other serviceable form of local administration in fact
exists. The District Councils, established in 1948
and reformed in 1959 and at subsequent dates, were less
than effective, being often over-stretched in their
duties, and occasionally even disruptive (14). Native
tax, later Basuto tax, is also collected through the
chiefs, and in fact many Basotho regularly describe
their allegiance in terms of the chief through whom the
tax is paid.
Chiefs are also both empowered and required to act
as law enforcement officer", making use both of their
traditional right to have their orders obeyed and to
preserve the peace, and of their more modern power to
prosecute offenders for criminal acts (which, of course,
include disobedience to orders). They arrest and
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detain alleged offenders, prepare evidence, and present
the accused before the judicial court for prosecution.
As has been noted, until the 1938 Proclamations,
chiefs held their own courts. Under the new legislation,
they could do so only if they held a court warrant, and
although in fact all the 1,340 gazetted chiefs received
such warrants, the principle was established that it
was not chieftainship but administrative recognition
that bestowed the right to a court. The de facto
coincidence of the two, however, disguised from most
Basotho the change that had been introduced, and the
actual situation continued with little structural
change until after the war (15). In 1946, warrants
were issued to 121 Chief's Courts, and the figure dropped
to 106 three years later. At the same time, Chiefs
and judges (court presidents) tended less often to be
the same people, and it became the practice of government
to continue this process and hasten it. Court presidents
were less often subjects of the chief in whose area they
sat, and though Chiefs were frequently appointed as
judges (being often the most suitable persons) they were
deliberately placed in courts outside their jurisdictions;
even the boundaries of court areas no longer necessarily
corresponded with those of uhe chieftainship wards.
The disjunction was emphasised when, in 1958, the appeal
courts at Matsieng, the royal capital, and the peripate¬
tic courts of appeal attached to Matsieng, ceased to
act as national courts of appeal and became simply courts
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of record for the Katsieng area (16).
However, the 1938 legislation, and the subsequent
modifications and implementations of it, neither struck
nor intended to strike either at the "administrative"
aspects of chieftainship (except in so far as only
gazetted chiefs retained administrative power in the
eyes of the government) nor at the freedom of chiefs or
their counsellors and representatives to hold makhotla
a tlhopho, courts of arbitration. Detailed considerat¬
ion will follow concerning the general "administrative"
powers still left with the chiefs and the "administrative"
courts (makhotla a puso) associated with these powers.
But at this point it is relevant to stress the role in
what might be called the "ordinary" process of justice
(both civil and criminal) which these courts of arbitra¬
tion, and the chiefs themselves, have continued and still
continue to play.
The lowest level of lekhotla la tlhopho represents
the continued existence in partially non-recognised form
of the lowest level of former chief's court. In so far
as cases are remitted from it to what are now the
administrative courts (makhotla a puso) of the chiefs,
the system that existed before the 1938 legislation
still exists. But, in fact, cases of every sort appear
before the lekhotla la tlhopho, and not just those that
are appropriate to the administration. It acts, in fact,
as a clearing-house for disputes and other matters,
where chief or headman or his deputy, together with his
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Fig. I
Judicial Courts Administration Prosecution
Fig. I
The "Lekhotla la Tlhopho" as a clearing-house
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advisers, can decide upon what action to take next, act
as arbitrator between disputants, or offer advice to an
aggrieved subject who wishes to vindicate his rights
(or what he conceives to be his rights). There is a
wide variety in the assiduity and conscientiousness
shown by chiefs and headman in their running of the
lekhotla la tlhopho. Three villages at Mofoka in the
ward of Matsieng are superintended by Peete Mofoka,
younger brother of the gazetted chief lehlola Setenane.
Peete is not himself gazetted, but he acts as a headman
under his brother, whom he will succeed in due course.
Peete sees it as his task to channel complaints and
disputes that come before him into the proper routes.
Some are criminal or quasi-criminal, and with these he
exercises a discretion whether to present an offender
for prosecution, or whether to issue a warning. Chiefs
can require a subject to live under their eye to check
on their good behaviour (ho ropa, literally "to tether").
In the case of offences which would not in themselves
constitute a crime in the eyes of the imported law,
naturally no question of prosecution would arise (17).
Eon-criminal matters might be suitable for administrative
action, in which case the aggrieved person could either
have his problem corrected by the chief or headman himself
or he could take the matter to the administrative court
of the senior chief. Other administrative matters would
be the concern of the organs of modern government, and
Peete, as an ex-policeman, is quite equipped to advise
a complainant to which official he should take his problem
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or request. Other civil matters might be suitable
for the judicial courts, in which case Peete helps the
disputant with the procedures connected with "opening
the court" and preparing his case. He regards himself
as bound to perform a similar service for both or all
disputants in a case, seeing his function as being that
of an impartial adviser. But the majority of disputes
are settled in the lekhotla la tlhopho and the judicial
courts are not invoked. The fee of five shillings
payable on "opening the court" acts as a deterrent
against much litigation (18), and goes some way to
explaining the success which Peete met in reaching a
successful settlement within the village (19).
Peete is aware of a litigant's right to "open the
court" himself and knows that his own position is an
advisory one. But few Basotho believe this. They
believe, in nearly all cases, that they cannot open the
court without the mediation and authority of the chief (20).
In Masite Nek, all disputes came before Ramakau (the
chief of Masite), having sometimes been considered even
more locally by the village headman Chitja. But Chitja
only hears small cases, usually involving family matters
and homestead disputes (litaba tsa lelapa); and in fact
these are mostly handled on his behalf by Radebe, in
his capacity as ohala. There is no reason in principle
why this should be the case; but Chitja is neither young
nor very forceful, and is not in any case particularly
interested in the more onerous aspects of his office.
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Nov that he is gazetted, he is anxious to have a pound
of his own, "but this is more because he feels that it
is owed to his position (and because of the share of
the "fines" he would expect to get) than because he
takes his chieftainship very seriously. In fact, he
lets Mahlaku, the shop-keeper, and others use his own
personal lands and spends a large portion of the
proceeds on beer at Mahlaku's drinking place. He is
one of the less prosperous of the inhabitants of Masite
Nek, and not one of the most respected. He has a
legitimate grievance, in that Ramakau, the Chief of
Masite, is a young man who (as has been mentioned) was
sent to be "bought up" by him but who was then promoted
over his head. (It will be recalled that Ramakau is
a junior member of Mohlalefi's lineage, his father
Mokhalinyane being a junior half-brother — from the
fifth house of Sekhonyana — to Mohalefi's father Bereng.)
A comparison between Chitja at Masite Nek and Peete at
Mofoka's shows how far chieftainship can be what the
individual makes of it, or what his age and position
enable him to make of it (21). If Ramakau cannot solve
the dispute — if it proves too "hard" (thata) for him —
then it proceeds to Rothe and is considered further by
Mohlalefi's local administrative court. (Mohlalefi
does not usually attend, except where a boundary dispute
is involved, or where the matter is of great importance.
But he will sometimes interfere if he does not approve
of the way his counsellors are conducting the case,
speaking privately to them and pressing his view of
the matter.) If the case proves too "hard" for the
Rothe lekhotla la puso (22), it will be sent to the
local judicial court. This happens to be at Rothe also
but is a quite separate building, and its president and
clerk live in publicly provided houses tied to their
positions, over which Mohlalefi has no formal control.
Area disputes, or "administrative" appeals concern¬
ing land, can go to the Paramount Chief's administrative
court or to the College of Chiefs (in the 1959 Constitut
ion) but "judicial" matters are not considered beyond
Rothe in the hierarchy of makhatla a puso. From Rothe
"puso" they pass to Rothe Local, and from there to the
Central Court, which in the case of Rothe happens to be
at Matsieng (see note above).
A case of night-grazing (Masite)
Thabo's wife is Selina, and they have an
unmarried son, Ts'epo, and two unmarried daughters
Thabo is a rich man, and has twenty-nine cattle,
all his own; none of them, at least, are known to
be mafisa'd out to him by others. In summer,
all his cattle (except one cow that he keeps at
home for milk) go to the leboella in the mountains
They go in a group of about fifty, joining up with
the herds of other villagers, and are driven by
two young herdboys (balisana). The cattle post
(motebo) is about two days' drive away. Thabo's
son, Ts'epo, is one of the balisana.
Molise's homestead is in the same village,
separated from Thabo's by about two hundred yards
of open land. Kolise has five cattle, but he
sends none of them up to the summer grazing.
There are so few that he hopes to be able to look
after them well enough locally. His son also,
like most of the young boys, is a molisana, but
only round the neighbourhood. He takes the
cattle out by day and keeps half an eye on them
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while he chats and plays with the other young
herdboys, but brings them back to the draal at
night, and sleeps at home. In other respects,
Thabo and Molise are similarly placed. Both
of them have the recognised allocation of three
lands, which they cultivate and harvest in the
summer, and which are open to communal grazing
when the grain has been taken off the stalks.
One night, Thabo sent his son Ts'epo out
secretly, to drive the cattle on to Molise's
lands (about half a mile away) and feed on the
growing corn. Molise heard a noise, and thought
his cattle had broken out of the kraal, but when
he went out to inspect, he found that they were
still inside. He heard the noise of cattle
munching stalks, and found them eventually graz¬
ing on his land. Ts'epo concealed himself and
was nowhere to be seen. Molise herded the
cattle and drove them off to the headman, who
impounded them in the kraal he kept for the
purpose; in the morning, they were recognised as
belonging to Thabo and Thabo was promptly sent
for.
Following the usual procedure in such cases,
the headman chose four men, none of them related
to either Thabo or Molise, and sent them to
inspect and assess the damage to Molise's crops.
(Had he not been able to find four such men, he
would have gone to the headman of a neighbouring
village, or if that failed, he would have gone
to his superior chief to get the men that were
required). The headman, since he knew that he
was to judge the matter, did not go to inspect
the damage.
The four men went out, accompanied by both
Thabo and Molise, and discussed the matter.
Molise overclaimed, putting too high a figure on
his loss. The four assessors went off apart,
and after some discussion returned to tell
Molise that he was asking too much. After some
haggling, Thabo and Molise agreed on a figure
of twenty Rand, and the headman was so informed.
Thabo signed an agreement in these terms, and
after he had paid sixpence a head as a pound fee
the cattle were released to him. (This money,
which is regarded as a "fine", is a perquisite
of the keeper of the pound, an appointment in
the headman's gift. It is the duty of the
keeper to graze the cattle and look after them
and to return them to the pound-kraal in the
evening.) What Thabo should now have done was
to pay over the twenty Rand to the chief, who
in his turn would pay it to Molise. But Thabo
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tried to cheat. ?irst, he brought two sheep
and two goats, putting a value of £2.10.0 (five
Rand) on each of them. This was reasonable in
itself, but in fact Thabo could produce no bewys
(Afrikaans: certificate of ownership - it is
illegal for beasts to change hands without a
bewys). He was sent off to produce the bewys,
and took his beasts with him. He then went to
a friend, and the two, in collusion, found the
chief alone and agreed falsely that the animals
had been handed over. The chief was uncertain
where the rights and wrongs lay, and Molise
therefore took the case over his head to the
lekhotla la puso at Rothe. The banna ba lekhotla
(officers of the court) decided to send the case
on to the judicial court, Rothe local. When the
case was heard, Thabo did not call the headman
as a witness, but the headman, knowing that the
case was to be heard, went to the hearing and
the President of the Court called him to give
evidence, against Thabo's protests. During the
course of questioning, the President asked Thabo
if the headman was alone at the time that the
beasts were handed over. Thabo, knowing that if
he replied in the negative the court would want
to hear from the others present on the occasion,
was compelled to reply that he was alone. The
President then declared that this answer proved
that Thabo was lying, since such transactions
never took place without witnesses and Thabo
would not have handed the beasts over in private.
The President in question was new to the
area (Court Presidents are in any case not usually
subjects of the chief of the area in which the
court sits), but in fact the lekhotla la puso at
Rothe had passed over both to him and to his
clerk the record of their own proceedings, in
which Thabo and his friend were named as rogues
who had been in trouble for similar deceptions
in the past. The President, therefore, was not
a stranger to the case, and was so conscious of
the trickery that was in process that he threatened
one witness with a fine of £12 if he tried to tell
lies.
After the case was finished (in Molise's
favour), the Court President asked Thabo, out of
court, why he had attempted to defend the case
when his actions had put him so clearly in the
wrong. Thabo replied with a laugh that he knew
he had no real case at all, but was simply hoping
that through some chance he might nevertheless
get away with it. However, the President at
Rothe Local, in spite or because of the cleverness
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that he showed in tricking Thabo into a damaging
lie, is not highly regarded in the district; and
this view was shared by the Department of Justice,
who regarded him as one of the poorest presidents
on their books.
Once a case is before the court, the chief's
responsibilities do not end. He should make sure that
witnesses attend, and should be told the decision which
the court has reached, so that he may be sure that its
terms are understood and followed through. Where, as
often happens, a disputant is illiterate or insuffic¬
iently literate to cope with the formal side of the
case, the chief or his court serve a very important
function in taking the necessary steps.
But much depends on the individual chief, and on
the effectiveness of chieftainship in the area as a
whole. Where chiefs are lazy or incompetent, people
will seek their justice where they can find it. There
is also a growing sense, though this can be only
impressionistically assessed, that the judicial courts
offer an independent set of tribunals against which
even the chief cannot ultimately prevail (23).
CHAPTER FOUR
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Chieftainship: Administration and Jurisdiction
The principal function of chieftainship concerns
the land. Sheddick's terminology, distinguishing
between "administrative" and "usufructuary" titles will
be adopted in what follows (sheddick 1954: 1-12), though
under the caution that the concept of "usufruct" as
used here is specific to the topic and does not carry
the implications it possesses under Roman and Roman-
Dutch law (sheddick 1954: p.4 n.l). The basic principle
is that mobu ke oa sechaba, "the land belongs to the
nation". This maxim, as it stands, would of course
be meaningless were it not given practical implementat¬
ion and operated. The chieftainship is the institutional
means whereby the "national" ownership of the land is
given practical effect. The current Roman-Dutch
conceptualization is that the land belongs to the nation,
and is held "in trust" for it by the Paramount Chief.
The Paramount Chief is then thought of as delegating
his trust to the subordinate chieftainship, who in
turn delegate to their sub-chiefs and headman. This
is the view expressed in Lekulana. v. Borena J.C. 108/56,
by Ramsden as Judicial Commissioner. Sheddick also,
though avoiding this kind of terminology, approaches
a similar perspective in what is perhaps a rather
"over-circumspective" view of the Paramount's position
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(1954: 141). As has been argued above, the chieftain¬
ship has a more collegial character than such formulat¬
ions suggest (1). Nevertheless, it is true that the
ultimate right over land is in the Paramount, and that
lower chiefs and other persons participate in this to
varying degrees according to their rank; but the notion
of "delegation" is best kept for liphala and baabi,
discussed below (2). In the first place, chiefs
cannot be simply removed from their place by decree.
In a very formal sense, of course, they can be, by
the political act of the Resident Commissioner (now
Parliament), but such an act would be regarded as
wrongful and illegitimate. If a chief is removed,
this is for cause shown and after careful consideration
by the Paramount Chief or the College of Chiefs (in
the 1959 Constitution) (3). But this is personal to
the chief and does not interrupt the succession. It
is also true that chiefs could lose some of their
rights as a result of a "placing", but this was a fully
institutionalised process that did not formally take
away the incumbent's chieftainship. (The new constitut¬
ion treats chieftainship as a vested right, justiciable
by the courts, and. only defeasible by a political act
with the authority of Parliament. This reversion to
the system preceding the College of Chiefs structure
is not unfaithful to traditional practice (4).) The
second reason why "delegation" is an inappropriate
concept to describe the relationship between higher
and lower chiefs is that a superior chief is hound to
"work through" his subordinate and cannot, properly,
act directly in that subordinate's ward. Since a
chief does not, by his presence, annul his subordinate
position, the latter is not a delegate of his superior
It is true that a chief or headman should not act
directly over the head of a phala either, but since a
phala can be dismissed without formality, this makes
little practical difference. These topics are
discussed in detail below.
The administrative rights vested in the chieftain
ship extend over the whole area of Basutoland, with
the exception of those areas that are specifically
withdrawn from their control — in effect, the nine
government "camps" or "reserves", and other government
sites such as police stations and barracks, some
hospitals, and outlying administrative offices. To
all intents and purposes, the whole of the land area
falls under chiefly administration and control, and
wherever such derivative rights to the use and produce
of land as can be and are allocated to subjects fail
through death, removal or forfeiture, they revert to
the chieftainship for reallocation. Most of the
ensuing discussion will be concerned with rights to
arable land, which is the central case, but it must be
stressed that even where different kinds of land use
are involved, the "radical right" remains in the
chieftainship. Thus, homestead-sites, some tree
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plantations and gardens are not "arable" lands in the
relevant sense (not even if a garden site is ploughed)
and it is both possible and normal for such sites to
be inherited; but such inheritance is subject to
certain conditions, and in no way removes the site from
chiefly administration and control. If the inheritance
fails, the site returns to the chief, who can then re¬
allocate it. Land which has so fallen back does not,
however, "belong" to the chief; that is to say, it is
not the case that the chief is a simple "owner" of the
land of his ward (even if this were read subject to
the position of his superiors). It is still the case
that mobu ke oa sechaba, and although a chief can indeed
allocate land to himself, it is only such land that
even in a limited sense can be said to "belong" to him.
In other words, administrative and usufructuary titles
are held distinct, even where no present usufructuary
exists. Nor does unallocated land form part of the
masimo a lira, which are in a different category again.
The phrase means, literally, "lands of the enemy", and
is usually translated by "chieftainship fields".
These are lands that are specifically annexed to the
chieftainship as such, and their identity remains
constant. Strictly speaking, only Principal Chiefs
have the right to masimo a lira, though they exist in
important subordinate chiefdoms too (v. Sheddick 1954:
147 ff.; see also Sekake v. Tautona J.C. 15/59, Appendix
II below, where evidence shows J hat lira lands are
14 9
attached to the ward of Patlong). These were the
primary focus for matsema labour (working parties
summoned by the chief) and are supposed to provide
the wherewithal for the discharge of the obligations
of chieftainship referred to above (5).
The "national" character of the soil and its
wealth is perhaps most clearly seen in the case of
grazing land (leboella, pi. maboella, in the narrower
sense (6); it can also be used to include other land,
such as reed beds and "public" tree-areas, which
while not used for grazing is not allocated to indivi¬
dual homesteads). The general topic has been well
canvassed by Sheddick (1954: 104 ff., 116 ff., 153 ff.),
Duncan (I960: 74 ff.) and Wallman (1969: 103 ff.), and
what is there said will not be reiterated except so
far as relevant. The mountain grazing-grounds, where
cattle are driven for summer pasturage, are in general
withdrawn from arable use, though encroachment is
common if unlawful. Administration tends to lie
directly in the hands of major chiefs, who however will
appoint local caretakers to supervise the maboella on
the spot when they are in use. Grazing is permitted
only at specified times of the year, and is in principle
open to all the subjects of the Principal Chief who
either holds maboella areas within his own ward or who
has obtained permission from a chief with such rights
to allow his subjects to use the area for grazing their
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cattle. Maboella thus cut across the ordinary system
of chiefly administration, in that they operate on a
Principal Ward basis, and the headmen who have charge
of a leboella are not in the same position as other
subordinate chiefs, except in regard to those people —
if indeed there are any — who live permanently under
them. Maboella thus constitute a second and parallel
resource, additional to that represented by arable
land, and a very precious one indeed (cf. Wallman 1969:
115) (7). They are a national resource which differs
from arable lands not only in the obvious respects
but also in that rights to lands are individuated and
specified — a landholder has the use of this and that
identified field — whereas rights to grazing are
essentially diffuse: all of a given category of person
can use any of a large area of grazing land, from the
time announced for the "opening of the leboella" until
the onset of winter and the long trek home. The chief
who "has the right", when he opens the leboella, is
administering a national asset, and not manipulating
a personal prerogative or choosing between one man and
another, as in the case of allocating arable land.
When the Chief of 'Hamathe's showed favouritism in
allowing some subjects to use the leboella and not
others, the court at 'Kamathe's (unsurprisingly)
upheld his right to do as he pleased. But the
Paramount Chief's Court reversed the decision, stating
15 1
that maboella ke a sechaba, "Maboella belong to the
nation" (Masopha v. Mabu J.C. 261/48). On appeal to
the Judicial Commissioner, the Chief was successful,
the Court taking the inevitable "modern law" view that
the chief's favouritism was deplorable but that it was
an administrative matter within his discretion, though
he had certainly acted abusively. The difficulty
that confronted the court was that of what specific
order it could, judicially, make: for the Paramount
Chief's Court this was naturally no problem at all,
provided the chief had acted against the "national"
principle at stake. But in fcatlosa v. Ramokone J.C.
130/54, the court at Katsieng refused to listen to a
subject who complained that he had been forbidden the
leboella while some others had been admitted: "Chief
Mojela knows the reasons why he has allowed those
people to graze their stock". There are, indeed,
certain reasons why people with infirm stock should
be given a prior right to use the grazing, and the
Matsieng judgment follows this rule.
The diffusely "national" character of the cattle-
post maboella (8) accounts for the special position of
the Paramount Chief in relation to them, to which
attention has already been drawn (see Chapter Two note
35 above). The maboella that exist outside the cattle
post country, and are to be found in most wards of
every level of jurisdiction, are however subject to
the same general principles, though they fall under
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the immediate authority of the local chief, who
designates where and at what times the cattle may be
grazed. He does not, however, designate by whom they
may be grazed, since this is defined in terms of the
ward involved, and all entitled cattle-owners may use
the leboella once they have been opened (9).
However, though maboella (and especially those at
the cattle-posts) may represent the most general and
diffuse sense of the doctrine that all land resources
belong to the nation, the most central concern, both
for this discussion and for Basutoland, is that of
arable land, the chiefs' administrative role in
relation to it, and the character and operation of
their subjects' rights and duties.
As was noted in Chapter Two, while jurisdictions
in Basutoland are in principle territorially defined,
such that each chief has a discrete and unitary ward,
there are many exceptions (Chapter Two, note 35).
Those that are relevant to the administration of
arable land are, in particular, the institutions of
paballo and mekopu e namelane. Paballo (10), which
Sheddick defines as "the loan of administrative rights
in land" (1954: 139; and see following pages), has
been a source of continual disputes, and is now illegal.
The Paramount Chief's rule, referred to as the "eliminat¬
ion of lioaballo", issued in 1958, contains a definition
and description of the practice that serves as a start¬
ing-point for the discussion.
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Elimination of Lipaballo
A. In this rule (molao) unless inconsistent with
the context, paballo means
(1) An area (sebaka) in the caretaking (boliseng)
of one chief the rights to which are vested in another
chief, and the inhabitants of which and any headman
who may be placed over them, whether recognised... or
not, owe allegiance to such other chief ("area paballo");
(2) land in the caretaking of one chief or
headman used by a person or persons subordinate to a
different chief or headman
(a) where rights are granted to such person or
persons, by the chief or headman in whose area
the paballo falls, to have the use of the land
in his area while continuing to live in the
caretaking of their own chief or headman; or
(b) where such person or persons live as well
as use land in the caretaking of the chief or
headman ~ ** " " " lo, while continuing
man; or
(c) where such person or persons live but have
the use of no land besides a dwelling site
(land paballo); and
(3) the Basuto custom (moetlo oa Basotho) whereby
land rights in the caretaking of one chief or headman
may be granted to a different chief or headman or to
a person or persons subordinate to another chief or
headman (custom of paballo).
B. Subject to the provisions of paragraph (3),
after the commencement of this rule no rights or
alleged rights which accrued... to any chief headman
individual or community by virtue of the Basuto
custom of paballo shall be cognizable by any Court
of Law in this Territory.
C. (1) Subjects of a chief to whom an area
paballo has been granted who live or plough on such
paballo shall have the right to decide whether they
shall continue to owe allegiance to their original
chief and leave the paballo area or continue to live
on the paballo and transfer their allegiance to the
chief in whose caretaking the paballo falls:
Provided that the chief in whose caretaking
the paballo falls may refuse to accept as his
subjects persons of known bad character or who
are known to be hostile to himself, and in such
case such persons shall move to the caretaking
of their original chief:
and
to owe own chief or head-
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Provided further that any such person who has not
been accepted by the chief may appeal to the
Paramount Chief on the grounds that the refusal
to accept him was unreasonable, and the decision
of the Paramount Chief shall be final.
(2) Where an area paballo is under the supervision
of a headman... such headman'shall become the subordin¬
ate of the chief in whose caretaking the paballo falls:
Provided that if he so desires the individual
headman may abdicate his rights to the headman-
ship and move to the caretaking of his original
chief.
D. After the commencement of this rule (molao)
the grant of any new paballo shall be unlawful (e tla
ba ka thoko ho molao)....
(Laws of lerotholi (1959) Part II s.40)
Embedded in these definitions, there is a distinct¬
ion between paballo ea mpa. ("for the stomach") and
paballo e hlapenyelitsoeng ("sworn paballoalso known
as "paballo for the children"). The first of these is
relatively straightforward, and is not so much the loan
of an administrative title as the short-term provision
of usufructuary rights by one chief to another for the
use of the latter*s subjects. Grazing rights (in
particular the rights of stover after the lands have
been harvested) remain with the donor chief, to whom
also the lands revert on the death or removal of the
landholder (Mafeka v. Libetoe J.C. 74/56).
The contentious form of paballo is the second,
which involves the indefinite and long-term transfer
of administrative rights over an area from a donor
chief to a recipient chief. What he retains is, in
such a case, simply the radical right of ultimate
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reversion, together with some sort of expectation that
he will be treated as the "real" chief of the area
concerned. Lipaballo of this kind are frequently
made at the behest of a superior chief, who requires
either that of two subordinate chiefs one should make
a paballo-grant to the other or that an inferior
chief or headman should grant a paballo to his superior (11).
It can be used as a way of in effect expropriating one
chief for the benefit of another whom the superior
desires to favour, while leaving the donor's position
sufficiently intact at a formal level for him to be in
a weak position to complain that his rights have been
confiscated. When eventually the paballo is recalled,
moreover, problems are created for those subjects of
the recipient chief who have settled in the paballo area,
and there is every inducement for them to resist any
change. It was, indeed, the frequency and bitterness
of disputes over lipaballo, that occasioned their
"elimination" in 1958: but, predictably, this new law
has been the occasion for still further dispute, since
many lipaballo are generations old and questions of
fact arise concerning whether an area was in fact a
paballo or not, and if so where the boundaries fall.
Lipaballo may have been eliminated, but quarrels over
them certainly have not, as the cases discussed below
reveal (12).
Paballo must be distinguished from the situation
described in the phrase mekopu e namelane, "let the
156
pumpkins intertwine". Where no boundary exists between
two chiefs, or between a chief and a subordinate, the
lands are frequently scattered about, at least in the
intermediate area, with one land being under the juris¬
diction of one caretaker and the next land under that
of another. As the Paramount Chief's Court put it in
the judgment in Seeisa v. Nts'oereng J.C. 31/45, "mekopu
e namelane, bana ba lesafo ba ja pitsaneng e le 'ngoe" —
"let the pumpkins grow together, children of the same
stock (13) eat from one bowl". In the area of Masite,
people from Masite Nek, from Ramakau's village, and
from Masite, all three, have their fields mixed up.
When headman Chitja was proclaimed at Masite Nek, and
Ramakau was placed over him as titular chief of Masite,
no boundaries were drawn, and as people moved from
one village to another within the same chiefdom when
they set up a home on marriage they often retained
their fields, though strictly speaking they were now
in another formal area, in that they had moved out of
or into Chitja's h^admanship. If, for the convenience
of living near their lands, they wished to arrange an
exchange, they were free to ask the chief to try to
procure this or to ratify a private arrangement, but
otherwise they continued with the lands they had before.
Since lands are scattered about, and people tend not
to have all their holdings together, it was likely
that a change of residence would bring the landholder
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nearer to one of his lands than he had been before,
and no further from the others. Such an arrangement
works well and no issue comes up for decision until
a quarrel breaks out, in which case there is much
dispute about distant events and previous rights.
Grazing, thatching-grass beds and other maboella are,
however, separately disposed between Chitja and Ramakau,
and this is a source of dispute between the two.
The Basotho courts have usually tried to persuade
litigants to go back and try to live together (e.g.,
the Paramount Chief's Court in Seeisa above), but if
this proves impossible, the superior chief must define
a boundary, and of course this is an occasion for
further quarrelling.
Both paballo and interploughing (as mekopu etc.
is called (14)) raise the question of the nature of
the relationship between chiefs of different degree
and between chiefs and headmen. This issue is
complex and contentious enough in "traditional" terms
and has been further complicated by the competing
interpretations placed on the ambiguous and even
obscure wording of some modern enactments. As has
been seen, a caretaker must always act "through" (ka)
or "with" (le) his subordinate, but this requirement
has all the uncertainty that characterises many areas
of Sotho law, and leaves room for dispute whether it
is satisfied if the superior instead of acting directly
acts by giving an order to his subordinate, or if the
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injunction leaves the subordinate free to disobey if
he dislikes what his superior has proposed to him.
Two points to note in particular are that the position
of a chief differs from that of a headman, and that
appeal procedure is a different matter again. It is
probably the case that (at least traditionally) a
chief had more or less full autonomy within his ward,
but that a headman did not, and that while acting
"through" or "with" a subordinate chief meant co¬
operating with him, if the subordinate were a headman
it meant that he had to carry out his superior's wishes,
though the latter could not act directly (15). Some
recent interpretations of the position, however, have
come near to equating the positions of the two categor¬
ies, in the headman's favour, so that there is no
particular content in the distinction save in terms
of honorific style. It is also important to note
that appeals against the administrative acts of a
headman or a subordinate chief can be taken to the
lekhotla la puso of the superior chief (often the
Principal Chief) (16). But this appeal procedure is
a separate matter from the question of the "original"
jurisdiction of subordinates.
The general discussion of these related topics —
psballo, mekopu, and the relative rights of chiefs —
can now be interrupted, and the problems that they pose
considered in the light of some disputes. Most of the
cases to be described involve more than one of the
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issues, and show how they have a hearing on each other,
creating at every turn a new set of choices for both
litigants and judge. Some of the events recorded
raise points of law and practice that are relevant to
other matters of concern, and these will also he the
subject of some discussion.
The case of Mafetoa v, Mothebesoane J.G. 256/48
raises questions of paballo, but has wider implications
as well. Mafetoa was a chief in 'Mamathe•s ward, who
had a younger brother, Mothebesoane, living in another
ward and not his subject. He gave Mothebesoane some
land for his support and that of his children. Both
brothers died, and were succeeded by their sons, Masupha
and Mpiti respectively. Masupha then took back the
land — or area (17) — and Kpiti went to law to regain
it. The transaction could be regarded in several ways:
as an allocation of land (kabo ea masimo), as a. paballo
of an area, or as a kind of placing. The Paramount
Chief's Court did not definitively resolve these issues.
It awarded the land to Kpiti, on several not fully
compatible grounds. Mpiti had been ploughing the lands
for six years; they had been "given" to his father for
the children's support; Mpiti had taken his father's
place; and, finally, "it is difficult for us to undo
what your fathers had agreed on together". The land
was treated, in fact, as a "gift" (mpho), though this
is not (as will be seen) a concept that can be directly
1
associated with allocation: yet the judgment equally
holds back from considering the matter to involve
either the paballo or the outright grant of jurisdiction
The case is particularly interesting because of the
light it shows on the principles controlling Basotho
judicial decision-making ("it is difficult for us to
undo what your fathers agreed on") and for the signi¬
ficant gloss it places on the doctrine of ts'imo hase
lefa ("land is not an inheritance"). The case will
be referred to again when this doctrine is discussed
in detail below, Chapter Five.
The case of Lirahalibonoe Letsie v. Lesaoana
Sempe J.C. 201/55 is a relatively straightforward
boundary dispute, involving questions of alleged paballo
the dispute arose before the law eliminating lipaballo.
Lirahalibonoe is chief of Likupa's, in the ward of
Likhoele (at the time, not an independent Principal
Chiefdom). Lesaoana Sempe, whose name has occurred
before in this narrative, is chief of Liphiring, and
was accused by the plaintiff of exercising rights of
jurisdiction within the latter's area, in particular
by issuing lands and marking leboella there.
Lirahalibonoe claimed that the disputed area had been
given to his grandfather by Lerotholi, the Paramount
Chief who reigned from 1891 to 1905, and that some
of Lerotholi's people still lived there. Afterwards,
a dispute broke out between the then chiefs of Liphir¬
ing and Likupa, which was resolved when Paramount Chief
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Griffith fixed a boundary in 1930, by his messengers.
(As has been remarked, a chief's "messengers" are not
small men; one of them in this case was Chief Lerotholi
Mojela of Tebang. It should also be observed at this
point that the dispute and its origins go back before
the memories and even the lives of most of the actors.)
The lower court at Likhoele, however, decided that the
area in dispute was a paballo, a situation compatible
both with the allocation claimed by Lira and with
Lesaoana's claim to have rights over it. However,
this was enough to resolve the matter, since not only
did Lira contest the paballo, but there was also no
clear boundary at certain points: Griffith having
decided, as not seldom occurred, that the best way of
stopping disputes in an area was to close it off
altogether in the hope that with time matters would
settle themselves. The next court, again at Likhoele,
found an escape from its difficulties by sending the
disputants before the Chief of Likhoele to make an
administrative decision. A familiar feature of area
disputes is their despatch from judicial to administra¬
tive courts and back again. The Chief over both of
two quarrelling chiefs, if he is reluctant to decide
between them, hopes that by sending them to the judicial
courts he will escape the need to act: it is, after all,
a question of who has the vested right, and this is not
a matter for the administration. But the judicial
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court, faced with the problem not of vested rights but
of the concrete res to which the right adheres, decides
that it is not for the (judicial) courts to draw bound¬
aries and sends the dispute back to the chief (18).
The Paramount Chief's Court (in fact, A.C.I Matsieng)
upheld the existence of a paballo, and sent the chiefs
home again, telling them that if their subjects had
any complaints about lands being wrongly issued, or
issued to the wrong people, they should bring up the
case themselves, and that the chiefs should not dispute
on their behalf. (In Koeno's case, below, it will
conversely be seen how, when subjects litigate, they
can be doing so as catspaws for quarrelling chiefs.)
If the chiefs wanted the doubts surrounding the boundary
cleared up, they should go to their common Chief.
One particular mark of difference between a chief
and a headman occurs in the "Elimination of Lipaballo"
law quoted above, and entered into Mpo v. Mopeli J.C.
107/60; this difference, which reflects traditional
distinctions, arises in section C of Laws of lerotholi
(1959) II 40, where it is clear that it is for chiefs,
and not for headmen (who are specifically named in A
and B - "ramotse"), to terminate lipaballo. Headmen
must either continue with the chief in whose area the
paballo falls (i.e., the "donor" chief), or to resign
their position, move out of the paballo area, and go
with the "recipient" chief: in other words, their
obligations are analogous to those of their subjects,
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who must make a final choice between their lands and
their chief. It is chiefly caretakings, not those of
headmen, that determine how the new boundaries are
drawn, and headmen have no active role attributed to
them in the matter (19).
Chief Buller Peete, Chief of Motloang in Kakhabane's
ward of Koeneng and Kapoteng, was engaged in almost
continuous litigation over area rights in the 'fifties
and 'sixties (20). The first case to be considered is
the action that he raised against his younger brother
(cousin) Lihoapa Lejaha, his subordinate headman at
Mokhathi's (Lejaha v. Peete J.C. 26/64, cf. Kapoteng
Local C.C-. 188/62, Kotjoka Central C.C. 8/63). The
case took its root in a judgment of the Paramount
Chief's Court in 1940, when Lihoapa was accused of
allocating lands within Puller's area. The court
ordered that Buller had the right to allocate virgin
and fallow lands "through your younger brother Lihoapa
by mutual arrangement". In a sarcastic address,
Buller asked "whether now that there are new courts
the judgment of the Basotho courts have become invalid,
so that I may know and not trouble Chief Lihoapa any
further.... I should like to be enlightened as to
whether decisions of the past no longer have any force".
Lihoapa took Buller up on the point, freely admitting
the "charge" against him (that he had allocated lands
without consultation) and taking his stand on Laws of
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Lerotholl (1959) s.7, where it is stated that every
(gazetted) chief and headman is responsible within his
area for the allocation of lands to his subjects.
nI no longer think in terms of the judgment of the
Paramount Chief, I have set it aside. In accordance
with the lavs of lerotholi I plead not guilty". The
lower court upheld Lihoapa, and Buller thereupon appealed,
arguing that the mere fact of gazettement did not make
Lihoapa more than what he was — Buller's headman, who
had precisely the rights awarded to him by the Paramount
Chief in 1940 and no more. The Central Court accepted
Buller's argument, distinguishing between a chief, who
is assumed to have complete internal jurisdiction, and
a headman, who has what he is given. "I do not believe
that being gazetted gave power to the recipient that he
did not previously have". This clearly reflects the
customary law of the matter, but the Judicial Commissioner,
interpreting Laws of Lerotholi with the precision of a
lawyer, reinstated Lihoapa — and thus rendered nugatory
the distinction between chiefs and headmen, reading the
Declaration of Custom as though it were simply a question
of terminology or at most of prestige.
In 1964, Chief Buller was again engaged in litigat¬
ion against lihoaoa, who was on this occasion represented
by his son Leluma (Lejaha v. Peete J.C. 135/65 etc.).
Ke told the court at Mapoteng that he had received a
letter from lehoapa which instructed him (Buller) and
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his "people who plough here" to cease using the lands
I
which were in Lihoapa's area and which, following the
law eliminating Lipahallo, were now returned to his
full jurisdiction. "I say to the court," said Buller,
"Lihoapa is my headman, I am a chief. Shall I bring
it to the Court's mind, who is senior between a headman
and a chief? If I am a chief, how can my headman be
superior to me?" After his disappointment in February,
the question was probably more anxious than rhetorical.
Lihoapa, in reply, began by recalling his victory in
the previous case, and went on to base himself on the
elimination of lipaballo, and specifically on section
(40 (2) (b)) (see above). Adding the confirmation of
his status obtained from the Judicial Commissioner on
the basis of the latter's reading of Laws of Lerotholi
s.7, Lihoapa argued that as a proclaimed headman he was
not only within his rights, he was in fact obliged, to
expel Buller from his caretaking. He was ready to
admit that the powers of a chief and of a headman
differed, but when pressed replied that "the Chief's
powers are greater in administration (puso)namely,
in appeals arising from lower levels of hierarchy.
The lower court supported Buller, asking "can the
headman baballa his chief?" The issue was beginning
to turn, not on whether or not Lihoapa was caretaker
of the area where the lands were, but on Buller's right
to use lawfully allocated lands within his own ward,
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even though they were also within Lihoapa's caretaking.
lihoapa appealed, stating his reasons somewhat petulantly
and implying that the court was consciously twisting the
law against him. The Central Court at Motjoka under
J.M. Mohale dismissed the appeal; it pointed out that
when a chief is placed, he is taken to more than one
headman, and these headmen are required to give the new
chief a bokhina-pere — lands for the chief and the
people who come with him (see the matter of Seeiso's
placing in Kokhotlong in Chapter Two, and Lelingoana's
case J.C. 31/46). The Court pointed out that if such
lands were to count as paballo, such a chief would have
no lands at all, only the bare jurisdiction with nothing
else to support him as a man, let alone as a chief.
It followed that a chief cannot be the recipient of a
paballo in respect of lands which he holds, as chief,
in subordinate wards. (Perhaps this was to overstate
the matter, since a chief might additionally take lands
in paballo, though the point was not essential to the
case.) Pointing out that the law eliminating lipaballo
referred (s.2) to "land in the caretaking of one chief
or headman used by a person... subordinate to another
chief or headman", the Court reasoned that Buller was
not subordinate to such another within his own ward.
"The area where the lands are situated belongs to Buller
under the caretaking of his headman Lihoapa...." On
this occasion, the Judicial Commissioner upheld the lower
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courts, adding only the point that while the new law
required landholders to choose to follow either their
chief or their land, this could not apply to a chief
in circumstances where it would mean that he became
the subordinate of his own headman.
The dispute between Buller and Lihoapa continued,
and in the case of Letima v. Peete J.C. 54/66 it took
the form of an action not directly between the chiefs
themselves but between two of their subjects (see
Lirahalibonoe's case above, and Moeno below; most
jurisdictional disputes reach the courts when two
landholders sue each other — often the issue turns
on which chief had the right to allocate). Peete,
the plaintiff at Rapoteng, complained that he had been
allotted a land by Buller in 1944, and that Lihoapa,
purporting to act in terms of the law eliminating
lipaballo, had taken it from him and given it to Letima.
Letima's reply was that this was the lawful, indeed
mandatory, procedure. The Mapoteng Court upheld
Lihoapa•s right, stating that a paballo between Buller
and his headman was struck at by the law, and that
subjects must choose either to follow their chief and
lose their lands or keep their lands and change their
chief. There were also clear party-political overtones
to this case. The Rapoteng hearing took place in March
1965, just five weeks before the first General Election,
and party-political activity was reaching a climax o-"
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intensity, rivalry "between the National Party and
Congress "being cross-cut by the activities of the
divided but still hopeful Marematlou-Freedom Party.
Buller and Lihoapa, like Peete and Letima, were divided
across these lines, and there was a strong suggestion
that the Court President sided with Letima on political
grounds. The appeal was heard at Motjoka in June,
when the court followed its own logic in the previous
case (Lejaha v. Peete, discussed above); Mohale was
again president. He declared that "Lihoapa is headman
under Chief Buller, who is not a 'different chief'....
This field does not fall under the law relating to
lipaballo". If it was a loan at all, it was a case
of interploughing, but Peete could not be evicted so
long as he remained on the land. letima now appealed,
and the Judicial Commissioner held that Lihoapa was
entitled to act as he did; in other words, he decided
that the ruling he had given in the previous case
protected the chief alone, and not his subjects. The
view of the Central Court was not very dissimilar, in
as much as although it maintained that the land was
not a paballo (since Buller was the chief of the whole
area) and protected Peete*s tenure, it suggested that
on Peete's death or removal the land would fall back
to Lihoapa for re-allocation. The position, however,
was obscured by the uncertainty as to whether the land
in question was in the same category as the Chief's
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fields referred to in the previous judgment, and also
by the nature of the boundary, which was a temporary
one that cut across the disputed land.
The case of Moeno J.C. 214/64 occurred at Masite
Nek, and concerns the relationships between chiefs and
headmen. The Moeno family are among the older inhabi¬
tants of the village, and are mentioned at various
points in the current study (for their official links
with the ruling house of Mohlalefi see Chapter Two note
36). It will be remembered that Ramakau is the chief
of the Masite, subordinate to Mohlalefi Bereng at
Rothe, and that Chitja Mohloae is the headman under
Ramakan at Masite Nek. The headmanship had belonged
to the Moeno lineage, but they lost it when Chitja was
placed. Old Philemon, the senior Moeno alive, acts
as phala and as head of the Moeno's is left to supervise
the affairs of the cluster of households and homestead
in the Moeno corner of the village. Philemon's younger
brother (third son of their father Pokane) predeceased
his wife, who was left to bring up the children; she
had no assistance from Philemon, who disliked her.
She also died, and her son Douglas cut his ties with
the family, moved out of the Moeno hamlet and built
his own house separately, though at a close distance.
Douglas was allocated a site in Masite Nek by
Ramakau; Chitja, on the other hand, allocated the
same site to Monnamoholo, son of Philemon and a senior
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in the family. The case thus involved, first, a
dispute between two Koeno sub-lineages, or perhaps
rather two factions with the lineage, and second, a
trial of strength between Chitja and Ramakau.
Chitja refused to accept Ramakau's allocation — he
admitted that he was the chief's hand (letsoho), but
claimed that he, Chitja, had the right to allocate;
"I could not eat inedible bread". This points up the
ambiguity in a junior caretaker's rights — does he
have the right to allocate in the sense that he can
decide the allocation? or only in the sense that he
is the man who carries it out? The dispute went to
the administrative court at Rothe, the consequence
being that the acting chief wrote a formal letter to
Ramakau, in the course of which he said: "You should
see to it that your headman satisfies your orders in
allocating the site to (Douglas).... Send out messengers
after speaking to your headman, to see that your orders
are obeyed". The judicial court at Rothe accepted
that Chitja had been present when Douglas was given the
site by Ramakau's messengers, and that the authority
of Chief Mohlalefi (the Principal Chief) was behind the
allocation, in terms of the decision of the administrat¬
ive court. It accused Chitja of using his subject as
a stalking-horse for challenging Ramakau. On appeal
by Monnamoholo, the Central Court at Matsieng started
off, accurately enough, by observing that the case was
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"riddled with lies", but concentrated on the fact that
» '
Ramakau, after his success before the "puso" at Rothe,
had sent his messengers to act directly within Chitja's
village. This was a contravention of the law and
custom of the country. What Ramakau should have done
was to order Chitja to allocate to Douglas, using the
authority of the superior chief to enforce his will,
but not to act directly in Masite Nek. Because of




Chiefs, People and the Land
The topic to be considered in this chapter is the
usufructuary aspect of chiefly control of land resources:
the procedures and norms in terms of which lands (fields)
are made available to the population. From the point
of view of the socio-economic life of the people, this
is the crucial issue. In common with other Southern
Bantu kingdoms, Basutoland*s life centres on the land.
In principle, every adult (1) Mosotho has a right to an
allocation of land to provide for his subsistence and
that of his family and dependents, and it is for the
chiefs to arrange for him to have this (2). In return,
the subject owes allegiance to the chief, residence
within the ward belonging to the chief (3), and culti¬
vation of the lands allocated to him. If he withdraws
his allegiance he loses his lands and can be expelled
from the area completely (4). Traditionally, as has
been seen, this took the form of "turning the door of
the hut" (ho reteletsa ntlo monyako) against his own
chief, which formerly implied looking to another chief
instead (5). Now that it is more possible to "escape"
from chieftainship altogether, by seeking employment
or other productive activity whether in Basutoland or
in the Republic of South Africa, it does not necessarily
follow that to abandon one chief is to turn to another;
173
but in the past this was the case, since the only-
source of rights to residence and the only access to
the economic conditions for survival lay with the
chieftainship. But it is still true today that the
tenure of lands represents an ultimate security, a
residual fall-back, even for those who do not presently
stand in need of it; the greater part of the population,
however, do stand in immediate and direct need of land
and the consequence is that the general claim on land
resources remains vigorous and that the role of the
chiefs, as mediators of this diffuse right, remains
central (6). The general and diffuse "right of avail"
is without content until it is specified by a particular
allocation: it is not a specific right to this field,
nor (in the case of a "stranger") does it impose even
a general duty on this chief. Even one born into a
particular ward has still only a diffuse claim on his
own chief, and it is the latter*s task so to administer
the land in his area that, so far as possible, all
claimants receive a share in the available resources.
The allocation of land resources is particularly
crucial in view of the pressures upon land (7). This
situation puts considerable power in the hands of
chiefs and renders matters of land administration both
contentious and delicate. In theory, every adult
married Mosotho male has a basic entitlement to three
lands. The question of size is at least marginally
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relevant, in that a man with very small fields (masimo,
sing, ts'imo) is more likely to succeed in an application
for a further allocation than a similarly placed man
with large ones (Morojele 1962: Part 3, p.44); but as
Sandra Wallman's brilliant and incisive article on
Sesotho measurement shows (Wallman: 1965), there is
little or no concern with exact calculation, fields
being measured in terms of their width alone, the
length being left out of account (8). What is always
stressed is the number of fields, and it is only in
response to specific questioning, or where a field is
particularly large (like Kohlalefi's field at Thaba-
Chitja referred to above: but this is more a consolidated
arable bloc consisting of many fields) that size is
animadverted to. The norm of three lands (fields) is
steadfastly adhered to, though in the face of the
evidence this represents, again, more a moral than an
actuarial expectation. It means that a man with fewer
than three lands considers that he has a good case for
seeking more, and that a. man with four or more must
show special grounds for asking for any others or even
for keeping all those that he has. A man with three
is (other things being equal) in the proper condition
of a Kosotho and can expect to be left with them.
But though in the past the expectation of three fields
corresponded to the statistical norm (which is no doubt
how the figure became established) this is no longer
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the case. The I960 Agricultural Census shows that
more holdings have two fields than have three, except
in the Border Lowlands, where the two categories are
about equal. The average number of fields per holding
(of all holdings with fields) has been estimated at
2.4 (9). The consequence is that well over half (59
per cent) of all holdings have fewer than the acknowled¬
ged norm, so that even taking into account the fact
that some persons (widows, residual families with adult
children away and no dependants) may not be entitled
to the full complement, there remains a substantial
number of people who experience a felt land-hunger that
is also normatively legitimised. Land is therefore an
issue of crucial importance and there is no dearth of
claims and counterclaims in respect of its allocation (10).
Some conscious attention is given to the quality
and siting of lands. The fragmentation of holdings is
due partly to the consideration that it is only fair
that a people should share equally the different qualit¬
ies of land available in a ward; it also is due to the
need to distribute the inconveniences of distance fairly,
and of course to historical accidents, such as the
contingency of a land becoming available in one place
and being allocated to an applicant who has another
land some distance away. But though people are
conscious of the differential yields of different lands,
they think of these differences as given facts which
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they can do little to modify; quality enters into land
matters as a secondary issue, subordinated to the more
fundamental question of having a land at all.
It is once more convenient to use the Laws of
Lerotholi (1959), Part I, as a starting-point for the
discussion of land administration. The relevant section
(sec.7) reads as follows:
7. (1) Allocation of land generally (Kabo ea mobu)
Every (gazetted) Chief and every (gazetted)
Headman... is responsible, within his area of
jurisdiction, for the allocation of land to his
subjects (ho beha batho ba hae masimo). It
shall be the duty of the Chief and Headman to see
that land is allocated fairly and impartially....
(2) Inspection of land (hlahlobo ea mobu)...
Every Chief and every Headman... shall
frequently inspect all lands allocated by him in
his area for the cultivation of crops and is
empowered to take away land from people who in
his opinion have more lands than are necessary
for their and their families' subsistence (hore
ba phele le ho phelisa malapa a bona) and grant
such land so taken away to his subjects who have
no land or insufficient lands.
(3) Deprivation (kamoho) of land not used
or ill used
It will be at the discretion of such Chief or
Headman to take away a land or lands which he has
allocated to any of his subjects who, through
continued absence or insufficient reason, fails
for two consecutive years properly (ka nepo) to
cultivate or cause to be cultivated. "
(4) Retention of lands by widows
No widow shall be deprived of her land except
under the provisions of paragraphs (2) and (3).
(5) Provision of lands for minors and other
sons on the death of their parents
(a) On the death of the father or mother,
whoever dies last, all arable land allocated to
them shall be regarded as land that has become
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vacant and shall revert to the Chief or Headman
for re-allocation.
Should, however there he minor dependants
left in such households, it shall he the duty of
the guardian... to report (their) presence to the
Chief or Headman, and it shall he the duty of the
Chief or Headman to make provision for (them),
during the period, of their minority, from the land
or lands of their deceased parents. If the minor
dependants are sons, the Chief or Headman shall,
on such sons attaining majority, confirm them on
the land or lands used for their benefit during
the period of their minority.
(h) In the re-allocation of lands which have
reverted to the Chief or Headman on the death of
the previous occupier and after the needs of any
minor dependants have been satisfied... (he) shall
give priority... to the requirements of any adult
son or sons of the deceased provided (he or they)
reside in the village of the deceased.
(c) Any person aggrieved by the action of
the Chief or Headman in failing to observe the
provisions laid down in this paragraph (5) may
appeal to the Paramount Chief.
(AUTHOR'S MOTE: The English edition of (5) (c)
reads that "any person aggrieved... may complain
to the Principal or Ward Chief... and if dissat¬
isfied... he may appeal to the Paramount Chief".
The omission of these words from the Sesotho
version points to nothing except an accident,
probably the result of haplography.)
(6) Right to select which land to surrender
When under paragraph (2) or (4) above a Chief
or Headman orders that a land or lands be surrendered,
the person so ordered... shall have the right to
choose which land or lands shall be surrendered....
••• Land required in the public interest
Except in the public interest (ho etsetsoa
sechaba molemo) it shall not be lawful for any
person to be deprived of his lands... except in
accordance with the provisions of this law.
This statement does not in every particular reflect
customary law, but it represents a good approximation to
the norms that control lawful land administration.
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These can be re-ordered and re-stated as follows:
1) A landholder must receive his land from his
chief, or his chief and headman, if any is available.
It is, generally, a matter for the local chief to make
the decision himself, but a subject can complain to a
higher chief if he has been unjustly dealt with.
However, the superior is unlikely to do other than
leave the matter in the local chief's hands, unless the
applicant has the superior's support: in which case,
however, the superior would probably have made a
"request" in advance, if he could not or would not
allocate lands to him from his own direct area.
2) Once he has been allocated land, he has a
usufructuary title to it for life, subject to certain
conditions. (a) He may lose his land if he removes
from the area (ward, including headman's caretaking)
where the land is situated. However, removal (though,
as will be seen, this includes death) does not include
the case where the landholder himself leaves to work
elsewhere, for instance in the Republic or in Maseru,
provided that he leaves a member or members of his
family (for example his wife) to look after the land
during his absence. Many people, especially those in
urban employment and living with their wives elsewhere,
leave brothers or cousins to maintain title, and chiefs
do not necessarily regard such people as "removers".
The test is rather the two-fold one that (i) the holder
179
should continue in his allegiance to the chief, tax-
payment being the generally recognised index of this
and (ii) continue to occupy the land, through others
if not by himself. This condition virtually extends
•f
the conception of reteletsa (turning the door).
(b) He must cultivate the land or cause it to be
cultivated. Land is too scarce to waste, and if it
lies untended for two successive years, it can be taken
away after inspection and allocated to another, even
if the holder continues to reside. (c) If the holder
has more than he needs, the Chief may take the surplus
away and re-allocate it. It should be emphasised,
however, that the usufructuary title is not simply
conditional. In principle, the holder has a secure
lifelong title, and it is only if certain events occur
that he loses it. The conditions, in other words, are
strictly resolutive. Again, an aggrieved landholder
can complain to the superior chief.
3) Death counts as removal, except that the widow (s)
and other minor dependants of the deceased have a right
to continue to use the lands, though not necessarily
all of them. A widow's entitlement is to two lands.
Minor sons should be confirmed on the lands when they
attain their majority, provided they remain under the
same chief and fulfil the other conditions. Major
sons have a special claim to the family lands, though
this is weaker than the claim of minors, and again this
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is subject to the conditions of tenure.
Underlying these norms, lies the principle which,
though easily over-interpreted and open to misunder¬
standing, nevertheless essentially contains one major
component of the law: ts'imo hase lefa, "land is not
an inheritance". The subtler implications of this are
discussed below, but the broad meaning is that after
a "removal" or a forfeiture, the land reverts to the
chieftainship for re-allocation, and cannot, when it
has so reverted, be claimed as of right as an inheritance
by any person who may nevertheless be an heir (mojalefa)
for other purposes.
Land allocation by Chiefs and Headmen
The "administrative" or jurisdictional aspect of
rights to allocate has been considered in Chapter Pour.
The concern here is with allocation as it affects the
beneficiary or usufructuary. First, it is clear that
a chief may appoint a phala to act for him in matters
of land allocation, though the Roman-Dutch courts
disapprove of "delegating discretion" (e.g. Kotsomotso v.
Molise J.C. 155/57 for the principle; and see Lelingoana
v. P.C. J.C. 51/46) where the phala remains a mere
"bugle" or herald and is not recognised as a chief or
headman with original jurisdiction. Secondly, land
allocation is a public act, and private allocations
are both illegal and void; see the Basotho Court at
Lejone in lekhala v. Shishila J.C. 74/65. This require-
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ment of publicity is a common feature of Sotho law
(see "A Case of Night-Grazing" in Chapter Three, and
the alienation and allocation of the family estate,
below, Chapter Six), and is essential for evidential
purposes. Thirdly, land is allocated through
specifically appointed land-issuers, baabi (sing, moabi)
and not directly by the chief. These persons are
required to have a full knowledge of previous allocations,
and to act as the chief's executive agents in taking or
identifying a vacant or forfeited land or lands, and
supplying the information about lands that the chief
needs in order to make his decision. They also go
with the chief or headman or his phala to point out,
publicly, the field in question to the person who has
been given it. It is the law that the chief must work
through his baabi and not directly and by himself
(Paramount Chief's Court in Konne v. Rabolinyane J.C.
570/52). Formerly, the baabi were discretionary
appointments, and there was clearly no way of determin¬
ing what they chose to remember, misremember or forget.
This represents one of the ways in which chiefs can
manipulate land, and render their subjects* tenure
less well-protected than the "rules" make it appear.
Examples abound — indeed, disputes over the facts of
allocation are countless — and a not untypical illus¬
tration will suffice. In frithembu v. Monare J.C. 272/65,
Chief letsie Theko allocated a site to Konare near the
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village of Sebaboleng (Maseru). Monare built on it,
and then Letsie claimed the site back. His land-issuers,
one of whom was his paternal uncle Mosuoe, claimed that
they had allocated the site to Letsie himself (in itself
a perfectly valid procedure), and that Letsie had then
commissioned Mthembu to build on it. The present
writer took part in this affair, and there is little
doubt that Letsie and his chiefs were attempting to go
back on a previous allocation. A judgment of the
administrative court was produced making this fairly
clear. One of the easiest ways to deprive a man of
his land is to declare that it had never been allocated
to him, if complaisant land-issuers can be persuaded
to do this, as often they can. One particular device
is to argue that the land was not formally allocated
but only lent. (What is at issue here is not the loan
of land between subjects, but a temporary loan of usufruc¬
tuary rights by a chief to a subject.) In Morie v.
Mokhesi J.C. 211/64, Tseliso claimed that he had been
allocated his grandfather's land, and that during his
minority it had been temporarily allocated to others.
The loan (mokobobo) had lasted no less than twenty-three
years, but the plaintiff was now anxious to resume his
land. The lower court at Setleketseng supported Tseliso,
but did not consider the principle involved. On appeal,
the Central Court at Matsieng stated that "mokobobo does
not exist in our law... it is not true that a person can
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"be allocated a land temporarily". But the temporary
use of land, for short periods, is another matter, and
would not constitute unlawful mokobobo. Several
examples of such loans will be mentioned below. The
court may have disliked the custom, but it undoubtedly
exists. A different issue altogether is involved if
such loans could last for twenty-three years; this
would undermine the whole system of land administration
and would enable any allocation to be treated as
temporary and revocable.
Under the new (1965) constitution, land-issuers are
no longer intended to be discretionary appointments by
the chief. In terms of sections 90-94, local baabl are
to be elected at a pitso (general meeting of all subjects),
and are to form a consultative council with whom the
headman must act in deciding all matters of land
allocation. A pitso of the ward within the jurisdiction
of the immediately superior chief elects an advisory
board to hear appeals from the subjects of subordinate
headmen. Second level appeals are heard by an advisory
board elected by a pitso of all the inhabitants of the
Principal ward. Prom the Principal Ward level, appeals
go to Motlotlehi. Similar procedures apply to appeals
against deprivation of land. This move to democratise
land-administration is accompanied by an attempt to
formalise it by requiring that applications for land,
notices of appeal, and notifications of allocation or
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forfeiture must be in writing, and that records of
all allocations, deprivations, procedures and appeals
must be kept. Evidence is not available to gauge
the general operation of this complex system generally.
However, by January 1970, no appeals had been notified
to Motlotlehi (11); and there is evidence that the
machinery is not fully operational (Ashton 1967: xxx f.,
but see also Hamnett: 1967a). In Masite, a village
pitso was held in 1965, under the Land (Advisory Boards
Procedure) Regulation 1965. The headman, who is not
gazetted, proposed six people for election to fill the
five vacancies. The system of election, which seemed
to be locally conceived, was an interesting one. The
President was chosen first, and then all who had voted
for him retired; the remainder elected the second member,
and those who voted for him retired, and so on. The
figures were approximately 60, 25 and 15 for the first
three places, which nearly exhausted the total attendance,
•
about 100 people having now voted. All therefore came
back, and the procedure was repeated for the last two
places. This system was seen as ensuring reasonably
fair representation for minority groups, where a more
straightforward election would have meant that the
strongest voting group would have secured all five places.
One of the five elected baabi is supposed to attend
appeals, not as a member of the appeal board but as a
witness of lower level events. The ward pitso was
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dominated by 'Ma-Bereng, the wife of the Principal Chief
(Mohlalefi) who was still in gaol following the shoot¬
ings at Rothe in the previous year (Chapter Three, note 9).
This was so in spite of the fact that, at Rothe, written
voting papers were used, on which those attending the
pitso were to write the names of five candidates from
the twelve nominated. Of the five elected, one (Masite
Bereng) was already the president of the five first-level
baabi in Masite (where he is also the chief's phala),
and had been a moabi under the old system. He is
illiterate, and was chosen for his great knowledge of
lands in the ward. Of the others, two were liphala in
Rothe, and one was elected raleboella (controller of the
leboella). Apart from Masite Bereng, all the baabi were
from Rothe itself. Of the seven not elected, only one
came from Rothe and one from near Rothe. The other
five came from other villages in the ward. In 1966,
the printed forms were not in use, and all the probabili¬
ties are that the system will work much as the previous
one did, where the chief is strong enough to make it so.
There was evidence that in many places the elections had
been abandoned and that there was great difficulty in
making the new procedures operational. The baabi for
Masite Nek and Ramakau's village are used in common
between the headman and the chief, since the fields are,
ps noted, "mixed up". A joint meeting was held at
Ramakau's, and three baabi were chosen, but the meeting
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was stopped and the elections cancelled, since political
feelings began to run high (Masite Nek is a strongly
Congress village).
Land allocation is traditionally made to married
men only, and this rule is still relied on by the Basotho
Courts, at least when it supports the decision they wish
to come to (the principle was invoked as an additional
consideration by the central court in Morie v. Mokhesi
above); but there is now a tendency for minority and
majority to be assessed more in terms of years than of
marital status. The norm of three lands, however,
assumes marriage to one wife, and there is thus a sense
in which an allocation is made in respect of a wife,
though not specifically to her. In Setsapa v. Lethuoa
J.C. 125/64, Setsapa had privately lent a land to his
son Mene. His wife objected, claiming that the land in
question had been allocated in respect of her marriage,
not that of Setsapa's other wife. The Chief of Senqun-
yane sent a letter to the court indicating that the
field in question had been allocated for the wife
involved, and this view of the matter was shared by
both the Basotho Courts: the land was ea 'MaTseko,
"of 'Matseko". In Machela v. Tholoana the point arose
in connection with a divorced wife. The lower court
(Bela-Bela Local, C.C. 168/63) held that the disputed
land had been allocated to the wife, during her marriage,
and that as she continued to live on it with her
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husband's children, she retained her title. On appeal,
the Court at Motjoka (C.C. 19/64) held that though the
land was issued in respect of the wife, it was allocated
to the husband, and that the divorce had terminated
her rights in respect of it. The issue is finely
balanced. In Kobefu J.C. 259/63, the Makhaleng Central
Court stated that "lands are allocated to the husband
and not the wife; it is the husband who will portion
them out to the houses..."; and in Matsoso J.C. 247/63,
Maja's Court said "lands are the property of a man and
his wife; that means that when one of his wives has
died, the lands shall be annexed to the remaining wife
or wives".
One source of difficulty and confusion here arises
from the ambiguity of the word "allocation" (kabo)
itself. It can refer to chiefly allocation of land,
or to "private" allocation by the family head of assets
within the family (see Chapter Six, and Laws of Lerotholi
(1959) Part I sections 11-14). These private allocat¬
ions are principally to houses (matla, malapa) but can
also be made to sons or brothers, especially where the
mere use is involved. Thus, even a ts'iroo (land),
though not part of the estate (ts'imo hase lefa), can
be allocated to a particular person; and since lands
are issued in respect of marriage, this has particular
^orce. It is a delicate matter, evenly balanced either
way, whether such internal family and household arrange-
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ments are matters that carry over into the question of
chiefly allocation of land to a subject. This is all
the more true in so far as the chieftainship itself is
still conceptualised in at least partly paternal terms,
and indeed in some smaller villages the roles of head¬
man and household head are virtually fused, the
"political" and lineage positions being both empirically
and analytically inseparable. But the private
allocation of lands is a regular feature of Sotho
practice, even where the two domains are distinct and
seen to be distinct. Josias Thabo died in 1934>
having three lands in Masite. His eldest son David
was already married and had two lands. His younger
son Edwin was a bachelor and had none. David said,
"I took one of my father's lands, and made up my
lands to three. I gave two to Edwin, who was married
now, and he got a third one from the chief". (It
was, in fact, apparent from further questioning that
"I took..." and "I gave..." definitely included
consultation with and permission from the chief.
This aspect is considered below, in the discussion of
the quasi-inheritance of land rights. What is in
point here is the way in which fathers, husbands and
heirs make their own allocative arrangements (ratified
though they are) within their families of origin and
procreation). It is normal and regular for lands to
be allocated to houses by family heads, and these acts
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are expected to survive the head in at least some of
their effects.
The "ideal" allocation of three lands refers to
a man with one wife (12). For each additional wife,
there is an "ideal" of two further lands. Although
there is a positive correlation between household
size and lands, it does not, on average, reflect this
ideal and many households with large numbers have fewer
lands than the ideal suggests (see annex to this
chapter, especially Fig. J and Table 4). Nevertheless,
the statistical correlation, while not reflecting
allocations directly proportionate to numbers of persons,
suggests that the chieftainship does on the whole match
lands roughly to size. As has been noted, polygamy
is now very rare, at least in its formal sense, and
large households are more likely to consist of brothers
and their wives and sons and their wives than of
polygamous wives and children. A large family group,
such as the Moeno's in Masite Nek, can achieve economies
of scale by taking the household economy as one unit,
which go some way to make up for the sub-ideal allocat¬
ion of lands. The Moeno's themselves, thanks to their
established position in the village and Philemon's
status as headman Chitja's phala, are in fact well
provided with lands, and Philemon, as head of the house¬
hold, is given a more or less free hand with the
household fields. The seven nuclear and residual
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families who live in the consolidated Moeno site number
about 25 persons, of whom five or six live away, either
in the Republic or in other parts of Basutolana, and
share a total of some seventeen fields. Chitja has
no garden, and only three lands; even these he share-
crops, for reasons noted in "A Case of Night-Grazing"
above, section two.
The kind of economy which a large household can
achieve can be seen by contrast with the case of small
households, whose womenfolk sell small quantities of
corn to find cash when they need it for taxes, school,
hospital expenses, or other demands, only to buy back
later from the same store at a higher price. It often
happens that two women will enter the store together,
one coming to sell, and the other to buy. The store,
in effect, hands over the seller's corn to the buyer,
and charges the latter a mark-up of 15 per cent or
more. An integrated household can avoid these dis¬
economies by balancing its own needs and resources
without making a cash transfer to the trader for the
nugatory service of weighing* and warehousing the corn.
Although a married man has formally entitled himself
to a full allocation, he is unlikely, even if shortages
and other constraints do not intervene, to receive it
if he continues to live at home, bringing his wife with
him. He will be much more likely to receive one or two
lands, and will be given the full complement (if at all)
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when he moves out to establish hie own lelapa. This
incremental allocation is well adapted to the changing
needs in the developmental cycle of the family. At
first, before children are born and when they are very
young, fewer lands are needed. As the children grow,
more lands are required, and the children can help
with the household economy, especially as balisana
(herds). Quite often, by the time the father dies,
the older sons have moved away, and the youngest son
may stay at home (with the widow, if she is still alive)
and inherit the site. Such a person is known as the
toeba ea lerako (lithako), the "mouse among the ruins".
But though this is a recognised practice, there is no
rule of ultimogeniture in Sotho law, and the youngest
son cannot claim to inherit the homestead or huts.
Meanwhile, it is not a clearcut matter where the fields
"belong". A father will "retain" more fields than he
needs or is entitled to, in respect of married, or
supposedly about-to-be-married, sons. This is once
more an area of uncertainty between chiefly allocation
to a subject and "private" allocation within the family.
Khadebe — a second generation immigrant to Masite Nek —
has three sons, one married son working in Maseru, one
married son living at home, and one unmarried son living
in Matelile. Although a recent arrival and of Nguni
origin (his name is phonetically impossible in Sesotho)
he established a remarkable position for himself in the
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village, partly as a result of his somewhat forceful
personality. His brother married a Moeno girl and
had no issue. Before his death, he sold his hut end
dwelling site, but failed to clear the transaction
with the chief. Khadebe was thus able to claim the
site himself (sites are not lands and are inheritable
in a restricted sense to be discussed later) and put
his married son in it. He holds ten lands, and
argues that some of them are for his son in Matelile,
whose marriage he claims to be due in the not very
distant future; others are for his married son in the
brother's site. Both sites have gardens, and share
the same kraal for their few cattle. The eldest son,
who is an interpreter in Maseru, has left his wife and
children with his father. This is an example of a
man who has been successful in all his efforts; and it
is pertinent to note that his good fortune in respect
of his salaried son, his sites and his gardens has not
resulted in his receiving fewer lands, but more.
Nevertheless, a headman will sometimes take into
account the possession of a garden, particularly a
large one, in considering allocations. The applicant
will resist this, and argue that sites and lands are
legally in quite different categories. Sheddick notes
(1954: 77, 183 ff.) that Basotho make this insistence,
but ignores the question of the land-issuers response
to it (see also annex to this chapter). This probably
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accounts for the fact that some gardens are under-used.
People who could maintain themselves out of a garden,
like the Hlabi's in Masite Nek, would by doing so
prejudice their right to receive or retain their lands.
Since sites such as gardens are tenurially much more
secure than lands, as will be seen, they can be allowed
to deteriorate and remain unused or underused, and
lands cultivated while they are there: for the garden
remains with the resident owners more or less unconditi¬
onally.
Other considerations taken into account in land
allocation are length of residence in the village,
birth in the ward or caretaking, and kinship links,
preferably agnatic, with those who are already established.
Other factors can also weigh. When Josias Thabo came
to Masite, he had some cattle and was accounted fairly
well to do. The chief therefore gave him some stony
ground (he was a stranger, too, and could not claim
the best) and told him he could have what he could use.
He improved the land and created a large field. His
son David refuses to give any of it up, and points to
the circumstances of its allocation. It would be
unrealistic to omit one further factor in addition.
Although land allocation is, in law, a gratuitous act,
there is an abundance of evidence that many land-issuers
expect and receive payment for giving out fields. It
proved almost impossible to gain specific information
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on this topic, since not only the chief but the land¬
holder would never admit to a transaction of the kind.
It was always a question that arose in another village,
or a story that was told about a relative or friend.
Nevertheless, there is no real doubt at all that land
allocation is subject to this form of "corruption",
and that the incidence of cash or other inducements to
chiefs is widespread. These inducements cover a wide
spectrum, from simple bribery at one end of the
continuum to the proffering of respectful gifts or
services at the other. In the latter case, there is
no clear distinction between "improper" inducement on
the one hand and the simple expression of allegiance
on the other. "Good" subjects deserve land more than
"bad" ones; the abolition or attenuation of chiefs'
courts and compulsory letseme (labour services) has
modified the criterion of what constitutes these
qualities, and opened the system to what in many cases
is clearly an abuse that works powerfully against
precisely those who are in most need.
The Unit of Allocation
In the simplest sense, what is allocated is a land,
a defined area of ground. Sheddick, however, prefers
to analyse allocation as involving a "production unit",
specifically the arable rights over a cadastrally
defined land parcel, rather than the land parcel itself
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(1954: 3 f.» 10 f. and passim). This distinction is
drawn because of the right of stover (qheme) in terms
of which, after the harvest, the fields are opened
for the common grazing of the stalks. The right of
stover is not allocated to the landholder, except in
so far as he shares it as one of the entitled community (13).
A man cannot graze the stalks of his own land without
opening it to all in the community. One consequence
of this is that lands may not be fenced, since as soon
as it is opened to stover, all may use it. However,
in some areas at least, including some within the ward
of Rothe, the chiefs have met and formally agreed that
a man can divide his field into strips, rotating his
crops, and using stover at various times of the year.
In such a case, he can graze his own cattle without
permitting others to do so, but he is not then permitted
to take advantage of the general qheme after harvest.
Moreover, there is a gradually growing tendency to
tolerate the ploughing-in of stalks, and even for a
man to harvest his stalks and store them as winter
fodder.
The distinction between different production units
has undoubted analytic value, as Sheddick's whole study
makes clear, but it is possible to make too much of it
in relation to arable and stover rights. To insist on
it beyond a certain point is to imply, even though not
to entail, an indigenous view that does not in fact exist.
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People see the situation as one in which they are
allocated a land, subject to certain obligations: e.g.,
it is specifically for cultivation, and not for build¬
ing on. (David Thabo tried to get permission to fence
and build on one of his fields, but Mohlalefi forbade
the project, saying that Basutoland must not be turned
into a "nation of farms".) It is also subject to the
right of stover, but this is seen as a burden on the
land, rather than as a separate unit of title.
Loan of land and other de facto interests in land
In spite of the hostile attitude of the Basuto
Courts, at least to a very long loan (mokobobo; see the
case of Morie v» Mokhesi above), land is not infrequently
lent or temporarily allocated — it is better, anyway,
that it should be used than not, though in disputed
matters it often lies uncultivated, and the courts used
to order this.
This may take the form of a temporary allocation
from a chief to a subject, where a further complication
is introduced if the land in question is regarded as
the chief's "own" land, and if it forms part of the
masimo a lira, chieftainship fields. But a loan of
land may also be made between subject and subject.
In these cases, a consideration is nearly always involved,
except where the purpose of the loan is to maintain
title during the landholder's absence or to provide for
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dependant kin while the landholder makes his living
differently or elsewhere. All such loans, however,
require the consent of the chief or headman who
administers land in the area. Where a consideration
is involved, this can take many forms. One landholder
in Masite Nek has lent part of his land to a member
of a nearby village in exchange for driving-lessons.
In other cases, a straight payment of cash or the
setting-off of a debt are involved. The cash trans¬
actions are not legal, however, if they involve the
effective transfer of rights in land and to use land
in exchange for a consideration in money or commodities.
But the issue is not, in fact, so simple, since there
are man;' arrangements, notably share-cropping, whereby
what is transferred is a right to part or whole of the
produce of land. Moreover, what is obtained in return
for this, by the landholder, is frequently the use of
a plough, of oxen, of labour or of a tractor, without
some or all of which the land could often not be
cultivated at all. There is no real discontinuity
between the widely-found and quintessentially traditional
practice of cooperating in land use on the one hand and
entrepreneurial share-cropping on the other. It would
be quite misleading to suggest that the inhabitants of
Masite Nek were given to mutual cooperation in any
general way: rather the reverse. Essentially, the
different households tend to perceive their socio-economic
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situation as "zero-sum", in such terms that one man's
gain is regarded as almost hound to another's loss.
But particular relationships of cooperation are wide¬
spread and institutionalised, operating sometimes on
a neighbourly basis but more frequently on a basis of
agnatic or cognatic ties, or of affinity (14). Some
less structured forms of cooperation between wider
groups also occur; a man can announce a letsema, or
work party, for hoeing or harvesting, in return for
which he will provide food and beer, and sometimes
cash. But ploughing arrangements are generally more
particularistic. They may take the unilateral form
of a son ploughing for his widowed mother, or a man
helping his daughter-in-law during her husband's
absence. A man may mafisa his stock, and accept
assistance in ploughing in return. Two or more house¬
holds, none of whom may have sufficient oxen separately,
may have enough together, and arrange to plough each
other's lands in turn. Unequal contributions may be
paid for in cash, in kind, or by rendering other
agricultural services at another date. At this point,
the economic inequality of the partners begins to make
itself felt in the distribution of the product, and
there is an analytical progress from this arrangement
to a more openly exploitative relationship between the
parties. Full share-cropping (seahlolo) can mean that
a man with lands but no means of ploughing them and (for
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any reason such as recent arrival, unpopularity or
dearth of kin) no accessible sources of cooperation,
and no cash to hire a ploughman, is obliged to enter
into an arrangement with an entrepreneur, whereby the
latter ploughs the lands and takes half the produce.
The typical entrepreneur has lands of his own, and
owns or hires a tractor, using it to acquire shares
in a considerable number of fields, both inside and
also outside his own ward. According to the I960
Agricultural Census Reports, of all holdings, in 34.2
per cent of cases the holder used his own stock and
labour (the proportion of holdings doing so rising
from 18 per cent in the smallest holdings to around a
half in the larger ones); 17.6 per cent operated the
land through the family unit, and 11.2 per cent worked
with unrelated families. Thus, about two-thirds
(63 per cent) of holders appeared to plough either
without help or in terms of basically non-exploitative
arrangements. But in about one-third of cases (31.8
per cent) (15) a share-cropping arrangement was used
which in principle involved a bargaining situation
between parties of such a kind that the economically
more powerful of the two would stand to gain — and
from this position deja prise he would be in a position
to strengthen his market situation still more, while
reducing the other's chance to improve his own. This
does not mean, however, that the relationship is always
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directly exploitative, if it is exploitative at all.
Thus, Chief Mohlalefi Bereng share-crops some of his
fields to Kahlaku, not because he is weak, but because
he has more fields than he can use. It is however
complained locally that he should allocate more of
them to his subjects, instead of keeping them and
lending or share-cropping them out; and the arrangement
has also had the effect of enabling Mahlaku to enter
into arrangements with poor or feckless landholders,
where a direct element of exploitation can be said to
enter (16). In Masite Nek, the leading resident
entrepreneurs were Mahlaku and Moroeng. Moroeng has
arrangements with about fifteen other landholders, not
all of which however are on a commercial basis. He
has fourteen cattle and five horses and owns agricultural
implements such as cultivators and harrows. He is a
blacksmith, though he no longer works as one, and can
repair his own equipment. Mahlaku, whose name has
occurred several times before, is a hard-working and
intelligent man who has built up his little business
as a small shop-keeper in the ten years that he has
lived in Masite Nek. He has three lands in Masite
Nek, and has kept the three he had at his former home
at Thaba-Chitja. He is a creditor of headman Chitja,
some of whose land he share-crops; as has been noted,
Chitja spends a lot of his time at Mahlaku's cafe
drinking sorghum beer (kaffir-corn beer) and is almost
continually in debt* As has been seen, Mahlaku also
share-crops part of Chief Mohlalefi's large field in
Thaba-Chitja. His son married the daughter of
Rantsilonyane, reputedly the richest man in Masite Nek,
with sixteen cattle, six horses and donkeys and about
seventy sheep and goats. But the most successful
local entrepreneur does not live in Masite Nek at all,
but in Kothe, where he has established himself as a
small businessman in an internationally recognisable
sense, with the help of his brother, a doctor in
Maseru. He runs an authorised bus service, owns a
car, and possesses tractors and other expensive equip¬
ment; he and his brother have extensive interests in
land, extending outside not only the local ward at
Rothe but into Matsieng and very probably other areas
as well. Rural entrepreneurs (or "capitalists") are
thus able to build up large de facto landholdings, the
nominal landholder sometimes being little more than an
unpaid labourer on his own fields. This development
in effect sidesteps the customary law of land tenure.
It cannot be said to be consistent with it, since it
presupposes a form of social structure and a pattern
of social and economic organisation of a kind entirely
inconsistent with those that underlie customary law;
yet it is not specifically in breach of any particular
and definable provision. Little is known about the
scale and total impact of these entrepreneurial
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arrangements in the nation as a whole. They tend to
be somewhat invisible, since people do not reveal them
freely, and the structure of systematic statistical
inquiry is not well adapted to uncover them, much
less to identify the point at which a basically co¬
operative if unequally balanced relationship yields
to a commercial and entrepreneurial one. Nevertheless,
this excursus indicates that the actual structure of
control of land resources cannot in principle be read
off from the norms or even the rules of customary law.
Land Deprivation
Land allocation can be regarded as involving the
diffuse "right of avail", as Hughes calls it (1964).
No specific claim, in principle, exists such that a
particular man can call on a particular chief to
allocate him a particular land. Land deprivation, on
the other hand, is specific and particular, since here
a particular man is losing a particular field at the
hands of a particular chief. Again, land may be
allocated or withheld for general or negative reasons:
"there is no land, you are not my subject, there are
others with a prior claim, I will see..., come back
next year". But land can be lawfully taken away only
on positive and specific grounds. The basic ground
is that a "remover" (mofalali) forfeits his rights
automatically. As has been remarked above, death
counts as removal (17), but simple physical absence
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does not, title being without any question maintained
by a wife or son, but also in many cases by more
distant agnates or other kin. Removal includes or
overlaps with the concept of allegiance. Subject to
the important qualifications of fact discussed in
the previous section, a man cannot hold lands under
two different chiefs or headmen. If he attemDts to
do so, he stands to forfeit one or other or even both
of his holdings. Removal and dual allegiance strike
at the basis of landholding by undermining the links
between political allegiance, residence and access to
arable resources (18).
The incidence of forfeiture for non-cultivation
is difficult to assess. As in most land-disputes,
the case becomes visible when a man finds another
ploughing his land, and the issue turns on whether the
chief had properly reallocated it to the interloper.
In many cases, removal and non-cultivation go together,
but the point does not, in the nature of the case,
cause a dispute, unless the remover returns and claims
his lands again. The practice in the Masite area is
that after a land has not been used for two years, the
holder is warned, and if he fails to heed the warning
the land is taken the next year. Such land may be
called moshoqa (land cultivated for the first time
after being broken up the previous year). Thite,
strictly, means virgin land, but current governmental
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rules of soil control are thought to require the
permission of the "master of lithite" before moshoqa
can be put under the plough again; in fact, the chief
and baabi will often decide. Land inspection should
be carried out annually by the chief with or through
his land-issuers, but the actual practice varies.
Deprivation on the grounds that a man has more
than is sufficient to maintain his household (lelapa)
rests on the underlying norm that mobu ke oa sechaba
(land belongs to the nation) and is in principle
available for the sustenance of all. What is "suffic¬
ient" depends partly on the size of the lelapa. and
this in turn is partly a function of its developmental
cycle. If a bachelor has any right to land at all,
and the point, as has been seen, is controverted, he
would not be given more than one or two. A married
man, especially when he sets up his own establishment
and has a child, will if he is lucky receive the "ideal"
three, and if he is a polygamist may look for more
again, as he may also do if, though monogamous, he has
many dependants. But if these dependants include
sons, then as they grow and marry, the allocation to
the household head will be in effect to the adult sons.
As was noted, there is often an area of confusion here,
between the father's "private allocation" to his son
and the "public" aspect of allocation by the chief.
Radebe in Masite Rek tried to take advantage of this,
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claiming that his seven lands were needed "for his son".
Then the son applied for lands himself, and Radebe was
found out and made to hand over some of his seven.
(Radebe had been a land-issuer, and was able to get
away with his accumulation. When he had a difference
with the chief and lost his position, his good fortune
came to an end.)
When the father dies, then although the widow
retains her land rights, she loses or is liable to lose
one of the "ideal" three, two being now considered
sufficient for her needs. In fact, she may well be
left with only one. But if new needs are anticipated,
the allocation may be left alone. It has been seen
how Khadebe speaks of his son's forthcoming marriage
in order to keep his lands; and 'Maliketso (the widow
of the younger brother of the entrepreneur Moroeng)
has kept all her three lands, in the expectation that
a son of her own family of origin will marry and come
to live with her. Being a sister-in-law of Moroeng
she has no difficulty in getting her lands ploughed,
but some widows would not be able to cope with more
than one or two fields and so would lose them anyway.
A special problem arose in the case of Thabana,
an evangelist in Masite ward, who had three lands
allocated to the church as well as three of his own.
The chief took the church lands away, but since the
church does not remove or die and thus has a virtually
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perpetual title, he lent them out on a temporary
allocation, allowing a landless family to use them.
Had Thabana given up his own lands, he would have been
badly placed when he retired from his post (19).
A general feature of the right to deprive a man
of surplus fields is that it can mean that a man who
by good husbandry and hard work increases the yield
of his holding may forfeit one of his lands. It will
be recalled that Josias Thabo and his son were confronted
with this, but resisted it on the ground that Josias
had been given stony ground and told that he could
keep as much as he could use. Wallman (1969: 108-9)
gives instances of similar fears. The problem is, at
least partly, recent in origin, in as much as it is
only since improved agricultural methods have become
available that any qualitative difference in yield
could be readily achieved by those able to take
advantage of them. It is also the case that a
"progressive farmer" can often look for protection
from the government. Certainly, Phiri would not have
made such extensive investment in his farm near Thaba
Bosiu had he not secured permission to fence it and
to exclude neighbours from grazing the qheme, and
obtained some convincing guarantee of security of
tenure. But such farms are very rare, and different
considerations apply to ordinary cultivators. A man
who does particularly well risks becoming the object
207
of envy or of witchcraft accusations, and in any case
will immediately become the prey of less prosperous
kin — for whom he will not be able to obtain more
lands, since his own production "suffices". Basotho
dislike and often resent the way in which they become
the victims of their own prosperity in this way, but
still often find the pressures hard to resist (20).
In Masite Nek, Moruti Hlabi is unpopular, and finds
that when he issues an invitation to a letsema (work
party), very few present themselves. He admits that
this is probably because when he came back from the
war in 1945 with his gratuity, he "stinted people",
instead of showing generosity. Unpopular people can
find their crops burned or grazed down in the night,
their cattle loosed from the kraal, or even their house
set fire to while they are sleeping in it (21).
These grounds of deprivation leave much room for
actual or felt injustice, and much scope for manipula¬
tion by chiefs and land-issuers. Land disputes often
reveal a situation where a man has quite simply been
deprived of his land, but where he can find no witnesses
willing to speak to his title to it (cf. the case of
Mthembu v*> Konare J.C. 272/63 above). The uncertainty
surrounding what it is that constitutes removal (Makibi
v. Mabeko J.C. 11/56) and how many lands are in fact
"sufficient", means that the courts are often disposed
to leave the matter in the hands of the chief if no
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compelling evidence can be found. It is also the fact,
of course, that when a chief takes a land away from one
man and gives it to another, he automatically acquires
an ally in the new beneficiary. The loser has a fight
against both his chief and his supplanter, a state of
affairs that has been aggravated by the insistence of
the Judicial Commissioner's Court that an aggrieved
person must sue the alleged interloper and not the
chief (though the latter or his land-issuers may be
the principal witnesses). It can also mean a reversal
of the onus of proof, at least before the judicial
courts, since it is usually up to an evicted person to
prove that he has the right. The possibly unlawful
interloper does not need to prove anything, unless his
invasion was flagrant. The administrative courts and
quite often the Basotho courts take a broader view of
proof and do not confine themselves to a narrowly
accusatorial role (see Chapter Seven). Nevertheless,
the effect of the courts' view has been to favour the
physical landholder, and this can militate against the
interests of a wrongfully expropriated subject (22).
However, the introduction of the chief as witness raises
the questions of whether the chief or his agents had
acted properly in re-allocating the land — and indeed,
whether the chief had authority to issue the lands at
all. In Moeno J.C. 214/64, it was seen that this could
depend on whether the chief acted "through" his subordinate,
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or sent his baabi directly into a headman's ward.
Lands may also be issued by an ungazetted headman or
even a mere phala, and though the courts sometimes
endorse this (e.g., the local court in Majara v.
Seetane J.C. 131/65) they much more frequently do not.
A brilliant attempt (see Khati v. Jonathan J.C. 149/51)
to argue that ungazetted headmen, though without rights
under the proclamation, retained customary rights
derivative from whichever superior chief had authorised
them, was foiled by the High Court in Kkhasi 1955 M.C.T.L.R.
39; but this does not erode the position of chief's
messengers, on the previously mentioned principle of
leqosa la morena ke morena (a chief's messenger is the
chief himself). In Makibi v. Mabeko above, there was
some further confusion between the executive and
administrative aspects of allocation, in that the claim
to "issue lands" may mean either to be merely a moabi,
or else to make decisions as to allocation; but a
moabi may be vested with an authority to make decisions
too, and though the Judicial Commissioner's Court may
not like this, it is a customary practice of unassailable
legality in traditional terms (see Paramount Chief's
Court in Phohleli v. Nkhema, C.A.C. I Matsieng, C.C. 256/61,
where the maxim leqosa... was quoted in support).
The security which the Laws of Lerotholi purport
to offer is thus deceptive. Landholders do not feel
secure, and the volume of litigation indicates that this
#
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feeling is amply justified. No systematic count was
taken, but probably over half the appeals to the
Judicial Commissioner involved land disputes (as
distinct from area disputes) as either a principal or
ancillary feature. Where they do not involve a
question of law, of the types considered in this and
the preceding chapter, they nearly all take the form
of a direct confrontation by opposing witnesses as to
the particular facts, each side claiming that the land
was allocated to himself. As noted before, the
chief's evidence normally prevails, except where a
previous land-issuer in a past allocation convincingly
contradicts him. But it must be stated that in the
greater number of cases, the court is simply faced with
contradictory testimony, and the chances that a correct
decision is eventually arrived at are probably no more
than even. The Basotho courts have a tradition of
being more willing to act in the matter themselves,
either by making an allocation or directing a chief to
make one — in fact, to do what they hold the chief
should have done — but there is no consistency in their
practice in recent years, and they have increasingly
tended to conform themselves to the received view of
the judicial courts, that administrative matters are
for the chieftainship. They have thus no way of
getting behind the chief's "discretion", and except
where there has been a demonstrable illegality, no
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attempt or desire to do so. These points are further
examined and documented in the concluding chapter,
where the progressive bifurcation of customary law
into "administrative" and "judicial" aspects is fully
discussed.
land is thus open to bold and illegal initiatives,
and frequently the success of a man's bid to take a
field depends on the determination of his rival to
defend himself. In Masite Nek and the ward of Masite
generally, land disputes are very frequent, and often
the real test is whether a man will stand up for himself.
Re-allocations are often quite openly illegal, but
they will succeed if the aggrieved person is too weak
or too confused or fearful to act. The Chief may not
take a hand in the matter if nothing is done about it;
and if he takes the interloper's side, his opponent is
obliged to go to the judicial courts, where there are
fees to pay and possible costs to incur if unsuccessful.
The invader counts on this, and feels that he has little
to lose and a land to gain if events go his way.
Quasi-Inheritance of Land (23)
The final topic to be discussed in connection with
arable lands is the cardinal maxim that ts'imo hase lefa,
"land is not an inheritance". It is a doctrine quoted
so frequently and relied on so often in the Basotho
courts and by Basotho generally that documentation is
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almost otiose. In 1934, the Paramount Chief's Court
said, in terms, "It is the fact that land is not an
inheritance. It is the property of the chieftainship
after death or removal" (Kekane,v. Makhorole J.C. 11/60).
In 1945, the same court said, "Land is soil (ts'imo ke
mobu), it is not an inheritance (lefa) like animals
or goods. When someone dies or removes, it belongs
to the chief alone" (Ramabanda v. Mkopane J.C. 134/45).
And the doctrine is still reiterated many times in a
year. It was accepted, over-interpreted, and heavily
relied on by the Judicial Commissioner's Court after
Mr W. G. S. Driver's judgment in 'Ma-Dyke's case, Lesitsi
v. Nafa J.C. 84/53. This judgment was duplicated and
circulated, and has been constantly referred to since.
What it offered to the judicial courts was an escape
from any substantive inquiry into the lawfulness or
otherwise of claims to land that did not fall within
the specific clauses protecting widows, dependants and
minor sons set out in Laws of Lerotholi (1959) Part I
s.7 (5) (a), quoted above. These protective clauses
were thus placed on an entirely distinct level and in
an entirely different juristic universe from section 7
(5) (b), where reference is made to the priority which
the chief is expected to accord to the adult sons of
the deceased. The latter situation falls simply
within the rule that ts'imo hase lefa, and the courts
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leave the decision to the discretion of the chief.
The difficulty here is that it is the case both
that land is not an inheritance but reverts to the
chieftainship for re-allocation, and that a son has a
moral expectation to be given his father's lands (or
some of them, or equivalent lands), and this expectation,
moreover, is legitimated by customary law. The effect
of 'Ma-Dyke was once more to polarise the law into a
judicial aspect that can be enforced in specific terms
(viz., sec.7 (5) (a)), and an administrative aspect
that is left to the "discretion" of the chief (viz., 7
(5) (b)). This fails to reflect the delicacy and
subtlety of the customary situation, in which both
norms involved (the non-inheritance of land, and the
legitimacy of an heir's claims) are maintained, without
the one being sacrificed to the other or the two being
institutionally, procedurally and juristically separated
into distinct categories of right. The norms remain
at a high level of generality, and it is when they come
to be applied to a particular case that they are disposed,
weighted and manipulated in such a way as to procure a
result which appears to the lekhotla (court in the
Sotho sense) to be the correct and lawful one. The
ambivalence here is thus profited from and explored
in ways analogous to those described in Chapter Two
(where the ambiguities in the law of succession were
discussed) and to those that are considered in Chapter
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Six below (concerning the respective rights of widows
and heirs). It is true that the Basotho courts have
always been ready to use the maxim, and true also
that, at least since 'Ma-Dyke, they have tended to
move strongly to a "judicial" view of their function.
But until modern pressures constrained them, they
used the maxim, where they did, as one weapon in their
juristic armoury among many, not as a way of consigning
a wide range of matters to an "administrative discretion"
that was not, of course, in any case institutionally
segregated from other aspects of the lekhotla's task.
For instance, in the first case referred to above
(Kekane v. Makhorole), having stressed that ts'imo hase
lefa, the court went on to instruct Chief Thakamakula:
"There is your subject — attend to his cry about his
children... Chief, there are your children, see to
them and give them lands when they come humbly before
you.... They live with you and help you and work for
you". Similarly, it will be recalled that in the
case of Mafetoa v. Mothebesoane J.C. 256/48 (see
previous chapter), the Paramount Chief's Court stated
that "it is difficult for this court to undo what was
mutually done by your fathers". The Judicial Commis¬
sioner founded on ts'imo hase lefa and upheld the
appeal. The Paramount Chief's Court was capable of
doing the same, where it felt that the case was one
where the chief's decision was the right one. In
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Hamabanda v. Kkopane (cited above), Ramabanda's father
and mother were dead; he ploughed the land for eight
years, and then left it for ten, before returning and
attempting to reclaim it from Nkopane, to whom it had
been issued in the interim. The Paramount Chief's
Court rejected Ramabanda's complaint, in the words
quoted above. But it would be an error to suppose
that the Basotho Courts regarded themselves, in the
past at least, as constrained by the maxim: they would
use it when it served the ends the court was seeking,
but they could turn to other and "competing" principles
emphasising succession and chiefly responsibility in
other circumstances. (It is true that they could also
use ts'imo hase lefa as a way of emphasising chiefly
prerogatives, on the lines of the solidarity with
chieftainship, of which several examples have been
given: cf. Matli v. Letsie J.C. 4/49, Phakisi v. Borena
J.C. 69/54, Chapter Three, note 11 and text. But the
courts are ready to order an allocation (Matjeketjela
v. Theko J.C. 19/47), and even readier, as has been
seen, to put the law on the matter to the chief in
such terms ©s to brook no denial (cf. Kekane and
Mafetoa above.)
Litigants regularly base their claims on their
status as successors to a deceased, and this often
slips over into a claim to lefa. Sometimes this
represents little more than a daring initiative,
almost foredoomed to failure. It will be recalled
that in Lesia's case (J.C. 142/64) the appellant simply
refused to state a case defending his action in taking
over his parents' lands. In Mlaba v. Qhobela J.C.
111/65, Ndlaba went so far as to state: "This field
was ploughed by my father in 1962 and I reaped it in
1963 after his death. It was never allocated to me.
Lands in Basutoland are an inheritance (masimo mona
lesotho ke lefa)". But he did not mean this seriously
On appeal, when he had clearly lost, he confessed that
"lands are not an inheritance", and sought only to have
the damages reduced. As appears elsewhere, Basotho
will try their chances in litigation and will quite
happily admit that they had no real case. The well-
known proverb mooa-khotla ha a tsekisoe ("he who
stumbles in court is not prosecuted") covers a multitude
of such sins. But in other cases, a claim to land
based on a right of inheritance is more soberly and
responsibly advanced. In Mokola v. Klaas J.C. 243/64,
the plaintiff said: "This field was my father's.
There is nothing surprising in my ploughing my father's
land after he is dead. My father gave it to me. I
insist that it is my inheritance" (and cf. Ntebele v.
Theko J.C. 67/66). In Mphuthing v. Kubutona J.C. 23/66
Mphuthing in the lower court claimed land as an inheri¬
tance on behalf of his widowed mother; this is interest¬
ing as a transitional case, since (as will be seen in
Chapter Six) there is a complex relationship between
widows and heirs in respect of property that is
undoubtedly lefa (cattle, money, goods); and widows
have an undoubted right to (some at least of) their
husband's lands (sec.7 (5) (a)). Thus the son, on
behalf of his mother, claims as heir in respect of
what is not an inheritance but nonetheless is an
asset to which the widow has an enforceable title.
In Thipane J.C. 183/60, Mokone turned the door of
his hut from his chief and was expelled from the area,
his lands being allocated to Makirika. After Makirika
death, his widow 'Ma-Thipane continued to use the
lands, until she gave them to her son, Thipane.
'Ma-Thipane claimed to have the right to allocate
lands, though she was not proclaimed, but the Chief of
Peka allocated the same lands to Pius. The administra
tive court at Peka unsurprisingly upheld Pius's right,
but on appeal to the administrative court of the Ward
Chief of Tsikoane and Kolbere, the judges awarded to
Thipane, "as it used to belong to his late father
Makirika". Pius then went to the judicial courts.
The lower court at Peka restored the land to Pius, for
a confusing assemblage of reasons. One of these was
that •Ma-Thipane was not proclaimed, but another was
that the administrative court of Tsikoane had treated
land as an inheritance. This is an example of how
some Sotho presidents have over-interpreted the rule,
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and indeed wholly misunderstood what even the Judicial
Commissioner's Court was trying to do; for the Tsikoane
Court was acting "administratively", as it was both
entitled and obliged to do. To rebuke it for attend¬
ing to Thipane*s being his father's son was wholly
to misconceive the issue, since it was precisely the
intention of 'Ma-Dyke that the administration should
have a "free hand" in its "discretion". The view
taken at Peka Local was, in effect, that an administra¬
tive court must act randomly and without adherence to
principle, for only so could it avoid the charge that
it was trying to "make law". The Central Court at
Ts'ifalimali upheld Thipane, on the strength of the
Tsikoane khaolo (administrative decision), and noted
with approval the grounds on which the Tsikoane judges
had reached it. Meanwhile, various other features
had entered the case. First, it appeared that Thipane
was legally a minor, in that he was unmarried, and so
had a stronger claim to the fields in terms of sec.7 (5)
(a). Secondly, there was conflict of testimony as
to the identity of the lands being disputed. Thirdly,
the question of 'Ma-Thipane's right to issue lands
arose again. Fourthly, Thipane showed that he had
ploughed the land for seven years. The Appeal Court
restored the Peka judgment, on the grounds of 'Ma-
Thipane 's lack of jurisdiction, and did not consider
the decision of the Tsikoane administrative court.
The Judicial Commissioner upheld the Appeal Court,
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evading the question of the Tsikoane decision on the
somewhat devious grounds that there was no evidence
that the ward chief himself had had a hand in it.
In many respects, this is an illuminating dispute.
It illustrates several features that occur, separately
or together, in many cases over masimo: conflict of
evidence over basic issues of fact, such as the identity
of a field; conflicting claims by different baabi (land-
issuers); arguments founded on long-distant events (the
original allocation took place in 1935, and the case
was heard in 1959); a long history of suits and appeals,
passing from the administrative to the judicial hierarchy;
the determination of litigants to exhaust every remedy
available; the uncertainties surrounding jurisdiction;
the tension between the principle of succession and the
principle that ts'imo hase lefa; the ambivalence in
allocation itself, as to whether an administrative
right was being exercised, or rather a "private"
distribution of family resources. These complexities
were added to by the cross-winds blowing from 'Ma-Dyke
and the other judgments of Judicial Commissioners
insisting on the segregation of "judicial" and "admin¬
istrative" affairs, which introduced confusion and
contradiction into the Basotho courts and led them to
display an excessive zeal in adhering to doctrines
which they failed fully to understand.
It should be clear that it is no part of this
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argument to deny or depreciate the customary-law
validity of the maxim that land is not an inheritance.
It is indeed a cardinal principle of Sotho law, and
underpins the whole fabric of land use and administration
But, as with all customary principles, it cannot
properly be treated in isolation from other norms,
much less relied on as a rule of thumb that enables
claims to land to be consigned to an administrative
"discretion" falling outside normative control. The
institutional separation of judicial and administrative
courts has the effect of placing sub-sections 7 (5) (a)
and 7 (5) (b) into different and discontinuous categor¬
ies, whereas in customary law terms there is no such
discontinuity. The cases that have been discussed
above, and the account of Sotho practice that preceded
it, largely based on the evidence of the people of
Masite and Masite Nek, suggest that over the whole
area of land administration there is a play of norms,
general in character, potentially inconsistent in
their implications, and that it is in the specification
and application of these norms in particular cases
that decisions are reached that are at once unconstrained
and at the same time lawful (24).
Sites and Gardens (25)
If land is (in the qualified sense indicated)
clearly not an inheritance, and certain other resources
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discussed in Chapter Six as clearly are, sites and
gardens are a transitional category. The relevant
provision of the Laws of Lerotholi (1959) Part I reads
as follows:
Sec. 7 (7) Land allocation for gardens (lijarete)
and tree plantations, etc.
On the death of a person who has been
allocated the use of land for the growing of
vegetables or tobacco, or for the purpose of
planting fruit or other trees, or for residential
purposes, the heir, or in the absence of the
heir, the dependants of such deceased person
shall be entitled to the use of such land so
long as he or they continue to dwell thereon
(ho aha teng).
The type case concerns residential sites, and
most attention will be given to these. Like masimo,
sites are a matter for allocation by the chief. To
qualify, a man must bear allegiance to the chief (or
headman) of the village or place where he seeks a site.
If he "turns the door of his hut", he forfeits his
rights of residence, and so his site, though he is
entitled to take away at least part of his hut or huts
when he leaves (26). Removal results in forfeiture,
as with lands, but again like lands, title can be
derivatively maintained through close kin, including
affines; and there is no obligation corresponding to
the duty to cultivate. Unless a garden has been
abandoned by its owners, it remains with them even if
they do not make use of it. Nor can it be taken away
from them simply because it is more than is "sufficient
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for their subsistence".
These, at least, are the simplest expressions of
the law that applies, but they are not wholly without
qualification. In Sofeng v. Letsie J.C. 97/62, the
lower court at Maja's stated that even though Sofeng
"had not elected to remove from the area of Chief
Mpiti to that of Chief Letsie, but is still living
under Chief Kpiti near this site as their areas are
adjacent, he is still entitled to this inheritance of
his grandfather". But the tendency has been to insist
on a conjunction of residence and allegiance (Maile v.
Sekhonyana J.C. 115/63» Letsolo v. khubetsoana J.C.
115/63* etc.), though this is obviously a difficult
and potentially inequitable rule when buildings might
be of considerable financial value. (Some governmental
protection is being provided to cover such cases,
however; the traditional law is more appropriate to
sites with little or no commercial value.)
In Matsela v. Matete J.C. 243/60, Ramosebetsi was
adopted by his paternal uncle, Samuel, and married
'Malithakong, having a son Soabi. Samuel and Ramose¬
betsi died, and the chief took Samuel's garden, which
'Malithakong now claimed was hers (or hers for her son).
Chief Mahao agreed that he had taken the garden, and
defended his action by saying that sites at Morija
were in very short supply; 'Malithakong had already
been allocated a site of her own, and should not be
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allowed to keep two, when there were many people with
none who wanted one. He was upheld by the local court
at Matsieng, which accepted also that 'Malithakong was
not a "dependant" of the deceased Samuel, at least
since she had been allocated her own garden and building
site. Samuel having had no issue, the site reverted
to the chieftainship. The central court at Matsieng
reversed this decision, pointing out that "a garden is
not a land (ts'imo)and that although it would no
doubt be undesirable if one person were allowed to
accumulate many gardens, this did not constitute a
reason for depriving 'Ma-Lithakong of her inheritance.
The case then came before the Appeal Court at Matsieng,
where Chief D.M.L. Mojela restored the decision of
Matsieng B. In his view, the maxim mobu hase lefa
(the soil is not an inheritance) extended to cover a
case of the present kind, not precisely in the sense
that it covered masimo, but in terms rather of the
social interests of the community or the nation at
large, and in support he referred to sec. 7 (8) of the
laws of Lerotholi. where reference is made to "land
required in the public interest" (melemo ho sechaba).
Chief Mahao "was applying a benefit for the people,
rather than for one person who would have several
gardens to herself.... (He has) the right to allocate
the soil (mobu)... and so much the more if he applies
this law for the benefit and well-being of the people".
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The Court also impOied that the provision requiring
that the claimant should dwell on the site, while
clearly not directly applicable to a garden, meant
that one person could not use more than one site,
especially if there were a shortage and the Chief
decided to expropriate. (The Judicial Commissioner
held that "to dwell there" meant only that he must live
"under the chief or headman" (27), and that "public
interest" referred to communal assets such as schools
or roads, not to the needs of other individuals or
households. Accordingly, he upheld 'Malithakong*s
claim.)
However, in spite of the doubts that were raised
in this special case of multiple ownership, sites and
gardens have a greater security than masimo. This
is partly because it is obviously much more difficult
for a chief to re-allocate a site unlawfully if people
are actually living on or near it, but also because
forfeiture cannot take place, even lawfully, except
on the special conditions of removal or possibly, as
seen, where ownership of several sites is involved.
Moreover, not only a son but also an heir can claim.
Thus, a brother can inherit a site, if he is heir
(mojalefa) to the deceased. It is less clear whether,
if the heir is disqualified (e.g., by non-residence or
another allegiance), the next in line inherits. Laws
of Lerotholi 7 (7) implies that he would not, and the
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Judicial Commissioner took the same view (Mosala J.C.
65/59), "but some Sotho opinion is that a younger
brother would take the heir's place. But in Letsae
(Bela-Bela C.C. 20/64 etc.), Motjoka Central Court
said that the right of inheritance passed to the heir
(or dependants) of the deceased, and that a remover
left no heir: the site reverts to the Chief, and only
the dependants of the deceased can claim it — that is,
a younger son could not take a "removing" elder son's
right.
Sites can be alienated, but since the newcomer
requires an allocation, this means that the chief
must agree. Whereas in a loan of land between
subjects, no consideration should pass, it is not
unlawful to sell a house-property. It is not,
strictly, the site but the building that is sold, but
in fact such transactions are treated very much like
a sale of land, except that, as stated, the Chief's
consent must be obtained. Residential title is in
fact the foundation title for all other rights, and
the Chief cannot be required to allow a newcomer to
acquire it without his approval. But it is also a
need even more basic than the need for lands, and is
more easily granted, since it is easier to find a
space for a hut or two than to find an unoccupied
field. Similarly, while to forfeit lands is a
serious loss, to forfeit residence is more serious
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still, and indeed carries the loss of lands with it.
Of course, the fact that a particular man does not
inherit a site does not mean that he loses his rights
as a villager and subject; but the fundamental
character of residence helps to explain why it is
less easily lost and more securely protected than
rights over arable land.
In certain respects, therefore, sites and gardens,
though still part of the mobu that is oa sechaba,
constitute something of a mid-case between masimo (lands)
and lefa (inheritance). The spectrum of "ownership" in
Basutoland in fact moves in an order that can be
extended even further, to show several degrees of
individuation. At one end are the maboella, the
grazing grounds and qheme, which are open to all in
the entitled community and are not allocated to
individuals as such. Next, there are the other chief¬
tainship properties, liremo, or thatching-grass, reeds,
and public trees, which are for communal use until they
are subjected to specification by individuals, who
then (so long as they are resident) acquire an exclusive
title to the particular objects which they have cut or
plucked and taken to their own use (fruetuum separatio).
Next, there are mssimo, which again are "of the nation"
until specified, but which are — outside the qheme,
or stalk-grazing season — more individual than the
liremo, since in the latter case no rights are acquired
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over the reed beds etc., and rights are acquired over
the items only as they are gathered or cut, whereas
in the case of lands it is otherwise; exclusive even
if defeasible rights over the land are acquired, and
the crops belong to the landholder without fructuum
perceptio or separatio. Sites and gardens are more
individual still, since titles to them, though still
defeasible, are less easily so, and they can pass to
an heir or (with consent) be alienated for value.
Finally, there are objects of which it can be said
that they are in some sense "owned" — though, as
will be seen, it is another question to determine
what sense this is, and who the "owners" may be.
Lefa (inheritance) falls into this last category,
and forms the subject of the following chapter.
EXCURSUS:
Land Shortage in Basutoland
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Annex to Chapter Five: Land Shortage in Basutoland
Sheddick advanced a plausible case for treating
the alleged land shortage in Basutoland with some
scepticism (Sheddick 1954: 183-192). He takes up
"the most frequently expressed complaint... that
(people) do not hold title to three fields" and points
out that acreage, to which the number of lands bears
no necessary relation, is the appropriate measure to
apply. Sometimes people consolidate holdings, and
appear to have fewer fields than before, or they are
holders of a status (head of a residual family unit,
widow, etc.) that does not entitle them to three in
any case. He argues that "there is sufficient arable
land available in Basutoland to satisfy all legitimate
claims.... The apparent shortage of land may be more
adequately explained in terms of the failure of the
existing production units (viz., arable fields in this
case) and of existing methods of land utilisation to
achieve an adequate expendable surpliis.... The problem
is one of production shortage rather than a land parcel
shortage.... The cry for more land arises from the
failure of the production units to balance the country's
budget. The extent to which this adverse balance
weighs upon individual families is partly a measure of
individual competence and individual resources.... The
net value of a production unit to the individual family
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depends not so much on the relative fertility of that
unit as on the possession by the individual family
unit of certain attributes, the ability to cultivate
adequately, the availability of capital equipment and
the possession of sufficient resources to enable the
family to avoid converting its subsistence production
into ready cash only to have to rebuy at higher prices
later in the year". He then mentions climatic
factors, and points out that "no less than nine of
the last seventeen seasons (1932-6, 1941-2, 1943-6,
1948-9) have yielded inadequate harvests" because of
too little or late rain, and unseasonal frosts. He
argues further that although chiefs may, on the whole,
have larger holdings than others, this was partly
because they had more people and households to support,
and in any case these holdings have if anything
decreased in size. "Popular opinion, pre-occupied
with attempts to lay all land evils at the door of
the chiefs, has largely failed to appreciate the
extent to which commoners have been able to acquire
direct holdings far in excess of their legitimate
expectations* But even more extensive are the
indirect holdings of the capitalist farmers (who) have
acquired a multiplicity of shares in the production
units nominally held by others." He considers that
wage-employment ("held to be both easier and more
attractive than the hard monotonous grind of cultivating
and herding") has favourable repercussions on land-use,
by reducing the need for intensive exploitation of
land and permits or imposes a periodic fallow.
"There is no physical shortage of land.... The problem
is better viewed as a production shortage."
Sheddick's contribution to the study of land
tenure in Basutoland is so valuable that any views he
expresses on the subject deserve serious attention.
The criticisms that follow imply no depreciation of
the value of his study as a whole. Moreover, it
must be borne in mind that over twenty years have
passed since the fieldwork underlying the report was
carried out (p.xv), and that the objective situation
has probably changed appreciably since that time.
In addition to this, many of the points made are valid
ones in themselves, and were well worth some degree
of overstatement, if only to challenge the despairing
orthodoxies against which Sheddick's protest is made.
Nevertheless, it will be argued here that the views
Sheddick expresses are probably wrong if applied to
modern Basutoland, and are also open to methodological
criticism of a more general order, no matter what
empirical situation is assumed to exist.
Methodologically, it is open to question whether
it is possible or meaningful to discuss land shortage
in the abstract, as though it could be detached from
the technical skills, social organisation, cultural
232
dispositions and capital resources of the people who
use it. No one who talks of "land shortage" supposes
that there is no room to stand up or sit down; they
mean that the yield is too small to support more than
basic subsistence and that no accessible means of
increasing food-production exist other than acquiring
more land- In one sense, Sheddick is right to speak
of a "production shortage", but this one sense is
truistic, since people do not want land for any other
purpose except production. (Basotho people have a
distinctly instrumental attitude to land parcels and
do not form affective attachments to particular fields.)
His view ceases to be truistic only at the price of
ceasing to be true, in that it then implies that
production can be increased by means that are available
to the people; but Sheddick himself recognises that
this is not so. They do not have the capital resources
and have no means of obtaining them. They lack
technical skills and only a few are likely to obtain
these either. The social organisation of land admin¬
istration is adapted to a form of "communal" or
"national" ownership, which it also reinforces, and
this militates against exceptional individual achieve¬
ment, since such achievement threatens these "communal"
or "national" characteristics and thus puts at risk
the minimal security currently held out to all subjects.
Cultural values underline and support most of these
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features of the system. Nothing is gained by positing
fields that till themselves or landholders who acquire
technical skills and capital resources overnight and
as rapidly transform their social structure and cultural
orientations. The reductio ad absurdum of the argument
is found when Sheddick invokes climatic factors in
support of his contention that there is no "physical
shortage" of land. At this point "land" becomes an
almost purely metaphysical entity, since it is now
analytically separated even from its climatic environ¬
ment. It is hard to believe that any Mosotho has
ever regarded "land" in this quite abstract sense either
as in short supply or as an object of desire. The
"cry" of the Basotho is much simpler — that if they
had more land they would have more food, and that if
they cannot get more land they can get food only by
working for it in wage employment. Sheddick is
perfectly right to state that the latter is the only
recourse available, and that is why so many Basotho
adopt it. (The notion that life in the South African
mining compounds is in any sense "easy and attractive",
however, bears little examination — as does the idea
of the "monotonous grind" of subsistence farming.
Subsistence cultivators have little to do for most of
the year, since there is in fact little to be done,
and much of that is done by women. At periods of peak
labour demand, especially for ploughing, many wage-
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labourers in fact come home to help. It is, of course,
true that considerable cultural as well as economic
value is attached to working in the Republic, but this
is because it is seen as a mark of sophistication and
manliness, not because the work itself is seen as
intrinsically preferable to the otium cum (or even sine)
dignitate of the villages.
Sheddick also seems to overlook the actual physical
condition of the land. Much of it is now almost
irreparably ruined, and a good part of the rest is so
shallow as to be considered only marginally productive
in a modern agronomic setting. Gully erosion is
catastrophic over the densely populated border lowlands,
and there is no obvious way in which the situation can
be seen as other than bound to deteriorate. It is
certain that the case is now appreciably worse than it
was in 1947-1949, when Sheddick's fieldwork was done,
but it is also arguable that no qualitative change has
occurred to justify the apparent optimism of the final
pages of his study. (However, it must be remembered
that his was an operational report, among the purposes
of which was the implicit prompting of remedial action
to the commissioning authorities. It would have been
counterproductive to suggest that nothing could be
done.)
Even if some of Sheddick's arguments were to be
accepted in relation to the situation in the late 'forties,
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however, it would be difficult to maintain them there¬
after: though here, too, it must be stated that some
of the trends which Sheddick identified (such as the
growth in disparity of holdings and in "rural capital¬
ism") have continued and been aggravated. The later
evidence both bears out Sheddick's particular observat¬
ions of facts and tendencies and at the same time
contradicts the conclusions which he then drew.
Population growth is a factor which has certainly
aggravated the problems, and it is only recently that
figures have been available for this on which any
serious reliance can be placed (Basutoland 1956 Popula¬
tion Census; Batson I960; I960 Agricultural Census of
Basutoland).
As a preliminary, it may be recorded that the
geographical area of Basutoland is about 11,720 square
miles. According to the 1949-50 Agricultural Survey,
only 1,453 square miles were available for cultivation,
of which 323 square miles were left uncultivated in
that year, leaving 1,130 square miles for food (Morojele
1962: Part 1, p.9). The number of agricultural hold¬
ings, on the basis of the I960 Agricultural Census is
estimated at 161,250. Of these, 5,693 (3-7 per cent)
are without land but with stock and a further 9»161
are without both land and stock. The following tables
exclude the last category, but include holdings without
land but with stock, since these are clearly relevant
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in a frame of reference directed to the rural economy
and society.
TABLE 1
Percentage Distribution of Holdings according to Acreage
Size iof holdings £ Average A<
Holdings without land 3.7
Holdings with land up to 1.99 acres 16.7 1.23
W tt tt 2.00 - 3.99 ft 25.9 2.99
ft ft ft 4.00 - 5.99 tf 21.1 4.92
ft ft W 6.00 - 7.99 tt 13.5 6.84
ft ft ft 8.00 - 9.99 w 7.1 8.83
n ft tt 10.00 -14.99 tt 8.4 12.03
?t ft tt 15.00 -19.99 tt 2.1 16.92
tt ft ft 20.00 -29.99 tt 1.1 23.24
tt ft tt 30.00 -39.99 n 0.2 35.28
tt ft tt 40.00 acres and over 0.2 56.36
100.0
N - 161,250
Mean acreage - 5.4
Median " - 4.4
Modal " - 3.3
(adapted from Morojele: 1962 Part 5, p.10)
The skewness of the distribution is apparent from
the variations between the mean and the median and modal
averages. Morojele comments (ib., p.ll) "Although it
would appear that an average holding size of 5.4 acres
might be adequate... the unequal distribution prevents
many (over 60 per cent) of these households from enjoying





























The total number of holdings thus appears to have
increased, this increase being mainly in the smaller
holdings of 0.01 - 3.99 acres. The percentage of such
small holdings has also increased. Morojele comments
that "while the number of households with access to
arable lands has increased, more and more people seem
to be operating smaller holdings than before" (ib., p.15).
Moreover, in spite of the fall in the number of larger
holdings, the tendency has been towards a more uneven
distribution of land overall. In I960, 4 per cent of
households operated 15 per cent of the land, and 12 per
cent operated 34 per cent of the land. The following
table presents the distribution of holdings in relation
to their total area: *
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TABLE 3
Distribution of the percentage area of holdings by
size of holdings
Size of halding %
of total acreage
v
Holdings without land —
- 1.99 acres 3.8
2.00 - 3.99 14.3
4.00 - 5.99 19.2
6.00 - 7.99 17.1
8.00 - 9.99 11.6
10.00 - 14.99 18.6
15.00 - 19.99 6.5
20.00 - 29.99 4.7
30.00 - 39.99 1.6
40.00 and over 2.5
99.9
Total acreage - 871,687
(Adapted from Morojele, ib., p.19)
Morojele observes (ib., p.23) that the average
size of holding is 5.4 acres, and if calculated for
all households is 5.1 acres. But part of the reality
is concealed by the fact that in certain cases family
groups live together in one household. If the
average figure is calculated for the simple family unit
(v. Morojele 1962: Part 2, Table 56), the average
acreage for each rural family is 4.9. If landless
people are included, this average again drops to 3.7
acres.
Fig. 1
Average number and size of fields per holding
Size of holding (in acres)
Source: Morojele 1062: Part 3, p. 50
Fig. 2
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Average size of fields in acres
11.0
Source: Morojele, ibid., p. 51
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Reference has been made more than once to the
absence of any logical relationship between the number
of fields in a holding on the one hand and the acreage
of the holding on the other. The I960 Agricultural
Census provides some material that illuminates this
question. Figure 1 plots the size of holding against
(a) the average size of fields and (b) the average
number of fields. Figure 2 plots the average size
of fields against the average number of fields-
Morojele comments (Part 3, P-52) that "both the size
and number of fields increase together fairly rapidly
up to holdings of about 20 acres.... The majority of
the smallest fields are found in the smallest holdings.
As fields increase in size, the majority are found in
the larger holding groups" until they reach a size of
about 4.5 acres each. This suggests that those with
few fields are worse off than those with many because
their size as well as their number is likely to be
smaller; which leaves little empirical foundation for
the argument that those with few fields might well
enjoy a larger acreage overall: proportionately, they
will tend to have even less than would be expected if
all fields were the same size. This goes some way to
validate the apparently illogical Sotho practice of
thinking in terms of field numbers rather than field
size. While this procedure is no doubt of little
value in respect of any given individual, it seems to
Fig. 3












Average holding size (in acres) o
Acreage per head X
Average number of fields a
1 234 56 78 9 10 11
Size of household (number of persons)
Source: Morojele, ibid., p. 59
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have an unsuspectedly firm statistical foundation for
the agricultural population as a whole.
A rather different picture emerges from the Census
data relating to household size. Figure 3 plots the
relationship between size of household and size of
holding (supporting tables are in Morojele, ib., pp.
55 ff., but are omitted here). From this, it is
clear that there is a strong positive correlation
between the two variables, a circumstance which lends
support to the view that the large holdings do not
usually represent an inequitable distribution of land
resources: rather, the holdings tend to be large
because the households attached to them are large*
Indeed, it is apparent from Figure J that the proport¬
ionate size of holding of the larger households is
smaller than for the smaller households, a much lower
average acreage of arable land per person being found
in the former than in the latter. There is an average
of 1.1 acres of land per head in a household of 5.1
persons (the mean household size emerging from the
census); this ratio is doubled in households with 2
persons and trebled in those with 1 person, but almost
halved in households of 10 persons or more. Nor, of
course, should this positive correlation obscure the
fact that many households of average and more than
average size have no fields or fewer than they need,
as Table 4 reveals:
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TABLE 4





persons) No fields 1 field 2 3 4 5 Total
1 6.2 26.4 47.8 17.3 2.3 — 100.0
2 2.8 23.5 42.9 22.4 7.3 1.1 100.0
3 6.1 23.5 39.9 21.6 7.0 1.8 99.9
4 4.9 22.3 39.7 21.8 7.7 3.6 100.0
5 4.7 22.2 31.1 28.7 11.3 2.0 100.0
6 2.2 19.5 29.8 30.6 11.9 6.0 Hoo *o
7 2.2 19.1 27.8 33.9 11.4 5.6 100.0
8 1.2 12.4 33.3 29.9 13.4 9.8 100.0
9 1.2 9.9 25.9 28.2 14.3 21.5 100.0
10 and over 1.1 10.3 28.7 30.7 10.9 HCO • 100.0
Total 3.7 20.2 35.2 26.2 9.5 5.3 Hoo to
(Source: Morojele 1962: Part 3 p. 57)
N - 161,250
It is apparent that many households are without
land, or without sufficient land, in all categories of
household by size; and it appears from the figures for
arable land cited above that little unoccupied land is
available that could raise the net occupation ratio.
(It will be recognised that the existence of uncultivated
land does not argue either (a) that it is unoccupied or
(b) that its cultivation is desirable. One of the
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agricultural hazards in Basutoland is that lands are
driven to the limit and do not lie fallow frequently
enough from a soil conservation point of view. That
apart, it is also obviously the case that full (100
per cent) utilisation of land resources is virtually
impossible since demand and supply will not be likely
to achieve a perfect geographical coincidence, especially
in so illiquid a good as arable land). In these
circumstances, many households and families are seeking
land which is not available to them, not because a few
households have taken more than their share but because
the land does not exist. On any operational criterion,
this constitutes a "land shortage". This shortage
has grave consequences in that it means (as Sheddick
says) a "production shortage" in a society whose basic
economy and residual security are overwhelmingly
agricultural and likely to remain so. The relevant
point is that the most critical struggle that marks the
life career of a Sotho family or household is the
struggle for land: it is, as the lower court in Koeno's
case said (J.C. 214/64 above), a matter of bloodshed,
and this in itself is the best index of its scarcity.
This discussion has so far left aside two points
in particular (both of them referred to in the main
chapter) that are relevant to the land situation in
Basutoland. One concerns the fact that, as Sheddick
points out and Morojele confirms, what may be called
246
"rural capitalism" has resulted in the aggregation of
considerable de facto holdings of disproportionate
size by some individuals throughout the territory.
In this annex it is sufficient to note that such sub
rosa accumulations tend to aggravate land hunger among
those who do not profit from them, thus increasing the
disparities and generating a submerged class of effecti¬
vely landless or land-short persons. The second point
omitted here is the existence of garden sites and home¬
stead yards; as Sheddick points out, Basotho think in
terms of traditional "lands", and often leave out of
account the gardens and yards that they may cultivate
quite separately. "A Mosuto holding two fields will
often complain of the injustice which robs him of his
third field whilst studiously overlooking his possession
of, perhaps, two plots and a garden which may themselves
exceed the average total size of two fields. This
careful distinction between fields on the one hand and
plots and gardens on the other is one that must be
constantly carried in mind when examining pleas of land
shortage and of unfair distribution" (Sheddick 1954: 77).
It must suffice here to observe that in the territory as
a whole, of the 161,250 estimated holdings, an estimated
57,347 (23-2 per cent) have gardens. Of holdings
without lands, only 1.2 per cent have a garden, and
holdings with land of 8 acres and above in size more
frequently have gardens than those with less than eight
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acres* Sheddick*s implication is thus squarely contra¬
dicted. Moreover, the total acreage of gardens in
Basutoland is only about 1,640, or 2.6 square miles —
a clearly nugatory area (Morojele ib., pp. 73 ff. )*
An economically and productively analogous resource
is the "yard around the homestead", which Sheddick
treats in the same general category as "gardens".
The percentage of holdings with "yards" is 13.2, of
which the overwhelming majority have only one. Hold¬
ings of 10 acres and above have yards much more
frequently than those with less than ten acres*
Information is not available to enable any correlation
to be assessed between holdings with yards and holdings
with gardens, so that it does not follow that the two
categories vary together. It is theoretically possible,
though in fact very unlikely, that gardens and yards
are so distributed as to achieve the greatest possible
equalities in their joint incidence. But even if that
were assumed to be the case, the impact on land shortage
would be minimal. The total acreage of yards is
estimated at 14,191 acres. The aggregated acreage of
yards and gardens together is therefore about 15,831
acres — or roughly 1*5 per cent of the total arable
area of Basutoland. Important though such resources
may be for their "owners", they are of only the most
marginal relevance to the "production shortage" in the
country as a whole.
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Though on both the principal issues of fact (the
apparent disregard shown by Basotho for the true size
of fields, and the productive contribution of gardens)
Sheddick was wrong, he was wrong for the right reasons.
The relevant information was not available to him,
and he was justified in challenging commonly held
views that bore little logical relationship to the
then established facts. What is of particular interest
is that the intuitions and impressions of the Basotho,
though irrational in particular instances, should have
proved to be so close to the reality suggested by a
systematic statistical inquiry.
CHAPTER SIX 2 4 9
THE LAW OP PRIVATE SUCCESSION AND INHERITANCE
The title of this chapter should not be taken to
imply that there is a neat distinction, or in many
respects any distinction at all, between "private" and
"public" law in Basutoland. But it is convenient to
use this term as a purely indicative label in the
consideration of those aspects of succession that are
not covered, or not exhaustively covered, in the
chapters dealing with chiefly succession and seniority,
and with administrative titles to land. It has been
seen that some uncertainty exists as to whether and
to what extent issues of chiefly succession can be
seen as determined in the same way as issues of succes¬
sion within a subject lineage, or as issues of inheri¬
tance of discrete items of property. The tendency has
been to move towards a more "public" set of procedures
in issues of chieftainship, especially in the case of
the Paramountcy; but this should be seen as part of
a continuing process, more apparent at certain levels
of hierarchy than at others, and should not be inter¬
preted as any radical theoretical discontinuity between
"public" and "private" rights. Nevertheless, there
undoubtedly exist certain points where a fairly sharp
distinction can be drawn. As is noted in the preced¬
ing chapter, the chieftainship lands, masimo a lira,
do not belong to the personal patrimony of the chief;
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and it is involved in the working of the placing system
that the administrative rights of chiefs — since they
can be curtailed and ultimately abrogated when a superior
is "placed" — are distinct from the chief's own posses¬
sions and personal rights. The whole of customary land
law is posited, as has been seen, on a denial of personal
ownership in respect of all titles to land.
This has implications for the rights of subjects,
too, since the nature of their rights to land is, of
course, crucially different from their rights to cattle,
to personal and household goods, and to other items
that fall within the concept of lefa (inheritance) (1).
Though, as has been seen, there are certainly ambival¬
ences here which recent legal changes have tended rather
clumsily and misleadingly to polarise and "rationalise",
it is enually clear that notwithstanding the legitimacy
of a man's expectation to continue in his predecessor's
holding, this is qualitatively different from the
specific rights he can claim to whatever emerges as his
lefa. Lefa does not indeed exhaust tokelo, but it
forms a special area within it.
The present chapter, then, is principally concerned
with lefa, and with those other incidents of succession
and inheritance that are related to, or derivative from,
this category of right.
I
Much of the discussion will refer to two texts,
one of some antiquity, and the other, though much more
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recent, still to a considerable degree reflective of
customary law. It is therefore convenient to set these
out in advance. They also serve to indicate the general
area with which this chapter is concerned and at the
same time to draw attention to some substantive issues
that call for exposition and clarification.
The first passage is taken from the evidence of
George Tlali Moshoeshoe (a junior son of Moshoeshoe)
given before the Commission on Native Laws and Customs
of the Basutos in December 1872 (2).
"What is the law with regard to inheritance? —
Each wife has a separate establishment. The
husband apportions cattle to each house; the eldest
son in each house inherits all the property which
has been allotted by the father to that house.
A widow can inherit cattle belonging to her house
in case she has no male children at the death of
her husband. Children belong solely to their
father; when he dies, they are left in the charge
of the mother; the dowry cattle (3) of the girls
is claimed by the eldest son of the house to which
tuey belong, and is divided between him and
malome (4) in the usual way. Although I have
said the eldest son of the house claims the cattle,
I must explain that he is only acting for his
mother, who has charge of all her deceased husband's
property during her lifetime belonging to the house,
but at her death, then it devolves upon the eldest
son of the house".
The second passage consists of sections 11 to 14
of the 1959 edition of the Laws of Lerotholi (Part I).
Heir (Mojalefa)
11. (1) The heir in Basutoland shall be the first
male child of the first married wife, and if there
is no male in the first house then the first born
male child of the next wife married in succession
shall be the heir.
(2) If there is no male issue in any houses
the senior widow shall be the heir, but according
to the custom she is expected to consult the




12. (1) When a man dies leaving an heir who is a
minor, the person appointed as guardian of the heir
and administrator of the estate (molisa oa lefa)
shall keep a written record of the administration
of the estate, and this record shall be open to
inspection by the paternal uncles (bo-rangoane) and
by such other relatives of the heir (bang-ka-mojalefa
ba bang) as are permitted to do so by Basuto Law.
(2) No property belonging to the estate shall
be sold or otherwise disposed of by the guardian,
administrator or widow without the prior consent
(tumello) of the paternal uncles and other relatives
of the heir entitled by Basuto Law and Custom to be
consulted (rerisoe).
(3) If the heir in any house is a minor, the
principal heir (mojalefa ea ka sehlohong), if he is
of age, is regarded as his guardian (moholisi).
If the principal heir is himself a minor, the guard¬
ian appointed by the relatives (barig-ka-eena) for
the principal heir shall also be the guardian of
the minors in any other house. Such guardian must
use the property allocated to any particular house
for the maintenance of the heir, his brothers and
minor sisters of such house only.
(4) Where property has been allocated (abetsoeng)
to any particular house and the wife in that house
predeceases her husband, the property allocated shall
remain with that particular house to he inherited
upon the death of the father by the eldest son of
that house and to be shared by him in accordance
with Basuto Law and Custom with his junior brothers
in his own house.
Inheritance (Lefa)
13. (1) Subject to the provisions of paragraph 14
the heir in Basutoland shall inherit all the un¬
allocated property of the estate (lex'uo lohle le
siiloeng le sa ajoa) and he is obliged by custom to
use the estate with his father's widow (ho sebellsa
lefa leo le mohlolohali) or widows and to share with
his junior brothers according to their rank, which
shall be according to the order in which their
mothers were married.
(2) The question of what portion of the un¬
allocated estate shall be set aside for the support
of the deceased's widow or widows during her life or
their lives, shall be decided (reroa) by the paternal
uncles of the principal heir and other persons whose




Allocation (kabo) of property during lifetime
14. (1) If a man during his lifetime allots (aba)
his property amongst his various houses but does not
distribute (arola) such property, or if he dies
leaving written instructions regarding the allotment
(kabo) on his death, his wishes must be carried out,
provided the heir according to Basuto custom has
not been deprived of the greater part (karolo e kholo)
of his father's estate.
(2) A widow who has no male issue in her house
shall have the use of all the property allocated
(abela) to her house. On her death the principal
heir shall inherit the remaining property but he
must use the property for the maintenance of any
dependants (baphelisuoa) in such house; provided
that no widow may dispose of any of the property
without the prior consent (tumello) of her guard¬
ian (raolisa).
(3) If there is male issue in any house other
than the house from which the principal heir comes,
the widow shall have the use of all the property
allocated (abela) to her house and at her death any
property remaining shall devolve upon the eldest
son of her house who must share such property with
his junior brothers in his house; provided that no
widow may dispose of any property without consult¬
ation (therisano) with the guardian (molisa) while
that son is a minor, and provided further that on
the eldest son reaching majority he will assume
control (o tla gala ho laola) of the property in
his house.
(4) Any dispute amongst the deceased's family
(bana ba mofu) over property or property rights
shall be referred (for arbitration - namola) to the
brothers (bana babo) of the deceased and other
persons whose right it is under Basuto Law and
Custom to be consulted (rerisoa). If no agreement
is arrived at by such persons, or if either party
wishes to contest their decision (khaola), the
dispute shall be taken to the appropriate Court
by the dissatisfied person.
Both extracts express or imply three basic principles
of succession which are aptly summed up in some well-known
Sesotho brocarts or legal maxims (5):
(a) malapa ha a jane (houses do not eat each other un
(b) molao o tloha ntlo-kholo o ee ntloaneng (rights
go from the senior house to the junior);
(c) nts'o-salla o salle ba melato (the successor
succeeds to the liabilities too);
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(d) monna ha a shoele (a man never dies).
The customary law of succession could be described
and analysed very largely in terms of these legal proverbs*
The fact that they are not at all points fully consistent
with one another only reinforces their importance and
makes them the more appropriate, since it is at the points
of collision, and within the interstices of their ambigui¬
ties, that the real essence of the law as a living
institution in society is most faithfully expressed.
Commentators have encountered great difficulties in
seeking to give a definitive account of the Sesotho law
of succession (6). Some of these difficulties are real,
but many of them are the product of the commentators
themselves, who too often embark on an erroneous quest
for substantive rules of universal applicability.
As has ' n seen in the case of land allocation, there
are legalities indeed, but these take the form of
principles that are at once general and concrete, whose
application and specification in particular cases depends
upon a very wide range of facts, for the most part
peculiar to each individual situation. The search for
a fully deductive system is misplaced; it will be argued
in the final chapter that this is always and especially
true in a society where roles themselves are not fully
"specified", and where as a consequence it is never quite
possible to isolate matters of "relevancy" in such a way
as to provide an armoury of rules enabling decisions to
be arrived at, as it were "in advance" of the facts.
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Furthermore, the application of a general rule to a
particular case does not have the effect of specifying or
narrowing the law in other "like" cases, since "likeness"
is a function of what it is that is regarded as importing
a relevant comparability, and this criterion is not
available in Basutoland below a fairly high level of
generality. Just as it has been argued that it is
precisely where ts'imo hase lefa and morma ha a shoele
are set on a collision course that the living reality of
land law emerges, so also it is often exactly where the
heir's rights and the widow's claims collide that the law
of succession and inheritance proves itself as a servant
of the living society that generates it (7). The
revised provisions of the laws of Lerotholi set out above
represent a brave attempt by contemporary Basotho (and
other"*) to "codify" and specify the "rules" which are
taken to apply. It is fortunate — and significant —
that this goal has not been achieved. For it is precisely
at the points of greatest difficulty that sections 11-14
are either silent or ambiguous.
It would be no more than a venial exaggeration to
claim that the only really valid, customary and "universal"
rule in these sections is that contained in sec. 14 (4),
where it is stated that any dispute over succession and
inheritance must go before the lelapa (family) of the
deceased. This is a traditional rule, and it is in the
attempt to get back behind this crucial procedural
requirement and to specify the substantive rules to be
applied that most of the recent explorations in this
field have been mistaken. It would be going much too
far, of course, to claim that there are no substantial
"rules" of customary law at all; an attempt will be
made below to ascertain and describe them; but they are,
like nearly all customary "rules", not really "rules"
at all, but norms, at once general and concrete, express¬
ing principles that are held to activate and inspire
the decisions in particular cases. In many respects,
the current ^aws of Lerotholi are a very respectable
attempt to render these visible and articulate.
Before the four brocarts quoted above are individ¬
ually and collectively discussed and referred to the
passages from the 1873 Report and the 1959 "Declaration
of Custom", some characteristic attitudes to the relevant
legal concepts will be analysed as a way of setting the
scene. One of the most important and illuminating of
these attitudes is found in the context of "ownership" (8)
Lawyers find it frustratingly difficult to match the
categories in which common-law or civilian systems
handle this concept to the categories employed by Basotho.
In some senses, it is impossible to equate "ownership"
to any Sesotho category. This does not, of course,
mean that the Basotho have a permissive view of theft,
or that they are in the smallest degree uncertain of when
some item or right does not belong to an interloper who
sets about claiming it. In quarrels over property of
every kind, the Basotho are a supremely litigious society,
with an extremely highly wrought consciousness of rights
and a lively resentment of any invasion of them. But
within what in a particular matter is taken to be the
primary affinal and/or agnatic group, the concept of
ownership is not used to discriminate between the rights
of different group members. In a case where a widow
and an heir survived and it was a question of liability
for bohali in respect of a younger son, I was told "The
widow has the cattle, but they belong to the heir"
(mohlolohali o na le likhomo, empa ke tsa mojalefa).
Commentators, more particularly lawyers, have exercised
themselves fruitlessly in the search for a clear explicat¬
ion of just such statements. Of course, there is an
important sense in which the property of a minimal agnatic
lineage is a common asset of the group; but this does not
so much dissolve as pose the problem, since bitter disputes
occur within such groups over the distribution and allocat¬
ion of divisible items. Moreover, the widow is not an
agnate of the deceased, his brothers or his sons, and her
position in relation to the houses (huts), cattle or
other wealth of her late husband is contingent and non-
heritable, yet it is above all in relation to her that
the greatest complexities have arisen in determining the
differential character of the rights of widows and heirs.
From time to time the courts have tried to apply concepts
of "usufruct" and "estate", but with inevitably limited
success (9).
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Another fundamental attitude characteristic of the
Basotho, and linked again to the generality of customary
norms, is the regular recourse to the requirement that
disputants within the "family" must agree. This stipulat¬
ion replaces the specification of any substantive arrange¬
ments which they must agree to — and of course it is the
latter which typically interest and concern the western
lawyer in his approach to these problems; to him, it is
precisely when disputants do not "agree" that the law
becomes manifest; whereas for the Basotho, such a break¬
down within the family represents a situation not where
the law is at last made clearly visible but rather one
where it is most distorted and obscured. It is certainly
the case that when this happens the disputants will fight
their case with the greatest passion and tenacity, but
it is an error to suppose that this is therefore the point
where "law" has emerged from "private agreement". The
law, in the ideal case, defines certain parameters within
which the anticipated agreement operates, and provides a
battery of often inconsistent and sometimes directly
opposed legal weapons, to furnish the various interests
with a broad legitimation of their general position and
claims. To that very significant extent, social
relationships in matters of inheritance are "law-governed"
as they are, in principle, in other fields too. The
Basotho, as has been noted, are not only litigious, they
are lawyers, even legalists. They are all the more able
to be so, by virtue of the very ambiguities of the law,
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which enable a variety of different claims to be advanced
and different outcomes to be justified, on the basis of
an overarching "law" to which all assent.
Both the Laws of lerotholi as cited above, and the
traditional language of the Basotho in court and out of
it, make frequent use of expressions translated by such
words as "work with", "use the estate with", etc. The
word "with" is, in fact, an accurate translation of the
Sesotho le, and conveys just the indeterminacy which
pervades the norms of customary law — e.g., in 13 (1),
where the heir is obliged by custom to "use the estate
with his father's widow" (ho sebelisa lefa leo le
mohlolohali). Such "laws" are, in fact, not to be seen
as the stipulations of a code that is invoked after the
breakdown of "family" consultations — if they were that,
they would be meaningless — but rather as the norms
which are expected to be expressed in such private gather¬
ings, and to determine the contours of the emergent
settlement.
Traditionally, of course, if recourse were had to a
court at all, it would be to the undifferentiated lekhotla
of the chief, where what are now distinguished as judicial
matters (litaba tsa kahlolo) and administrative matters
(litaba tsa puso) were not segregated. The modern
judicial court finds itself in a difficulty, since it
conceives its function to be that of determining existing
rights, whereas it is exactly because no rights have been
created that the deceased's relatives have come to court
at alls hence the anxiety of judges and magistrates to
ascertain specific rules enabling them to declare rights
abstractly and universalistically deducible from the law
The view point of the chiefs' courts was quite different
and is aptly expressed in the words used by a court
president in a case that occurred before these courts
were overwhelmed by modern legislation:
"I am proud that this case has reached me,
as I am the distributor of estates (moabi oa
mafa). I am awarding these things in
accordance with the law. If your father had
died without giving this horse away, I would
have divided it in two parts and each of you
would have had his share" (10).
In another case, the Paramount Chief's Court gave
precise instructions to a husband to restore to the
house of the principal wife "the saw, saddle, hammer,
battle-axe and a copy of the judgement". It went on
to threaten that if these instructions were not obeyed,
the husband's land would be allocated to the wife (11).
Such disputes are, in fact, brought still to the
chiefs' courts, either instead of or as a preliminary
to the judicial courts (12), where matters can be
conducted without the distractions of "judiciality" (13)
The chiefs' courts, in fact, act — or attempt to act —
where family councils fail, or where (as in the
Rantsilonyane case described in the previous footnote)
there is no basis for consensus. New rights flow from
the decisions (likhaolo) of such courts, much as they
flow from a council of the lelapa. As will be argued
in the concluding chapter, it is wrong to regard this
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situation as one where the (specific and determining)
"law" sets a framework for the operation of "discretion"
where legal rules do not operate. The likhaolo of the
chiefs' courts flow from the law and are shaped by the
general norms that characterise it.
II
It is against this whole background that the
ensuing discussion of particular matters and purported
"rules" is to be understood.
The brocart stating that malapa (matla) ha a jane
means, literally, that "houses do not eat each other" (14).
Subject to certain important reservations, especially
with regard to the special position of the first house
and, within that, of the senior son, the "houses" of a
polygamist (15) are separate and mutually protected
entities, each with its own limited autonomy and each
endowed with its own estate. The points of interest
that arise concern (a) what constitutes a "house", and
who are members of it and (b) what kind and degree of
autonomy the houses possess, and what acts or behaviour
amount to "eating up".
In the most direct sense, of course, a house is
constituted by one of the wives of a polygamist together
with the issue of that wife. Complications enter
because of two principal factors — the introduction of
"secondary" wives, and the practice of adoption. It
has already been observed that where a wife is barren,
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and dies without issue, her father (or his successors)
are expected to provide another daughter as a substitute.
The amount of bohali is reduced in such a case. As was
observed in Chapter Two, the requirement that the original
wife should have had no issue is probably not absolute (16).
This seantlo (17) enters the house of the wife whom she
replaces (18), and her children are sons and daughters in
that house. But seantlo in this strict sense is only
one form of secondary union. If any of a man's wives
dies, he may marry another wife (not a sister of the
deceased) into the same house, and her children will be
children of that house ('Mota, J.C. 176/57). Where a
wife is barren, or even where she is not, a junior wife
(ngoetsi, also meaning daughter-in-law) can be married
into an existing house and bear issue in it. Kenelo,
which has been discussed in Chapter Two in relation to
the succession to Lerotholi, also introduces issue to
a house, though in this case it is the genitor who is
replaced, rather than the wife. Marriage to the grave
(ho n.yalla lebitla) is another (now officially discon¬
tinued: Laws of Lerotholi (1959) II 34 (3)) form of
providing issue to a barren house. Janefeke had no
issue in his first three houses, but only a son (now
deceased) in his fourth. He therefore married a girl
to the still-born son of his first house and arranged
for Tau, the son of his brother, to cohabit with her (19).
Woman marriage is another expedient for filling or
reviving a house, though it is very much open to doubt
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how successful a claim based on this alone would prove
to be — or has ever been (20).
A further complexity arises from the payment of
bohali. First, it does not necessarily follow that an
illegitimate child is legitimated by the subsequent
payment of bohali for his or her mother (Mahamo v.
Hamohele J.C. 197/64, Basotho Courts* Judgments).
Normally, extra bohali are paid, or there should be
some other form of indicating that the legitimation of
previous issue is intended (cf. Duncan I960: 30).
But it is not always easy to determine questions of
bohali; in the first place, though the number of cattle
is theoretically twenty (or more in the case of major
chiefs), a smaller amount is adequate if agreed to (21);
in the second place, bohali is not necessarily, or even
usually, all paid at once, so that it is hard to
determine which beasts are the "extra" supplied for a
child; and in the third place, special arrangements
can be made for particular purposes, whereby the payment
of bohali can be partly concealed (22).
Secondly, it can be relevant who it was that "took
out" the cattle (from his kraal) to provide bohali for
the groom, or (more commonly) to legitimise a child.
Thus, where a second son paid ten cattle to legitimise
the offspring of a union between his younger brother
and a girl, the child so legitimised was the heir of
the second house, instead of the elder brother (eldest
son) (Monne J.C. 91/49; 125/51), since ngoana o tsoaloa
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khomo, "the child is begotten by cattle". (See also
Lejaha J.C. 91/59).
It will be apparent that the question of who con¬
stitutes a house is thus open to a wide range of doubts,
both of "fact" and of "law", especially when (as so often)
the event cited took place some time ago, and where only
a tiny fragment of evidence may suffice to tilt the
balance one way or the other (23). Adoption introduces
a further complication again. What is at issue here
is not, in the normal case, the adoption of a stranger,
but rather the removal of a person from one house and
his translation to another. This regularly happens
in the case of imbecility or insanity, or where there
are several sons in one house and only daughters in a
house senior to it. As was seen in Chapter Two, much
of the trouble in the house of Molapo was due to the
(imbecile) Joseph being put in the charge of Joel from
the junior house, even though there was no adoption or
translation. An issue of "private" succession, how¬
ever, arose in the case of Matjeketjeke's sons.
Sekhukhuni, his son in his first house, showed signs of
imbecility, so he translated Ketseletso, the eldest
son of his second house, to the first. But the
Paramount Chief's Court decided that Ketseletso's heir
could not oust the son of Sekhukhuni (Mokhesi J.C. 230/45).
But where a senior son, Mosoeu, had no male issue, the
son of the third house adopted into it (ngoana ea holet-
seng ha Mosoeu) was heir in precedence over the second
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house (so Mohaleroe in Sefali J.C. 1/64, only the
adoption was not proved). When a man adopts an orphan
into an existing house, he determines the order of
succession, putting his own heir or the senior son of
the house first.
More than one of these various sources of dispute
is illustrated in the case raised by Joel Mots'oene
against Letsie Mots'oene, Principal Chief of Leribe (now
deceased). Joel argued (Mots'oene 1954 H.C.T.L.R.I)
that his father was the eldest son of the former chief
Mots'oene by the latter's fifth wife, Selahlelo, whereas
Letsie*s father, Koabeng, was the son of the seventh
house. Letsie argued, against this, that Selahlelo
had never been married to Mots'oene. She was the wife
of Sekake, to whom she had born three children, and after
his death she went to live briefly with Mots'oene to
whom she bore a son. But since she had not restored
the cattle of her marriage to her late groom's family,
she had never been divorced from him (24). Joel
argued against Letsie that since Selahlelo's children
had been left with Sekake*s people, no restoration of
bohali was required; moreover, Mots'oene had paid
bohali of twenty cattle to Selahlelo's father, as bride-
wealth for the marriage. Letsie denied that these
cattle were bridewealth, and argued that they had simply
been paid so that the boy, Makakamela, should stay with
Mots'oene as a junior son. Moreover, Letsie claimed
that his father Koabeng was the eldest son of the third
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house of Mots'oene and thus in any reckoning senior to
Makakamela (25)•
If the order of houses is agreed, or decided by the
lelapa or a court, then the law is that the inheritance
passes from the senior house to the junior, if there is
no heir in the senior. This is the meaning of the
brocart, molao o tloha ntlo-kholo o ee ntloaneng.
Property remains within the minimal agnatic lineage,
descending (in the absence of a son) to the next junior
brother of the deceased. Only if there is no such will
it "rise" and be distributed in terms of the next
inclusive lineage segment. But if a younger brother
dies with no issue then (leaving aside the question of
any widows he might leave) the estate passes to the
principal heir (in the senior house). The brocart
does not strike at the position of the principal heir,
who remains the head of the minimal lineage of the
deceased and is the residuary beneficiary. Its purpose
is rather to send an inheritance "down" from him to the
junior house in the event of his death without issue
instead of allowing it to pass up to a brother of the
deceased. If the latter happened (other than when
there was no other person to "eat" the estate), then
this would mean that one house (in the previous generat¬
ion) was "eating up" another, contrary to the interdiction
on ho jana. It would also be logically contrary to the
movement of succession in a forward direction, and this
movement is seen as essential to a properly working
267
system, since it is only if it passes to younger men
that a consistent principle can operate; if it went
"backwards", either there would be no one alive to
succeed, or it would pass, in a way seen as indefensible,
to the scions of remote houses. This approach was
stressed by the Paramount Chief's court in Shoaepane
v. Maama J.C. 92/58. The principal heir's position
within what might be called the "successor group" —
the sons of the deceased — is thus not diminished but
rather strengthened by the rule of ho ea ntloaneng.
Ill
Paramount Chief Seeiso divided the bulk of his
cattle between his first three houses (those of 'Mantsebo,
'Mabereng and 'Maleshoboro). On his death, 'Mantsebo
retained the cattle for her lifetime, after which they
passed to Paramount Chief Bereng (Moshoeshoe II), in
the second house (he had failed to remove them from
'Mantsebo in I960). George Moshoeshoe in the 1873
Report states (p.45) that "a widow can inherit cattle
belonging to her house if she has no male children at
the death of her husband", and this might be thought
to support an argument that she could dispose of them
as she pleased. But such an assumption would be
unwarranted. In the case in question, Ntsebo (the
Chieftainess's daughter) was already married, but it
does not follow that had she not been her mother could
268
have given the cattle to her. This would he to mistake
the position of women, at least in the older society,
though recent practice (and this means indigenously
derived practice) has undoubtedly greatly modified the
status and capacities of women in Basutoland. Never¬
theless, the argument figured above, in reliance on
George's statement, remains open to doubt. If, for
the sake of analysis, it is assumed that a widow is
left with no issue in her house, then George's opinion
that she can "inherit any cattle belonging to her house"
appears either illogical or superfluous, since "her
house" consists simply of herself, and if they "belong"
to that house, she does not need to "inherit"them.
This goes to show the caution with which formulations
like this need to be approached, and underlines the
warnings expressed above about the attribution of rights
in rem to individuals — especially to women, and more
especially to widows in polygamous families. "Belong¬
ing" as used here refers to the allocation (kabo) of
cattle to a house by the husband or other entitled
person. At the time of the allocation, it is not
normally known what issue will come to that house.
Once the allocation has been made, the husband is
obliged to "use" that allocated estate "for" the house
in question, and this obligation survives him and passes
to his heirs. The widow is thus a main beneficiary of
the allocation and is protected in her enjoyment of the
style of life made possible by it for the rest of her
life (26). It is in this sense that she "inherits"
the property "belonging to her house".
It is true that George distinguishes between the
case where a widow has a son, and one where she does
not, and the question arises whether this does not
therefore give a special meaning to his statement that
in the absence of male issue 1he widow "inherits" the
cattle, since where there is male issue he qualifies
the son's "inheriting" by saying that he is only
"acting for his mother, who has charge... during her
lifetime... but at her death, then it devolves upon"
the heir of the house. Since, it is argued, the widow
in a qualified sense "inherits" the use of the cattle
where there is a son, then where there is no son, her
"inheritance" must be unqualified, giving her the right
of disposal. The argument is plausible, but unsound.
Where there is a son, George first states that he
"inherits", and then proceeds to qualify the rights
which this gives to him to a point which seems to
restore the effective control to the widow. Where
there is no son, the matter cannot be expressed in
this way, and the widow is therefore said to "inherit".
But it is quite certain that in George's time widows
(in common with though to a lesser extent than women
in general) were obliged to act always and only "with"
the male agnates of the deceased, and though their
obligation to do so is probably much less strictly
defined today, the core of the doctrine remains: the
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agnatic family cannot be deprived of its wealth (leruo)
by the unilateral act of a widow, who (after all)
remains a member of her husband's family and "married"
to them even after his death. It is, moreover, common
for a husband to allocate much of his estate to the
senior house, and where (as with Seeiso) this house has
no male heir, it would be the consequence of the argument
here assailed that this substantial portion would be
removed from the agnates — a conclusion whose absurdity
is, in Sotho terms, self-evident.
A great amount of debate has gone on, in court and
out of it, as to the relative position of the widow and
the heir. The above account, though based on the
continuing argument, represents the writer's analysis
of the position, and to a considerable extent departs
from the indigenous conceptualisations both of the
Basotho and of the Roman-Dutch courts. Basotho, and
the Basotho courts, talk in terms of heirship, and
frequently disagree with each other. At times, these
disagreements concern the status of women, some adhering
to the more restrictive features of the older law and
regarding the de facto changes as foreign to Sesotho
custom, others affirming that though there have been
changes, these are either less radical than is claimed
(since the old law was not in fact as restrictive as
the others assert), or that such modifications are
legitimate changes in custom, not abrogations of it (27).
But, for much of the time, the disagreements are largely
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terminological and neither represent nor lead to any
substantive difference•in outcome. In Makafane's case,
the Basotho court stated that "under the customs of
the Basotho the widow cannot become an heir" (Hololo
Central, C.C. 63/61, cf. J.C. 100/64). At Likoeneng
(C.C. 49/63, Qatba v. Nte J.C. 55/64), the Basotho court
stated that the estate of the deceased Brakafese was
"still in the hands of the widow"; and at Salang, it
stated that the widow, not the son, was heir (Kente v.
Poloko J.C. 212/63). Such seeming contradictions
could be multiplied. But it is the argument of the
present analysis that these do not represent, for the
most part, substantive disagreements at all. Whether
the widow or the son is called the "heir" depends on
whose rights appear to be under invasion. In Kafakane
above, the purpose of the decision was to make sure
that the widow did not alienate her late husband•s
estate in her house without consulting the deceased's
agnates, so that it could be determined from which part
of the estate the debt claimed was due. In Qatha above,
the son appeared to think that his late father's creditor
was suing him for the estate, as though disputing the
"lefa" itself. The court pointed out that the suit was
for a debt (the return of goats and progeny lent to the
deceased); the son in stating that he was only the
molisa (guardian) of his mother, who held the goats,
failed to realise that it was precisely as guardian that
he was liable, and that Nte had properly sued him as the
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successor of the late Brakafese. The puzzlement arises
from the fact that there is in fact a kind of guardian¬
ship within guardianship. The widow is not, as had
been shown and is in any case universally admitted where
there is a son, the "owner" of the estate in the Roman-
Butch or commonlaw sense, but only holds it "for" the
house. Yet the son, at least if married, is regularly
his mother's guardian too. He looks after the cattle
"for" his mother, who in turn is looking after them "for"
him. The purpose of the system is to secure proper
support for the widow, and at the same time to protect
the property of the house, for the benefit of the heir.
During the joint lives of widow and son, that person
can be said to have the right to "eat the estate" whose
position in the particular case appears to need protect¬
ion and support. Equally, it may be necessary to deny
the name of mojalefa to a person who is using his or
her rights to the property in a way that causes detriment
to the other (28).
The "indigenous conceptualisations" of the Roman-
Dutch courts are to be more impatiently rejected.
They depend upon a determination to identify a single
unambiguous titular of the rights in rem to property,
and result in a false dichotomisation between an "heir"




Not all the estate is normally allocated to the
houses of a polygamist. That which is left unallocated
at death passes to the principal heir, viz., the eldest
son in the senior house with male issue. This unallo¬
cated estate is not earmarked to the widow of the
principal heir's house but falls directly to him,
provided he is of age (i.e., in traditional law, married)
A problem that arises concerns what is to happen when
the deceased had only one house. Is all the property
to be regarded as allocated to that house? Or is it
all unallocated property, which passes directly to the
heir? An immense amount of judicial and juristic
energy has been brought to bear on this issue. It is
argued that if all the property is allocated, the heir
to a monogamous marriage is worse off than the heir to
polygamy, since all the estate is earmarked to the
widow. It is also argued, against this, that if all
such property is regarded as unallocated, the widow's
position is very weak since she is left with nothing (30)
It will be apparent that in terms of the present discus¬
sion, both these arguments, and others couched in
similar form, must be treated with some scepticism,
since they are based on questionable assumptions as to
what the debate should be about, and turn largely on
the desire to locate the holder or holders of rights
in rem to the estate. If the terms of the discussion
are transposed in such a way as to be directed to the
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protection of the rights (litokelo) of the various
persons involved (the widow and the issue, among whom
primarily the heir) then much of the debate becomes
irrelevant. The superior Roman-Dutch courts are
reluctant to see the issue in this way, since the way
in which modern courts handle interpersonal issues is,
so far as possible, by attributing predetermined and
if possible real or at least specific rights to the
parties. The Basotho courts kept close to the
relevant concerns in Ralienyane v. Lekaota (see note
30), one declaring that it was a case for the family
council, and the other (recognising perhaps that matters
had passed beyond that point) finding for the son but
upholding the right of the widow to be supported by
him from the estate (31).
It is not inevitable that the husband should make
an allocation during his lifetime, but if he does so,
he must stand by it and use the allocated parts "for"
the houses to which they "belong". But he must not
allocate it in such a way as to deprive the principal
heir of more than half the estate (32). This offers
the heir some protection in his vulnerable position
as universal successor, discussed below. Where there
is no male issue, the property still attaches to the
house until the widow's death, when it falls to the
principal heir. Where there is male issue, the
property of course remains with him after the widow's
death (33).
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If the estate has not been allocated at all, the
unallocated entire estate falls to the principal heir;
but as Lavs of Lerotholi sec. 13 makes clear, this does
not acquit the heir of his obligations towards the other
houses; rather, it places on him (subject as always in
this area to the family decision) the duty which his
father has left behind when he died. Although the
Laws of Lerotholi do not use the word "allocate", this
is what is involved (sec. 13 (2) speaks of a portion
"set aside", beoa kathoko). The principal heir for
many purposes steps into his father's shoes — he is,
in fact, a successor, and his position needs rather
more careful and concrete scrutiny than the discussion
so far has provided. But before specific cases are
considered, some preliminary attention must be paid to
the general nature of the heir's status as successor,
a status which is expressed in the third and fourth
brocarts set out previously, and especially in the
maxim nts'o-salla o salle ba melato. In Matsosa J.C.
151/55, the judge in the Basotho Court at Matsieng
(A.C.I., C.C. 190/55) quoted the maxim and commented
that it means that "the heir... will make good his
late father's debts, regardless of how much estate he
has left behind". The court at Lejone came to an
identical conclusion in Kotsiri v. Lintlhonoane J.C.
79/65, and a similar interpretation is directly implied
in Brakafese's case discussed above (Qatha v. Nte J.C.
55/64), where Qatha was liable for his father's debts,
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even though the estate was in the hands of the widow.
The saying that monna ha a shoele, "a man does not die",
reinforces this: there is always a successor (34).
The obligations of succession apply not only to debts
owed "outside the family", but also, as has been said,
to arrangements inside the family of the deceased.
It is now necessary to see what may be involved in this.
Real life situations are less unambiguous than the Laws
of Lerotholi suggest, and it has of course been argued
above that (quite apart from the exogenous character
that marks certain aspects of these "laws") the norms
of customary law are not to be taken as rules governing
every future eventuality. Thus, the Laws as given do
not disclose the possibility, and the consequences of
the possibility, that the estate may have been allocated
in such a way as to leave the junior houses well provided
for, or that it may have left them with very little.
What happens is that each case is looked at in the light
of the customary norms of fairness between houses and
obligations of support, and a decision made that flows
from this consideration of the matter. Thus, David T.'s
father died leaving a large number of beasts, which may
be put at 250 as a round figure. Before his death, he
allocated fifty to his second house and twenty-five to
his third. He did not formally allocate any to his
senior house. The 175 unallocated cattle stayed with




his mother and the cattle too. The two younger brothers
also stayed in the same place and the cattle were all
used together, though they took their cattle out when
they left to go to their own place on marriage. (Such
allocations in fact take place between brothers in one
house, though the law as so far discussed only contem¬
plate allocation between houses). If the heir leaves
his mother's home, she should release some cattle to
him — and, of course*, they will all come to him on her
death — especially where the heir had no cattle of
his "own", unallocated by his late father. Disputes
would traditionally go before the "family" and then on
to the chief's lekhotla if no settlement could be reached.
Normally, where a reasonable part of the estate has been
allocated to junior houses by the deceased, the principal
heir is not obliged to support these houses (e.g., by
providing bohali for sons being married) out of the
unallocated estate. If the heir himself discharges
the duty of allocating a (wholly or largely) unallocated
estate, he will take such debts into account in deciding
how much support he can afford to let the junior houses
have, as well as other factors such as the number of
dependants to be supported in each house. And the
heir is, of course, liable to look after his younger
brothers in the junior houses. It is further his
responsibility (as with all eldest sons) to support his
own mother, no matter whether a part of the estate has
been allocated or not (35).
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These considerations raise the question of the
relationship between houses, and recall the maxim
partly discussed at the outset, that malaoa ha a jane,
"houses do not eat each other up". What falls now to
be examined is the question of what kind of action or
disposal actually constitutes such "eating up".
Basically, what is forbidden is the use of the property
of one house for the benefit of another, and the problem
arises most frequently at a point where the houses have
not yet emerged into full independence: where the heir
of one or more of the houses is a minor, and the widow
either dead or under the guardianship of the principal
heir or of another agnate (usually brother) of the
deceased. It is for example contrary to the maxim to
take cattle from one house to provide bohali for the son
of another, and it is equally wrong to take bohali paid
in respect of a daughter of one house and put it into
another. The position here is, however, complicated
by the fact that if a man helps a junior with bohali,
he can receive a portion of the bohali paid for that
brother's sister: and a fruitful cause of dissention is
whether such a transfer is the repayment of a debt, or
the improper "eating up" of a house. Where the estates
are "mixed up", for example where cattle are kraaled
together, there is moreover no visible or physical
separation of the houses. When quarrels supervene on
a previously amicable arrangement, questions of house-
property arise that are hard to sort out since the
original facto have passed away or never been ascertained.
It is largely for this reason that the houses of a
deceased often physically separate out after the death,
and most independent homesteads have their own kraals.
Half-brothers, and brothers too, seek their own sites
because of the need to identify their own property.
This is more true in the larger villages than it is in
smaller homestead-type settlements, where the headman is
in fact the head of the extended family and can make a
more immediate determination of rights. Thus, at
Temeki's village under Masite mountain, all the inhabit¬
ants are members of one extended family, under their own
(ungazetted) headman Nkopara, and they all kraal their
cattle together. No one seemed to think that this
arrangement would work in the immediately neighbouring
village of Masite Nek. This is not just because the
village is not "one family". The relatively coherent
and long-established Moeno lineage uses seven different
kraals between its six minor segments. It is, of
course, the obverse face of coherence that there should
also be disputes, since quarrels arise precisely between
those who live close enough to have occasion for dis¬
agreement; and the Moeno people are constantly quarrell¬
ing. The separation of cattle is partly a consequence
of past quarrels, partly a recognised means of reducing
future ones. (The dispute current during the research
concerned not cattle but sites and lands; see Chapter
Fiw, and the case of Moeno J.C. 214/64). But this
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physical separation will often not occur during the life¬
time of the father, so that on his decease it becomes a
question of recalling the details of his allocation.
As with all such acts in the law, allocation requires
publicity, and should not only be performed "with" and
in the presence of the heir and other agnates, but also
reported to the chief. Nevertheless, questions of fact
become matters of dispute when years have passed — and
when, as often enough, the original witnesses are absent
or dead.
It is worth repeating that the maxim malapa ha a
,1ane applies equally to the father during his life as
to the heir after his death. The allocation to houses
means, for instance, that bohali cattle must be taken
either from the kraal of the groom's house or from that
of the unallocated estate retained directly in the
husband's hands. On his death, the maxim protects the
house-property of the heir as well as that of Junior
houses. But it does not protect the unallocated estate,
nor does it free the heir from his personal liability
to discharge his father's debts, which he may have to
do out of his own labour and wealth if the estate is not
large enough to bear the charge. Though the maxim nts'o
salla is in tension with the maxim malapa, the two should
not conflict. The aspect of the law which a disputant
stresses will, nevertheless, tend to reflect his view of
his own interests. In Mangana v. Tlali J.C. 50/60,
Albinas claimed from 'Ma-Phiri (a woman) two goats which
had admittedly been borrowed from him some years before.
'Ma)Phiri was the widow of Sehloho, from his father's
senior house, and she replied by arguing that the goats
had not been borrowed by her, but by her late husband's
son, Moela, from a junior house. The debt therefore
bound the house of 'Ma-Moela, and 'Ma-Phiri was not
involved. This defence was accepted by the court at
Maja's, but the Paramount Chief's court at Matsieng
differed: "According to law, 'Ma-Phiri may not be forced
to pay this debt with the property of her own house, but
it is nnt for Albinas to say which house it is whose
property must satisfy the debt. It is for 'Ma-Phiri to
determine the family property that must settle the
liability". It is clear from this that although the
heir (in this case, the heir's widow) is liable, this
does not rule out his own recourse (in turn) to another
source. This is shown (though malapa are not involved)
in the case of Katsosa already mentioned above (J.C.
151/55), where a closer look at Lerotholi's judgment
illuminates this point. It will be recalled that the
heir was held liable for his father's debt, even though
the estate is small. In this case, the elder son
argued that his younger brother should pay the balance
of his own bohali. The court affirmed that the heir
was liable, and quoted nts'o salla, pointing out that
the elder should have taken the matter to a family
council first. The liability of the heir, while not
permitting him to breach the rule of "eating up", does
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not mean that he has no recourse to persons substantively
liable (36). Chieftainess 'Mamathe of Masupha's was
involved in a dispute that raised this question (Masupha
v. Rapopo J.C. 22/64). The plaintiff's case rested on
the concept of nts'o sella, the chieftainess1s defence
on that of ho se jane (not eating each other up). The
case was brought by Zulu Rapopo, who claimed bohali for
his daughter, who was married by Liketso, heir to a
junior house of Masupha I. The court at Motjoka
decided in favour of the chieftainess (Zulu later com¬
plained that the judge was her "brother", viz., parallel
cousin) on the ground that "it is not all the sons of
Masupha for whose bohali the defendant (moarabeli) is
answerable". The chieftainess was properly sued, as
head (regentess) of the house of Masupha, but she was
not obliged to take out cattle from her own kraal.
bohali still owing must come from the house to which
Liketso belonged. This case involved "houses" related
at a considerable lineage depth ('Mamathe's late husband,
Gabashane, was the great-grandson of Masupha I), so that
reference to "unallocated" estate would be inappropriate.
The issues of succession on the one hand and house
autonomy on the other were thus squarely posed. The
only complication that entered was that there was some
evidence that the late Gabashane, during his life, had
tendered some bohali for the junior (-nd in fact illegi¬
timate) grandson of his grandfather. 'Ma-Mathe denied
this, and she may have been right, but at all events it
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would have been an entirely normal act for the senior
chief of a cardinal house to undertake. Zulu's tactic
was to represent this gift — if it happened — as an
obligation that fell on Gabashane's widow as his
successor-regent.
Another case in which seniority in succession
founded an argument that ran counter to the ho se jane
rule was that of Mojake v. Litjarela J.C. 4/63. Here,
Lerata argued that bohall for his junior half-brother
(Sekautu) was due not from himself but from Pakalitha,
the heir of the senior branch of his grandfather's
lineage. It was, in this instance, in the interests of
the disputant to stress the line of succession superior
to his own, and try to settle the liabilities away from
his own house. He did not, of course, pursue the logic
of this to the minimal lineage of which he was head
(here, it was of course in his interest to recall the
autonomy of the houses).
(SEPOLO)
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Mojake v. Litjamela
Disputes such as these (37) are p further illustra¬
tion of how the norms of customary lew, since they are
maintained at a high level of generality, can sometimes
2
more and sometimes less plausibly come into real or
apparent conflict, parties stressing the one rather than
the other according to their perceptions of their interest
In the more plausible cases, the Basotho courts will
normally look to the question of who is being invaded,
who is threatened with "eating up"; the maxims enable
the decision to be based on reasons, but it does not
follow that that decision is constrained (38). In less
plausible cases, Basotho litigants cheerfully acknowledge
that they were simply "trying it on", and giving their
adversary a run for his money.
V
The "Family Council"
The council of the lelapa referred to in Laws of
Lerotholi 14 (2) consists essentially of the brothers
(bana babo) of the deceased. Its exact composition,
however, depends on the interplay of several other
factors, such as the status of the "family" involved and
the importance of the matter of succession and inherit¬
ance to be debated, the social and geographical proximity
of the various individuals who fall within the categories
of person who may attend the meetings, the history of
individual and group relationships within the wider
lineage, and even the personal predilections and prefer¬
ences of influenJial members of the inner agnatic group.
The usual reference is to the "paternal uncles" of
the heir. The most important decisions obviously have
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to be made when the head of a senior segment dies, and
since by definition all his brothers are in that event
junior to him, the paternal uncles are often called bo-
rangoane of the heir, rangoane being the junior brother
of EGO's father (bo- is the plural prefix for this class
of noun). But an elder brother is entitled a fortiori
(ntate moholo, the same term being applied to a paternal
or maternal grandfather). Brothers, of course, include
parallel cousins (in this context, patrilateral parallel
cousins), and the lineage depth in terms of which these
are defined depends on some or all of the factors that
have been mentioned. It has been seen in Chapter Two
that in the case of the Paramountcy, it has now been
settled that this definition is co-terminous with the
national character of the office (39). The dispute
over the chieftainship of Patlong, fully discussed and
analysed in Appendix II, is an intermediate case, being
less extensive in its implications than matters of
succession to the higher chieftainships but much more
"important" than succession within "private" or commoner
lineages. The population composing the family council
here was loosely defined to include many, but not all,
of the representatives of lineage segments at a depth
of four generations. In such cases, there is occasion
for dispute over what is to determine seniority: whether
this is to be "circumspectively" defined, giving special
weight to the immediate agnates of the deceased, or
"retrospectively", when the heads of collateral segments
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will rank higher than the junior members of the deceased's
family; in fact, the outcome will usually be "mixed", but
the proportions of each component are a matter which
cannot be deductively or predictively determined.
Seniority is important, since the decision depends not
simply on counting heads, but more centrally on the views
of the senior members of the assembly. Age itself is a
relevant factor here, too, length of years constituting
one element in seniority (see the role played by Kali
Makoae in the Patlong dispute).
Balanced with these considerations are practical
matters such as geographical proximity or the existence
of some special constraint such as illness, old age or
poverty that might make it difficult for a person other¬
wise wanted and welcome to manage to attend; in such a
case, however, if a suitable representative could be
found, he (if also a member of the deceased's lineage)
would often come in his principal's place. Where much
property is involved, it is important that all trans¬
actions, allocations and decisions should be witnessed
by as large a proportion of the agnatic group as possible.
Where there is little inheritable wealth, or few depen¬
dants, or only light obligations, publicity is less
essential. Indeed, it is particularly where much is at
issue that the more distant agnates (in either a geogra¬
phical or a genealogical sense) are themselves most
concerned to have a voice in the decisions that are made.
Again, an important factor in determining the
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catchment is the character of the relationships between
the lineage segments, which again depends at least in
part upon their physical and social proximity. Where
brothers have stayed together for generations (as with
the Moeno's of Masite Nek) all who live in the cluster
of associated homesteads will be members of the council.
Where (as again with the Moeno's) one brother has moved
away from the others, his presence or absence will
depend on the degree of his proximity, the seriousness
of his disagreements with his agnates, and the extent to
which his interest in the matter is seen to be that of
a potential contributor or rather that of a forisfamili¬
ated son who is only anxious to take what he can before
severing his links entirely. (Inheritances, of course,
are potential occasions for disputes between agnates as
much as they are matters for joint decision and coopera¬
tion). By contrast, where the major lineage is
geographically dispersed and there is insufficient
community of interest in property to bring its segments
together, the composition of the family council will be
organised more tightly around the immediate agnates.
These extra-structural factors weigh much more
heavily where non-agnates are involved. The malome/
mother's brother of the deceased may have a voice in
the family deliberations, provided that he has seen a
"true malome" and not someone who simply falls into the
category of mother's brother. To be a true malome is
to take a personal interest in his nephew (mochana), help-
ing him with his bohali and looking after his sisters.
To be a malome in the relevant sense is as much an
achieved as an ascribed role; and among the many bo-
malome that a man may have, only a few will normally be
brought within the intimacy of the family. Again,
the malome will not as a rule have a voice in matters
of public succession or participate in decisions that
are internal to the agnatic family, or involving dis¬
putes between the agnates inter se. If the mother of
the deceased is still alive, he will be concerned that
she (his sister) is properly considered in the disposit
ions made after her son's death (40).
The malome of the heir also has a place, in his
capacity as an agnate of the deceased's widow or widows
Again, the widow's agnates are concerned more with
those dispositions that effect their sister than with
other matters, and outside parallel cousin marriage
would not have a voice in decisions that were internal
to the agnatic lineage of the deceased. But where a
"family council" met during the life of its senior
member, the "true malome" would have an important role,
especially where decisions affecting his nieces and
nephews were involved. (41)
The adult sons of the deceased, and especially the
heir, take a full part in the assembly, and in many
matters of allocation and distribution the role of the
principal heir (provided he is a major) is the most
important of all. The wives of senior brothers and
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elder sons are also entitled to attend, though here as
elsewhere the position and status of women must still
be regarded as in a condition of change, so that it is
difficult to propose any general rule determining the
part that they are expected or permitted to play.
Viduity itself confers rank and a degree of autonomy,
so that (other things being equal) a woman's role will
be the more influential if she is a widow, if among
widows she is senior, and if her husband had enjoyed
high rank among his own agnates. But here again non¬
structural factors enter, notably her seniority in
years, the personal respect in which she is held, and
the wealth or status of her own agnatic family.
The council of the lelapa thus consists of an
indeterminate group of agnates and affines built round
a core of "brothers" of the deceased. It is not
possible to specify a general rule defining its composi¬





M.G. Smith offers a framework for the analysis of
government of impressive theoretical value (Smith I960:
chapter 2). He regards "the essential components of
the structure and process of government" as being
"political" and "administrative" activities; though these
two components are found in a whole range of empirical
relationships and associations the one with the other,
they are analytically distinct, political activities
being characterised by "power", administrative activities
by "authority". The focus of political activities lies
in the selection of policy and is marked — and defined —
by contraposition. Administrative activity consists
of authorised processes and lacks contraposition at any
level, being an "inherently hierarchic" type of organisa¬
tion. Empirically, the two components are not found in
ideal form, yet the analytical categories can be employed
to describe and classify the actual systems of government
that exist in the field. Smith notes that no set of
administrative rules could cover every possible situation
or lay down in advance the precise action that an admin¬
istrative officer should take. In so far as the
administrative component is thus free, and indeed obliged,
to take decisions, it exercises political' powers.
Further, although in such cases the administration is
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operating within a framework of authority and exercising
only derived or delegated rights, its decisions are
regarded by subordinates as acts of power, as indeed
they are, though circumscribed by the enabling provision.
It must be added that empirically no code, as Smith
notes, can of itself secure obedience and no system of
supervision can wholly exclude ultra vires action by
administrative organs or personnel. In so far as the
administration is able to exceed its authority, there¬
fore, it displays in still clearer form an exercise of
power and a usurpation of political activity.
Smith's analysis does not deal explicitly with the
place of law in political or government systems. In a
brief reference he places it among the administrative
activities of government, as standing apart from the
executive or political spheres; it does not therefore,
appear to involve the taking of policy decisions or the
exercise of power. This corresponds to the view that
the English legal system has traditionally taken of
itself: its function is essentially declaratory rather
than creative. No matter what hesitation, debate and
uncertainty precede judgment, no matter how many inferior
judgments are overturned on appeal, the Court tends to
regard itself not as making but as declaring law, the
law itself being conceived as existing, disembodied,
in some noumenal realm of pure essence, from which it
realises itself with ever greater particularity and
sharpness of definition as it moves from potency to act
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in the mouths of judges. Judges "find the law", they
do not make it. They declare that the law governing a
particular circumstance "is" so-and-so, as though even
if they had, per impossihile, stated otherwise, it would
still have been so. Even where a judgment incorporates
an award of a particular sum of money in damages, this
is still an act not of power but of authority; it is
the ultimate self-realisation of the law, which here
reaches a particularity that briefly reveals its features
before it returns to the realm where only its hinder
parts are seen: where the law never is, but always is to
be.
Such a view represents the ultima ratio of authority,
and the total disappearance of power. It supposes a
code — the "ideal law" — wherein every possible config¬
uration of acts and events is provided for and where
every pronouncement of the administrative officer,
whilst it may appear at the level of phenomena as a
"decision" and is regularly so described, is really in
essence an act of pure obedience: not, of course, to an
identifiable human superior, but to the law itself.
Even where the Court is applying the enacted law of a
legislature or other sovereign, this obedience is not,
strictly speaking, given to a determinate superior.
The English and Scottish Courts do not inquire into
what that sovereign intended to enact but into what it
did enact; the object of obedience remains the Law, and
not the person or institution that made the law.
But it is no accident that, to the lawyer at least, the
quintessence of law does not reside in statute but in
the common law — "Judge-made law", as it is often
called, but "judge-found law" as it is better termed in
the context of the "declaratory" theory of judicial
functions (1).
The declaratory view of the judicial task also
possesses the characteristic of being unverifiablef
since there is by definition no alternative access to
the self-existing "Law" other than the words of judges,
there is no even theoretical possibility of independently
ascertaining the "truth" of the claims of the declaratory
theory. In this lie both its strength and its weakness.
The law embodies the values of the society, and its
progressive self-re']^a}isation in "decisions" of ever
sharper particularity is the mechanism whereby it fulfils
the "regulatory" function of which Eisenstadt speaks
(Eisenstadt 1959), transmitting those values to the
members of the society and eliciting (or compelling) their
loyalty to the total political system to which they belong
Smith's scheme has much to recommend it. The two
analytical elements of power and authority seem to
define two distinguishable components in social action,
and moreover to do so in a manner that is sensitive to
the "normative" or legitimate features that might be
regarded, and with reason, as the defining characteris¬
tics of "law". But although Smith's scheme is useful
for some purposes (as he himself has shown) it is only
a starting-point for the conceptual analysis of law.
In the first place, there are certain theoretical, diffi¬
culties in his way of discussing authority and power.
It is more satisfactory to argue that authority is one
of several possible bases of power than that it is a
kind of power. Moreover, when Smith's scheme is
applied to actual cases, it can lead to false conclusions
about the processed described (2). Furthermore, the
scheme is unbalanced. It implies that at one end of
the continuum, the empirical correlate of (pure) "power"
would be the Hobbesian war of all against all. This
is acceptable enough in itself, but the polarity is not
effectively balanced by any conceivable state of society
at the other end of the scale. One way of approaching
this is to observe that it is impossible to frame a rule
that defines its own application. A second-order rule
must be invoked to define the application of the first,
and a third-order rule to define that of the second, and
so on, in infinite regress. The purely "administrative"
myth is conceivable only in a society where the law has
no point of contact with concrete action at all: and
where, in consequence, the problem of relating structure
to event is eliminated by the expedient of eliminating
events, and so eliminating sociology. It is, however,
precisely in so far as law is "the point where life and
logic meet" (Maitland) that it raises theoretical
problems at all; therefore it is to that point, and not
to points on either side of it, that any projected
solutions must be directed (3).
It is not proposed to review here the massive
literature that exists on the nature of the judicial
process (4). The "declaratory" view which has been
presented above in ideal form is not accepted by jurists
of any sophistication, though in modified form it still
tends to represent the official doctrine of the courts,
or at least of the "judicial folk-lore" that underlines
the less academic jurisprudence of practising lawyers
or judges (5). The existence of an efficient legisla¬
ture naturally enables a form of declaratory theory to
be workable, since enacted law can always be invoked
to change the law as "found" by the court. But though
the "declaratory" theory in se cannot be taken quite
seriously by the analyst, it exists as an ethnographic
fact in the legal thinking of many societies where law
has not been codified. Codification implies the formal
exposition of the law in systematic form and is normally
followed and validated by legislative enactment.
Although a body of case-law grows up round the code, this
"jurisprudence" (in the French sense) is always referred
back to the code and does not as a rule take its place
or stand on the same level of authority. Consequently,
the Code is the ultimate "Law" and if it is of recent
origin (like the codes of most modern states, which owe
their existence directly or indirectly to Napoleon) it
is clearly not to be expected that a quasi-mystical
attitude should grow up towards it. Only where a code
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°r corpus is of ancient origin does it emerge as "Law"
in the sense in which the word has "been capitalised
above; thus the Roman Twelve Tables were still the
formal object of reverence even in the time of Justinian,
when their relevance to legal ari social problems had
long ago vanished (6). But where the law has not been
codified, its origins cannot be determined by any
particular human act to which a date can be given; it
is regarded as issuing from God himself, or as having
been delivered by a founding ancestor, or (rather less
simply) as secreted by the society itself over immemorial
time. It does not now follow that the acts and words
of judges will be regarded as infallibly or by definition
declaring the true law; least of all will this follow if
the judges themselves are not members of the society in
which they hold office; in this case, indeed, judicial
activity is seen by members of the society as an act of
power, both because the judge is regarded as a stranger
to the Law, and because he is seen as simply one part
of the alien government set over the nation; and indeed,
in Basutoland, until the recent past he may well aac %Ls
other roles have been a District Commissioner or other
executive official (7). Furthermore, as a result of
the changes imported into the judicial system by the
British Government in 1938 and after (see Chapter Three,
pp. above), no chief continued to act as a judge
in his own ward and the number of courts was reduced
in the course of a few years from over a thousand to
fewer than a hundred} in consequence, courts ceased to
form a natural and daily part of the ordinary Momotho's
life; such courts as continued to operate were no longer
so directly associated with the local chieftainship as
such, and thus ceased to "be implicated in the nexus of
other relationships, economic, disciplinary, political.,
administrative and ideological, which characterised
the chieftainship in the traditional society. All
this meant that the Basuto courts, like the European
ones though to a lesser degree, could not be regarded
as ipso facto the authentic exponents of the "law".
The very affirmation that such-and-such a decision was
not "our Law" implies the existence of this law as an
entity existing apart from its expositors; and it does
not need a long acquaintence with the Basotho to become
aware that they regard their law as the special posses¬
sion of the Sotho nation, expressive of its fundamental
values and a major determinant of its identity.
The historical experience of Basutoland has given
this insistence on legal identity and purity an urgency
and immediacy that go further still to account foi Uie
juristic awareness and pride that mark the people.
The basic principle of land-law — that the land belongs
to the nation (mobu ke oa sechaba) — is the charter on
which the Basotho have based their resistance to white
colonisation and settlement (8). When sovereignty
inhered in the Crown (as it did after 1870), chiefly
ownership of the land became a main conceptual focus of
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Basutoland's affirmation of a continuing if attenuated
independence; since much of Sotho law is concerned with
land use and administration, the will to preserve such
independence as remained has stimulated an insistent
loyalty to that law as such.
Sotho law as thus far considered forms part of
Smith's "administrative component" of government and
displays the features of the "juridical-cultural aspect"
of the political system in its regulatory processes as
analysed by Eisenstadt. Yet operationally it exhibits
features that can be regarded as falling within Smith's
"political activities", or forming part of the "executive
aspect" of Eisenstadt's "implementary" process. This
is the next question that arises here. In the traditional
system, the chiefs discharged all the tasks that are
now segregated, both in regard to subject matter and in
regard to personnel, into the two mutually exclusive
classes of "judicial" and "administrative" affairs.
(It is for the present purpose unfortunate that the word
"administrative" should be used, but its consistent
employment in Basutoland makes it impossible to r l*~oe
it with any other term; so long as it is understood
that it does not carry the implications of the word as
used by the two authors whose analyses have been largely
relied on, no confusion will follow, and for ease of
distinction the word "administrative" will be enclosed
in inverted commas whenever it is used in either of
their technical senses, and without them when it refers
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to the present system in Basutoland.)
The underlying theory is that administrative matters
are concerned with the modification, continuance or
extinction of existing rights, and with the creation of
new rights. "Judicial matters" are concerned with the
declaration of existing rights (9). Further, the
especial province of administrative action is precisely
the chief's control over land allocation and deprivation,
a matter with which the judicial courts have refused to
concern themselves. The chief's freedom of action is,
certainly, regarded as "circumscribed" by various rules;
he has no jurisdiction outside his own ward, and no
immediate jurisdiction outside his own immediate ward;
he must consult with village heads before allocating
land; and he must not be in breach of "natural justice"
(he must not act mala fide, ka moea o mobe). To this
extent, therefore, his actions with regard to the land
fall within Smith's "administration" and are character¬
ised by authority. But the field of decision-making
that remains is very large, and it is this field which
is regarded as administrative. (An administrative
matter is thus within the "political" component, rather
than the "administrative" in Smith's scheme.) Smith
notes that a "political" element exists in every
"administrative" structure, and in Basutoland this
element must be reckoned as very extensive within this
frame of reference.
Nor does the problem end there. Little distinction
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was drawn, in the traditional system, between judicial
and administrative affairs. The earliest reference to
such a distinction being present in the minds of Basotho
courts that was encountered goes back only to the early
1950's, and even here it was described to the writer as
having been a new concept introduced by the colonial
authorities (10). The chief filled various roles, which
were not segregated. He acted as judge in disputes
between his subjects, he adjudicated rival claims to
land, he deprived persons of land where they had forfeited
their right to enjoy it, and be allocated land to appli¬
cants; he maintained order in his ward and punished those
who broke it; he issued instructions to his subjects,
called upon them to labour in his own field, appropriated
the fines paid to him in his court and witnessed all the
major and many of the minor events in his village; he
represented his own ward in a question with a higher
authority, and transmitted the directives and policies
of the higher authority back to his people. In all
these crucial and various activities, the chief was
fulfilling not a plurality of roles but the one role of
"being a chief"; moreover, within his own ward he had
the monopoly of the chieftainship (though subject always,
of course, to the superior chief under whom he held his
ward). In all his actions he was, of course, expected
to conform to the law: not only in settling a dispute
over a debt of bohali-cattle, but also in his allocation
of land. Should he fail in his obligations under the
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law in either of these tasks, appeal lay to his superior
chief and from him to the chief above, until the resources
of law were exhausted. The law of the Basotho, molao oa
Basotho, furnished the principles in terms of which the
chief was expected to carry out his chiefly tasks, whether
these involved the "declaration of the existing rights of
parties", as they are now regarded, or the creation of
new rights and the extinction of preceding ones.
The 1938 changes initiated a new process which
fundamentally altered this system. Reference has been
made to the reduction in the number of courts and the
introduction of the principle that no chief could be
judge in his own ward, and to the effect of these changes
on the degree and kind of participation enjoyed by the
Basotho in general in the law and on the jural status of
the new class of Court Presidents. The courts thus set
up have come to be known as "judicial" courts (makhotla a
kahlolo), and all disputes concerning the existing rights
of parties must be brought before them for settlement.
But though the chiefs were thus deprived of their judicial
functions, they retained, as has been seen, all their
other duties and privileges; in particular they remained
responsible for land allocation, and for such elements
in the process of land deprivation as were not regarded
by the colonial authority as falling within the juris¬
diction of the judicial courts. Chiefs had always acted
in and with their courts (makhotla) in these matters, and
it was anticipated that they would continue to do so, as
in fact they have (11). The system of appeals, though
abridged, was also left structurally intact. In addit¬
ion to this, matters concerning chiefly jurisdiction and
discipline fell (after the 1959 constitution) within the
province of the chief's courts, with a final appeal to
the College of Chiefs. These are known as administrative
courts (makhotla a puso), and concern themselves with
supposedly administrative affairs. The internal operat¬
ion of this arrangement has been discussed in Chapter
Pour; the purpose here is to assess its effect upon the
status of law within the total political and governmental
system. This has been two-fold; the separation of
judicial and administrative affairs has had the effect
both of eroding the legal character of the norms under¬
lying what have become administrative processes and of
displacing the role of equity from the judicial processes.
An account of these changes demands as a preliminary
the introduction of a further concept. This may be
given the name of "abstraction", and is used in this
analysis as an index of what can be called the "objecti¬
vity" or "subjectivity" of the jural processes that
operate in a particular society. The distinction
suggested is perhaps best illustrated in terms of ideal
types (12). In a system of "objective" justice, the
court restricts its attention to the issue before it
and to facts and circumstances bearing thereon; legal
concepts are precisely defined and narrow in their
scope; laws of evidence are close and specific and are
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strictly observed; the extent of "judicial notice" is
as restricted as possible; the judge is socially and
psychologically isolated, supposedly without parts or
passions; he arrives at his judgment by isolating the
issues of fact and law, both from each other and from
every empirical and juristic consideration not bearing
upon them, and by basing his decision on an assumed
omniscient knowledge of pre-existing law as it applies
to the case before him. This is the ideal to which
the concept of legal justice in modern Western systems
tends.
In contrast to this, in a system of "subjective"
justice, the judge is personally acquainted with the
facts of the case and with the parties to the dispute;
the issue is not narrowly defined but extends to cover
the history of the parties' relationship with each other
and with other persons and to bring into judicial
consideration all facts and circumstances that throw a
light on this relationship; legal concepts are loosely
defined and broad in scope; rules of evidence are
generous and adaptable; the judge brings all his know¬
ledge to bear upon the case, and is not expected to
exclude the play of his own preferences and ideas in
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deciding it; he is fully integrated with his society
and in formulating his judgment he pays special and
conscious attention to the values of that society and
to its current situation at the time of hearing.
This is the type to which the concept of justice
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in chiefly society tends. The factor of abstraction
is continuously variable, and could form the basis of a
typology of justice: but of more importance here is the
relation between the scale of abstraction on the one
hand and the structure and organisation of a particular
political system on the other. This relation can be
clarified by considering the notion of functional
specificity (Parsons 1959; 1954: ch. 2), in other words,
the extent and kind of the division of labour and the
differentiation of roles. Where such specificity is
intense, it implies (in the judicial sphere) the selective
appointment of specialised judges, who become a class
of persons having the monopoly or near-monopoly of
judicial work. Recruitment to this class will be based
on skill, which in its most differentiated form will
become professional skill (a further aspect of functional
specificity), in terms of which the judicial quality
takes on something of the colour of the "arcane".
Relationships between persons are also functionally
specific, rather than diffuse, roles being institutionally
differentiated and the basis of their interaction
"segmental" rather than "total", segregated rather than
unitary. The matter at issue between two persons also
becomes "specific"; it is narrowed to exclude the total
relationship between persons that is composed by the
fusion of their roles, and instead includes only the
specific roles which are imputed to them in relation to
the transaction being discussed. This implies the
rejection of "irrelevant" matters, the narrowing of
legal issues, and the exclusion of "hearsay evidence".
Since total (or multiplex: Gluckman 1955: 19) relation¬
ships are not involved, it also implies a strict
attitude towards the onus of proof, since parties to a
dispute must fill the specific roles of plaintiff and
defendant. The specificity of the judicial role,
defining as it does the office and jurisdiction of the
judge, leads to the creation of precise rules as to the
competence of the court and to an exact formulation of
the sphere of its activity and concern. This whole
pattern is protected and reinforced by the institutional
isolation of the judiciary from contact with elements of
the general society characterised by particularity,
total relationships and diffuseness. This isolation
can even be generalised to cover aspects of a judge's
life that have no bearing on his judicial work. In
this way, the judge tends to assimilate all his roles
to that of his judicial function; the specificity of
office expands to fill much of the other areas of his
/
interaction. This process is typical of other offices,
the most notable perhaps being the priesthood; and the
policeman reflects something of the same isolation (13).
It is significant that all these are involved at differ¬
ent levels and in different ways with the "juridical-
cultural" aspect of the political system, and all three
are to different degrees invested with a certain charisma
of office. Although this may be seen from one point of
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view as a confusion of roles, it is more properly
regarded as a usurpation by one role of other potential
rival roles, and is positively associated with the
internal differentiation manifested by a political
system. For example, in the contrasting case of the ,
Kuejlt, the leopard-skin chief enjoys no particular
respect outside his special function (Evans-Pritchard
1940: 172 ff.); and witchdoctors in Basutoland, where
political differentiation (apart of course from the
institution of chieftainship) is socially sporadic and
limited, do not attract much particular respect when
they are not performing their specific function.
This specificity of function extends into the
substance of law itself. Legal norms themselves are,
in the objective system, specific rather than general.
The law becomes ever more precise, a given norm becoming
more specific with each application. The apparent role
of power is thus diminished as the clarity of definition
grows. At the same time, the political differentiation
of function within the social system implies the exist¬
ence of a legislature separate from the judiciary, and
this legislature discharges the specific task of legal
change or "reform", which the judges have formally
abandoned.
The "objectivity" of justice thus emerges as bear¬
ing a functional relationship to the institutional
features of judicial organisation in the society as a
whole. Both are functions of specificity. A converse
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structure can "be detected where justice is "subjective"
and political differentiation is low. In traditional
Sotho society, the overriding differentiation was that
between chiefs and commoners. Chieftainship was one
unitary role, within which sub-roles might be distin¬
guished ad hoc but had no structural or institutional
corollaries. Little distinction existed even between
the "public" and "private" roles of the chief.
Relationships between commoner and chief as well as
between commoner and commoner were diffuse rather than
specific, their base total rather than segmental.
The proliferation of chiefs and courts and the large
number of matters considered in the court meant that
"every Mosotho was his own lawyer" and legal competence
or technical knowledge was the possession of the
generality of men rather than the arcane skill of the
few. The immediate legal community (by which is meant
the group frequenting the same lekhotla) was small and
its members all knew one another and were personally
known to the chief. In this diffuse context, the
"judicial" function of the chief was not and could not
be differentiated from his other functions. Legal
issues were broadly framed and could be extended to
include the total relationship between the litigants.
Rules of evidence were few and wide; hearsay evidence
was admitted, representation of witnesses allowed,
relevancy was generously defined, and since litigants
were not expected to fill specific roles with any precision,
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the onus of proof was not specifically determined.
Since the "lekhotla" itself had no specific function,
questions of competence (other than territorial juris¬
diction, which equally defined all aspects of chiefly
activity) did not arise. The same generality charact¬
erised the legal norms in the traditional system.
The formulae of the law consisted, as they still
essentially consist, of general principles rather than
of particular deductions from those principles — or
particular applications crystallising into law. This
does not of course mean that law is not particularised
in action. It means that the particularisation of the
law is referable to a more general norm which is not
replaced by the specific norm nor restricted by it in
future application. Moreover, where the law appears
to lay down a specific and narrow formula, it will often
be found that an ad hoc rule has by accident become
incorporated in a wider collection of legal principles
but should not be regarded as juristically comparable
with them. Nor does it mean that the formulae lack
specific content. They are not abstract statements
of theoretical principle but concrete statements of
applied principle, with relevance to such major items
of social concern as succession to chieftainship,
inheritance of estates and the allocation of land.
At a lower level of generality, these norms can be
expressed in more specific form, but with each further
soecification, their juristic status is modified.
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It will be apparent that the traditional system in
Basutoland displays a degree of differentiation and
functional specificity, of which the institution of
chieftainship is the principal example. Within the
chieftainship itself, the various levels are again
differentiated, though here to a lesser degree. The
wide hierarchical distance between the phala or molisa
on the one hand and the Paramount Chief on the other is
the limiting case, but any two different levels are
structurally differentiated to some extent. Further¬
more, there is an ecologically derived differentiation
arising out of the different uses to which land is put
in the cattle-post country on the one hand and in the
arable lowlands and foothills on the other. This is
an "organic'* rather than a "mechanical" differentiation,
since the two principal ecological zones are enmeshed
functionally, lowland stockowners sending cattle to the
cattle-posts in the summer and the mountain dwellers
relying on the lowlands for many of their own supplies.
If, therefore, a functional relationship exists between
the degree of political differentiation on the one hand
and the scale of abstraction on the other, it would be
expected that the traditional legal system of Basutoland
would reveal a degree of "objectivity" roughly comparable
to the extent of its internal political differentiation.
The judicial task of the chiefs encourages this expectat¬
ion. They stand (or stood) in a position mid-way between
the non-institutional procedure of reference of an almost
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undifferentiated political system and the fully institut¬
ionalised process of western type. There are three
significant possibilities in a "judicial" system: in one,
reference is made to a person or set of persons who
emerge as leaders and "judges" by their individual
attainments and who exercise "judicial" powers on an
informal, non-institutional and largely arbitral basis.
In the second, reference is made to specialised judges
who have no other social or political role and who
p •
possess unique and compulsory jurisdiction by virtue of
their office. Between these two, however, there is the
case of the Sotho chief, who indeed exercises judicial
functions by virtue of his office, and who enjoys unique
and compulsory jurisdiction, but who is nevertheless
not specialised, having instead a variety of other tasks
to perform which are not structurally or "ideologically"
differentiated from his judicial function. This is
the legal analogue of the type of differentiation that
has been observed in other areas. The judicial role
is differentiated to the extent that it is a monopoly
of the chieftainship but undifferentiated to the extent
that it is not institutionally or conceptually segregated
from the chief's other roles.
The question thus arises of how far this limited
specificity of function may be said to be reflected in
the degree of "abstraction" manifested by Sotho law.
Land law provides one point of entry into this area of
inquiry. There is an ecological differentiation, as
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seen, "between the cattle-post country and the arable
areas. The law reflects this differentiation, stating
for instance that the "leboella" (pasture) belongs to
the nation and that administrative control over it is
vested in the chieftainship, whose responsibility it is
to "open the leboella" — declare pasture land in
particular wards open to general grazing. The general
norm — national "ownership" of maboella — and the
means of its implementation — control of maboella by
the chiefs — are both specified in the law. But below
that level of generality, it becomes increasingly
difficult to specify the specific norms or "rules" that
control the exercise of the chief's functions. They
are not, in fact, predictively specifiable in juristic
form, but are always referable to the more general
norms. Arable land on the other hand is distinct from
cattle pasture, and the law is "specific" in reflecting
this differentiation, being here concerned with the
allocation and deprivation of arable lands to village
subjects. Beyond the enunciation of certain general
norms controlling allocation, however, the specificity
again falls away. In deprivation, the law is more
specific and rules of law control some detailed applica¬
tions of the chief's rights to deprive a man of validly
allocated lands. It is not, perhaps, pursuing the
argument too far to suggest that here too the difference
in specifity (between allocation and deprivation) is a
function of the degree of differentiation of parts.
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Where land is to be allocated, only two elements are
differentiated: the chief who holds the vacant land on
the one hand and the landless applicant on the other.
But where land is to be withdrawn, there are three
elements — the chief, the landless applicants, and the
existing landholder himself. Thus, the extent of
differentiation can be related to the specificity of
law, which is itself one of the indices of "abstraction'*.
A similar relation can be seen to hold in the field
of procedure, Sotho law once again being intermediate
between the "subjective" and "objective" types: and it
is possible to account for differences between kinds
of rule in terms of the contrasting dimensions of differ¬
entiation within the social structure. For example,
there are two important rules of Sotho customary law
in regard to debt. One states that debts do not cancel
each other out (melato ha e lefane). This can be
regarded as an "objective" rule of procedure, implying
as it does a concern to distinguish plaintiffs from
defendants, to impose restrictive rules of relevancy and
to segregate issues. The other customary rule states
that a debt does not prescribe (molato ha o bole, literally
"a debt does not rot"). This could be classed as a
"subjective" rule, emphasising substantive rather than
formal justice and ignoring such technical rules as
prescription and time-bar. Both rules find their major
application in the field of bohali debts. On the one
hand, relationships would be exposed to uncertainty if
any kind of communal accounting cancelled de"bts against
each other and left only net creditors and debtors out¬
standing: a father might find himself owing three head
of cattle to a family with which he had no visible
relationship at all. The rule against set-off ensures
that bohali reciprocities are not cancelled out in this
way and that affinal relationships are concretely and
individually structured along identifiable and specific
transfers of cattle. Each debt is a separate obliga¬
tion that must be specifically rendered. Conversely,
the rule that debts do not prescribe is a necessary one,
given that on the basis of a standard payment of twenty
cattle relatively few households could afford to pay
all of them at once. The debt must carry over into
the next generation if necessary, and cases involving
bohali obligations going back over thirty years occur.
On the principles that monna ha a shoele and nts'o-salla
o salle le molato (discussed in the preceding chapter),
no distinction is drawn between different generations
of the continuing lineage (14).
Thus, a rule that has an "objective" and specific
character is associated with the structural differentia¬
tion between exchanging groups, whilst a rule that has
a "subjective" and generalised character is associated
with dimensions of structure that emphasise the homo¬
geneity and continuity of the lineage enduring through
time. These differences, of course, can be explained
concretely, as shown, by relating them to the functional
necessities of marriage alliance as an empirical
institution: the concept of structural differentiation
does not constitute a rival but a supplementary mode
of analysis, which suggests a way in which social
structure, judicial organisation and "legal rules" can
be related each to the other in a theoretically rigorous
manner that passes beyond statistical correlations on
the one hand or a mechanical notion of causality on the
other. It is not simply that one kind of rule is
"found to occur" in association with one kind of
structure; but nor is it the case that when a given rule
is once explained by the functional necessities of a
particular institution associated with it, analysis
must then stop. The rule and the institution alike
are jointly and severally open to an "explanation" that
overarches them both.
The relations suggested here are to be seen again
in the rules of evidence that prevail in the Basotho
courts, and in the conception of the judge's role.
Hearsay evidence, for instance, is accepted if the
witness is reliable. A village head stated "I am a
letona (chief's counsellor); I know what happened
because I am molisa (the village head) and I know the
village's affairs". His indirect knowledge of events
leading up to an act of arson was relied on by the
court (Moleko v. Motsumi J.C. 3/58). In another case,
the judge in the court of first instance made a private
inquiry into the facts, and on appeal he represented
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the principal witness (Kente v. Sohane J.C. 17/46).
A judge at Maja's court relied on his personal knowledge
of a boundary in reaching his decision in a land dispute
(Rannana v. Sehloho J.C. 194/55). In a case at Senekal,
a village near the District capital Teyateyaneng, the
court took judicial cognisance of the appellant's trade
as a tailor in Teyateyaneng without evidence being led
('Motlamelle v. Lerata J.C. 172/57). These cases are
significant because though they display "irregularities"
in terms of objective "Western legal systems, they are
not "irregular" from any other point of view and are in
themselves quite compatible with, even positively conduc¬
ive to, the doing of "justice between man and man".
They also illustrate the limited role-differentiation
of the traditional system — the judicial role is not
fully segregated from the other roles (observer, actor,
leader) carried by the office holder. The traditional
attitude to the onus of proof reflects this again.
Onus is not strictly apportioned and (if anything)
tends to lie on the defendant — a procedure which is
consonant with the diffuseness of relationship that
marks the traditional society (Parsons 1954: 39). In
Mangana v. Tlali J.C. 50360 it has been seen how 'Maphiri
was sued for two goats by Albinas Tlali. She admitted
that she had borrowed them from the plaintiff, but
claimed she was not liable since she borrowed them not
on her own behalf but in respect of her 'mangoane who
had died, so that the liability attached to the deceased's
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son, her classificatory brother (khaiteeli) Moela.
The court of first instance found for the plaintiff,
but the A Court found that the debt bound Moela, and
that 'Maphiri was wrongly sued. The court, in other
words, looked outside the immediate issue between the
litigants and ascertained the person who was ultimately
liable. On appeal, the Paramount Chief's court reversed
the A Court and decided that 'Maphiri was liable in a
question with the plaintiff, though she would have
recourse against Moela as a separate issue. This was
a reasonable decision, since it is clearly not the
plaintiff's duty to know all the internal affairs of
the defendant's family and to make sure that he sues
the ultimate debtor. Yet this is a relatively "object¬
ive" attitude to justice which would probably have had
little place in the traditional society, where it could
often be assumed that people knew each other's affairs.
This case is also of interest as showing the uncertainty
of the courts, one taking one view and another taking
the opposite — a difference of attitude symptomatic
of the transitions through which the courts and their
presidents are passing. Nor is it a coincidence that
in this case it was the Paramount Chief's court that
took the more "objective" view, and the lower court
that took the "subjective" one. The Paramount Chief's
court on this occasion was presided over by a particularly
"well-trained" and "instructed" judge.
The same thesis can be illustrated by the many cases
where the Basotho courts have — even after their formal
separation from the administration — acted within the
context of "subjective" justice, and drawn little
distinction between judicial and administrative tasks.
The traditional system of the Chief's court is here seen
in action, perpetuating itself in the judicial courts
in spite of the determined efforts of the colonial
authority to bring about a "separation of powers".
A chief ordered the arrest of a thief and ordered him
to move into the chief's village where he could be kept
under surveillance (Molapo v. Kolia J.C. 84/44). The
chief was here acting both as prosecutor and judge, a
practice perfectly consistent with traditional practice
and not open to obvious abuse in a context of total and
diffuse relationships. The same practice is evidenced
by a case where a chief ordered a man to remove (as he
was entitled to do), and when the man failed to do so,
the chief demolished his house instead of presenting
him for prosecution in court (R. v. Rantletse 1926-53
R.C.T.L.R. 226). In another case, a headman resented
the placing of Chief letsie Thella above him, and
refused to recognise his authority, persisting in this
recalcitrance even in the face of an unfavourable judg¬
ment. letsie in the end and after due warning took
direct action against the headman and his party, plough¬
ing their crops under instead of taking them before the
court (Tsikoane v. Thella J.C. 92/52).
The Paramount Chief, as noted in Chapter Two and
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Three, regarded herself as entitled to alter the judgment
of her judicial as of her administrative court, and
indeed was barely aware of any difference between the
two. Her judicial appeal court stated (lerotholi v.
Monyoe J.C. 189/45), "The Paramount Chief has the power
to quash or confirm or add to any judgment as she sees
fit". Chief Letsie of Leribe in Moqa J.C. 206/49
stated that before 1946 "we had all powers as chiefs;
we were quite free to alter judgments" — an incorrect
assessment of the position after 1938, as it happens,
but revelatory of the chief's view of their relation to
the judicial courts. The colonial government's efforts
to separate the administrative ("political") functions
from the judicial were not so much resisted as not
understood. Thus the Paramount Chief's Court in a
civil action between two parties took the area in dispute
away from both litigants and awarded it to a third party
(Seeisa v. Ntsoereng J.C. 31/45). It either ordered
a litigant to allocate land (Matjeketjela v. Theko J.C.
19/47) or itself did what it considered the chief should
do, allocating land to the persons who in its view were
those to whom the chief should have allocated it (Mafetoa
v. Mothebesoane J.C. 256/48). The tendency for the
courts to continue to identify themselves with the
chieftainship expressed itself in sometimes quite open
affirmations of solidarity. In one case, the Paramount
Chief's Court came very near to saying that as a matter
of law parties must appear before the chief in his
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lekhotla la tlhopho before going to the judicial courts
at all (Moqhetsola J.C. 19/50), and referred to the
judicial court of first instance as an "Appeal Court".
In another previously cited case, the Paramount Chief's
Court said, in a criminal appeal, "we do not allow this
case to go on as it causes Chief Matlere displeasure —
he is a son of Lerotholi and so are we" (Phakisi v.
Borena J.C. 69/54). Such a point of view would probably
be felt as an abuse of justice in any system, but many
of the underlying attitudes are shared by commoners as
a whole. Thus, a litigant wrote to the Judicial Commis¬
sioner in a pending appeal, giving a history of his
opponent's criminal record (Kali J.C. 4/59) — a litiga¬
tory attitude suggestive of discretionary power and
implying evidential rules that are only intelligible in
a context of subjective justice. In this instance,
the fact that the Judicial Commissioner was a European
introduced into the situation a "foreign-ness to ihe
law" of the kind mentioned above and thus inserted a
judicial proceeding into the general "power" structure
of the White government. It was an unforeseen irony
for the litigant that he should have made this assessment
of a judicial office that had, of course, committed to
the most objective concept of its function (15).
Conversely, the analyst of legal processes in
Basutoland is struck by the "legalism" of the Judicial
Commissioner's Court, that is, by its retreat from the
field of "discretion" and "power" into that of "authority"
and "administration", and by its tendency to narrow the
generality of customary norms by imposing on them a
specificity that distorts their content. It has been
seen in the preceding chapter that the principal heir
has the right, in consultation with the "family", to
distribute his deceased's father's estate; but he is
also under an obligation to make provision for certain
of his father's (now his) dependants. Traditionally,
the Sotho courts regarded it as equally the law that
the heir must decide, and that he must decide in
accordance with the law. But in a case where the
lower court undertook the distribution of an estate,
making references to good family relations and the
moral duties of a man, the Judicial Commissioner simply
stated that the decision lay with the heir and that
the courts were not competent to intervene. Further¬
more, the Judicial Commissioner remarked that the
question was not relevant to the plaintiff's claim and
so was not properly before the court at all (Kthathakane
J.C. 78/44). The senior court was here applying a
severely objective test of relevance, and insisting
upon a rigorous demarcation of the sphere of enforceable
legal rules and the sphere of "discretion". The effect
is to sever the ties binding that "discretion".to the
rules of la^ and to ensure that, authority being power¬
less, power must in compensation be exercised without
authority. In another case, the lower court directed,
inter alia, in a matrimonial dispute between a polygamist
and his senior wife, that "the saw, saddle, hammer,
table, axe" etc. were to be restored to the senior wife'
house, and that if this were not done the husband would
be deprived of his lands ('Matsoana J.C. 85/45). Here,
the court was acting as a chief might act, in its threat
to deprive the defendant of his lands, and also giving
precise directions as to the disposal of property.
The Judicial Commissioner rejected the lower court's
claims and declared that the whole matter was not
justiciable.
Another series of cases concerns the legal position
of chiefs who act unfairly in opening the leboella
(grazing grounds) to cattle owners. The separation of
judicial and administrative affairs has gone far to
excluding the superintendence of the courts over the
actings of chiefs, on the grounds that the law leaves
the decisions to them. Thus, in one case, the Para¬
mount Chief's Court stated — impeccably — that
"maboella ke a sechaba", "the maboella belong to the
nation", stating that it is not the law that "a chief
can do as he please unfairly". On appeal, the
Judicial Commissioner remarked that favouritism was
deplorable, but added that although "leboella is for
the nation and not only for the chief and his friends",
the court cannot enforce this rule or give directions
(Masupha v. Mabu J.C. 261/48).
Land allocation and deprivation raise similar
questions in acute form. In the previously noted case
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where a chief gave or lent some land to his brother for
the support of the latter*s children, the donee's son
claimed the land when both the original parties to the
transaction were dead (Mafetoa v. Mothebesoane J.C.
256/48). The donor's son resisted the claim, and the
Paramount Chief's Court acted as (in its view) the chief
should act towards his brother, upholding the claim of
the original donee's son. "It is difficult for the
court to undo what was mutually done by your fathers".
It is settled law that "land is not an inheritance"
(ts'imo hase lefa): it is equally clear that in Sotho
law attention must be paid to the claims of sons and
relatives in allocating the lands of deceased land¬
holders. But the Judicial Commissioner applied the
rule of non-inheritance so as to uphold the claim of
the chief (the original donor's heir) to the deceased's
lands; in an analogous case, the Judicial Commissioner
further declined to make any appeal to the chief to be
generous to a rejected claimant, since it was not the
Court's function to interfere (Seetsa J.C. 301/49).
Among the effects of these changes has been to release
the area of "discretionary" activity from legal control.
In one case, this took a bizarre form, when an employee
of the National Treasury at Matsieng sued for wrongful
dismissal aid found his plea rejected on the grounds
that the matter was an administrative one. It was
left to the Judicial Commissioner to explain that an
illegality remained actionable even though it took
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place in the administrative sphere (Makhele v. P.C. J.C.
137/55). Such a reading of the relative positions of
the judicial and administrative courts was, however,
not uncommon. In Mothibeli v. Lesaoana J.C. 52/50,
the chief of an area acted under the impression that
he could not make an administrative decision in an
opposite sense to the judgment of a judicial court.
This recalls the case of Thipane J.C. 183/60, discussed
in Chapter Five; it will be remembered that the lekhotla
la puso of the Chief of Tsikoane had awarded a land to
Thipane on the grounds that it had belonged to his father.
This was, of course, not merely a lawful decision but
in fact one which reflected the principle of succession
and "quasi-inheritance" that has been noted as underlying
the customary law of land allocation; but the judicial
Court at Peka rebuked the judges at Tsikoane, on the
ground that they had acted as though land were an
"inheritance" (ts'imo ke lefa). The implication of
this rebuke was that only by acting in an arbitrary
manner and expressly renouncing any guiding principle
of action could an administrative tribunal avoid the
charge that it was assuming a rule of law. In Motjoli
v. Rametse J.C. 106/58, Chief Makhabane was placed
virtually in the position of having to act as unjudicially
as possible in order to have some assurance that his
administrative decision would be upheld as valid by the
judicial courts. These are instances of the way in
which the institutional polsrity of judicial and
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administrative action not only confined the judicial
courts to a "legalistic" and inflexible view of their
function, but also obliged the administration to act
arbitrarily. The courts were inhibited from exercising
the functions of equity, while administration was
stripped of the guidance and inhibitions of law (16).
The judicial/administrative polarity suggests a
framework in which each of the two terms has certain
attributes and an ideal sphere of operation. Thus,
the .judicial is seen as rule-governed, and hence
constrained, and is concerned with the area of right;
the administrative is seen as discretionary, and hence
free, and is concerned with the area of power. But
these oppositions do not enter into that "executive law"
which was described in Chapter One as the characteristic
legality of chieftainship, and of which customary law is
perhaps not so much a synonym as a special case (17).
It has already been suggested that to follow a rule is
not necessarily to be constrained (18); and it is a
feature of Sotho law that an outcome can be both lawful
and legitimate even though an alternative conclusion
could be argued to be equally derivable from the "rule".
It must be reiterated that what is involved here
is not the familiar "judicial" criterion of whether or
not the act in question fell within the competence of
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the actor. According to this criterion, an outcome
is lawful if it falls within the area of "discretion"
left "free" by the circumambient rules — if the chief,
in other words, is acting "within his authority" in the
exercise of his power. (The only exception to this
is that he should not have been in breach of "natural
justice" and so rendered himself liable to a review
procedure which however cannot concern itself directly
with the merits of the case in hand (19)). The
proposition advanced here is not of this kind. It
is certainly the case, as Chapter Pour has shown, that
a Sotho chief must keep within the circumscription of
his particular office and authority; but it is not the
case (in the traditional system, at least) that all his
acts within that circumscribed area are surrendered to
a "discretion" fettered only by the rules of judicial
review. legality enters into his decisions as well as
bounding them, and these are in principle open to
challenge on their merits. Conversely, it is not the
case that legality itself is constrained by "decision-
inevitability" in such a way as to imply a unique out¬
come. The "rules" of customary law reside in concrete
but general norms, whose ambivalence, or ambiguity,
permits a variety of possible outcomes, each one of
which can be formally proposed and argued for as
"legitimate". It is true that one face of this is that
what are in effect "political" outcomes receive a
factitious and post factum legitimation derived from
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norms that would justify almost any decision. This
is the point at which the ambivalence in all Herrschaft
is found, and it is here that the current dilemma of
chieftainship has become explicit: the folk-ways, and
the ways of the folk in power. But a facile reduction-
ism only obscures the contours of all legitimacy,
obliterating the discontinuities of consciousness and
offering in their place a platteland of undifferentiated
"interests" that falsify the empirical reality while
purporting to explain it (20). For the other face of
executive law is to acknowledge no power that is not
also authority, to reject the dichotomy of "right" on
the one hand and discretion or freedom on the other,
and to bring into conjunction the divided and distinguished
worlds which the folklore of "judiciality" sets apart.
Not the least interesting aspect of these processes
is that the deceptions and "false consciousness" of
executive law — its temptation to obscure the bifurcation
and intertwining of legitimacy and self-interest —
should be so neatly paralleled by the equal inability of
judicial systems to conform to the requirements of their
own ideal theory. The presence of an institutionally
specific legislature — the precondition of any plausible
judicial system - cannot eliminate the need for decision,
nor can it, at the level of theory, constrain or
determine the decision that is made. In practice,
however, it can obscure the nature of the decision-making
process that is involved, by presenting the outcome as
inevitable, and thus as not a "decision" at all;
conversely, what is not inevitable is not seen as law.
But to give a reason is not to postulate an efficient
cause, nor is it to argue for a logically unique out¬
come; the juristic repertoire at the disposal of Sotho
customary law enables a decision to be both reasonable
and legitimate, since norms are not progressively
specified into constraining rules (and can therefore
remain reasonable), while decision-making is normatively
controlled (and can therefore remain legitimate).
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(1) Very little of the material in this section is
original. The main sources are: Lesotho (Central Office
of Information Pamphlet no. 73), H.M.S.O. 1966; Basutoland
Constitutional Handbook I960; Report of the Basutoland
Constitutional Commission 1963; the Official Gazette;
1956 Population Census (Basutoland); Sheddick 1953; Hailey
1953; Morojele 1962; Ramolefe 1970. See also Hailey 1963
Halpern 1965; Stevens 1967 (but cf. Hamnett 1967a); Spence
1968; Weisfelder 1969; Wallman 1969.
(2) The leader of the BNP, Chief leabua Jonathan, was
defeated in his own constituency but an early bye-election
arranged for the purpose, soon enabled him to enter the
house and become Prime Minister.
(3) Political tension remained at a high level after
independence (see Spence 1968: 52-3). As the votes were
being counted after the General Blection in January 1970,
Chief Jonathan suspended the constitution, proclaimed a
state of emergency, cancelled the elections and ruled
through an extra-constitutional Council of Ministers.
A few months later, the King lest Lesotho to take up
temporary residence in the Netherlands. The political
significance of his departure and the duration of his
absence are uncertain at the time of writing.
(4) 29° 36 S 27° 29 E. The village is also known
as 'Ma-Jane's (after the Christian name of the former
white manageress of the store), and is wrongly given as
"Palama" in the map published by the Directorate of
Colonial Surveys.
(5) In some respects a good esse can be made for the
South African orthography, especially in its use of w
and y; for the semi-vowels denoted in Basutoland by o and
e, and (though much less incontrovertibly) in its adopt¬
ion of d instead of 1 before the vowels i and u. Its
main defect lies in its failure to distinguish the second
and third person subjectival concords: "you are hapoy"
and "he (she) is happy" are both written o thabetse.
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(5) cont.
This is, strictly speaking, correct, since the vowel
in both cases is the close o («). In speech, however,
there is a tonal distinction, the second person tone
being low and the third person relatively higher, and
this distinction is conveniently if inexactly recognised
in Basutoland by the use of u and o respectively.
The marked visual difference between the two
orthographies can be seen in such words as the following
(South African form in brackets): khoeli (kgwedi), 'A&a
(nnqa), chaea (tjhaya).
(6) The law of husband and wife is not formally
discussed. Although references to legal aspects of
marriage, divorce and filiation are inevitably common,
in as much as they bear upon most of the topics consid¬
ered, I have offered no systematic treatment of this
field of law. Reference may be made to Ashton 1967:
62-87; Sheddick 1953: 33-39; Duncan I960: 19-42.
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(1) Reference has been made in the introduction (section
i, sub-section b) to the widespread literacy reported
for Basutoland. All Basotho Courts keep records of
the evidence and judgments in interleaved carbon books,
the carbon copy being remitted to the superior court on
appeal. But there is no general dissemination of
judgments. However, in instances considered important
by the Judicial Commissioners, copies of judgments are
from time to time circulated in an attempt to procure
the Basotho Courts' adhesion to them. The response is
sporadic. Individual Court Presidents sometimes dis¬
play in their own decisions an awareness of the higher
court's judgment, but the frequency with which the same
points come up on appeal over the years shows that this
is more the exception than the rule. In any event,
this whole procedure is a relatively recent introduction
and did not obtain until modern times. It is certainly
true that written records dating back into the earliest
years of the present century and beyond exist, and are
frequently relied on by courts and litigants; but they
are used to validate particular claims, and in nearly
all cases they are produced to support a right by pointing
to a decision granting or affirming it, rather than to
establish an abstract principle drawn from a decision
on other facts.
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(1) Much of the theoretical and analytical material in
this chapter has been presented or adumbrated in an
earlier article (Hamnett 1965). I am much indebted to
Mr Makhaola Lerotholi's criticisms of that publication;
many of his suggestions have been incorporated into the
present formulation. I nevertheless maintain my basic
argument, and for this Mr Lerotholi, as a confirmed
"retrospectivist", would be the first to disclaim
responsibility.
(2) See Hailey 1953, as supplemented by Basutoland
Constitutional Handbook I960.. See also Report of the
Basutoland Constitutional Commission 1963. For the
1966 position, see Basutoland Order 1965.
(3) Mabille and Dieterlen 1961: 427b. Cf. the form
of address or reference to a chief's wife, etc.,
mofumahali, from ho fuma, to be rich. Casalis's
comment (1930: 268-9) is perhaps unduly swayed by
sentiment: "Ce mot a une tres belle origine. II est
forme du verbe rena: etre prospere, etre tranquille.
Morena signifie done: celui qui veille a la surete et
au bien public."
(4) An analogous usage is found in the chiefs who
objected to the 1944 proposals for centralising court
revenues. Fearing that the change would impoverish
them, they complained that "Moshoeshoe will starve"
(Moshoeshoe o tla lapa), v. Basuto National Treasury
Explanatory Memorandum sec. 49.
(5) See below in this chapter, and also Jones 1966: 77 ff.
(6) Throughout, the terms "senior" and "junior" indicate
rank, while "elder" and "younger" indicate age (though
within the same house, age, of course, ordinarily
implies seniority).
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(7) When Seeiso succeeded to the Paramountcy in 1939,
he remained Principal Chief of Kokhotlong. The Tlokoa
thus became directly subordinate to the person occupy¬
ing the throne, though in his capacity as Principal
Chief. This helped to ease the transition. Kokhotlong
remained a ward of the Paramount Chief until the present
King awarded it to his full brother Kathealira. How¬
ever, at the relevant time, Griffith intended his son
Bereng to succeed him, as shown below, so that the actual
result was neither planned nor wished for. It may also
be observed that the mother of the present King is the
daughter of a Tlokoa headman in the ward of Kokhotlong.
(8) Under the 1965 and the existing constitutions the
twenty-two are also ex-officio members of the Senate;
the College of Chiefs still exists, but with diminished
responsibilities (see Introduction, sec. i} sub-sec. (f)).
(9) Basutoland is divided into nine administrative
districts (Butha-Buthe, Leribe, Berea, Maseru, Mafeteng,
Mohale's Hoek, Quthing, Qacha's Nek and Kokhotlong).
These do not generally cut across Principal Ward bound¬
aries (at least by intention), though most districts
contain more than one Ward. But in a few cases this
does happen, and in the present instance, which is one
of them, it is more convenient to consider only the
Maseru section of Kothe and Maeite etc., and not that
in Mafeteng.
(10) See also Chapter Three for a more detailed discussion.
(11) See for instance Ellenberger 1956: 13, 112;
Legassick 1969; Lye 1969.
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(12) Professor Edward Batson, Director of the 1956
Social Survey of Basutoland, has in a private communi¬
cation informed me that the population of male heads of
households described as "Kwens" in the 1956 Social
Survey was thirty per cent.
(13) The basic accounts of Koshoeshoe's life and work
may be found in any history of the area, for example,
Bllenberger 1912; Lagden 1909; Hailey 1953* Bee also
Wilson and Thompson 1969 and Thompson 1969. Becker
1969 is a popular but not valueless account of the life
and times of Moshoeshoe.
(14) Wives are here said to be ranked in order of their
marriage. Arguments are sometimes directed against
this view — for instance to claim that the mother of
the present Paramount Chief should not have been considered
Seeiso's second wife in view of her Tlokoa origin.
Nevertheless, Sotho customary law has traditionally laid
much stress on the order of marriage and in this respect
differs from the case of the Swazi Kings (Kuper 1947).
See also below in this chapter, where Griffith attempted
to manipulate the seniority of his wives in order to
promote his son Eererig. The Anonymous of Leribe, also,
argues that Jonathan holapo's third wife should have been
the senior, since she was a Mokoteli (Anon. 1928: 5).
The question cannot be regarded as entirely settled.
Ashton's view that "nowadays, the first wife is always
the senior wife, but formerly this was not always so"
sec .a as good a way of avoiding the iesxxe as any (Ashton
1967: 193). The ranking applies especially to the
first three wives; subsequent wives are separated from
the first three by a wider distance (unless the only
male is born to one of them: but in such a case he would
normally be adopted into the senior house). A fuller
discussion of the problems of fact and law in the
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ranking of wives and houses, with special attention to
the question of subsidiary marriages, is given in
Chapter Six sec. II below. See also Appendix II.
(15) Details of the events here alluded to are in
Lagden 1912: 583 f.; Jones 1966: 70-71.
(16) Hence the "Laws of Lerotholi". These were revised
in 1922, 1946, 1955 and 1959. Part I of the present
version is a self-styled Declaration of Basuto Law
and Custom and is printed in English as an appendix to
Duncan I960.
(17) Cf. Laws of Lerotholi (1959) Part I sec. 14 (4).
This provision is indubitably "customary" and is discussed
in Chapter Six below, especially section V. See also
Appendix II.
(18) Sekake v. Tautona C.C. 70/57 (Qacha's Nek) and J.C.
15/59, discussed at length in Appendix II. Other formu¬
lations are ngoana ke oa khomo (the child belongs to the
beast); khomo e kopanya batho (the beast joins people
together). Rote, however, that it is the payment of
the bohali and the person of the payer that count, not
the identity of specific beasts. Leenhardt 1939 appears
to be quite mistaken.
(19) In point of fact, a posthumous child was born to
one of Letsie's widows in 1918 (five years after Letsie's
deaJh). This man is Makhaola Letsie, whose genitor is
commonly supposed to be chief Goliath Moshoeshoe.
This old man (Goliath) holds a peculiar position in
Basutola?I. Although not a member of the "twenty-two",
he holds the ward of Likoeneng directly of the Paramount
Chief. He comes from the third house of Moshoeshoe's
father, Rokhachane, and is the son of Senate's daughter
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Lets'abisa. On the basis of this paternity, Makhaola
(like Goliath himself at one time) has claimed the
right to the Paramountcy. Recently Makhaola was
involved in a dispute with a man who, he alleged, had
seduced his daughter. The interest lies in the fact
that Makhaola fixed the bohali at fifty head — a scale
appropriate to a major chief (Makhaola v. Bolae J.C.
182/64). (Makhaola himself married a daughter of
Griffith from his senior house.)
It is sometimes argued, however, that a union between
Goliath and •Ma-Makhaola could not be a case of kenelo,
since Goliath's matrilateral descent made letsie — and
so also 'Ma-Makhaola — a malome (mother's brother/mother's
brother's wife) to him.
Makhaola also raised an action against the Paramount
Chief, claiming the right to a ward at Likhoele, where
Letsie II had a personal ward and where he left his
widows. The Paramount Chief's court rejected the suit,
remarking that "You father is still alive, in the name
of Paramount Chieftainess 'Mantsebo" (C.C. 152/46
Matsieng).
(20) Strictly, seantlo probably applies only where the
wife of the first house dies childless and a sister is
provided in her place for reduced bohali. In the
present case, Sebueng was not of the first house, she
was not childless and she did not die; and no cattle
were paid. But Duncan is probably too strict in his
retaing (I960: chap. 19, esp. sec. 3) and is not supported
by Ramolefe, n.d.
(21) See Bereng v. 'Mantsebo supra: Ashton 1967: 196 f.
The issue appears to have been further complicated by
the fact that 'Ma-Bereng was Griffith's favourite wife,
whom he married civilly and ecclesiastically (Griffith
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was the first Paramount Chief to adopt Roman Catholicism,
now the religion of most of the higher and middle chief¬
tainship and the dominant faith of the country: see
Basutoland 1956 Population Census Report (1958) and
Introduction Sec. i) sub-sec. (b)).
(22) This is a suitable point at which to note a further
question about Laws of Lerotholi (1959) Part I sec. 2.
It is not always the case that women are only regents.
This indeed happens, and very commonly, when the deceased
leaves a minor heir: the senior widow (not necessarily
the heir's mother) normally now acts as regent until
the boy comes of age. But if a chief dies without male
issue, the senior widow reigns until her death as a
chieftainess in her own right. However, this does not
interrupt the line of succession, which passes to the
nearest agnate of the deceased, commonly his brother.
The matter is more fully canvassed in Appendix II,
In 1964, something over 130 chiefs were women, of whom
the greater number were gazetted as reigning in their
own right, though the gazette was probably wrong on
this point.
Many Basotho regard the present position of women as
contrary to traditional law, and in this they are
certainly right. More objection is taken to women as
regents than to women as full chiefs, since a woman
chief would traditionally be under guardianship,
whereas a regent is expected to exercise it. Bereng
ar -ied this in his case against 'Mantsebo, 1926-1953
H.C.T.L.R. 50. The current Laws of Lerotholi display
a sensitivity to this issue, in that while nothing is
said about female succession to chieftainship, sec. 11 (2)
recognises that a woman may be an heir (mojalefa) though
she must still consult with the brother of the deceased.
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(23) See Lagden 1909; Jones 1966: 77-80; Germond 1967:
372-4, 389, 399-401, 403. Illuminating evidence is
provided by Anon. 1928, a precis of which follows below.
Disputes over the succession to Chief Mots'oene
(Mots'oene 1954 H.C.T.L.R. 1, discussed in Chapter Six
sec. II).
(24) The Khoakhoa people occupy a ward under their own
Principal Chief in the north, but this is not in any
meaningful sense a part of the Molapo ward.
(25) This leads Sheddick, following some colonial
government practice, to regard the Chief of Leribe as
a "Provincial Governor" over the whole of the North
(1954: 28-9).
(26) In a private communication, Dr Antony Atmore of
the University of London has suggested that the author
is probably the historian and folklorist Azariele Sekese.
(27) Mots'oene was the son of Joseph and Senate, Letsie
I's daughter from his first house. Moshoeshoe took no
bohali, intending the succession to pass to the child
of the union. Cf. Jones 1966: 70-1.
(28) Part of the other side of the story is in Germond 1967.
(29) Matsieng archives contain records of land and
area disputes going from Leribe to Matsieng from the
reign of Letsie II.
(30' His father, Gabashane, was executed after convict¬
ion for medicine murder, together with Chief Bereng
Griffith. Bereng's son, Letsie, succeeded as Principal
Chief of Phamong, a ward carved out of the Paramount
Chief's area and representing the segmentation of
Lerotholi's house between Letsie II (Likhoele) and
Griffith (Pharaong). See Appendix III Pig. 2. cont.
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It is pertinent to note that these two executions
gave rise to enormous eclat, since two of the most senior
chiefs in Basutoland were involved; moreover, whereas
Gabashane owed his preeminence to his heirship in the
cardinal house of Masopha, Bereng owed his to his proxi¬
mity to the existing Paramount; the two principles of
seniority were thus neatly juxtaposed. A similar
juxtaposition of a "cardinal" chief and a "junior royal"
can be found in the Basuto National Treasury Explanatory
Memorandum issued in 1944 by the Paramount Chieftainess,
setting out the proposals for the new system. Among
these were arrangements for paying salaries to the
Chiefs. In most cases, the capitational basis was
adhered to, but special exceptions were made for Bereng
Griffith and Majara. Bereng was given an extra allowance
on the grounds that he was "the senior chief in Basutoland
after the Paramount Chief" (morena ea kaholimo ho a mang
mona Lesotho ea hlahlamang Morena e Moholo); and Majara
received an increment on the grounds that his normal
allowance was too low for a "Chief of his status in the
house of Moshoeshoe" (morena ea kaalo ka eena Ntlong ea
Moshoeshoe). Bereng was of course the son of Griffith,
and Majara was the successor to the fourth son of
Koshoeshoe's first house. (However, Bereng thus received
a total salary of £1,700 per annum, but Majara only £300.)
(31) This phrase indicates the fullness of succession
of an heir to the rights and liabilities of his pre¬
decessor, without distinction of generation ("the links
of a family are unbreakable through generation and
generation", as Ezekias Labane argued in his case against
his nephew1s widow: Labane v. Lichaba J.C. 334/49).
Cf. the Paramount Chief's Court's reminder to Makhaola
Letsie quoted above, note 19.
NOTES TO CHAPTER II (cont) 339
(32) It was precisely as "the second biggest chief in
Basutoland" that the Chief of Leribe introduced himself
to me at a drinking party early in 1964. Up to that
point, I had been encouraged to think of Leshoboro of
Likhoele, elder half-brother of the Paramount Chief, as
entitled to make that claim.
(33) Molapo's senior son was, as mentioned above, Joseph.
But he went mad, and Jonathan, his younger brother in
the same house, was put in charge of him and thus emerged
as head of the house of Molapo.
(34) Strictly speaking, a wholly retrospective, non-
repetitive system would recognise only senior sons, the
heir's brothers and uncles being at best only non-
hereditary officers — forming a kind of patrimonial
bureaucracy.
(35) This is in principle the case, though there are
contrary instances. For instance, there are a number
of minor wards and headmanships that lie outside the
Principal Wards and though they fall directly under
Matsieng they are not strictly part of the Principal
Chiefdom, so much as attached directly to the Paramount
Chief. The Gazette is slightly misleading in this
respect, tending somewhat to exaggerate the "capacity"
in which a chief holds his seat. Often these villages
are inhabited by non-Koena or non-Sotho groups. I
lived for some time next to a so-called Xhosa village,
Temeki, whose ungazetted headman, Nkopara, was ramotse
to the gazetted headman Suping, directly under the
Paramount Chief.
Some also maintain that the Paramount Chief has
direct rights over all maboella (grazing grounds), and
even that the tops of all mountains belong to him, the
local chief (even a Principal Chief) being merely the
Paramount's "eye". Instances quoted to me were the
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"mountains" of Masite (in Rothe), Qeme (in Thaba Bosiu)
and Morija (in Matsieng). These are not inhabited and
are essentially maboella; but they all fall within the
general southern area, within Letsie I's province, and
my informants were not thinking in terms of the other
cardinal wards.
There are also cases where an area of alien juris¬
diction exists as an enclave in another ward. Bereng
Sekhonyana, Chief of Thupa-li-kaka in Rothe, has in the
middle of his ward a village of Barolong people, directly
under the Paramount Chief. He told me that there is
another village in his area where there are individual
persons and individual sites subject to another chief.
Some aspects of these anomalies are more closely con¬
sidered in Chapter Four below, where the institution
of paballo is examined. But though such anomalies are
quite common, they do not alter the correctness of the
proposition stated in the context of the present dis¬
cussion. The important qualification is that spelled
out in the text immediately following.
(36) A good example occurs in Rothe. The recent
genealogy of the house of Sekhonyana (with the wards
attached to each house in brackets) is as follows:
- (1) 'Ma-Makopoi (No male issue)
* (2) 'Ma-Bereng BERENG M0H1AIEFI (Prin¬
cipal Chief)
- (3) 'Ma-Seshope — SESHOPE (Khutlong-tse-peli)
SANKOR (Qeme)
s (4) 'Ma-Letsie — LETSIE (Ts'oeneng)
= (5) 'Ma-mokhali-
nyane — MOEHALINYANE RAMKAU
(Masite ha
Mohloai)
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The demotion of other lineages can also be illustrated
from this chieftainship. Chitje Mohloai was originally
headman of Ramakau's present ward. Ramakau was first
sent to Chitje's to be "brought up", but was subsequently
placed over him. Old Chitje's ward is now only the
village of Masite Nek. Chitje, unlike Ramakau, is not
a son of Moshoeshoe, nor is Moeno, another of the older
(but not original) inhabitants of the village. Old
Philemon Moeno, formerly headman, now has no official
rank at all, though Chitje tends to consult him,
especially in matters affecting the 'Moeno lineage.
But Philemon is relatively well placed through having
married his daughter to a son of Sekhonyana; the daughter
of this marriage has subsequently married Ramakau.
See also Appendix II for the distribution of minor
wards between the Sons of Sekake in Patlong.
(37) Sekake v. Tautona J.C. 15/59, Appendix II.
Other examples occur in the disputes over the Molapo
succession, and in the Regency case (Bereng v. 'Mantsebo
1926-1953 H.C.T.L.R. 50). See also the discussion of
the succession to Lesaoana, note 39 to this chapter.
The order of bohali payments can complicate the issue.
In the Principal Chieftainship of Thaba Bosiu, Letsie
Theko appears to be the son of the "second" wife, his
half-brother Sechaba being son of the first. But
Letsie succeeded since bohali was paid for hie mother
first. But subsequent payment legitimises the off-
spr :.ng, and it can also be argued that a marriage is
complete when bohali has been agreed.
Sechaba was discontented with his situation; and in
the dispute between Mthembu and Monare (Mthembu v.
Monare J.C. 272/63) discussed in Chapter Pive below,
Sechaba was seen giving counsel and support to the
defendant, Letsie's adversary in the matter.
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(38) Paramount Chief's Court, Matsieng, A Court, Book 2
of 1944, p. 419.
(39) A dispute with which the writer had personal contact
illustrates both the way in which placing operates and
the manner in which problems of filiation can complicate
subsequent issues of succession. Early in the century,
a son of Moshoeshoe's brother Makhabane came south from
Mapoteng to Matelile, and was placed as Koena Chief over
the existing Taung and the Taung Chief Raborabane.
The Raborabane line is, typically, now represented only
by an ungazetted headman, virtually a mere phala or
Chief's herald, at Thabaneng.
The newly placed Chief, Sempe, was succeeded by his
son, Makhabane, who was in turn succeeded by Lesaoana,
who died in 1959, predeceased by his only son in his
first house; I.esaoana was therefore succeeded by his
heir in his second house, Sempe. But Lesaoana's own
younger brother had a son, Rafael, who claimed that he
had been adopted into Lesaoana's senior house to take
the place of the deceased Peete.
(40) Compare the events at Rakhoeletsane, where
Ntsekele was reduced to a headmanship when Tumo's son
was placed over him, and to the status of a mere phala
(see preceding note) when another junior son, Noko,
was then given a placing (Ntsekele v. Mathealira J.C.
261/45).
(41) I was told that there was a move to have Leshoboro,
thu Paramount Chief's elder brother from Seeiso's third
house, placed in a new Principal Ward of Mafeteng,
carved out of the existing ward of Matsieng, which until
very recent (post-independence) changes put an end to
the system had been the personal patrimony of the
Paramount Chief. In fact, however, Moshoeshoe II
excised a much smaller but still far from insignificant
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caretaking, Likhoele, and erected this into a Principal
Ward and one of the twenty-two.
(42) A misleading implication is contained in my article
on Koena Chieftainship seniority (Hamnett 1965: 245),
where it is suggested that Leshoboro's act in pouring
soil on to the grave of Mojela of Tebang was evidence of
his national seniority. This act (ho ts'ela mobu) does
not have direct implications for chieftainship but refers
to internal relationships within the lineage and family
of the deceased. Leshoboro's mother comes from the
third house of Letsie I (now the Principal Ward of
Matelile) and Kojela's father was a son of the fourth
house. Leshoboro poured soil in his capacity as senior
father's sister's son (son of the rakhali). The Para¬
mount Chief poured first, because of his singular position;
and nobody else poured at all. This avoided any
unpleasantness when it came to ranking the other members
of the Letsie lineage in relation to those from the other
cardinal lines. Thus, though questions of seniority
entered into the matter, Leshoboro's act in pouring first
after the Paramount Chief was not in itself an assertion
of "circumscriptive" primacy, and the fact that he was
not yet installed as Chief is irrelevant. (I am indebted
to Mr Kakhaola ierotholi for correcting my mistake on
this point, and also for pointing out the misleading
suggestion in my reference (1965: 246) to Moiphepi Letsie
of Boleka; the case of this son of a junior house of
Letsie I illustrates the fact that not on even the most
"circumscriptive" principle could a very junior scion of
the senior segment be promoted over the heads of a
cardinal line; the demographic and economic factors
referred to at the foot of the previous page have no real
relevance.) Sometimes a relatively unimportant person
with no plausible claim at all to a senior position in
MOTES TO CHAPTER II (cont) 3
(42) cont.
the family will be invited to pour, in order to avoid
the risk of quarrels over the grave. But when Rafael
Sempe's mother died in 1963, the occasion was seized by
Chief Sempe (see note 39 above for the persons involved)
to assert his primacy by pouring earth in his capacity
as head of the sons of Makhabane.
(43) This placing was in fact made, but circumstances
are such that no proper assessment is presently possible.
(44) Though the Principal Chiefdom of Koeneng and
Mapoteng is a partial exception even to this. Originally
granted as a loan (paballo — see Chapter Pour below) to
Makhabane's son Lesaoana by the Molapo Chiefs in Leribe
and Butha-Buthe, it was subsequently converted into a
permanent ward by the Paramount Chief (see Sheddick 1954:
141).
(45) As noted, it is also the case that in terms both
of population and geographical area, more especially the
latter, letsie's house commands much more than half of
Basutoland and its inhabitants. This reflects the fact
that the original wards of the three first sons did not
extend at first to cover the whole territory now
comprised by Basutoland, and that when other areas were
effectively brought within the nation (Mokhotlong,
Qacha's Nek, Quthing and Mohale's Hoek) they were annexed
to the Paramountcy and later in part distributed to the
Sons of Letsie. Had the expansion taken place to the
north-west, the subsequent history of Basutoland might
well have been very different.
(46) Which is not to say that they are never advanced
at all, and in exactly these forms.
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(47) The Paramount Chief would also confirm judgments,-
and then, some years later, reverse the decision admin¬
istratively: 'Makhoana v. Setho J.C. 188/45. Compare
the historical observations in Ketisi v. Neisi J.C.
215/54, which is also an instance where such action by
the Paramount Chief took place within the Molapo ward
at Leribe.
(48) See also Tsikoane v. Thella J.C. 92/52, where the
Paramount Chief intervened in a chieftainship dispute
in Leribe. Here as frequently the Paramount acted
through messengers and representatives (maqosa), on the
principle that leqosa la morena ke morena (the messenger
of a chief is a chief himself).
(49) An enthusiastic royalist admitted to me that a
certain act of Letsie I, invoked as a precedent in a
case at Matsieng and accepted as such by the Paramount
Chief's Court, was in fact a case of Letsie's "getting
away with" something in virtue of his position — Ts'epo
v. Sempe J.C. 220/45.
(50) The new constitution regards chieftainship rights
as "vested" and so as justiciable before the judicial
courts. Administrative action in regard to chieftain¬
ship rights is a matter for Parliament.
(51) Strictly, this applies to land allocation.
Since land deprivation is regarded as involving a vested
right in the landholder, it is, as such, justiciable
before the judicial courts except in so far as the
judgment and "discretion" of the depriving Chief are an
issue. These minutiae are more important than they
look and are considered at length in Chapters Five and
Seven below.
(52) Motsie v. Borena J.C. 44/57 (Paramount Chief's
Court). Cf. also Ntho v. Sempe J.C. 209/45; Rametse v.
Peepe J.C. 261/46.
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(53) The mixed system has implications for the rule of
primogeniture as well. The practice of placing the
"brothers and sons of a chief does not in itself detract
from the principle of primogeniture, since the senior
son may still succeed his father, his brothers and
uncles being so placed as not to disturb the successor's
position. But in so far as plscings by the Paramount
Chief advance the rights of the primary cardinal line
at the expense of the other three, they interfere with
their primogenitural claims. The fact that primogeniture
has not been fully and unambiguously institutionalized
among the Sotho, operates as a justification of such
interference; even today, in strict law, the heir even of
a principal chief, having been presented to the Paramount
Chief in terms of the laws of Lerotholi, sec. 3 (2), is
then "placed" by him in his ward, so that at least in
legal theory he derives his status from such placing and
not from right of birth. The maintenance of such a
legal principle in effect serves to underline the national
identity of the Sotho people as expressed in the Param-
ountcy, while its negligible political reality preserves
the rights and status of the subordinate chiefs.
Moreover, the original constitutive act — if such a
description of Moshoeshoe's allocation may be permitted —
invests the concept of primogeniture itself with an
ambiguity similar to that which has been detected in the
principles governing chiefly seniority. Clearly, given
the 'once-for-all' constitution of the cardinal lineages,
the rule of primogeniture tends to operate in favour of
a retrospective principle; but, equally clearly, a rule
of primogeniture will tend to undermine the original
fraternal allocation itself, and to favour the circum¬
spective principle, whereby each succeeding Paramount
Chief is seen as a new Moshoeshoe in whom the processes
of promotion and extrinsic seniority can repeat themselves.
HOTES TO CHAPTER II (cont)
347
(54) The circumspective principle also underlay the
incorporation and subordination, by means of placings,
of the non-Koena groups. Here the preponderance of
political power over lineage authority is particularly
apparent, though it was tempered by intermarriage and
also by the granting of subordinate autonomy to certain
tribal groups where this was desirable or inevitable,
for example in the cases of the IChoakhoa (Makhoakhoeng),
the Tlokoa (Malingoaneng), and the Taung (Taung).
Other smaller groups such as the Pokeng, Phuthi and
Nguni also enjoy some local autonomy at lower levels.
(55) Traditionally, as has been noted, the courts were
in the hands of chiefs, and no distinction was made
between judicial acts (recognising existing rights) and
administrative acts (creating new rights or modifying
or extinguishing former ones). It is considered in
the final chapter how far this "ambiguity" in the sphere
of the courts is structurally related to the other
ambiguities that have been noticed here.
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(1) For background, material, see Ashton 1967, especially
chapters 2, 10, 12-15.
(2) These senior headmen tend to be concentrated in
the Paramount Chief's own ward of Matsieng, and in
other wards such as Phamong that were until recently
part of the Paramount's domain.
(3) Ntate and 'me are also the words used for "(my)
father" and "(my) mother" respectively.
(4) The question may be asked whether there is a term
for "commoner" that can be used in binary discriminat¬
ion from aorena, to define someone who is not a chief.
The stem -fo in fact yields the word mofo (also
mofohatse), which can be translated "commoner". In
the plural, it is found in the name of an early politi¬
cal association, the Lekhotla la Bafo, or Congress of
Commoners (see Halpern 1965: ch. 7), and the word
occurs elsewhere. But it does not mean simply "a man
who is not a chief". Just as "chief" implies a
positively high status, so does "mofo" imply a positively
low one, and has the connotations (in ascending order
of disrepute) "subject, servant, slave". The only
word that can be used without risk of offence would be
motho, pi. batho, a person, as in marena le batho ba
Lesotho, "chiefs and people of Basutoland" (cf. English
"officers and men", "master and man").
(5) It is notable how easily the radical Basutoland
Congress Party were able to reverse their previous
stance of hostility to the Paramount Chief in 1965,
and to put their whole political organisation behind
Motlotlehi. Whatever discomfort may have been felt
by some of the intellectuals, this was not generally
reflected among the rank and file.
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(6) A routine interchange of greetings might very well
go as follows:
A. Lumela, ntate. (Greetings, sir).
B. Lumela, ntate, u tsohile joang? (Greetings, sir, how
did you wake up?)
A. E, ntate, kea lehoha, ke tsohile hantle. Uena u
sa phela na? (Ah, sir, thank you, I woke up well.
And you, are you still in life?)
B. Chee, kea. phela, ke leboha ka'nete. (Oh, I am
living, sir, I thank you truly)
A. Kea leboha, ntate, sala hantle. (Thank you sir,
and stay well)
B. Rtate, kea leboha, tsamaea hantle. (Sir, I thank





Such conversations can occur frequently in the course
of a short walk. The field worker is well advised
to resist the temptation to omit or truncate these
exchangee, however much they may seem to impede his
progress.
For another aspect of such exchanges, see Wallman
1969: 57.
(7) The verb ho fisa is specific to this practice and
means "to lend out cattle".
For the practice of mafisa generally, see Sheddick
1954: 109 f.; Ashton 1967: 181; Duncan I960: 81 f.;
Korojele 1962: Part 2, Households and Families, pp.
29 ff., Part 7, Livestock and Poultry; Wallman 1969: 67.
(Wallman is mistaken in reporting that the borrower owns
the progeny, at least in Basutoland generally.) In
I960, 24.6 per cent of all holdings with cattle (which
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constitute about two-thirds of all holdings) contained
mafisa'd stock; and about 15 per cent of cattle in
Basutoland were mafisa'd (personal communication from Mr
0:, M.H. Morojele, 27 November 1964). The practice of
mafisa is a source of difficulty in eliciting details
of ownership. People do not care to admit to owning
much stock and will not readily go into detail about
numbers. Much information on this topic is probably
unreliable.
(8) This is not to suggest that all rich men are chiefs.
No doubt the richest Africans in Basutoland are the
small number of successful traders, and the odd
individuals who make lucky finds of diamonds in the
mountain concessions. Professional and political
life also provides avenues of advancement to a few
(though chiefly families are well placed to take advant¬
age of these).
(9) One incident illustrates the dilemmas of chieft¬
ainship in the modern situation. In September 1964,
Mohlalefi Bereng, the Principal Chief of Rothe and
hasite, banned the Congress from holding a political
meeting which had been planned to take place in Rothe
itself. The Congress, however, regarding the prohibi¬
tion as a party-political act, ignored the ban and
proceeded to Masite Nek in large numbers, from where
they started to move in a procession along the road
leading to Rothe. At a turning in the road, near a
small wood, they were ambushed by some of Mohlalefi's
people, armed with guns, and three of the Congress
supporters were killed. Prom one point of view,
Mohlalefi's prohibition was a legitimate act, not only
because it could be represented as a proper exercise
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of the "police" functions of the chieftainship in
prohibiting a possible cause of disturbance, but also
and more importantly because it could be regarded not
as an action structurally equivalent to and co-ordinate
with an initiative by an opposing group but rather as
an assertion of the chieftainship's claim to a monopoly
of political right. What was being defended was the
chieftainship as the unique governmental order.
Political activity could take place within it, but
such activity became subversive of national institutions
when it claimed to treat the chieftainship as simply
another institution at the same level of structure.
Prom the other point of view, which was also the one
that received sanction from the statutes and the con¬
stitution, Mohlalefi's action in banning the Congress
was an illegitimate manipulation of the "public"
rights of the chieftainship which conscripted a formally
"national" institution into the service of one particular
group within the nation.
(10) See Hamnett 1967.6: 386, where an account is also
given of some of the functions of Sotho riddling, and
their relationship to proverbs is discussed. For
this latter point, see also Milner 1970.
(11) Some cases were noted in Chapter Two above of
how chiefly authority was directly applied in the courts;
see the cases of Lerotholi v. Monyoe J.C. 189/45 ("The
Paramount Chief has power to cancel or confirm or add
to any Judgment..."), Moqa v. Moqa J.C. 206/49 (where
Letsie Mots'oene of leribe stated that "we bad all
powers as chief. At that time we were free to alter
any Judgment") and Mahase v. Borena J.C. 59/52 ("there
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are no limits on the orders that the administration
can give").
An interesting example of how chiefs can consolidate
their interests as a group is seen in Phakisi v.
Borena J-C. 69/54, where the Paramount Chief's Court
is alleged to have preceded its judgment by saying
"We do not allow this case to go on, as it causes
Chief Matlere displeasure.... He is a son of Lerotholi
and so are we, and we naturally share the disappointment
he has suffered in this matter...."
(12) As has been noted, the College of Chiefs lost
this role in the 1965 and 1966 Constitutions.
(13) And for this, inevitably, they were rebuked by
the Roman-Dutch courts on the grounds that administrat¬
ive discretion cannot be delegated: Lelingoana v. P.C.
J.C. 31/46. See also Tumahole Jonathan, Petnr., J.C.
58/44, and Tsikoane v. Thella J.C. 92/52.
The reliance on representatives is reflected in
the (formerly universal but now much less common)
practice of giving evidence through others in court.
Quite often, the real witness is not present at all,
and all his (or her) evidence is given by a represent¬
ative, especially in the case of women and chiefs.
This again provokes the wrath of the Roman-Dutch
courts, where the role of the advocate is of course
very carefully segregated from that of all other
actors.
The standard word for a "representative" is moemeli,
from ema, stand, and its applied verbal derivative
emela, stand for. Hoemeli is (significantly) also
one of the words meaning "advocate".
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(14) The constitutional development of local government
is well outlined in the Report on Constitutional Reform
and Chieftainship Affairs 1958, paragraphs 147-157,
Jones 1951: 52-78, 147-164 (see Basutoland Constitutional
Handbook, I960). See also Pim 1935, Hailey 1953,
Moore 1954 (the ill-fated Report that was virtually
suppressed by the Government), Constitutional Report
1963, Halpern 1965.
(15) This does not mean that the Gazette, or the list
of warrants, represented the previous situation of the
chieftainship. Patrick Duncan (then Judicial Commis¬
sioner) commented as follows: "(The 1938) Legislation
need not have derogated in any way from established
xights; the gazette list might have been drawn up with
great care on the principle that all with litokelo
(rights) would be included.... That has however not
been done, and from a glance at the various lists... it
is clear that no consistent criterion has been followed
of what is, and what is not, a chief or headman....
In Leribe possibly between a half and three-quarters
of those who have in Sesuto law litokelo have been
omitted from the Gazette.... A list drawn up adminis¬
tratively has extinguished rights which in many cases
are of great material value, which are highly esteemed
for the status which they confer, and which in many
cases have belonged to the families in question beyond
the span of human memory" (Mathealira v. Tumo J.C.
135/51). See also Jones 1951 passim for the relation¬
ship between these changes and other features of
Basutoland in the 1940's, especially the outbreak of
medicine (liretlo) murder. See also Chapter Two above.
Por the reaction of a chief who found himself being
prosecuted for holding a court without a warrant, see
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Ntja v. Borena J.C. 169/45: "I sat in judgment over
them lawfully in the ward that was put in my charge
lawfully
The Judicial Courts were usually called "National
Treasury Courts" by the Basotho, after the introduction
of the Basutoland National Treasury in 1946, to the
dismay of government. The term was still in common
use in 1966, in spite of the abolition of the B.N.T.
in 1959.
(16) During the period of research, the Basotho courts
were as follows:
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Appeals lay from the Local to the Central Court.
In 1944, the office of Judicial Commissioner was
created, as an appeal from the then Native Courts.
The Judicial Commissioners were the principal means
of imposing the new norms on the Basotho courts, a
task in which they met with varying degrees of success.
See also Excursus to Chapter One above.
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(17) One instance would be that of a woman who persisted
in walking in front of the patlello (patlelo) ea lesaka,
the open space in front of the kraal. This is believed
to be a danger for the cattle and will cause them to
sicken and even die, especially if the woman is menstru¬
ating or if she is carrying water. The Basotho courts
can treat such a matter indirectly, in that if the
woman is assulted (one woman was killed in a nearby
village during the fieldwork but I was unable to learn
much of significance about the case) she will be judged
to have been guilty of serious provocation. The
Roman-Dutch courts, of course, adopt a similar view,
but differ in so far as they do not share the evaluation
of the act in itself.
(18) Such is the litigious passion of the Basotho that
the Basotho courts could hardly function were this not
so. Even the Judicial Commissioner's court, which was
at one time the fourth level of appeal (before the
abolition of the Paramount Chief's appeal courts),
nandled anything up to six hundred cases a year. Since,
as will be seen presently, there may be not one but two
or even three stages before the lowest level of judicial
court is reached, it would be more realistic to see
the Judicial Commissioner as a fifth or sixth stage of
appeal.
(19) In both criminal and civil matters, the lekhotla
may also occasionally have to send the matter to the
Roman-Dutch subordinate courts, or even the High Court,
if a serious crime is alleged or a civil dispute outside
the scope of customary law is involved. But the Basotho
courts consider the question of "civil" damages in cases
of murder (normally ten head of cattle).
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(20) The Basotho courts encourage this belief. In
Moqhetsola v. Kphunyetsane J.C. 19/50, the Appeal
Court at Matsieng said: "The plaintiff at Semonkong
did not pass before his ward chief... as it is right
and lawful to pass before him all matters pertaining
to his ward, so that he can investigate them and bring
them on to the appeal court/viz., the judicial court/
if necessary, as is done by all the chiefs in this
country.... Therefore the case is dismissed.... If
there is any complaint it must first be lodged with
the chief to consider it thoroughly or pass it on".
The Clerk at Rothe Local actually refuses to open
the court to people who have not been through the puso.
(21) For a trial of strength between Chitja and
Raraakau, see below, Chapter Four (end), Moeno1s case.
(22) At this level, the aspects of puso and tlhooho
are virtually fused.
(23) There is a wide variation in appeals between
districts, as an analysis of the districts of origin
of appeals to the Judicial Commissioner's Court reveals:
DISTRIBUTION OF APPEALS FILED U THE JUDICIAL
COMMISSIONER * S COURT BY DISTRICT, 1953-1963.
District % Cases 7£ Population* no. of cases Populat¬
ion
Butha-Buthe 7.3 6.6 180 58,704
Leribe 23.1 15.0 581 133,379
Berea 10.9 13.6 270 121,350
Maseru 21.0 18.8 518 166,795
Mafeteng 15.2 10.9 325 97,243
Mohele's Boek 7.1 11.6 174 102,648
Quthing 4.4 8.8 108 78,037
Qacha's Nek 4.4 7.8 109 69,118
Mokhotlong 8.4 6.9 204 60,804
TOTAL 99.8 100.0 2469 888,258
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It will be noticed that Mohale's Hoek, Quthing and
Qacha's Nek have a lower proportion of appeals than
their population would suggest, while Leribe has a
higher one. These relationships are borne out in a
sample of 304 cases over the period 1944-1964:
DISTRIBUTION OP 304 APPEALS PILED IN THE JUDICIAL
COMMISSIONER'S COURT BY DISTRICT, 1944-1964-
District % Cases $ Population* no. of cases
Butha-Buthe 7.3 6.6 22
Leribe 24.2 15.0 74
Berea 14.5 13-6 44
Maseru 22.5 18.8 69
Mafeteng 12.1 10.9 37
Mohale's Hoek 8.0 11.6 24
Quthing 4.7 4.7 14
Qacha's Nek 1.7 7.8 5
Mokhotlong 5.0 6.9 15
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 304
*
Population figures are taken from Korojele 1962: Part
2, p.11. Though the figures are held constant through¬
out the periods covered by both tables, there is no
reason to suppose that internal migration took place
on a scale that would significantly distort the results.
In any case, no other at all reliable figures are
available.
It would, of course, be a matter for further and
specific research to determine whether and to what
extent these variations are related to the conscient¬
iousness of chiefs, and how far this in its turn is
related to the remoteness of certain areas from the
urban and semi-urban centres of population. This
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-
last hypothesis gains some support from the low
figures for Qacha's Nek, but is contradicted by the
high one for Mokhotlong. Of the two, Mokhotlong
is the more inaccessible from centres of "modern"
life.
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(1) But litigants may, nonetheless, invoke the
Paramountcy if it seems in their interest. Thus, in
Lesia v. Oliphant J.C. 142/64, the appellant, who had
taken over his parents' land without allocation, stated,
"I will not defend in a case concerning the soil.
The soil is a prerogative of the Paramount Chief and
I have nothing to say; it is the Paramount Chief who
has the right to allocate the soil".
(2) It might seem that it would be appropriate to
invoke the distinction between "sovereignty" and
"ownership" rather than between "administrative" and
"usufructuary". But there are two objections to this.
First, "ownership" is, as will become very clear,
precisely what landholders do not enjoy. Secondly,
during the colonial period, "sovereignty" was vested
in the Crown, so that ultimate political rights could
not inhere in the Paramount Chief. Hence the notion
of "ownership" was invoked to cover the position of
the land.
(3) Chiefs are suspended and replaced by acting chiefs
on grounds of senility, madness, extreme and continued
incompetence, or outrageous ill behaviour. But
Mohlalefi Bereng, after being released from prison
after conviction on an extremely serious charge arising
out of the political killings at Rothe in 1964,
returned to his position as Principal Chief.
(4) In 1967 and after Chief Leabua Jonathan attempted
to legitimise and legalise his position vis-a-vis the
King by bringing pressure on him to sign an agreement
that certain actions on the King's part, as evaluated
by the Prime Minister, would constitute abdication
ipso facto. Chief Jonathan relied, in this action,
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on the support of the College of Chiefs which, though
shorn of the powers it enjoyed under the 1959 Constitut¬
ion, retained a special position in regard to the
Paramountcy — though it is another question whether
this special position extended so far as to cover the
Prime Minister's intentions in the matter.
(5) Kohalefi Bereng of Rothe has chieftainship fields
at most of his many titular wards. One is a large
field which is now, in fact, within the Principal
Ward of Matsieng in Thaba-Chitja, opposite Masite Nek
on the other side of the Maseru-Mafeteng road. Some
of this is now cultivated by the subjects of Thaba-
Chitja, and a large part of it is share-cropped by
Mahlaku, the zealous entrepreneur who runs a shop and
beer-hall in Masite Nek and who was mentioned in
"A Case of Night-Grazing" above. But it was difficult
to find out which of the many lands that Mohalefi was
criticised for not allocating to his subjects but
continuing to use or share-crop for himself were
actually masimo a lira and which were lands that he had
allocated to himself — or, indeed, simply lands that
had not been allocated at all.
(6) The word comes from ho boya, to return, come back,
the perfective derivative of which is ho boella, mean¬
ing to return to the beginning, to return again and
again. The more general sense of leboella is thus
(as given by Mabille and Dieterlen 1961: 42) "provisions
kept for another occasion".
(7) About 36 per cent of all stock-holdings send
cattle to the cattleposts (nersonal communication from
Mr C.M.H. Morojele).
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(8) The current system is laid down by the Paramount
Chief's Order in Laws of herotholi Part III 13.
(Part II 11 refers to leboella in the wider sense.)
(9) The Paramount Chief is said to have three kinds of
cattle-post (mothebo), one for his own cattle, one for
the people of Matsieng, and one that is open to all
Basotho.
(10) Prom beballa, to take care of. Paballo (pi.
lipaballo) means "care", "safeguarding", rather than
"loan".
(11) But in Letima v. Peete J.C. 54/66, the Central
(Basotho) Court took the view that "paballo exists
when chiefs or headmen are not under the rule of each
other", i.e., only between coordinate jurisdictions.
This in effect means that if a headman is required to
grant an area to his superior, he simply forfeits it.
(12) It will be clear that the elimination of lipaballo
does not mean the confirmation of the status quo, but
rather the opposite; the original jurisdiction is
revived, and landholders must choose between their
lands or their chief. Every elimination therefore
involves the risk of a new dispute. ubjects are
aggrieved if they have to leave their lands, chiefs if
they have to lose their people.
(13) For the word lesafo and this proverb, see Hamnett
1967: 390 n.3.
(14) "Interploughing" is also used of a paballo ea moa.
(15) Bee the judgment of 'Mamathe's court in Mafeka v.
libetoe J.C. 74/56, where it was stated that "chieftain-
ess 'Mamathe never goes to allocate lands in the area
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of Mosongoa (Thakampholo's — a minor chiefdom, not a
headmanship), but rather she goes to make a request".
Of course, a request from a Principal Chief is not
lightly refused.
(16) Thus the Paramount Chief's Court in Mat.1eket.jela
v. Theko J.C. 19/47: "I order you to give Matjeketjela
a land".
(17) The term "area" refers to a unit of administration
(sebaka), "land" or "field" to a unit of usufruct (ts'imo).
Precisely one of the doubts in this case is the question
of which was involved.
(18) R.P. Thompson, Judicial Commissioner, was probably
right to remark that "the elimination of lipaballo is
affecting the rights of thousands and thousands of
people... and it is a delicate matter which is not very
apt for solution in courts" (Mofoka v. Moshoeshoe J.C.
128/60).
(19) In fact, the rule as written had the unintended
effect of compelling Principal Chiefs to eliminate
lipaballo in respect of their own headmen, which was
not what was expected. Legislation to correct this
was imminent. See Theoha v. Lebajoa J.C. 143/64,
including Paramount Chief's administrative decision of
19 December 1958. In this case, Makhabane Peete, Chief
of Koeneng and Mapoteng, claimed that as the whole of
the chiefdom was his ward, he could not be subject to
paballo within it, and that any of his subjects directly
under his jurisdiction were unaffected by the law
eliminating lipaballo. The Paramount Chief supported
this view. But the Basotho courts did not accept that
a Principal Chief was in a special position, and required
NOTES TO CHAPTER POUR (cont)
364
(19) cont.
his direct subjects to bring their allegiance into
line with their land-holding, though they were free to
decide which to retain and which to adjust. But the
view that a Principal Chief cannot be baballoa'd
probably represents the traditional law. The position
here was somewhat complicated by the fact that the
headman who had ruled the area in question had died,
and Chief Makhabane, instead of appointing his son, had
retained the ward in his own hands. The jurisdiction
thus existed, but the vacancy was unfilled. The
Paramount Chief took the view that "the ward chief may
spread out to any extent within his ward".
(20) In addition to the cases that follow, I have
records of a case against his ward chief before the
Paramount Chief's administrative court in 1950, a
dispute against Chief Molikuoa lejaha before the College
of Chiefs in I960, and an administrative case against
Lihoapa before the Chief of Koeneng in 1963. No
doubt there were many others.
(21) The Judicial Commissioner reversed the Central
Court, partly on the grounds that Ramakau's allocation
had taken place first, partly on the grounds that at
the relevant time neither Ramakau nor Chitja were
proclaimed, so that the only officially recognised
authority was that of the Chief of Rothe itself.
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(1) Strictly, this means "married".
(2) This general and unspecific claim to a share in
the land resources of the nation has been called the
"right of avail" by Hughes (Hughes 1964).
(3) T>Ls obligation must, of course, be read subject
to the qualifications discussed under paballo in the
preceding chapter.
(4) The obverse face of this liability is that a
subject could withdraw from his allegiance and transfer
himself to another chief. There was a time when this
was an effective sanction, since a chief needs subjects.
When Basutoland was being opened up and new jurisdictions
created through the placing of chiefs, subjects were in
a position to exercise a real choice. This is much
less true now, even though chiefs* salaries are linked
to the number of tax-payers in their wards, since
expansion has virtually halted, few "vacancies" exist,
and land is competed for. A chief without subjects
was known as morena-'mele, "the chief of his body".
Compare also the proverb phakoe e ja ka balisa, "the
hawk relies on the herdsmen for his food".
(5) However, at Masite, Chief Ramakau and his headman
Chitja have an arrangement whereby each other's subjects
can live in either village without being regarded as
"turning the door".
(6) It is notorious that many Basotho spend the greater
part of each year, or even years together with only
short breaks, as migrant labourers working in the
Republic of South Africa, notably in the mines and
factories of the Witwatersrand. The exact number is
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not certain, but the proportion of young and young-
middle-aged males who are more or less permanently
out of the country is very large. Something in the
order of two-fifths of adult males have been estimated
to fall into this category, and probably between a half
and two-thirds of all males in their twenties. These
wage-earners remit much of their earnings to their
dependants in Basutoland, whose economy indeed depends
importantly on this resource. But the migrants have,
of course, no rights in the Republic, and after some
years away they virtually all return home — as,
indeed, they must do when they cease to be acceptable
as labourers. Their wives and children remain at
home, to tend the fields and even to plough them if the
men do not (as they usually do) come back in the spring
to do this work. In any case, permits are normally
issued only for single labourers, not for wives or
dependants. The family lands thus represent a form
of ultimate security — and in most cases, the need is
fairly immediate — and migrants are always anxious to
retain their allegiance to their home chief, which they
do by making a point of paying their taxes to him and
returning home for holidays and visits on occasions.
Basotho who leave the country areas to chance their arm
at employment in Maseru or other urban centres in
' Basutoland are equally anxious not to forfeit whatever
claims they have in their home areas, though some have
left the land because there was so little hope for them
from it. Even civil servants and professional men are
keen to retain their lands, and often leave a junior
brother or other kinsmen in the village to keep their
rights in active exercise. The general pattern of
migrant labourers retaining an eventual security when
their wage employment ends is familiar enough to need
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no documentation. It is the scale rather than the
pattern which is so special a feature of Basutoland's
economy,
(7) This observation is more controversial than it
looks. Discussion is remitted to the excursus to
this chapter, "land Shortage in Basutoland", below.
(8) A small footnote to Dr Mailman's article may be
added. In 1966, I was helping 'Ma-Pula, the manager¬
ess of a small South African-owned store near Mafeteng,
to weigh and pay for small bundles of corn which women
from the nearby village were bringing in to sell.
'Ma-Pula examined the quality of the corn, as she was
instructed to do, and took great care to weigh it very
precisely on the scale provided by the company. But
she took no account of the containers in which people
brought the corn to the store; one woman brought a few
pounds in a cloth and was paid exactly; the next brought
hers in a heavy metal pail, and she was paid for the
weight of the pail as well as the corn inside it.
But the discussion in the annex to this chapter
suggests that, in the round, the apparently irrational
measurement practices of the Basotho may be more valid
than they look. Field size and field numbers do not
vary independently on a statistical level. An individ¬
ual may be foolish to gauge his fields by numbers, or
to measure them along only one dimension, but some of
his perceptions turn out to be uncannily close to the
truth.
(9) See Morojele 1962, especially Part 2, pp. 33 ff•,
from which the following table is adapted:
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The total number of holdings is taken as 161,250, and
that of fields (lands) as 388,657. Note that in the
above table, holdings with stock but without lands are
includ ed.
(10) The obviously vital question of acreage is dis¬
cussed in the excursus, since it does not enter so
directly into Sotho consciousness. Though the economic
yield is a factor of which people are aware, they
conceptualise any shortfall in terms of "not having
enough lands" rather than "not having enough land".
(11) Personal communication from H.M. Moshoeshoe II,
June 1970.
(12) Some people say that one land is for tax, one is
for the "house" and one is for the children. Since
tax liability starts at 21, this view founds a claim
that bachelors are now entitled to at least one field.
(13) It will be recalled that in the paballo ea mpa,
the donor generally retains grazing rights — perhaps
the clearest case of the separation of the two production
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units, since the identities of the entitled individuals
are distinct.
(14) On "both cooperation and share-cropping, see
Morojele 1962: Part 5 and Wallman 1969: 50 ff. No
attempt is made here to treat these topics systematically;
only those aspects that have a hearing on the legal
implications of usufructuary titles are considered.
(15) The sum is less than 100, since 5 per cent of
cases are unclassifiable in these terms. These figures
are taken from Morojele 1962: Part 5, Table 26. In
so far as it was possible to arrive at an estimate,
the situation at Masite Nek is consistent with the
Census extrapolations. Of 36 cases about which relevant
information was available, about 13 appeared to involve
what has been categorised as an "exploitative" relation¬
ship, the remainder being cases of cooperating with
kin or friends or not requiring help at all. These 36
cases represent about half of the households, if land¬
less families and temporarily vacant sites are included.
(16) It should be borne in mind that where labour is
directly hired, any exploitation involved is in the
opposite sense. A wage-labourer will find it very
difficult to acquire lands himself. He is unlikely to
be able to afford to marry, and may not have a residential
title within the ward, or even owe allegiance to the
same chief.
It is also important to add the caution that a
relationship may be potentially exploitative, in that
its structure is compatible with exploitation, without
actually being so. It would be dangerous to assume
that one-third of all holdings had fallen into entrepren-
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eurial control. Rather, it is remarkable that, in a
society characterised by such general poverty, where
even a small absolute economic advantage can give its
possessor the means to use it for further advance,
entrepreneurial control of land resources is not more
widespread than it is. The basic reason for this is
probably that land is not a good investment in Basuto-
land, so that people use their skills and capital to
build up interests elsewhere; they may then use any
spill-over from this to acquire de facto land rights,
or they may contract entrepreneurial arrangements in
order to acquire the initial capital. But in neither
case does the successful entrepreneur usually regard
land as in itself the principal object of his activity.
There is a small group (0.4 per cent of holdings) of
"progressive farmers" in Basutoland, a few o,f whom have
relatively highly capitalised "farms". But there is
no evidence to link these systematically with rural
entrepreneurs.
(17) Cf. Paramount Chief's Court in Kanyeli v. Brand
J.C. 168/45, "I find that these are lands of removers,
your father and mother being dead".
(18) Several proverbs describe a man who runs after
two chiefs: lemao le ntlhapeli (a needle with two points),
ke motjoli o tono se sephatsoa (a wagtail with a black
and white tail), o ja ka mehlahare e 'meli (he eats with
both jaws).
(19) Special problems are raised for customary law by
the mortmain created in the case of perpetual corporat¬
ions, especially when, as with the University of Botswana,
Lesotho and Swaziland at Roma, they hold title outside
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the government reserves and furthermore need to encroach
on arable land. This topic will not be further
explored (v. Sheddick 1954: 154-156).
(20) Housing at Roma for the academic and administra¬
tive staff was deliberately not built to provide
accommodation for servants, since the assumptions under¬
lying such provision were disapproved by "liberal"
sentiment- In the case of white staff, this means
that servants have to walk to and from their place of
work every day (the local community would resent it if
the University and its staff did not provide employ¬
ment when they are known to be able to afford it),
while black lecturers and administrators find their
houses filled up by kinsfolk of all ages (often unpaid
servants in all but name), who have to live and sleep
in places around the house that are actually worse
than servants' accommodation would be.
(21) People who acknowledge the greater cheapness and
better insulating qualities of thatched roofs often
prefer to use corrugated iron. This is partly because
it is culturally preferred, being more modern and
"smarter", but also because it reduces fire risk,
accidental or malicious. While I was in Masite Nek,
a woman deliberately burned down her mother-in-law's
hut, even though both women lived in it together.
(22) In the interests of the agricultural economy,
the higher courts have also permitted a wrongful
occupier to reap where he has sown. While this may
be better than ploughing the crops in, as traditional
practice allowed, it can be said to put a premium on
wrongful occupation of lands.
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(23) Throughout this section, it should be remembered
that Basotho do not, as a rule, attach much importance
to particular parcels of land affectively or culturally.
Their attitude to ts'imo is basically instrumental, and
a man who can exchange a poor land for a good one would
not be likely to hesitate out of any attachment to
"his father's lands". The stress on the "family lands"
is a practical one. In principle, what a man wants
is land, and if his father has died, the obvious course
is to apply to have the same lands confirmed on himself,
but if other lands are offered instead, then other things
being equal they will be acceptable. The particular
identity of a given land-parcel also has evidential
importance, since it is usually easier to support a
claim if it can be shown that a land has been "in the
family" for some years and ploughed by a certain person.
Consequently, considerable importance is attached to
particular land-parcels, but the reason for this should
not be misunderstood. It is otherwise with residential
sites, to which there is considerable attachment. One
sign of this is the fact that when a site changes hands,
usually after a death, the new owner fears persecution
at the hands of the dead man's lineage. The former
owner will have, or will be thought to have, hidden
medicines under the hut which will be dangerous for any
new occupier from a different lineage. The new owner
will usually destroy the hut and build a new one.
Similarly, when a man alienates a site, he opens himself
to supernatural reprisals from his own ancestors; and
if on marriage he moves to his wife's place, he will
be nervous about supernatural dangers unless some months
pass with no untoward accidents. Medicines are also
used on land, but this is to protect the fertility of
the soil against possible magic or witchcraft from a
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neighbour. If a man suspects that his neighbour is
causing damage to his land by supernatural means, he
will mix up some earth from both fields and scatter it,
thus throwing the evil influences off the scent.
It was the traditional practice not to continue to
use a hut after a death, but this is less common now,
especially when durable structures are built that it
would be far too wasteful to abandon or destroy, cf.
note 26 below.
(24) For a further reference to this notion of decis¬
ions being lawful but not therefore constrained, see
Chapter Six, note 38 and Chapter Seven, where the
philosophical and epistemological basis for this view
of "action" is made more explicit.
(25) Cf. Duncan I960: 67-69, 95-99; Sheddick 1954:
70-71, 78-80, 125-6.
(26) It will be obvious that great difficulties have
been created for customary law by the existence of
durable, immovable and expensive structures in modern
times. Traditionally, a remover could take what he
provided himself, but had to leave whatever he had
acquired from the communal liremo — including the
walls of the hut, if they were made from mud or clay,
and not of bricks purchased by the occupier.
(27) In the 1946 edition, sec.7 (7) read "continue to
dwell thereon or in the immediate vicinity". The last
five words were removed in 1959.
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(1) The stem Is -fa, meaning "give, "bestow". It
should not be connected with the word lefa, stem lef-,
meaning to pay (of a fine or debt).
(2) 1873 Report, December 3rd 1872 paragraph 21. It
is important to notice that the quotation from this
Report contained in Duncan I960: 11 contains a misprint.
As the Judicial Commissioner observed in Khatala J.C.
70/61, the word "and" in the last sentence should read
"who". This error virtually reverses the sense of the
passage.
(3) Viz., bohali.
(4) The mother's brother. The malome has a claim on
a part of the bohali paid in respect of sister's daughter
on the assumption and provided that he made appropriate
contributions to her well-being, especially at the time
of her initiation and marriage, or helped towards the
bohali payable in respect of her brothers. This right
of the malome is called lits'oa. Cf. Laws of Lerotholi
(1922) Law 20; (1946), (1955) and (1959) sec. 5.
(5) The language of the second and third of these
brocarts, like that of so many proverbs and sayings, has
the abridged and elliptical quality of traditional poetry
and praise-songs.
The word "house" is translated by both ntlo and lelapa
%
(6) I am thinking largely of the bewilderment of the
official courts and the clumsiness which they have so
often displayed in this area — albeit with the best of
intentions. But the puzzlement is also apparent in the
treatment this tract of law has received outside the
courts and away from the bench: cf. Duncan I960;
Ramolefe 1969.
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(7) Continental jurists, with their experience of codes
and their undogmatic approach to la jurisprudence, are
better equipped for the understanding of customary law
(paradoxically enough) than are English and South African
lawyers (notwithstanding the civilian roots of Roman-
Dutch law in the latter case) with their case-law
orientation. The word "customary" itself, of course,
has confused most common-lawyers (as is argued in Chapter
One); but it is also apparent that the procedure of
customary law is not nearly so close to that of case-law
as it is to a system of jurisprudence with, as it were,
an "implicit code".
(8) There is no exact translation of the word "own",
especially in relation to the difference between "own"
and "possess". "To have" is ho ba le, formed from the
copulative verb ("to be") with the addition of the conjunc¬
tive le (with). "I have a cow" is ke na le khomo, but
there is no definite implication of "ownership". The
word rua means "own" or "possess", but with the connotation
of being rich, owning much (cf. English "landowner").
The nearest word for "owner" is mong (plural beng), but
this too has the implication of mastery or lordship rather
than simple ownership. The word mong is also used in
senses where the word "owner" would not be used in English,
e.g., in describing a husband and wife as "owners" of a
marriage, or of a case (nyeoe).
(9) My own conviction is that if alien concepts of law
are to be applied at all, then all individual rights in
a deceased's estate should be regarded as iura in personam,
and the quest for a determinate titular of rights in rem
should be abandoned at this level of analysis. But
ultimately, no doubt, a meta-language of comparative
jurisprudence is the only answer: see Vanderlinden 1966
and 1969.
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(10) Manyebutse J.C. 49/44 (judgment of Paramount Chief's
Court). (Note the Salomonic touch).
(11) 'Matsoana J.C. 85/45. This was a family dispute
not involving inheritance, but the principle at issue is
the same. It is of passing interest to note that though
the court's address was headed "Kahlolo" (judgment), it
ended with the words Hena ke eona khaolo", the term khaolo
usually being used of an administrative "decision'', in
contemporary language. Cf. the more "sophisticated"
statement of the Paramount Chief's administrative court
in Phatela v. Mapote J.C. 163/49: "this is not a judgment
(kahlolo), it is a decision (khaolo)For similar
actions by the chief's courts, see Rakoboso v. Nkaka
J.C. 49/51 and many others.
(12) The role of the makhotla a tlhopho and a puso is
described in Chapter Three.
(13) In the house of Rantsilonyane in !4asite Nek, the
senior son was Pheello, now dead, who had two wives.
The son of the senior house left with his mother and
married, taking cattle from his mother's place and with¬
out informing his father or asking his help. Pheello
then settled with his second wife at Masite Nek, and had
two sons before he died. The son of the senior house,
who has now moved back to a village nearby (Thaba-Chitja),
then claimed a share of his father's cattle. Pheello's
brothers resisted this claim; but the second widow
declared herself content with the share, provided the
son came to live with her and her own sons. However,
he is evidently interested only in the cattle, and is
acting under pressure from his mother, from whose
father's kraal his bohali had, as seen, been provided.
Ramakau, chief of Masite (Mohloai), and Chitje, headman
at Masite Nek, appointed a phala to hear the case; but
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the dispute was not settled, and in 1966 was due to
proceed to Mohalefi's lekhotla la pueo at Rothe.
(14) The stem -ja means "eat", in its primary sense.
It also means "consume, take over, enter into", as in the
word mojalefa, heir - "the one who 'eats' the inheritance"
But it is also widely used as meaning "despoil, impoverish
take away the rights or property of", and in this sense
can be translated "eat up". (The form jane is the nega¬
tive conjugation of the reciprocal derivative - "each
other"; cf. Doke and Mofokeng 1957).
d
(15) Polygamy (sethepu) is comparatively uncommon today.
Using data from the 1956 Census, it can be calculated
that only about 4^ of males and 7';« of females were
partners in polygamous marriage. In most of these
marriages, there were only two wives. Since most of
these were of the older generation and many will have
since died, these figures should probably be reduced
today. Nevertheless, the question of "houses" remains
of great importance. (1) Many contemporary disputes
about both property and succession refer back to a
period or periods in the past (and often the fairly
recent past) when polygamy was common. (2) Chiefs
have traditionally been polygamous, and it is above all
in the chieftainship that many crucial issues of ranking
and seniority arise, with consequences reaching out
beyond the successors and affecting the junior sons of
junior sons, who have now been extruded from chieftain¬
ship. (3) Customary law marriages are still (it can
be argued) polygamous, though it may be a case of
"polygamy with one wife". The law that applies to
customary succession, filiation and inheritance is a law
that reflects a polygamous society. (4) Basotho often
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apply categories derived from polygamy to situations
which might not be so regarded in modern courts. For
instance, when a man remarries after divorce, or after
the death of his wife, the rules applying to malapa are
often applied. The same is sometimes true even when a
man simply takes a mistress and has children by her.
In these senses, polygamy is much commoner than it looks.
(16) See Ramolefe, n.d., contra Duncan I960: 19. The
difficulty arises that when Griffith took a second
daughter from Nkuebe to replace Sebueng (Sebueng having
ia fact born Seeiso, and having returned home, not died),
this incident can be as easily regarded as an example of
how a Paramount Chief can "get away with" behaviour that
would not be tolerated in ordinary people; moreover,
Griffith paid no cattle for the seantlo.
(17) Lit., "one who goes to the house".
(18) So the Paramount Chief's Court in Khabele J.C. 319/48
(19) Malofotsane v. Mpho J.C. 1959/107.
(20) See the story of Moshoeshoe, Letsie I and Senate
in Chapter Two, and Jones 1966: 70-71. The cause celebre
of Sekake v. Tautona J.C. 15/59 (see Appendix II) illus¬
trates all and more than all of the points referred to
here.
It will be seen that the question of the order in
which wives are ranked is far less simple than is sugges¬
ted in Laws of Lerotholi (II) (1) or 13 (1) above.
(21) Cf. the saying monyala ka peli o nyala oa hae - "he
who marries with two (sc. beasts) gets his wife just the
same".
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(22) E.g., in the case of Philemon, Ramakau and Mohlalefi
referred to in Chapter Two, note 36, Sekhonyana's house
had received cattle from Philemon for the marriage of
his son Moeno, and had given cattle to Moeno when the
latter's daughter married Raiaakau: Khomo li boela hae,
"the cattle return home". Mohlalefi now suggests that
the daughter of Ramakau from this marriage should "be
brought up by Mohlalefi and marry one of his sons, with
a reduction in the bohali payable. See also leshoboro's
marriage to his cross-cousin Mosa, and Khethisa's contri¬
bution of ten beasts (Appendix III, sec. 4). It may be
added that the order in which bohali was paid can also be
ar issue. Mention has already been made of the chief¬
tainship of Thaba Bosiu, where the rival claimant argues
that since bohali was paid for his mother first, he has
the title to succeed (Chapter Two note 37).
(23) One further point, particularly relevant in modern
times when monogamy is vastly commoner, is whether a
subsequent marriage after death or divorce is to count
as a second house or not. The point arose in lephole
J.C. 15/58, Ntoula v. Morake J.C. 227/60, Mojake v.
Litjamela J.C. 4/63. The Basotho courts were undecided.
Of course, the same issue can arise in the traditional
context, where it is a doubt whether the second marriage
was designed to replace the first.
(24) On this, see Basotho courts in Molapo v. Mahoona
1926-1953 H.C.T.L.R. 309. A widow remains married to
her husband's family unless she divorces them and restores
the cattle.
(25) The case was decided in favour of Letsie, but since
it was one that originated in the High Court, neither
this outcome nor the grounds for it are of direct
relevance to this study.
380
NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX (cont)
(26) At Thabana-Morena, in the case of Leluma v. Mojela,
the Basotho court held that "the rights of a widow after
her husband's death do not multiply or decrease; she
lives as she lived during his lifetime" (J.C. 184/64,
C.C. 183/63).
(27) One area of disagreement concerns whether a widow
can "open the court", i.e., sue, in her own name. This
is a rather unrewarding discussion at this level, and will
be considered only in so far as it bears on the widow's
relationship to her husband's agnates.
(28) In Kotsiri v. Lintlholoane J.C. 79/65, the effect
was that the widow could not prevent the heir from dis¬
charging the deceased's debts. This is a case where
the heir was described as "not having eaten the estate",
i.e., where the mo-ja-lefa did not ho ja the lefa.
This seeming contradiction in fact reveals a fairly
simple state of affairs.
(29) In Roman law, usus fructus is, of course, a real
and not merely a personal right, so in relying upon the
concept of usufruct the court is not necessarily setting
up a distinction between real and personal, as it is in
the terms of owner and tenant. For limited purposes,
the notion of usufruct is not in fact inappropriate,
but it runs into difficulties all the same, since it
implies a distinction between the res and its usus
an<* fructus which breaks down in the Sesotho case.
The "capital" of the estate is not untouchable.
Besides, it seems preferable, if such terms must be used
at all, to regard all individual rights as being in
personam, rather than as all in rem.
(30) The main line of cases is Makupu J.C. 89/55,
Ralienyane v. Lekaota J.C. 11/62, Seisa J.C. 80/62 and
Xhatala J.C. 70/61. (The Appeal Court judgment in
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Khatala is reported in Journal of African Law, Volume
10 no. 3, Autumn 1966, pp. 173-177.) It must unfortuna¬
tely be stated that Ramolefe's discussion of the issues
is both confused an ,, inaccurate (Ramolefe 1969).
Khatala married 'Ma-Tatela and had a son, Molungoa.
'Ma-Tatela died, and Khatala married Prancina, who bore
no issue. Two of the Basotho courts relied on Laws
of Lerotholi 11 (1) and found for Molungoa. The third
(Maja's A) took the view that Molungoa could not have
ousted 'Ma-Tatela, and that since Prancina had come
into (kenela) all her predecessor's right, he could not
oust her either. In taking this line, the court rather
bizarrely founded on the well-known case of 'Ma-Dyke
(Lesitsi v. Mafa J.C. 84/53)» which is discussed in the
preceding chapter and which, of course, is concerned
with a very different set of issues in its own terms:
though Kaja's were nevertheless operating on a relevant
basis in attending to the rights of the widow, while
transferring the argument from land to lefa.
(31) There is, moreover, a case for the view that the
debate has been falsified by the assumption that Sesotho
marriage is monogamous where there is only one wife (one
wife at a time, in Khatala's case). It has already
been suggested that this is not so. It is rather a
question of a polygamous marriage with only one wife.
(32) In Sesotho, karolo e kholo, which can mean simply
a major part. Notions of strict accounting hardly
apply.
(33) In Laws of Lerotholi 14 (3), the clause "other than
the house from which the principal heir comes" is mis¬
leading. The principal heir's house is not excluded
from the law as related here; the meaning of "other than"
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(ntle ho) is to direct attention to junior houses, one
class of which (those lacking male issue) have been
dealt with in 14 (2), the class with male issue being
considered in 14 (3)»
(34) See the argument of Ezekias in Labane v. Lichaba
J.C. 334/49, Chapter Two note 31 above, and the reference
there to Makhaola's case, J.C. 182/64. Cf. also
Lichaba v. Lekata J.C. 7/44 where Lefokoloi was described
by the Paramount Chief's Court as the "husband" of his
paternal grandmother, his father and his father's father
both being dead. See also remarks in Ramolefe 1969.
(35) Compare the foregoing discussion of "allocation"
where there is only one house.
(36) The issue between malapa strictly concerns the
houses set up by the different marriages of one man.
But the principles that apply between full brothers are,
as seen, very similar; this is especially true after
the first generation has passed, the same protective
rules applying to parallel cousins inter se as apply
between brothers of different houses in the narrower
sense (see the case of Mojake v. Litjamela, discussed
below). It will be recalled that Letsie, Molapo,
Kasopha and Kajara were all full brothers - sons in
Moshoeshoe's first house.
Pull brothers, half-brothers and parallel cousins
are all bana ba motho in Sesotho terminology, and
address each other as ngoaneso (see Appendix I, sec. 1).
(37) Other cases include Mokhesi J.C. 230/45, 'Moleli v.
Maisa J.C. 286/60, Moseli J.C. 125/64.
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(38) To be able to give a reason is not to postulate
an efficient cause. The view of reasoned decision
adopted here follows the thesis in Louch 1966 (and compare
Wine; 1958), and is amplified in a judicial context in
Stone 1964. What is implied in denying that a decision
is "constrained" is the repudiation of what Sawer calls
the myth of "decision-inevitability" (Sawer 1965: 105,
and see note 1 to Chapter Seven below). However, it
must be stressed that what is involved in this approach
is not that there are a series of bounding rules which
define areas of free "discretion". To suggest that
this is the case is to imply "decision-inevitability"
in regard to the rules and disorderly choice in their
interstices, which is precisely the view that it is
here being attacked. The argument is developed in
Chapter One above, and explicitly related to Sotho law
in Chapter Seven.
(39) Strictly speaking, under the 1965 and Independence
Constitutions, succession to the Paramountcy is recommen¬
ded by the College of Chiefs, which contains all the
Principal and Ward Chiefs, whether or not they are
members of the Koena lineage.
(40) On the malome relationship, see also note 4 to
this chapter, and Appendix I sec. 4.
(41) Like the malome, the rakhali (father's sister)
also plays an important role in the life of a child of
a family, more especially in the earlier years, and she
may well also be given a voice in the formal council of
the lelapa. But the personal relationship between the
heir and his mother's brother or father's sister is
analytically separate from the roles performed in the
assembly of the lelapa.
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(1) Jerome Prank quotes from Abbott's Justice and the
Modern Law as follows: "The judicial process in ascert¬
aining or applying the law is essentially similar to the
process by which we acquire our knowledge of geometry....
In the great majority of cases the solution of (legal
problems) is as certain and exact as an answer to a
problem in mathematics" (Prank 1949: 8). W. Blackstone
writes that the judge "is not delegated to pronounce a
new law, but to maintain and expound the old one".
Even where a decision is "most evidently contrary to
reason" or divine law, "the subsequent judges do not
pretend to make a new law, but to vindicate the old one
from misrepresentation.... It is declared, not that such
a sentence was bad law, but that it was not law.... Our
lawyers... with justice... tell us, that the law is the
perfection of reason.... Not that the particular reason
of every rule of law can at this distance of time be
always precisely assigned; but it is sufficient that
there be nothing in the rule flatly contradictory to
reason...." (Blackstone 1783: Book I, Introduction,
Section 3, pp. 68-71).
The myth is described by Sawer as being one of
"decision inevitability" (Sawer 1965: 105). Prank (1949)
analyses it as involving a notion of law as a logical
plenum, and in expounding the view he is concerned to
attack he writes that according to this myth, "law is
a complete body of rules existing from time immemorial
and unchangeable.... The law, ready-made, ore-exists
the judicial decision. Judges are simply 'living
oracles' of law. They are merely 'speaking law'...."
(It may be recalled that Coke referred to judges as
lex loquens.)
Certain time-honoured phrases used by advocates
in addressing the Court of Session in Scotland are
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redolent of parts of this myth: "If your lordship so
finds the law...", "... the words that have fallen
from your Lordship's mouth...."
(2) It is hardly appropriate to develop all the impli¬
cations of these assertions here. The point concerning
authority as a basis rather than a kind of power has
been well expressed by Parsons (I960) and admirably
glossed by Giddens (1968). One particular source of
confusion in Smith's approach is that if authority is
seen as a special case of power, the opposition should
(correctly) be between two kinds of power, viz., that
with and that without authority; but though the analysis
may start from that point, it all too easily shifts into
opposing power on the one hand to authority on the other,
which in the original terms is to contrast two different
levels of structure. The whole and the part are
treated as co-ordinate. Again, if authority is regarded
as legitimate power, there is no easy answer to the
question of the source of non-legitimate power: this
cannot always be, or at least cannot remain, simply
force or self-interest.
The second assertion (that Smith's scheme leads to
erroneous conclusions about actual processes) is one of
the cardinal themes of the argument in this chapter and
will be developed at length below. Briefly, it leads
to a polarisation of "discretion" on the one hand and
"rule-governedness" on the other, which though a fair
reflection of the conceptual set of "declaratory"
legal systems, distorts the reality of what will be
characterised as "executive" law.
In fairness, it must be conceded that Smith's
scheme is professedly analytical, and that he is careful
to repudiate any temptation to reify the concepts which
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he employs. Indeed, hie earlier application of the
same general framework to the Nuer (Smith 1956 passim)
shows clearly that the terms he employs are in principle
universal in intention. In fact, it is the clarity
and simplicity of his theoretical apparatus that have
led to its adoption here; but the hazards it conceals
demand that it should be treated precisely as a starting-
point and not as a resting-place.
(3) Popper's sketch of a wholly "abstract" society has
many features in common with a wholly "administrative"
one (Popper 1962: 174-5); but a better example for the
present purpose is that of the "musical banks" in
Samuel Butler's "Erewhon" (Butler 1872: chapter fifteen).
These institutions form an entirely self-sufficient and
"perfect" system — but they have no concrete function
and their absence would make no difference to Erewhon
in practical terms. Butler, of course, had the church
in mind, but the allegory would fit a judicial system
that became wholly specialised and "administrative".
Legal concepts properly exist on a kind of inter-level
between logic and life. One of the first lessons that
a student of law must learn is that many words of common
usage are given a specialised juristic meaning, and
become terms of art. Thus, "negligence", "injury",
"fault" and even "lawful" carry heavy loads of inter¬
pretation and commentary. In some instances, special
terms evolve (e.g., "tort") which bear this technical
quality on their faces, but in the majority of cases
an ordinary word is adopted and given a specialised
sense. But it is as important to recognise that this
sense cannot by wholly specialised, if the courts are
to engage with the concrete life of society at all.
For example, the legal concept of "negligence" retains
much of its everyday motivation as well as its quality
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as a term of art, and it is exactly this "bridging"
characteristic that renders it serviceable in both "law"
and "life". It was by virtue of its everyday connotat¬
ions, for instance, that Lord Devlin was able to enlarge
the English common law of "negligence" in Hedley Syrne v.
Heller (1964) 4 A.C. 465 at p. 516.
(4) See for instance Pound 1923» Stone 1964 and 1966:
50-85, Priedmann I960: 401-509.
(5) Yet some of the implications of the "pure theory
of law" come near it: see Kelsen 1934. Compare in
contrast the openly law-making approach of Denning L.J.
in, for example, Candler v. Crane Christmas (1951) 2
K.B. 164 at p. 178.
(6) Sir Henry Maine stressed the importance of the
stage in legal and social development at which codifica¬
tion takes place. In ancient Rome, it occurred at so
early a stage (the Twelve Tables are conventionally
dated 451-450 B.C.) that change and growth overran the
code, leaving it with only a formal dignity to which
lip-service was paid, but which had no practical
consequences. Maine suggests that it was because Hindu
law was committed to writing if not formally codified
after it had developed certain "cruel absurdities"
'w-
that it acted as a powerfully conservative force (Maine
1950: 15-17).
et
(7) Until the 'forties, District Commissioners enjoyed
and sometimes exercised tne powers of magistrates.
This meant that they were in a position to issue orders
in one capacity and in their other capacity try and
sentence those who disobeyed them. In a formal sense,
they were not unlike chiefs in this respect, but of
course their actions carried no inherent legitimacy
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and they were equally regarded as part of the colonial
ruling government in whichever capacity they acted.
(8) In common with other Southern Bantu peoples, the
Sotho found that settlers (in this case, the Boer
voortrekkere) interpreted the granting of permission to
use land, first as a transfer of ownership and then as
a surrender of sovereignty (Wilson and Thompson 1969:
364 ff., 405 ff.).
(9) The crucial distinction is perhaps worth underlining.
It is seen as the function of the judicial courts to
ascertain the existing rights of parties, whatever they
may be, and to declare and if necessary enforce them.
These courts do not have the competence to create,
extinguish or modify rights, this being the function of
administration. Hence, in a boundary (area) dispute,
it is the task of the judicial court to find out what
the lawful boundary is. This involves or may involve
adjudicating which chief it was who had the right to
make a boundary, and also whether subsequent alterations
of that boundary were lawfully or unlawfully made.
But the judicial court can neither make a boundary where
none exists, nor correct an unsatisfactory but lawfully
created one. Conversely, it is the function of
administration to create, extinguish or modify rights,
provided it does so within its delegated competence,
and the existing rights of parties are purely ancillary
to this process. Administration may, in other words,
weigh the existing rights as one factor in the case,
but must not allow itself to be bound by them in coming
to its decision. It will be argued that the polarity
thus set up is inappropriate in the Sotho context,
leading as it does to a rigid view of vested rights on
the one hand and to administrative arbitrariness on the
other.
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(10) This was the view expressed to me in. 1964 by Chief
Kelebone Nkuebe, an old man with great experience of
customary law and customary courts in Basutolana.
(11) The word lekhotla, besides meaning "court" in the
judicial and administrative senses, is also used of any
deliberative assembly (the National Council was the
Lekhotla la Lesotho) and in addition is applied to a
band or regiment of people or warriors. The Congress
Party (though usually referred to as "BCP" as in English
or as "Kongerese") is the Lekhotla la Mahatammoho, the
"court" of those who march together.
(12) The distinction overlaps with that between "formal"
and "substantive" justice though it is not identical with
it and has fewer evaluative implications. There are
many circumstances where the content of a rule is
virtually irrelevant, and only the fact of the rule
matters. This extends beyond such obvious cases as
rules laying down which side of the road is to be used
by motor vehicles, and is equally true of wide areas in,
for example, the law of contract. It is more important
that the parties to a contract should know what the
rules are, have access to authoritative and agreed
sources of decision in the case of a dispute, understand
the extent and limits of their power to alter the
assumptions of law, and recognise the area where the
law is silent than that the rules themselves should be
of one kind rather than another (cf. Hamnett 1961: 373 f.).
Formal justice, in fact, can be the vehicle of substantive
justice, and should not be regarded as necessarily
either hostile or indifferent to it.
(13) Banton (1965a: 34) refers to these as "general
roles". It should, however, be noted that Banton uses
the eoncept of differentiation in an idiosyncratic sense
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which is not followed here. The present approach relies
on Parsons 1939; 1954: ch.2.
For an account of the social organisation of the
Faculty of Advocates and the Court of Session based upon
an analysis of roles, see Wilson 1965.
(14) For rnelato ha e lefane, see Rankali v. Thelelisane
J.C. 162/60, Mosoeunyane v. Khomoeamollo J.C. 27/61
(where the maxim is quoted in terms by the A.C.III Court
at Leribe); Mokonyana v. Hoturni J.C. 102/61; Nonyana v.
Ralilochane J.C. 128/61. The Judicial Commissioner's
Court normally observed the precept in this maxim, but
was much more reluctant to accept that rr.olato ha o bole.
In Kafisa v. Hots'oene J.C. 305/49 a debt was described
as unenforceable after thirty or forty years. In
Dimema v. Velaphe J.C. 5/45, the Judicial Commissioner
even held that a creditor must prosecute his claim
during his lifetime. In Makibi v. Khosi J.C. 83/57,
the Judicial Commissioner refused to entertain a claim
dating back twenty-nine years. The doctrine adopted
was that the debt may not actually cease to be due, but
that the right to sue for it lapsed; this is not so
vacuous a distinction, in principle, as it may appear,
since it means that if the creditor can at any time
lawfully gain possession of what would settle the debt,
he is entitled to resist the debtor's claim for its
return (naturalis obligatio). In Kjeke v. Ranthiba
J.C. 61/59, the A.C.I Court at Matsieng refused to
entertain a claim for a debt going back for sixty years.
(Of course, in such cases the extreme difficulty of
proof can also provide a quite separate obstacle to
the claimant.)
(15) Other instances of Basotho Court behaviour that
conflict with "declaratory" norms include the following:
NOTES TO CHAPTER SEVEN (cont) 391
(15) cont.
Leabua v. P.O. J.C. 59/44 (the Paramount Chief's Court
threatened Leabua with loss of jurisdiction if he
continued to threaten the Paramount Chief; the court
in this case combined "judicial" and "administrative"
functions quite consciously; and it also emerged in the
course of the case that it refused to allow appeals to
proceed to the Judicial Commissioner in land disputes
until the Paramount Chief had confirmed the Court's
decision); Makhomo v. Lerotholi J.C. 75/45 (in the course
of a civil action, a crime came to light and a fine was
imposed by the Paramount Chief's Court; similarly in
Rachobane v. Khoarai J.C. 14/45); 'Makhoana v. Setho
J.C. 188/45 (the Paramount Chief administratively reversed
her own court's judgment); Jonathan v. Tumo J.C. 264/45
(the Paramount Chief's Court acted as though it had the
power to effect a "placing"); Korolong v. Borena J.C.
33/60 (in the absence of the prosecutor, the President
of Leribe A.C. Ill Court called and led the chieftainship
witness); Rakhoboso v. Nkaka. J.C. 49/51 (Paramount Chief's
Court ordered the equitable division of an estate, and
later called the cattle before the Court for division:
cf. Nthathakane J.C. 78/44 in text); Macolela v. Ntereke
J.C. 109/58 (the Basotho Court of first instance awarded
an article in dispute to the claimant, not the possessor,
thus "inverting the onus of proof"; cf. Mosothoane v.
Malefane J.C. 17/59, where a violently deprived landholder
was required to sue the person who evicted him);
Matjatumile v. Khale J.C. 237/54 (the plaintiff had
possession of a disputed beast, and went to the court to
have his right affirmed); Phiri J.C. 87/57 (the plaintiff
came to court claiming a land and put the defendant to
his proof); Laboroko J.C. 200/48 (one of a long line of
cases where the plaintiff asks the court to assess the
quantum of his claim; in Tlape v. Mosoabi J.C. 217/53
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the plaintiff was aware of the Judicial Commissioner's
insistence on a specified claim, and where the sum
involved was about £28 he sued for £59,600); kolato v.
Moeko J.C. 3/56 (a criminal case, where the prosecution
witnesses (PW) and defence witnesses (DW) were examined
and cross-examined (X) in the following order: PW 1,
DW 1, PW 1 X, DW 1 X, DW 2, DW 3, PW 3 X, PW 2, PW 2 X,
PW 2 X, DW 4, DW 4 X, PW 3, PW 3 X); Nkhasi v. Mansel
J.C. 241/53 (one of many divorce cases where the Basotho
Courts issued exhortations to the parties; the B Court
at Leribe said, "The Court does not find any reason why
it should divorce elderly persons like you, who should
lead an exemplary life, and who are due to have a
daughter-in-law to whom they must give moral instruction...
Go and keep peace and give a good example to your
children....").
(16) The relationship between the judicial and the
administrative spheres creates profound intellectual as
well as practical problems in modern jurisdictions.
An outstandingly perceptive discussion of the concept
of "justiciability" is to be found in Marshall 1961: passim
That the dilemma confronting administrative tribunals is
an omnipresent one, and not simply the product of Sotho
inexperience, is shown in Shapiro's illustration of the
way in which it is experienced in the contemporary United
States (Shapiro 1965). Arbitrary action is or may be
struck down by the courts on the grounds that it is
contrary to justice; but the establishment of rules and
the following of previous decisions carry the risk that
the administrative tribunal will have its findings
quashed by the courts on the ground that it has acted
"judicially". The difficulties seem much more acute in
the Anglo-American common law jurisdictions than in the
civilian and code-based continental systems, where the
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droit administratif and its analogues — so profoundly
misunderstood by Dicey — have made possible an alterna¬
tive approach (Dicey 1948: lxxi-xcv, 183-283; Wade 1961: 7f.).
The common-law tradition has been to seek ever more
delicate points of articulation between "law" and
"discretion", providing different institutional structures
for each and linking them only at the level, and within
the constraints, of review procedure.
(17) Customary law can perhaps be regarded as that sub¬
class of "executive law" that prevails in the absence
of writing and of a specialised legislature. Ethno-
graphically, it corresponds to the anthropological
cluster designated as "traditional monarchies" and is
found in conjunction with an economy and a system of
internal stratification marked by a limited but still
significant degree of differentiation. Analytically,
however, there is no justification for limiting the
general category of "executive law" to this particular
empirical case.
(18) See Chapter Five, note 24 and text, Chapter Six,
note 38 and text. Analysts of "judicial" or "declara¬
tory" systems, of course, correctly apply the same
judgment to them too: the difference, however, being that
in such systems practice contradicts theory (Stone 1964)
and an effective legislature is always present to supply
the deficiencies of either. In Basutoland, an attempt
was made to bring practice into line with a theory that
lacked the institutional support to render it plausible.
In the absence of a. responsive legislature, a "judicial"
system necessarily acts (as Coke wished it to) as an
unbendingly conservative sovereign, insulated from and
impervious to events, which are recognised only as extra¬
legal activities operating behind the barriers of admin¬
istrative discretion.
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(19) Review procedure usually concerns itself with
whether a decision was made "in good faith", and whether
the criteria of audiatur et altera oars and nemo sit
judex in causa sua were adhered to. The remedy is
normally to remit the matter for reconsideration by the
competent authority rather than to substitute an alter¬
native decision.
(20) This is the tendency of both Marxist and positivist
"social control" conceptions of the normative universe of
action. Marxism, at least in its more sophisticated
forms, has the merit of acknowledging the reality of
legitimacy, while characterising it (often very convinc¬
ingly) as "false consciousness"; the theoretical
difficulty here is that it is not easy to see what
criterion of falseness can itself escape the toils of
"consciousness" in the end: and if none can, then what
it can be that enables the judgment to be made.
Malinowskian positivism, on the other hand, simply fails
to take seriously the specificity of law itself, since
it has no means of handling the problem of consciousness
at all. Durkheim (1912) confronted the same issues in
his study of religion, and although his solution is
certainly highly vulnerable, it offers insights into an
anthropology or sociology of law that deserve exploration.
Much of Elementary ^orms could be reformulated as an
analysis of law in society, with the "normative" replac¬
ing the "sacred" as the organising concept. The
substitution of "mediations" for "interdictions" (taboos)
would provide a conceptual bridge between orders of
reality which are related in a way that Durkheim was
aware of but which, in his anxiety to underline the
dichotomies of religious action, he never adequately
explained. But the issue is, as he recognised, one of
linkages between discrete orders of social reality, not
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points along a continuum. Social control doctrines,
whether of a positivist or vulgar-Marxist kind, fall
short of the reality of law, just as the doctrines of
his contemporaries fell short, in Durkheim's eyes, of
the reality of religion.
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APPENDIX ONE
Some Pootnotes on Kinship and Affinity *
1. Sibling Terminology
The basic rule is that siblings of like sex and
siblings of opposite sex are distinguished. The term
of address ngoaneso will be used by male EGO to male
ALTER and by female ego to female alter. EGO will use
khaitseli to female alter, and ego will use it to male
ALTER. Ngoaneso is also used as a term of address to
parallel cousins (matrilateral and patrilateral of the
same sex according to the same rule, as is khaitseli
between parallel cousins of opposite sex. Cross-cousins,
however, are addressed (and referred to) as motsoala
(pi. batsoala), without any necessary discrimination of
sex.
The literal meaning of ngoaneso is "child of my
place". The plural — "children of my place", "my
These footnotes are intended to supplement and
not to replace the already published material (e.g.,
Ashton 1967: 324 ff.). They reflect the evidence
I encountered, and make no claim to be either
definitive or unfalsifiable. The generalisations
attempted are offered as suggestions or hypotheses
that invite both more evidence and further analysis.
r 3 9
brothers" — is bana beso. The second and third
person terms are ngoaneno (pi. bana beno) and ngoanabo
(bana babo) respectively. Thus, it can be said that
two men are bana babo of a third man. But if it is
desired to say that two (or more) men are brothers
(sc., of each other) then they are described as bana
ba motho, "children of one person". The "person"
may, of course, be more than one generation removed,
as in the case of parallel cousins, and also of the
children of parallel cousins (who are also bana ba
motho since their fathers address each other as ngoaneso)
Thus, where two persons are so related that they use
ngoaneso to each other, the relationship persists into
the next generation, whereas where they use khaitseli
it is replaced by the term motsoala. (Basotho when
speaking English translate ngoaneso by "brother" or
occasionally "cousin-brother", and khaitseli by "sister"
etc., using the unqualified "cousin" exclusively for
batsoala.) The saying, "motsoala oa hao ke mosali oa
hao" ("your cross-cousin is your wife"), brings out
the distinction clearly; although parallel-cousin
marriage (particularly with PBd) has been practised
more especially among the higher chieftainship for
"strengthening of the blood", it is not a generally
approved practice (at least in theory), and it would
certainly be inconceivable to substitute khaitseli
for motsoala in the saying quoted.
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2. Affinal terminology
A man uses the term mosali (woman) of his own wife
(and descriptively of another man's wife). He also
uses it of or to the wife of any man whom he calls
ngoaneso, e,g», Bw, FBSw, mzSw. Similarly, a woman
calls her husband monna (man), and uses this term to the
husband of any woman whom she calls ngoaneso, e.g..,
zH, FBdH. A man will also use mosali to the sister
of his wife, and to the sister of his brother's wife
(Bwz); and a woman will use monna to her husband's
brother, or her sister's husband's brother (zHB).
The terms mOMA/mosali are thus reciprocal, and are
used where the sibling links are between persons of
like sex, including relationships between parallel
cousins. It is not used where the sibling link is
between persons of opposite sex, or where the link is
between cross-cousins (whether of the same sex or not);
e.g.., ego will not use monna to her Bw3, HzH, FzdH, etc.
and EGO will not use mosali to his zllz, wBw, FzSw, etc.
Male EGO will use the term mofobe of or to a man
who has married a woman whom EGO's wife calls ngoaneso;
e.g., wzH. More simply, the term mofobe is used
between men who have married sisters. It would also
be used by a man to his BwzH, since he calls his Bwz
mosali. It will be noted that here again the sibling
links are between persons of like sex, and that though
these may be replaced by parallel cousin links of like
399
sex, this is not true of cross-cousin links whether
of like sex or not.
As mofobe is used between men who have married
sisters, so molamo is used between women who have
married brothers: female ego will use molamo of and to
her HBw, and similarly her EBwz. But here the paral¬
lelism stops, since molamo is used also (and indeed
primarily) for brother's wife (Bw) and husband's sister
(Hz), whereas male EGO does not use mofobe for zH or wB.
In other words, molamo can be used across a sibling link
of unlike sex whereas mofobe cannot. However, at the
level of cousins, the two terms are similar in that
neither term can be used of cross-cousins, though molamo,
unlike mofobe, can be used across parallel cousins of
unlike sex (mzSw, FBSw).
Molamo is also used to zHz (Bwz); but such evidence
as could be gathered suggested that it is not used of,
for example, BwBw or its reciprocal HzHz. It is inter¬
esting to notice that these relationships involve not
one but two sibling links of unlike sex.
In all cases where a cross-cousin's spouse or a
spouse's cross-cousin is in question, the term motsoala
is used (with or without a qualification such as monna
oa mostoala or mosali oa motsoala).
The account so far has omitted many important and
universal relationships, e.g., male EGO to zH, zHz, zHB,
wB, and female ego to BwB, HzH. The term used in such
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relationships is soare, and in the logic of the present
analysis this represents a residual class, accommodating
all relationships where the terms monna, mosali, mofobe,
molamo and motsoala are excluded. For instance, whereas
molamo (unlike mofobe) can, as has been seen, "survive"
one sibling link of unlike sex, it does not survive two
such links, and at that point soare is used; and when
the link of like sex in the wzH (mofobe) relationship is
replaced by a link of unlike sex (BwB or wB), again soare
is used- (It is interesting to observe that the word
soare (also sebare) is the Sotho-ised form of the
Afrikaans swaer. This does not, in fact, diminish its
analytical significance, since many Afrikaans words have
become completely Sotho-ised and incorporated into the
language as Sotho words. Ashton is right to include
without apology such kinship terms as soare, aubuti and
ausi in his lists (Ashton 1967: 325). Many Afrikaans
words have been adopted since there were no others
available, e.g., borogo, bridge (from brug) and toropo,
town, (dorp); but some have extruded an existing word:
e.g., pere (from Afrikaans perd), meaning horse, has
largely replaced the Sotho pitsi. Sotho-isation is so
complete that where the first syllable of a foreign word
resembles a Sotho noun prefix, the plural is formed by
changing the prefix: thus the Afrikaans skool (school),
having been Sotho-ised as sekolo, takes the plural form
likolo, according to the normal rule for Class 4 nouns
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(classes 7 and 8 in Meinhof's classification: Doke
1954: 52). The plural of soare is bo-soare, on the
same rule as malome (mB), pi. bo-malome, 'mangoane (mz),
pi. bo-'mangoane, etc.,)
What has been attempted here has been to extract
some structural form from the apparently random
affinal terms as simply "listed". While it is not
maintained that the usages described are all always
uniformly observed, the best evidence available supported
the account that has been given. The analysis depends,
as has been seen, on projecting the distinction between
like and unlike sibling links (central to the ngoaneso/
khaitseli terminology, and to the differentiation of
parallel and cross cousins) into affinal relationships.
A pattern thus emerges which enables the somewhat
complex "rules" suggested above to be presented in a
simple and ordered form. In the tables that follow,
the letters NG mean that the link is across siblings
of like sex, and KH that it is across siblings of
unlike sex. Capitals are used where the person addressed
is male, lower case where she is female. (It should
be remembered, as stated above, that cross-cousins and
cross-cousin links are a separate matter and do not
form part of this analysis.)
TABLii. A
1. Man speaking to woman or vice versa
a) NG: mosali, MONKA
b) KH: soare, SOARE
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2. Man speaking to man
a) NG; MOFOBE
to) KH: SOARE
3, a) KG OR EH; molamo
b) KH, KH; soare
A more economical presentation still reduces the
cases from six to five;
TABLE B
1. Man speaking
a) NG; mosali, MOfilMA
b) KH; soare, SOARE
2. Woman speaking
a) EG; MOUHA, molamo
b) KH; SOARE, molamo
c) KH, KH; soare
(See also the diagrammatic representation in fig»l, "A
Structure for the Sotho terminology of affinee.'1)
A particularly interesting feature of the system
is the fact that, as shown, mofobe and molamo are not
mirror images of each other. At the most general level,
this failure in isomorphism is an instance of the
anthropological platitude that there is a basic asymmetry
in the structuring of male and female roles; a patrilineal
system is not transformed into a matrilineal system
simply by the reversal of terms (Levi-Strauss 1969).
Thus, in the Sesotho context, the fact that molamo
continues to be used in relationships where mofobe is
not, is a function of the structural position of women
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in the system. A woman is a member of her brother's
(father's) group, or of her husband's, or of both.
Moreover, her incorporation into a group, whether by
birth or marriage, is unevenly weighted, in that it is
the brother's or the husband's group that incorporates
the woman who is incorporated. It can be argued that,
within her family of origin, the "unity of the sibling
group" brings a woman into so close a relationship
with her brother that the sibling bond "carries through",
across the unlikeness of sex between herself and her
brother. But because of the passive nature of her
incorporation, it does not follow that her relationship
to him and through him is the same as his relationship
to her and through her (see Goodenough's warning on
the.danger of attempting to "read off" reciprocities
from one side of a relationship on to the other:
Goodenough 1965: 8 and passim). Where the relationship
in question is not of the monna-mosali type (e.g., zH),
one of her links will necessarily be across a sibling
bond of unlike sex (KH-type link). It is as though
one KH-type link were "taken for granted" in the system
so far as women are concerned, so that "molamo" fails
only when there are a plurality of such links. But a
man, as the immediate bearer of relationships and the
agent of active incorporation, is as it were not "allowed"
even one, so that across even a single KH-type link,
"mofobe" fails.
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The survival of the sibling link between LGO and z
(ego and B) after the sister's marriage, is reflected in
the special relationship that exists between malome (mB)
and mochana (as, zd) — a relationship already celebrated
in the literature (Radcliffe-Brown 1952: 15-31) and too
familiar to need further explicit documentation here
(cf. Sekese 1962: 35, 59, 60f., 66, 69; Duncan I960:
25f.J Laws of Lerotholl (1959) Part I, s.5; see also
the following sections of this appendix). This suggests
how the z-B link continues to structure affinal termin¬
ology after the sister's (and not only after the brother's)
marriage, and offers an explanation of the fact that a
woman is, so to speak, "credited" with one KH-type bond,
where a man is not.
This approach impliedly and perhaps somewhat
uncritically accepts the "complementary filiation"
rather than the "alliance" frame of reference (Dumont
1957, Fortes 1959, Leach 1961 etc.); but until some
means can be found of locating a structure in the use
of affinal terms that does not depend centrally on the
ngoaneso/khaitseli discrimination, the present approach
seems the most satisfactory, and the most theoretically
parsimonious. Of course, it may be that there is no
"structure" in the matter at all; but this is the last
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3. Some Forms of the "malome" relationship
f
Figures 2 to 5 illustrate some cases of what may be called
"malome variants", where EGO is classified as "sister's son" (mo-
chana) to his FBwB, FmBS, FBwBSw and mmBS respectively. The
malome is indicated by ^ or Q in each case. (Note that a
woman cab be malome, but only through marriage.)
a) FBwB
EGO
If FB is elder brother of EGO's F, he is ntate moholo to EGO,
the same term being used for FF. The wife of EGO's ntate moholo
is his nkhono (used also for Fm, mm), so that her brother is a
kind of mB, i.e., a malome. Further, EGO's FBwB is malome to










Since FmB is malome to EGO's F, then FmBS is by parallelism










In b) above, EGO's malome is his nkhono's brother's son (FmBS).
Here, the nkhono is the paternal aunt by marriage, the wife of EGO's
ntate moholo (F(elder)Bw). EGO's FBwBS and his wife can thus be
a kind of bo-malome to EGO. This is the only explanation that seems






EGO's mmBS can be regarded as a malome. This is contrary to the
"rule" that the child of a khaitseli is a mochana (complementary to
malome), whereas the child of a mochana is ngoanaka (complementary to
ntate). The explanation appears to be that mmBS retains something of
the quality of mB, since the two lines are related in this configur¬
ation. Since mmB is clearly malome to m, by parallelism mmBS is malome
to mS, viz., to EGO. But whereas in b) the parallelism was through
a male, here it appears to be through a female. This is an authentic¬
ated instance that was thoroughly explored, and no relationship exist¬





4. The malome in cross-cousin marriage
The '"normal" flow of bohali is from malome to mochana, in that
the malome commonly helps his sister's son on the latter's marriage
and has a claim to a share of the cattle received for the marriage
of his sister's daughter (lits 'oa: cf. Laws of Lerotholi Part I, 1959
ed., sec. 5). Where EGO marries mBd, however, the direction is
reversed, bohali passing from mochana to malome; hence the latter
will often reduce the amount of bohali by paying some himself.
Leshoboro Seeiso, Principal Chief of Likhoele and half-brother
to the Paramount Chief, married his cross-cousin, the daughter of
Chief Khethisa Tau. Bohali was fixed at fifty head (this being a
high chiefly marriage), of which Khethisa "paid" ten himself.
(It will be seen that KHETHISA and 'Ma-Leshoboro are parallel cous¬
ins, since their mothers were sisters. They are therefore khai-









The Dispute over the Chieftainship of Patlong
This is an account of the action raised by Mpiti
Sekake against Mitchell Tautona and Chieftainess •Ma-
ntoetse (Sekake v. Tautona J,C. 15/59) over the chief¬
tainship of Patlong. It raises many questions relat¬
ing to "public*1 and "private" succession and inherit¬
ance, illustrating several themes discussed in the text,
especially in Chapters Two and Five. Genealogies of
the principal actors in the case are attached, which
also reveal the main elements in the lineage structure
involved (see fig.s 1 to 3), (Some of the wider back¬
ground can be found in Jones 1966: 64ff., 74ff.)
Patlong is an important chieftainship within the
Principal Ward of Rats*oleli and Mashai (Qacha*s Nek),
where the Principal Chief in the relevant period was
David Theko Makhaola. It is ruled by the senior seg¬
ment of the Mosothoane maximal lineage, whose principal
"nested" segments for the purposes of the case are those
of Makoae, Sekake and Sehapa.
Sehapa Sekake (Sekake I as marked on the genea¬
logy and as named in the following account of the case,
but the second chief of Patlong with that name) had two
sons in his first house, Tautona (the elder) and Sekake








































































































































































































PRINCIPAL LINEAGE SEGMENTS IN SEKAKE v.. TAUTONA
had five wives in the following order of seniority:
(1) 'Matsatsane (Lefa) (2) Liketseng (3) 'Mathabo
(4) 'Mantoetse (5) 'Masebueng. (There is some
evidence of a further wife, Mats'eliso, between the
first and the second on this list.)
At Tautona's death in 1928, there was no male
issue in the first or second house. In the third
house there was an infant son, Thabo, who died shortly
afterwards in 1929. The fourth and fifth houses
were also barren of male issue in 1928. However, in
1933, 'Mantoetse in the fourth house became the mother
of Mitchell, the child of a union between herself and
her late husband's younger brother Sekake II (who also
acted as regent for the young child Thabo in the short
interval between Tautona's death and the boy's).
By his own marriage, Sekake had a son, Mpiti, who
raised the action here discussed.
Tautona's marriage in his fourth house forms an
important element in the case. He lived irregularly
with a woman called Potlako, who was herself the wife
of one Ntlarna Tlhakanelo. It was alleged that
Tautona married 'Mantoetse into the same house (his
fourth) as a ngoetsi or subsidiary wife to Potlako,
apparently at the latter's insistence.
The Chieftainship of Patlong passed in 1935 to
'Mathabo, Tautona's third wife, and she reigned in
her own right until her execution in 1952. However,
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she attempted during the course of her reign to raise
an heir to the chieftainship in her own house "by
entering into a woman-marriage with Mpho, who in due
course gave birth to a child, Sekake III, whom
•Mathabo sought to have recognised as her successor.
(An alternative view is that 'Mathabo married Mpho to
the grave of her dead son Thabo.) •Mathabo's action,
which she justified on the grounds that, as full
chieftainess, she "was Tautona" and "ate" all his
rights, was accepted by some of the sons of Makoae
but opposed by others.
There thus emerged three possible claimants to
the chieftainship: Mpiti, Tautona and Sekake III.
The dispute, however, is dominated by the first two of
these, and the history of their rivalry, together with
the arguments which each side marshalled, forms the
subject of these pages.
The first record is of a dispute between Sekake II
and Chieftainess fMathabo in 1941. It appears from
the judgment of the Civil Appeal Court that Sekake had
been convicted and fined by the Paramount Chief for
an assault on 'Mathabo. This was provoked, according
to Sekake, by the chieftainess•s dalliance with an
outsider, one Rahlolo, which Sekake regarded as an
affront to him as male head of the family with kenelo
(levirate) rights over her. At the time, Sekake II
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was also 'Mathabo*s principal counsellor (letona, right
hand). The conviction was upheld.
In October 1949, 'Mathabo appears to have attempted
some form of coup on behalf of her "son" Sekake III.
When this failed, as a result of opposition from the
Sons of Makoae, she had recourse to the Chief's Courts
against her rival •Mantoetse. At some point in the
early 1950's, 'Mantoetse and 'Mathabo took their dispute
to the court of the Principal Chief of Qacha's Nek.
Prom the judgment of the court it is apparent that
'Mathabo named her sons in order of succession as Sekake
III, then Mitchell, then Mitchell's two younger brothers
in the house of 'Mantoetse. She thus assumed all the
children of Tautona's houses as her sons (she being
chieftainess) and ranked them in order of seniority.
Against this, it was argued that the custom of woman
marriage was illegal, and that even if it were not,
Mpho would be no more than an insignificant wife, a
"broom" or lefielo, in the house of Makoae, and her .son
could not be heir. The banna ba lekhotla (men of the
court) at Qacha's Nek rejected 'Mathabo's claim, arguing
somewhat inconsistently that there was insufficient
evidence of woman-marriage for it to be accepted as
legitimate custom, and also that such marriages had
been a source of incessant unrest in the nation. (It
may be that the second part of this argument related to
"secondary" marriages in general, while the first
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referred more narrowly to woman-marriages.) Mitchell
was accepted as the son of 'Mantoetse, whose possible
•
status as ngetsi to Potlako (was was already married to
another man, as has been seen) was not brought in as an
issue.
The records then show that in 1952, following
•Mathabo's execution, the Principal Chief called upon
the "family" in its wide sense — the Sons of Mosothoane —
to propose a successor. In November of that year,
Patlong ward reported back to the chief that "the family
gives you Mpiti Sekake as the guardian of Mitchell
Tautona", adding that "a group of the people, being men
of Patlong, gives you Mpiti Sekake to be chief, not
guardian". Thirty-nine voices were raised for the
first of these motions, and thirty-six for the second.
But it was stressed that "we do not consider the number
of votes, but we of the family wish to inform you that
there have been different opinions," and the Chief was
invited to convene a further meeting in Patlong if he
i
wished to hear for himself►
The chief acted swiftly. Within a week or two,
he sent three representatives to Patlong, who were
present at a meeting of the Pons of Mosothoane and of
the people of Patlong. The chairman was Kali Sekake,
a junior son in Sekake's house, who had been appointed
as Acting Chief after 'Mathabo's arrest and imprisonment
awaiting trial. Mpho, 'Kantoetse and Mpiti were among
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those who spoke. Mpho seems simply to have declared
her position as having been married into 'Mathabo's
house and having born an heir to the chieftainship in
the person of Sekake III. 'Mantoetse argued for
Mitchell, as heir to the second house, there being no
male issue in the first. Mpiti, for reasons which
the record does not disclose, appears to have acknowledged
Mitchell as heir, with himself as the second in line.
Some difference expressed itself between the Sons of
Makoae, or a large group of them, in favour of Mitchell,
and a wider section of the people of Patlong (supported
by a smaller Makoae faction) in favour of Mpiti. The
Principal Chief appears to have favoured Mitchell, or
at least discountenanced Mpiti. The upshot was (at
least according to Kali Makoae's report) that the sons
of Mosothoane agreed that Mitchell was successor and
that Mpiti was to act for him until his majority.
They went on to propose Mitchell as the successor of
his own father, Sekake II, as chief of Thabana-Ts'ooana
(White Hill), a major headmanship within the ward of
Patlong. The Principal Chief's representatives
reported this latter proposition back, while acknowledg¬
ing that it was not part of the original brief. Por
the rest, at all events, it is clear that Chief Kakhaola
accepted the report and acknowledged Mitchell as heir,
with Mpiti a.s regent and guardian.
However, this outcome failed to satisfy either
'Mantoetse, who did not welcome Mpiti as guardian to
her son, or Mpiti himself, who now reasserted (if indeed
he had ever in fact withdrawn) his claim to full chief¬
tainship.. However that may he, Kpiti declined to
come before his chief, Kakhaola, for confirmation in
any junior capacity, and in July 1953 made an open bid
for control by assuming the chieftainship of Patlong.
The dispute that this action sparked off came before
the Paramount Chief in January 1955, and the case was
heard by two senior chiefs (one of them Leshoboro,
Principal Chief of Majara's and heir to Moshoeshoe's
fourth "cardinal" line).
A major preoccupation of the court was the fact
(admitted on all sides) that 'Mathabo had been appointed
as Chieftainess in her own right, not as regent, and
that she had continued in this position till her death.
Mpiti argued that this was an implicit denial of
Mitchell's claim, since if there were in fact a direct
male heir to the late chief, viz., Mitchell, then 'Ma¬
thabo would have been only a regent for that heir
(women become full chiefs only if there is no male son)..
Accordingly, in the absence of such an heir (as implied
by 'Mathabo's status as full chief) the proviso in
Laws of Lerotholi (1946) sec.2 applied, in terms of
which "if a chief dies leaving no male issue, the
chieftainship shall devolve upon the male following
according to the succession of houses". This, according
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to Mpiti, would have brought the succession to his
father Sekake II, and thence to him.
The Paramount Chief's court neatly countered this
brilliant initiative of Mpiti's by pointing out that
'Mathabo's proclamation as a chieftainess in her own
right actually negated Mpiti's argument, since Tautona's
chieftainship had not in fact passed to Sekake II.
Moreover, the Laws of Lerotholi were silent on questions
of posthumous children, and did not therefore exclude
the succession of such. The court went further, and
opined that even if Mpiti were right in hie theory of
fraternal succession, this was a custom falling into
desuetude and no longer a determinant of succession.
The published Laws of Lerotholi were described as "a
mere declaration of custom, rather than laws" and, as
a declaration, could be overtaken by change. They
then rather abruptly switched their direction, and
asserted that the law of posthumous succession held
good, no matter what a new-fangled declaration might
purport to say. (No doubt the Judges were somewhat
embarrassed by the fact that Paramount Chief Griffith's
succession was a case both of fraternal succession and
of the rejection of a posthumously conceived son.)
The decision was, therefore, unequivocally for Mitchell,
Mpiti being stripped even of his position as regent
and guardian; 'Mantoetse was appointed in his place.
But before Mitchell's confirmation and Mpiti's
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rejection were confirmed, the Resident Commissioner and
the Paramount Chief (the latter no doubt acting at the
former's instance) agreed to allow Mpiti an opportunity
to test his claim once more in the courts, Mitchell's
nomination continuing to be accepted for administrative
purposes meanwhile, but without prejudice to Mpiti's
eventual rights. The case was obviously one for the
Basotho Courts, and was assigned to a Special Court
under the experienced president A.I). Maime, which met
at Qacha's Nek in November and December 1957. An
account of this hearing now follows.
After a fairly uncontroversial rehearsal of some
basic facts, Mpiti presented his case by arguing that
Mitchell was not lawfully born to 'Mantoetse in such
a way to entitle him to succeed to the chieftainship.
In fact, Mpiti asserted, he was in law the child of
Potlako, and Ntlama's son by cattle. He elaborated
this assertion by explaining that 'Mantoetse had been
married with cattle taken as fines from men who had
committed adultery with Potlako, who was of course the
husband not of Tautona but of Ntlarna, to whom the
cattle in law belonged. This became one of the central
grounds of Mpiti's case, and was argued this way and
that throughout the proceedings. Mpiti would also rely
on what he alleged to be the defects inherent in a
kenelo birth, but his more radical attack was designed
to challenge the lawfulness of 'Mantoetse's marriage to
Mitchell's father. If she had been married for
Potlako, she could have no greater marital status than
the latter, who was no wife at all. The irregularities
alleged in Tautona's use of cattle were brought in as
still further proof that the marriage was unlawful.
But before leading evidence on the facts, Mpiti
introduced Chief Goliath Lets'abisa Senate Malebanye
Moshoeshoe, the celebrated ward chief of Likoeneng and
supposed genitor of Makhaola Letsie by one of the widows
of Paramount Chief letsie II. Goliath appeared as an
expert witness, to speak to the law of the matter, and
denied any knowledge of the particular facts under
dispute. But this was somewhat disingenuous, since
it was known, and emerged before the court, that Mpho
(the genetrix of Sekake III) was the daughter of
Goliath's junior brother Jagersfontein. He himself
was born to Senate's daughter, Lets'abisa, who cohabited
with one Kalebanye; no bohali was paid by the latter
or accepted by Letsie, so that Goliath remained in the
house of his mother. (Senate herself as related in
Chapter Two was at first intended to be the mother of
the Paramount, and no cattle were paid for her union
with Joseph Molapo.)
Much of the earlier part of Goliath's evidence
was in fact a display of legal and historical virtuosity
and backed his claim to expert knowledge and long
experience in the adjudication of question of succession
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On the question of kenelo, he stated that posthumous
children were incorporated into the family of the
woman to whom they were born, since a child is
begotten by cattle — "belched by a beast". However,
when a woman is seduced, if the husband sues the
seducer and receives a fine of cattle, the child is
legitimised but cannot be an heir. Alternatively,
the bohali can be restored and the wife dismissed;
in this case, she takes the child with her and he
belongs to his mother's people. Goliath seems also
(in the light of subsequent comment from witnesses
and the court) to have expressed the view that a
posthumous child can be heir to an inheritance (lefa)
but not successor to a chieftainship. It is not
quite clear whether he was in fact expressing this
view, or rather distinguishing between the issue of
a "true kenelo union and the child of a less regular
liaison.
He went on to say that when a chief takes out
cattle from a particular house to get himself another
wife, the woman so acquired is the wife of that house;
but that if he takes them from the unallocated portion
of his herd, then he can place the new wife in any
house, or establish her in one of her own.
Goliath, professing to take the facts as he was
told them, gave it as his opinion that the cattle
for 'Mantoetse had been taken from Potlako's kraal,
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and that she had therefore been married to Potlako's
"house"; but since Potlako was not the true wife of a
house, 'Mantoetse was no wife either, Mitchell was not
the true fruit of kenelo, and the succession passed
through Sekake II to Mpiti.
The rest of Mpiti's witnesses testified to the
facts of the case. Kokhele Chitja, a self-confessed
but plausible thief, agreed that 'Mantoetse had been
married for Potlako, and that the cattle paid for her
were those of Potlako's kraal, including those that
had been taken as fines for adulteries. Potlako was
not married to Tautona; and in fact, when Tautona
himself had been fined at Ntlama's behest for his own
adultery with her, she had pretended to go home to her
husband with the fines, but in fact had absconded and
gone back to Tautona, bringing the cattle with her.
(Chitja explained that he did not mean "cattle with
hooves"; in fact, there were four horses and £40 in
cash, but he adopted the common Basotho convention of
referring to all payments in certain kinds of trans¬
action as "cattle".)
•Malefa, the next witness, was another woman who
had been married into Potlako's establishment, and
confirmed that it was Potlako who had chosen 'Mantoetse,
although Tautona had wanted to take another woman.
'Masebueng, the last of Tautona's wives, had little of
interest to say.
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She was followed by Mpho, the mother of Sekake III,
who testified that 'Mathabo had taken her "as a womb"
for the third house, to raise up an heir to the chief¬
tainship; she claimed that the sons of Sekake had
deprived her house of its rights. Like several
witnesses, Kpho put up a singularly unconvincing
pretence of ignorance, even claiming that it was only
on the day the case opened in court that she was aware
that the chieftainship was being disputed. Admittedly,
she had no love for either Mpiti or Mitchell, but her
protestations of ignorance and impartiality were clearly
largely due to her anxiety not to prejudice her position
for the future.
Bolepeletsa, who followed, was not so much a
supporter of Mpiti as an adviser and confidant of
'Mathabo, and was called as a witness because he was
opposed to Mitchell. His view, however, was that
Mitchell was the successor and heir in his own house,
but that the chieftainship could not pass to him.
He thus took up a less radical position than those who
denied Mitchell's filiation altogether.
Chief Phalo Phatela, senior headman at Sekitsing
in the Principal Chiefdom of Phamong (Mohale's Hoek)
and a Son of Mosothoane like the others, testified that
Tautona had taken adultery fines for Potlako and used
them to marry 'Mantoetse into Potlako's house.
'Mantoetse was thus never a wife. He also maintained
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that the custom of kenelo was falling into disuse,
though he did not draw any distinction between inheri¬
tance and succession, and did not consider the argument
that the relevant date for the alleged desuetude of
kenelo was 1933, uot 1957.
Mitchell Tautona then opened his case on the other
side. Most of his own evidence followed a predictable
pattern. He affirmed that as Tautona's son by kenelo
he was heir to Patlong, and that Mpiti had at first
accepted this. He maintained that he had been installed
as chief shortly after 'Mathabo's death and denied that
he had either been under 'Mantoetse's guardianship or
been installed merely as an acting chief.
He called 'Mantoetse as his first witness. The
essential part of her testimony related, of course,
to her own marriage. She pointed out that Mpiti's
father Sekake II had lived with her leviratically after
Tautona's death, thus implicitly acknowledging the
validity of her marriage. And she claimed that 'Mathabo,
as chieftainess, had never objected to this. Mpiti,
she said, had without protest even used 'Mathabo's
cattle in 'Mantoetse's house, which he would not have
done had he declined to recognise her as Tautona's widow.
But she admitted that Potlako was not Tautona's wife,
though she went on to claim that she herself had never
formed part of Potlako's establishment. She had been
brought up as a wife by 'Matsatsane, and misunderstandings
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could have arisen since Potlako had also at one time
had a sleeping hut in the same enclosure. Her,
'Mantoetse' s, ovm marriage was a lawful marriage by-
cattle and was independent of Potlako, and her son
Tautona was the lawful chief.
Mitchell's mother was followed by Kali Makoae,
of a junior house in Kekake's lineage and senior headman
at Maboloka within the ward of Patlong; he had acted
as chief during 'Mathabo's trial and had been chairman
of the meeting held in 1952 of which an account has
already been given. It was he who first now testified
that Mpho was a brother's daughter to Chief Goliath.
He stated that the family had objected to 'Mathabo's
arrangement with Mpho, not so much on general principles
as because Tautona's wife 'Mantoetse had born her son
Mitchell, thus making it unnecessary to resort to
special means to raise up a successor. He went on to
speak about Mpiti's private life and conduct, bringing
into the open certain matters that had only been hinted
at before, all more or less to Mpiti's discredit.
Mpiti had, in fact, been convicted on several occasions
of fairly slight offences. He was also disapproved
of for living at a beer-hall and for having married a
t
Griqua wife; in Kali's view, this virtually disqualified
him from passing on the chieftainship.
Kali was quite ready to agree that Potlako was not
a ^vife of Tautona, but of Ntlama. 'Mantoetse's marriage
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to Tautona, however, wag not affected by anything that
Potlako did or was. Vvhore, thief and self-seeker,
she was regretted by no one (though Mpiti's failure to
call her as a witness was held against him when the
court came to consider its decision).
The Principal Chief of Qacha's Nek, Theko Makhaola,
came next. He confined himself largely to formal
evidence, and while affirming the fact of Mitchell's
appointment, showed every sign of standing aloof from
the dispute — "I have tried my best to get to the root
of this trouble, but without success". (It emerged,
however, that Mitchell's wife was a daughter of Theko's
junior brother Makhaola.)
The next witness was Molaoli Sekake, a subject and
kinsman of Kali's at Maboloka. He added little of
substance to what had gone before, but was called as a
member of the house of Makoae who had been present at
the critical meetings of the Sons of Mosothoane and
could speak to what had taken place there. Sekake
Posholi, a son of Sekake, followed and confirmed that
'Mathabo's attempt to promote Sekake III had been
rejected by the family. He averred that 'Mantoetse
was Tautona's wife and denied that the cattle taken out
for her had belonged to Potlako.
The headman of Kolo-la-Tso'ene, Moeketi Mapheelle,
followed and introduced some new factors. According
to him — and he claimed close acquaintance with Tautona
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'Mantoetse's father Eantebale had not only demanded
the high bohali of twenty-three beasts for his daughter,
but had asked to have them all at once. He also
stated that it had been Tautona's first wife, 'Matsatsane,
who had asked her husband to look after Potlako (her
younger sister), since she was unhappy with Ntlama.
The cattle paid as fines for Potlako were used by
Tautona to provide bohali for junior sons of Sekake,
instead of being kept as chieftainship beasts and kraaled
at 'Mathabo's, where the chieftainess could use their
milk and dung. He went on to deny that 'Mathabo had
any original right to the chieftainship of Patlong (he
had been engaged in a dispute with her over Kolo-la-
Ts'oene) and advanced the interesting proposition that
a man who consorted with a concubine was entitled to
the adultery fines taken on her behalf, if the woman's
husband or lover did not claim them. (There is some
ambiguity in this. One view — the older one — is
that fines are kept by the chief, who will usually pass
on a proportion to the injured person. The more
modern view is that they are in fact damages, and go to
the injured person direct. Moeketi's evidence seems
to try to argue in both ways, but to be consistent with
neither.) He agreed that Potlako was not Tautona's wife.
Motloang Phatela's evidence added little, unless
the record is correct in attributing to him the statement
that Mitchell was a son of 'Mathabo, since he was the
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child of her late husband Tautona. This probably was
his argument, since he went on to discuss (though with¬
out answering) the question of whether 'Mathabo had
specifically sought a kenelo union for 'Mantoetse.
This opened a new road for Mitchell: suggesting that
he could claim as heir to the late Chieftainess 'Mathabo
as well as to Tautona himself. However, Motloang
hedged his bets by asserting ignorance of whether
Mitchell had been born before or after Tautona's death.
His testimony was followed by a remarkable display of
know-thingism by Sejanamane, the major headman of
Mphahama's (Pheellong). His repudiation of any know¬
ledge of anything culminated in the memorable assertion
that "I have no knowledge of Basotho law and custom".
One of his problems was that he was clearly in great
awe of his chief, 'Mants'ebo Seisa (who was no connect¬
ion of the Paramount Chieftainess 'Mants'ebo Seeiso);
she was the widow of his senior brother, and Sejanamane
did not like to suggest anything that might in any way
be taken as a challenge to her rights. But the temptat¬
ion seems to have been present in his mind.
The evidence of Sera Paso, a junior son of Mosothoane
under Phatela (but not considered of the "family"),
underlined the point that 'Mathabo's seed-raising by
Mpho was superfluous since an heir already existed in
the person of Mitchell, whom she could have adopted;
and in other respects he supported the other witnesses
429
for the defendant.
Mitchell's last witness was Mopeli Makoko, headman
of Qhoalinyane in the ward of Patlong, and heir to
Sekake I's second house. (He was one of the signator¬
ies of the letter sent to Makhaola in November 1952
reporting that the "family" favoured Mitchell; Chief
Phalo Phatela (Mpiti's witness) had also signed the
letter, but later alleged that he had been coerced into
doing so by Mopeli.) He firmly repeated what had
been said before, stressing the rejection of Sekake
III and underlining that the great bulk of the Sons of
Mosothoane had given their support to Mitchell. Mopeli
also stressed that 'Mathabo was not entitled to take
any decisions on her own, and that her purported marriage
to Mpho was unacceptable because she had acted without,
or against, the authority of the Sons of Sekake. On
the issue between Mitchell and Mpiti, however, Mopeli
alone of all the defendant's witnesses betrayed the
fact that, after Mitchell's appointment, the "people
of Patlong" began to regret the choice that had been
made, and turned towards the plaintiff.
This concluded the evidence. The court produced
a lengthy judgment, finding in favour of Mitchell and
wholly rejecting Mpiti's claim. The judgment opened
with a full rehearsal of the facts, and of the evidence
put in by both sides. It was accepted as common
cause that Potlako was never Tautona's wife, and it was
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stressed that the Sons of Sekake had rejected 'Mathabo's
claim for her son Sekake III. The court gave rather
sceptical attention to Goliath's evidence, and recalled
his relationship to Mpho. It rejected what it read
as his contention that a posthumously conceived child
had no rights of succession while still retaining
rights of inheritance. Having had the advantage of
actually hearing Goliath, the court may well be correct
in its reading, though, as has been noted, the record
could rather more easily be taken as stating that in
Goliath's view there was a crucial difference between
the child of kenelo and less regular issue. But it
certainly seems probable that Goliath, while wishing
to keep his foot in the door of his claim to high rank
in Basutoland, was reluctant to say anything that might
be interpreted as a challenge to the throne.
Mpiti's argument that 'Mantoetse could not have
been Tautona's wife since she was married for Potlako
was neatly turned on its head when the court read
'Mantoetse's testimony as indicating that precisely
because Potlako was not the wife of Tautona, she
('Mantoetse) could never have been married for her.
This was thus the second time that Mpiti had been hoist
with his own petard, the first being the occasion of
his argument about 'Mathabo's chieftainship before the
Paramount Chief's court in January 1955.
The main legal hurdle that confronted the court
was the argument based upon the proviso to Laws of
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Lerotholl (1946) section 2, which as noted before read
as follows:
"If a chief dies leaving no male issue the
chieftainship shall devolve upon the male
following according to the succession of
houses".
But the line of argument adopted was (as in the
Paramount Chief's Court) that nothing in the law
stipulated that a posthumously conceived child could
not assume his late pater's rights and duties. The
words "dies without leaving male issue" were thus
explicitly interpreted to exclude the case of kenelo.
The court went on to repeat its rejection of Goliath's
evidence on the law, and affirmed that "the law does
not divide a man's rights into two; in declaring him
a chief, it makes him an integral successor". This
was in fact somewhat to distort as well as to overstate
the point. Kpiti was not, naturally, arguing that
Mitchell could be chief but must lose the inheritance,
he was arguing that whatever happened to the inheritance
(and as far as Mpiti was concerned, Mitchell could keep
it) he should not be chief. Moreover, the law does
recognise that chieftainship rights and property rights
are separable for certain purposes (for example, a
deposed chief, or a chief who loses part of his chief¬
tainship rights as a result of a placing, does not lose
any of his estate); and there had already been evidence
in the case, and from the defendant's witnesses, that
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Tautona's masimo a lira (chieftainship fields) had been
differently disposed from his own "private" allocation
during "Mathabo's reign. But the court's point is
nevertheless well taken, in that if Mitchell was Tautona's
son by cattle he was his son in respect of chieftainship.
Since, then, it accepted 'Mantoetse's marriage and
Mitchell's legitimate if posthumous birth, it followed
that it rejected Mpiti's claim in toto.
Six months later Mpiti formally lodged an appeal to
the court of the Judicial Commissioner. His basic
argument was based on the Laws of lerotholi, but he
added some further and often subtle (if highly debatable)
points. He argued that by the time Mitchell was born,
Thabo was long dead, so that Sekake II (Mpiti's father)
was no longer regent to the then heir and could not
pass on rights to 'Mantoetse's child. Thabo's premature
death also explained why regency was not an issue between
'Mathabo and Sekake II: the chieftainess's reign did not
interrupt the succession. (Mpiti was right about this,
whatever may be said of the implications he deduced from
it. A chieftainess in her own right reigns till her
death, when the succession resumes its normal line.
The real issue is one of "vesting". If the right vests
unconditionally a morte of the (male) chief, then Sekake
II passed his right on to Mpiti. If it is simply
conditional vesting, then the successor is looked for
a morte of the chieftainess, so that other things being
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equal Mitchell would succeed; of course, Mpiti had the
auxiliary claim that "other things" were not equal,
since Mitchell was no son of Tautona, but that is another
point. The third possibility is vesting subject to
defeasance, viz., under a resolutive condition: the
succession vested in Sekake II but passed away from him
again on Mitchell's (presumed legitimate) birth. But
Mpiti's strength lay in the point that an installed chief
cannot lose his chieftainship by the subsequent birth
of even a lawful son, and since 'Mathabo's reign does
not interrupt the succession, the same right inheres in
the male line to which the right will eventually pass
on her death. This argument was countered by asserting
that the actual installation of a chief brings a new
factor into the situation; a chief cannot lose his right
to another after he has once been installed, but this
does not alter the case when he has not.) Mpiti was
bold enough to bring out into the open the question of
the Paramountcy, arguing that he was seeking to follow
the law that gave Griffith the succession to Letsie II
(see Chapter Two above). He went on to defend the view
that one child could succeed to an estate and another to
the chieftainship, arguing that in the absence of male
issue the proviso to section two passed the succession
to the junior house, though a posthumous child in a
senior house could still eat the personal estate of the
deceased in that house. finally, he returned to the
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point that had figured so strongly in the hearing, that
the cattle taken out to marry 'Mantoetse were the fruit
of fines taken out for Potlako's adultery and thus
invalidated the alleged marriage.
The Judicial Commissioner's judgment can be very
briefly considered. On 18th May 1959, Mr W.G.S.
Driver upheld the special court's judgment, mainly on
the grounds that "even though the kenela custom may be
a decadent custom, it is still practised occasionally"
and that in its terms Mitchell should succeed.
(This remark on "decadent custom" is referred to in
the excursus annexed to Chapter One: Custom and the
Courts.) The judgment of the court below was upheld
and the appeal dismissed.
It is at this point that the record stops, though
Mpiti did not abandon his case, and prepared himself
for an appeal to the High Court, and no doubt beyond.
Shortly after the Judicial Commissioner's hearing,
Mpiti Sekake was returned as a Member of the legislative
Council for Qacha's Nek. At the time, elections to
this body were indirect, being made by the District
Councils, which were elected under general male suffrage.
Nevertheless, this circumstance goes some way to validate
Mpiti's claim to popular support. He was elected as
a representative of the Basutoland Congress Party (B.C.P.),
the most radical of the political parties in the territory.
He subsequently broke away from the Congress in what he
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claimed to be a "leftward" direction; but this assertion
must be read in the light of the tortuous politics of
African nationalist movements in southern Africa in the
early and middle 1960*6 (see Halpern 1965; Hamnett 1966;
Weisfelder 1969) and neither adds to nor detracts from
the plausibility of his claim to popular support in
Patlong..
This completes the historical narrative, but there
are some features of the case as a whole that will repay
further discussion.
The first concerns the interplay between somewhat
abstract legal debate on the one hand and asseverations
of "family" support on the other. The narrative itself
has no doubt sufficiently revealed the sophistication
of the first of these aspects of the story, particularly
in the way in which the court, on two occasions, engaged
in some intellectual fencing with Mpiti that is wholly
typical of Sesotho debating skill. These passages of
arms also reveal a delicate awareness of the two
"moments" of juristic argument — the enunciation of
the "law" itself, and the determination of what this
implies for the decision in hand. Some constructive
and fruitful ambiguities are exploited here; thus, if
Potlako is agreed not to have been married to Tautona,
could 'Kantoetse have been married as a ngoetsi in
Potlako's house? Obviously not, claims Mpiti; and
argues that Mitchell is therefore not Tautona's son.
Obviously not, agrees 'Kantoetse; from which the court
concludes that she was not married for Potlako but was
a wife in her own right. The question of the cattle
(which, it will be remembered, were not necessarily
"cattle with hooves"), which formed a very important
part of Mpiti's first case, clearly revealed that
Tautona had (and the point was not really disputed)
behaved both immorally and illegally not only in robbing
Ntlama. of his wife but also in depriving him of his
damages (on one occasion probably in conscious collusion
with Potlako). But the court was able to sidestep
this issue, since it was never clearly ascertained
whether Tautona was simply at fault in not compensating
Ntlama (and here the moot point of whether cattle are
fines or damages arises), or whether the cattle were
not his at all. Where the cattle "without hooves"
are in the form of cash, the ambivalence is profound
enough to make it possible to evade a direct answer.
It appears, indeed, from both positive and negative
evidence not to be the case that bohali depends on
the actual identity of particular beasts (still less
on that of particular pound notes), though this question
of identity may be evidentially important as a, way of
ascertaining who it was that paid the "cattle" and
from which house they were taken out; it may be this
that misled the Protestant missionary quoted by
Leenhardt (I.eenhardt 1939; contra all available evidence
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and a private communication from Revd G.M. Setiloane
of 8th July 1969).
But the other side of the matter, which for reasons
of exposition was not treated in any detail in the
narrative, concerns the matter of "family" support.
The general discussion of family councils in Chapters
Two and Pour shows that in matters of succession and
inheritance, the most important criterion is that of
the "family" council and the decisions at which it
arrives. The "substantive rules" in Laws of Lerotholi
and elsewhere however do not constitute an "objective
law" to which recourse is had if a "private arrangement"
cannot be agreed upon by the lelapa, so much as a set
of customary principles which reflect and also inform
the internal deliberations of the council. Three
different elements can be analysed in this. Pirst of
all, there is the question of the "law" applicable; a
case in point concerns the validity of woman- or grave-
marriage, or of kenelo. Secondly, there is the question
of fact, which consists in identifying the person of
the heir; in most cases, though certainly not in all,
this is a straightforward matter, but it is nevertheless
up to the lelapa to come to a decision and present the
heir, or heir and successor, of the deceased. Thirdly,
however, there is the question which in Western courts
would not be considered one of either law or fact (in
the relevant sense), namely, whom it is that the lelapa
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wish to advance or to put down. These are, of course,
analytical aspects, and in the actual decision, it
may be impossible, even pointless, to try to disentangle
them. It is quite clear, for instance, that the
greater part of the lelapa were opposed to 'Mathabo's
attempted coup on behalf of Sekake III, but they
objected rather on the grounds that there was already
an available heir, in the person of Mitchell whom she
could have adopted, than because the form of marriage
between herself and Mpho was illegal. It is also
quite clear, as the narrative has revealed, that many
in the lelapa were hostile to Mpiti and produced reasons
for considering him to be an unsuitable person to have
as chief: in the years 1950-1955, he had been convicted
on three charges (one of Stock Theft, one of Assault,
and one of Forgery and Uttering); he lived in a beer-
hall, and was married to a Griqua. The point is that
had the family considered Mitchell to be unsuitable,
and Mpiti to be a good candidate, there was sufficient
ambiguity in the law to have enabled them to make the
opposite choice, and to do so in a manner that legitima¬
ted their decision in legal terms. By this is meant
not simply that they could show that they had a
"discretion" in the matter — making their decision an
"act in the law" — but rather that they could assert
a direct legal authority for the specific choice of
the emergent candidate — an "act of the law" (Salmond
1947: 347 f.).
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Nevertheless, the degree and nature of the support
for each candidate is in itself a matter of great
importance, and this is the second of the features of
the case that deserves some expansion. Pour particular
levels of lineage depth emerge in the case, defined by-
reference to the Sons of Sehapa, the Sons of Sekake,
the Sons of Makoae and the Sons of Mosothoane. Sehapa
is the person designated as Sekake I on the accompanying
genealogical diagram (fig. 1). He was the son of an
earlier Sekake, who was the son of Makoae, who was the
son of Mosothoane. The most .important levels were the
second, the Sons of Sekake, and the fourth, the Sons of
Mosothoane. The reason for the relative unimportance
of the Sons of Makoae is obscure, but two probable
factors can be identified, one being the possible
failure of some of Makoae's junior houses to continue
through lack of issue, and the other being the (no doubt
consequential) adoption of some of the Sons of Sekake
into the original house of Makoae. Thus, Kali (a main
witness for Mitchell) though, in order of families,
from the sixth house of Sekake, described himself as
Kali Makoae and conducted himself as a senior member
of the Patlong chieftainship. He was acting chief
after 'Mathabo's death, took a leading role in the
meetings of the family, and was one of the four members
of the family to hold a major headmanship in the ward
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of Patlong (at Kaboloka). The other major headmen
in Patlong were (besides Mpiti himself at Thabana-
Ts'ooana), first, Khanyetsi Nalefane, headman of Thaba-
Chitja, of Sekake's first house and son of Sehapa
(Sekake I's) 's younger brother in that house, and
secondly, Makoko Sehapa, heir of Sehapa's second house,
who was headman at Qhoalinyane and was succeeded by
his son Mopeli Makoko, also a figure in the dispute.
These relationships are shown in fig. 2.
Mosothoane generated three houses, of which the
first was the house of Makoae, the second the house
of Phatela, and the third the house of Mpiti. Both
these major segments figured prominently in the current
dispute, it being notable that the successor of Phatela's
first house was Mpiti's most powerful supporter.
These relationships are shown in fig. 3. In the house
of Phatela, Phalo is a major headman at Sekitsing ha
Phalo, and Motloang at Sekitsing and litsoeneng.
These are both in the district of Mohale's Hoek, subject
(directly) to the Principal Chief of Phamong. In the
house of Mpiti Mosothoane, Sejanamane is a headman at
Malimong, and his senior brother Lisebo was his senior
chief at Pheellong, where he was followed by his widow
•Mants'ebo Seisa, both wards being in Qacha's Nek.
The ward of Pheellong is directly subject to the
Principal Chief.
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The major decisions, sketched in the preceding
narrative, were the work of the Sons of Mosothoane„
or such of them as were present at the meetings-
Questions of seniority arose, but were not definitively
resolved- Kali declared that he had paid little
attention to questions of seniority at the family
meetings- This remark, which he repeated and insisted
on, is significant of the ambiguities that perplexed
the decision-making body at the various stages in the
dispute. These ambiguities are developed, particularly
in relation to the higher chieftainship, in Chapter
Two, where they are conceptualised in terms of a
"retrospective" and a "circumspective" principle of
seniority reckoning (and see Hamnett 1965). In the
present case, this takes the form of whether a relatively
junior son of the house of Sekake is to be ranked senior
to a senior son in the house of Phatela — whether,
for example, Kali Makoae or Malefane Sekake is senior
to Phalo. At a lower level of segmentation, a similar
ambiguity surrounds the ranking of Orpen Maseru to
Malefane or Khanyetsi, of Malefane to Makoko, and of
Kakoko to Sekake II. Phalo declares his seniority by
reading his position as heir to the senior house in
the major lineage next in seniority to Makoae; Kali
however (who partly bases his claim also on his years)
has been promoted within the Sons of Sekake, who are
the senior segment of the whole Mosothoane lineage-
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Malefane, and his son Khanyetsi, come from the first
house of Sekake Makoae, but Malefane was the junior son
of that house; but precisely as junior son, he was
full rangoane (father's brother) to Tautona, Sekake II
and Makoko, and in that capacity a person of particular
authority within the house of Sehapa after his elder
brother's death. But Malefane's son is only a junior
brother (patrilateral parallel cousin) to Makoko, and
the latter, as head of Sehapa's second house, played
(as did Mopeli) a leading role in the history of the
case.
As has been observed, Kali was reluctant to commit
himself on general questions of seniority (his own
position being rather difficult to account for in terms
of any one principle) and his reluctance was shared in
various ways by other witnesses. There was a general
tendency to stall or hedge when they were asked how
many of the Sons of Kosothoane were present on any
occasion, how many were considered to make up a
satisfactory number, how the major segments aligned
themselves in decision-making, and how seniority was
defined.
One way of arriving at a general estimate of the
constitution of the "family" starts from the assumption
that when witnesses recite the names of persons who
were present at a meeting or who took a part in a
decision, they will recall and mention the most "important"
of the participants* Witnesses did in fact offer a
list of names (from three to about fifteen), and
usually added some such phrase as "and many others".
It is true that some of the witnesses were old and
their memories might have been failing, but nonetheless
there is sufficient consistency in the names recited
to suggest that any erratic performances cancelled
each other out and that the principal actors were
recalled quite faithfully. It must also be remembered
that some people who were major figures in earlier
stages of the dispute were dead in 1952 (particularly
Sekake II), so that their "score" in terms of mentions
is somewhat low. In other cases, however, a son or
brother carried on in the place of an infirm or deceased
man, and here the two voices speak as one. This was
obviously not the case with Sekake II, whose son was
of course the plaintiff. In addition to "mentions"
by witnesses, a score can be recorded for Sons of
Mosothoane who appeared as witnesses in the case, and
for those that the various Basotho courts singled out
as being seniors in the family. On this basis, some
assessment can be reached.
If the "mentions" are summed (as defined: casual
references and the mere repetition of a name in a single
incident are excluded), they yield a total of one
hundred and fifty-seven for the Sons of Mosothoane, the
maximal lineage (Mpiti Sekake and Mitchell Tautona are
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not counted, and nor are the wives of Tautona). Some
difficulty is presented hy the somewhat elusive Sons of
Makoae, but if the Posholi group is tentatively assumed
to belong to this segment, then one hundred and seventeen
mentions are "scored". The Sons of Sekake have one
hundred and five mentions, and the Sons of Sehapa have
thirty-eight.




C. Sons of Makoae (?) (four persons)
1st house SONS OP SEKAKE 105




POSHOLI 1 12 117
A. Sons of Sehapa (four persons)
1st house SEKAKE II 6
2nd house MAKOKO 7 ) gp
MOPELI 15 )
SHAKHAHE 10
B. Sons of Sekake (ten persons)















9th house HTEPE 8











D. Sons of Mosothoane (five persons)
1st house SOWS OP MABOAE 117





? ? MPOEA PHATELA 1
3rd house SEJAHAMANE
hPHAHAMA MPITI 6 40 157
The Sons of Sehapa thus account for about a quarter
of the mentions, the Sons of Sekake for about two-thirds,
and those sons of Mosothoane who emerged from the junior
(i.e., non-Makoae) houses for about a quarter. It is
clear, therefore, that the Sons of Sekake constituted
much the largest bloc, not only in terms of mentions but
also of numbers of persons (fourteen out of twenty-three).
Phalo Phatela, however, the head of Mosothoane's second
house, is a clear exception to this, as is Motloang
Phatela from Phatela's second house. Moreover, other
sons of Mosthoane were not excluded (Sejanamane Mphahama
Mpiti is mentioned a few times, and was a witness for
the defendants, and other sons of Phatela are remembered
and named by various witnesses on both sides). One
particular advantage that attached to the Sons of Sekake
was that they were so numerous. Sekake had eleven
houses, only two of which failed to produce male issue.
Moreover, they tended to have the advantage of living
either on the spot or in the general area of Patlong.
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In the case "before the special court, the two
"family" witnesses for the plaintiff were Mpiti himself
and Phalo Phatela. The defendants called Mitchell,
Kali, Molaoli (6th house of Sekake, junior to Kali),
Matsepe (10th house of Sekake), Ntepe (9th house of
Sekake), Motloang Phatela (junior to Phalo), Sejanamane
(a junior in the house of Mpiti Mosothoane), and Mopeli
Makoko, from Sehapa Sekake's second house. Mpiti
claimed, on appeal, that the defendants' witnesses were
all juniors. He chose to operate with a highly
"retrospective" frame of reference, since this alone
would enable the support that he derived from Phalo
Phatela to be reckoned as sufficiently "senior", on its
own, to avail against the seven family witnesses that
have been mentioned as supporting his rival. But (at
least from one point of view) Mpiti's whole case was
"retrospective", in that it depended on the view that
on Tautona's death, the line of succession should be
found by going up to Sekake I and then down again,
through Sekake II. Furthermore, Mpiti founded his
case, for obvious reasons, upon an assertion of the
strictness of the law governing chieftainship succession,
as against the characteristically "circumspective" view
that it is, up to a point, open to a chief to start the
process of calculating seniority afresh and to take
into account factors other than those of abstract right
in selecting an incumbent to a chieftainship. Never¬
theless, Mpiti was ready, of course, to derive what
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support he could from the alternative argument that
the defendants' hacking came from junior lines, albeit
within the senior segment of the house.
The final aspect of the case to be considered is
that of the headmanships within the ward of Patlong
itself. It will be seen that (leaving aside the some¬
what anomalous case of Kali's ward at Kaboloka) the
structure of the ward is contained in the first four
houses at the lowest levels of fig. 1: Tautona/Mitchell,
Sekake II/Mpiti, Makoko/Mopeli, and Malefane/Khanyetsi.
The first and last of these are distributed, therefore,
between the two sons of Sekake Makoae's first house,
the second son being naturally subordinated to the first.
The third of them represents the caretaking allocated
to Sehapa's second house, and the second that allocated
to Teutons's younger brother within Sehapa's first house.
Thereafter, the succession has followed from father to
son and will (most probably) so continue. This means
that junior sons will be edged out of the chiefly
system, if minor caretakings cannot be found for them
within the existing wards; but this latter provision
is possible only within certain limits, since once a
"jurisdictional plenum" has been reached, one of two
results must follow: either the new chief acts as his
predecessor did, and "circumscriptively" advances his
own immediate agnates (in which case the former incumbents,
from parallel but in lineage terms now junior lines, are
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extruded); or else (on the pattern of the "cardinal
lines" deriving from Moshoeshoe) the pattern of lineage
seniority once set up is left intact, in which case
the immediate agnates of any given chief, with the
exception of his heir, relapse into commoner status.
Mitchell's younger brothers in the same house, in fact,
emerged as very obscure figures in the story of this
dispute. It has taken Patlong some time to reach this
position, and it may not quite have come to the end of
the road yet. This is due to the coincidence of two
factors: the existence of a jurisdictional void in
Qacha's Nek until the end of the last century, combined
with the progressive settlement of the Orange River
valley, on the southern edge of which Patlong lies.
The significance of this lies in the fact that it is not
only, or even so much, land area that sets a limit on
jurisdiction as numbers of persons as potential subjects.
While there is nothing to be gained in becoming "chief"
of an uninhabited rock-face, on the other hand if
settlement is dense, as in relative terms it is in the
Orange Valley, many jurisdictions can be supported.
But once even this limit has been reached, a former
chiefly family will be left with only one installed
successor. The junior sons may act as counsellors or
as village liphala, but their junior sons will cease to
be even that. Until recently, this process of progres¬
sive detrioration was accelerated by the placing system,
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referred to in Chapters Two and Three, which had the
effect of depressing all subordinate levels whenever
a senior chief was placed. But even now that disruptive
placings have virtually ceased, there is little room
left for the continued expansion of chieftainship, and
it remains to be seen how Lesotho and its chiefs will
cope with the situation that results. It is clear,
however, that chieftainship, in the form that it has
taken in the twentieth century, was in terms of its
structural processes an intrinsically transitional
institution, well adapted for the purposes of expansion
and the progressive settlement of unoccupied or
conquered areas, but enmeshed in contradictions once
such development had come to an end. The closure of
the political frontiers in the last third of the
nineteenth century walled up the only avenue of escape
(Atmore 1969: 300 f.), though it was only with the
passing of several generations that pressures built up
sufficiently to precipitate the attempts of the
colonial government to control the situation in 1938
(see Chapters Two and Seven). Such a situation as
that of Patlong invites the possibility of an alternative,
indigenous solution in the future.
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